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Abstract 
This thesis, a genealogy of war as a problem of international politics, pursues two lines 
of inquiry.  
On the one hand, the thesis offers a genealogy of war’s becoming a problem to enable 
a critique of how war is presently constituted as problematic. The thesis analyzes the 
emergence of war as an object of empirical knowledge and practical action in four 
historical examples: a commission of inquiry into the Balkan Wars (1912-14), debates 
between international jurists in the aftermaths of the Franco-German War (1871-73) 
and the First World War (1920), and the post-Second World War International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East (1946-48). This genealogical analysis produces manifold 
empirical materials for getting to work on our contemporary ways of knowing about 
and acting upon war. Specifically, it points to these ways’ reliance on our being 
external to the problem of war.  
On the other hand, the thesis undertakes a conceptual and practical re-doing of 
genealogy. In the spirit of Foucault’s methodological conduct, the thesis foregoes 
genealogy as a pre-specified method. Instead, it constructs genealogy over the course 
of the research process: it conceptualizes genealogy as history/critique, 
problematization, and critical praxis, and it experiments with its own practices and 
ways of knowing. Understood and practiced in this way, genealogy pursues and 
actively tries to alter its entanglement with the problems that it studies. 
The thesis contributes to various International Relations (IR) literatures. To research 
on war as an object of knowledge and action, the thesis adds new historical insights 
and suggests a broadened critical outlook. To discussions about critical methods, the 
thesis contributes a historical, reflexive, and practical take on methods’ politicality and 
criticality. Finally, the thesis also makes a case for reconsidering IR’s assumptions 
about the problem of war and our capacity for knowing about and addressing it.  
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It is a very hot summer day. I am sitting in Hörsaal 21, one of the University of 
Tübingen’s largest lecture halls. The room is packed – there must be at least two 
hundred people in here, maybe more. All of us are here to sit an exam. To be admitted 
to the study of political science, we must prove what they call our Studierfähigkeit, our 
ability to study.  
We are told that we have sixty minutes, and we are each given a sheet of paper. It 
reads: “Before the North-South Commission, Willy Brandt said: ‘He who wants to ban 
war must also ban mass poverty.’ Discuss.”1  
For a moment, my mind goes blank. Then, I begin to write: “To understand the 
relationship between war and mass poverty, we must start by defining both 
phenomena.”   
 
																																																						





As students of International Relations (IR), we are told that the study of war and peace 
is one of our discipline’s foremost purposes. In the introductory chapter of any of IR’s 
plentiful stock of textbooks1, we are likely to learn as much: that “[t]he study of 
international relations has classically focused on the analysis of the causes of war and 
the conditions of peace,” for instance, and that the “[s]tudy of the causes of war 
continues to motivate International Relations (IR) scholars and students even now.”2 
In my university library’s copy of this particular textbook, a previous reader has 
underlined this last sentence, indicating that it gave them pause.  
Entangled with the study of war comes a question, however: how do we know what 
we know about war? On this issue, the afore-cited textbook tells us that the question 
of “whether or not International Relations can be, or should be, a form of inquiry based 
upon scientific principles” has always “cut across and underpinned” IR debates, 
including the debate about “the likelihood that the causes of war might be 
ameliorated.”3 Many in IR answer this “science question” in the affirmative.4 As but 
																																																						
1 For a discussion of the usage of IR textbooks as primary sources, cf. Benjamin de Carvalho, Halvard 
Leira, John M. Hobson, “The Big Bangs of IR: The Myths That Your Teachers Still Tell You about 1648 
and 1919,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 39, no. 3 (2011), 735-758, at 737f. 
2 Steve Smith, “Introduction: Diversity and Disciplinarity in International Relations Theory,” in Tim 
Dunne, Milja Kurki, Steve Smith (eds.), International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 2010), 1-12, at 2. Other introductory textbooks tell the same story. 
Booth and Erkine, for example, explain that in “the ‘real world’ of international relations […] the 
stakes are high” due not least to the ever-looming “prospect of war” (Ken Booth, Toni Erskine, 
“Introduction: The Argumentative Discipline,” in Ken Booth, Toni Erskine (eds.), International 
Relations Theory Today (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2nd ed., 2016), 1-19, at 2). Even a textbook that 
seeks to introduce its readers to the study of international politics in a different way does so by means 
of the question “Why are there wars?” (Jenny Edkins, Maja Zehfuss, “Introduction,” in Jenny Edkins, 
Maja Zehfuss (eds.), Global Politics: A New Introduction (London, UK: Routledge, 2009), 1-19). 
3 Milja Kurki, Colin Wight, “International Relations and Social Science,” in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, 
Steve Smith (eds.), International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2nd ed., 2010), 13-33, at 16f.  
4 On “the science question in IR,” cf. Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry in International 
Relations: Philosophy of science and its implications for the studdy of world politics (London, UK: Routledge, 
2011), at 3ff. See also Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, “Must International Studies Be A Science?,” 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 43, no. 3 (2015), 946-965, as well as responses. 
 
	 3 
one example, consider the so-called Correlates of War Project: founded in the 1960s 
and still ongoing today, the project’s “original and continuing goal has been the 
systematic accumulation of scientific knowledge about war.”5 Others, however, 
strongly disagree. They point out that the idea of a “science” of IR implies a mistaken 
ideal of objectivity and an undue separation of the factual from the normative6, and 
that IR’s purportedly “scientific” study of war occludes the violences of sovereignty 
and the nation-state.7 While commentators are split over the exact number of positions 
that IR scholars have taken with regard to the question of “how we know what we 
claim to know” about international politics in general and about war in particular8, 
this question thus constitutes a “main dividing line” within the discipline.9 
Entangled with these different stances on knowledge about war, in turn, comes the 
imperative to take action.10 It is at this point, at the very latest, that we are introduced 
to IR’s history, or more precisely to how, in 1919 and in reaction to the First World 
War, the founding of the allegedly first Department of International Politics at the 
University College of Wales in Aberystwyth marked the birth of the discipline.11 In a 
																																																						
5 Correlates of War Project, “History,” http://www.correlatesofwar.org/history (last accessed 12 
October 2018). On the project’s “discipline-stabilizing function,” cf. Duncan Bell, “Writing the World: 
Disciplinary History and Beyond,” International Affairs 85, no. 1 (2009), 3-22, at 20. 
6 Cf. Jenny Edkins, Maja Zehfuss, “Introduction,” 20; Christian Reus-Smit, Duncan Snidal, “Between 
Utopia and Reality: The Practical Discourses of International Relations,” in Christian Reus-Smit, 
Duncan Snidal (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Relations (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 3-39, at 16ff.  
7 Cf. Rosemary Shinko, “Agnostic Peace: A Postmodern Reading,” Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies 36, no. 3 (2008), 473-491, at 474. For examples, see Richard K. Ashley, “Living on Border Lines: 
Man, Postructuralism, and War,” in James Der Derian, Michael Shapiro (eds.), International/Intertextual 
Relations (New York, NY: Lexington Books, 1989), 259-321; David Campbell, Michael Dillon (eds.), The 
Political Subject of Violence (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1993). 
8 Smith, “Introduction,” 5. In Martin Hollis and Steve Smith’s account, there are two principal 
positions – explanation and understanding (Martin Hollis, Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding 
International Relations (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1990)). Jackson, by contrast, sees two 
dividing lines and proposes four principal positions: neopositivism, critical realism, analyticism, and 
reflexivity (Jackson, Conduct of Inquiry).  
9 Smith, “Introduction,” 5. 
10 Booth and Erskine, for instance, immediately follow up on their discussion of IR’s different ways of 
knowing with the question “How should we act?” (Booth, Erskine, “Introduction,” 3, italics in original). 
11 Cf. John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens, “Introduction: from international politics to world 
politics,” in John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics: An 
Introduction to International Relations (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014, 6th ed.), 1-14, at 3; 
Booth, Erskine, “Introduction,” 1; Kurki, Wight, “International Relations,” 17. For an early example, 
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particularly thorough account of this historical moment, Martin Hollis and Steve Smith 
argue that “[t]he subject of International Relations […] bore the birthmarks of its 
origins”: as “the imprint of the First World War […] stamped the survivors with a 
strong conviction that such a war must never happen again […] International Relations 
had to be concerned with devising ways to prevent such wars from occurring.”12 In 
short, IR’s inception in the aftermath of the First World War meant that “[t]he subject 
had a mission.”13 
Of course, these ideas about how and why we study war are part of the stories we in 
IR tell ourselves about ourselves to explain who we are and what we do: they are not 
objective facts, but function as “disciplinary mythologies” which normalize and 
legitimize our conduct of inquiry.14 From this perspective, the history of IR’s 
foundational moment rendered in the previous paragraph becomes “[t]he myth of 
1919.”15 This myth, it has been argued, has “three main elements” to it: a precise date 
of birth, a first great debate (the one which, famously, idealism lost to realism), and a 
belief that IR was founded “to solve the problem of war.”16 Against this disciplinary 
lore of the “epistemological big bang” of 191917, revisionist scholarship has lodged a 
number of objections. Accordingly, the myth of 1919 is not only historically inaccurate 
– questions of international politics had been studied academically long before the 
First World War and its aftermath18, and there was a far greater diversity of positions 
																																																						
see Brian Porter (ed.), The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics, 1919-1969 (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 1972).  
12 Hollis, Smith, Explaining and Understanding, 18f. 
13 Ibid., 19. 
14 Bell, “Writing the World,” 5; cf. de Carvalho et al., “The Big Bangs of IR,” 737; Brian C. Schmidt, “On 
the History and Historiography of International Relations,” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, Beth 
A. Simmons (eds.), Handbook of International Relations (London, UK: SAGE, 2002), 1-22; Vineet Thakur, 
Alexander E. Davis, Peter Vale, “Imperial Mission, ‘Scientific’ Method: an Alternative Account of the 
Origins of IR,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 46, no. 1 (2017), 3-23. On myth and IR, see 
also Berit Bliesemann de Guevara (ed.), Myth and Narrative in International Politics: Interpretive 
Approaches to the Study of IR (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). 
15 De Carvalho et al., “The Big Bangs of IR.” 
16 Ibid., 745f; cf. Bell, “Writing the World,” 6. 
17 De Carvalho et al., “The Big Bangs of IR,” 745. 
18 Cf. Brian C. Schmidt, The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998). 
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on these questions than the notion of a debate between idealism and realism suggests19 
– but also politically effective. Specifically, the myth of 1919 works to privilege certain 
approaches to the study of international politics at the expense of others, as well as to 
render invisible the part that Eurocentrism, imperialism, and racism have played in 
the becoming of the discipline of IR and its ways of knowing.20  
What, however, about the defining role that the problem of war has played for IR? 
Arguably, the assumption that war constituted the key problem for the study of 
international relations helped to aggrandize certain theories, epistemologies, and 
methodologies whilst debasing others: to the extent that it boosted approaches which 
could lay claim to providing the best analytical tools for making sense of the 
phenomenon of war, such as realism and positivism, it simultaneously diminished the 
analytical purchase of approaches which, within the story of IR’s foundation in 1919, 
did not seem to come off so well.21 More recently, historians of the discipline have also 
suggested that IR in fact emerged not (only) from the aftermath of the First World War, 
but (also) from the practice of colonial administration.22 Yet overall, there has been 
relatively little critical and/or historical attention to what we might call “the problem 
of war itself”: by and large, we in IR still seem to take for granted that war constitutes 
an analytical object that we can know about and thereby act upon. 
Against this background, this thesis, a genealogy of war as a problem of international 
politics, pursues two key lines of inquiry. First, by means of a history of war’s 
becoming an object of empirical knowledge and practical action, the thesis seeks to 
clarify, complicate, and enable further critical work on our ways of knowing and 
																																																						
19 Cf. Lucian M. Ashworth, “Where are the idealists in interwar International Relations?,” Review of 
International Studies 32, no. 2 (2006), 291-308; Brian C. Schmidt, “Lessons from the Past: Reassessing the 
Interwar Disciplinary History of International Relations,” International Studies Quarterly 42, no. 3 
(2002), 433-459. 
20 Cf. de Carvalho et al., “The Big Bangs of IR,” 737; see also John Hobson, The Eurocentric Conception of 
World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760-2010 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2012); Thakur et al., “Imperial Mision”; Robert Vitalis, White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth 
of American International Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2017). 
21 Cf. Smith, “Introduction,” 4f. 
22 Cf. Patricia Owens, “Women and the History of International Thought,” International Studies 
Quarterly 62, no. 3 (2018), 467-481; Thakur et al., “Imperial Mission”; Vitalis, White World Order. 
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addressing the problem of war. Secondly, to demonstrate what this critical work could 
consist in, the thesis reflects upon and experiments with its own way of knowing, 
genealogy. In what follows, I set out the two central problems with which the thesis 
grapples, war and knowledge, discuss the various literatures which provide the 
context for my work on these problems, provide a summary of the research question 
and my answers to it, and offer a plan of the thesis.  
 
A genealogical approach to war as an object of knowledge and action 
“[W]ar,” Michael Walzer writes, “is a social creation”: “[w]hat is war and what is not-
war is in fact something that people decide.”23 If this is so, then whether and how war 
constitutes a problem is also not a given, but something conjectured and concluded by 
us. Yet for a very long time, this conjecture had not been made. As Martin Ceadel 
points out, “[i]n medieval and early modern Europe people had taken for granted that 
they could do nothing to limit the incidence of war.”24 How, then, did we come to think 
of war as a problem that we could take action upon? And what are the repercussions 
of the history of war’s becoming problematic for our contemporary ways of knowing 
and addressing war? To develop answers to these questions is the first of this thesis’ 
two central aims.   
To pursue this aim, I undertake a genealogy of war as a problem of international 
politics: I analyze the history of war’s becoming an object of empirical knowledge and 
practical action in order to develop a critique of the problem of war’s present 
constitution. My contention is that war has not always been such an object, and 
furthermore, that a history of how it became empirically knowable and practically 
addressable can offer not only insights into the limits of our contemporary ways of 
rendering war problematic, but also materials for getting to work on these limits. In 
																																																						
23 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York, NY: 
Basic Books, 2006), at 24. 
24 Martin Ceadel, The Origins of War Prevention: The British Peace Movement and International Relations, 
1730-1854 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1996), at 1. 
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this way, the history of the problem of war that this thesis presents contributes to a 
critique of our present ways of knowing about and taking action towards war.  
Specifically, my genealogical attention is fixated on ideas and practices which were 
advanced in the aftermath of war and aimed at preventing its recurrence. My interest 
in the particular problem posed by the prevention of war’s recurrence arises against 
the backdrop of a belief which, contemporarily, is widely held both in the discipline of 
IR and in international post-conflict politics: namely, that the production of empirical 
knowledge about past war can contribute to the prevention of future war. As 
genealogy’s particular strength lies in putting into question that which we commonly 
take for granted, my focus in this thesis is on the historical emergence of this nowadays 
taken for granted belief and some of its attendant practices. 
The thesis inquires into how this connection between knowledge about and action 
against war is configured in the contemporary politics of transitional justice as well as 
into how it was forged in the work of four historical “post-war initiatives” (for lack of 
a better term): a group of international jurists who, in the aftermath of the Franco-
German War, debated the prospects of an international judicial institution to prosecute 
and try violations of the rules of war (1870-1872); a commission of inquiry whose 
members investigated the Balkan Wars (1912-1914); a panel of jurists who, in reaction 
to the First World War, were tasked with designing an international court of justice 
(1920); and finally, the post-Second World War efforts at criminalizing war (1945-
1948). In analyzing these four initiatives, I focus on formulations of war as a practical 
problem, on institutional forms and epistemic practices that made war into an object 
of knowledge, and on the kinds of epistemically, ethically, and politically capable 
subjects that these formulations, forms, and practices presupposed and (re-)produced. 
The historical analysis my thesis offers is no disciplinary history, but the history of a 
problem.25 As a problem of international politics, war has a history which is both 
																																																						
25 On the confines of disciplinary history writing and the imperative to broaden the scope of histories 
of the study of international politics, cf. Bell, “Writing the World,” 11. 
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longer and broader than a focus on IR as a discipline could capture. Therefore, while 
my curiosity about the problem of war certainly owes to my background in IR, this 
same curiosity demands that in charting the thesis’ terrain, I have to be concerned less 
with any disciplinary (pre-)history than with identifying some of the many locales in 
which it became conceivable to strive to know about and take action against war.  
Nonetheless, I hope that the questions the thesis pursues with regard to the problem 
of war will be of interest to scholars of IR – not least insofar as the thesis’ historical 
investigations serve a particular critical purpose. As Colin Koopman argues, 
genealogies are historical analyses of the preconditions and productive effects of our 
ways of knowing and doing that are critical insofar as they provide empirical materials 
which enable us to identify and get to work on the limits and constitutive exclusions 
of these ways of ours.26 In this regard, this thesis not only offers a myriad of materials 
concerning the emergence of war as an object of knowledge and action, but also 
develops an argument about one particularly vexing limit to our contemporary ways 
of problematizing war: namely that these ways, insofar as they presume for us to know 
about and act upon war from without, rely on our being external to the problem of 
war and therefore leave us ill-equipped to gain insight into and seek to change our 
implication in this problem. To those whose scholarly and disciplinary self-
identification relies on an aspiration to ameliorating or even solving the problem of 
war, the thesis thus extends an invitation to reconsider and perhaps begin to rework 
the ways in which they have so far sought to do so.  
In addition, as my analysis and argument draw on several more specific literatures to 
be found both in IR and in neighbouring disciplines, the historical findings and critical 
implications of this thesis’ genealogy of the problem of war also make a number of 
contributions to these more specialized discussions.  
																																																						
26 This particular understanding of genealogy will be discussed at length throughout the thesis. For a 
major statement on genealogy thus conceived, cf. Colin Koopman, Genealogy as Critique: Foucault and 
the Problems of Modernity (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2013).  
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While generally, discussion of “war” in quotation marks, or war as an object of thought 
and action27, has been surprisingly sparse in IR28, there are a few notable exceptions. 
For instance, there is Martin Ceadel’s history of how, during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, “fatalism” – a view that took for granted war as a “fact of life” – 
gave way to the idea of war as problematic, and specifically of war as a problem that 
could be addressed, indeed prevented by an (only just emerging) civil society.29 Then, 
there is Jens Bartelson’s historical ontology of the waxing and waning of “ontogenetic 
war” – the idea that war is productive of political order – from the early seventeenth 
until the late nineteenth century, which analyzes the history of this idea’s 
“performative consequences” in order to challenge its workings in our present 
moment.30 And as yet another example, there is Maja Zehfuss’ analysis and critique of 
the interrelationship between the notion of “ethical war” – the idea that war is or can 
be good – and the contemporary conduct of Western warfare.31 
The genealogy of the problem of war which I develop in this thesis overlaps with these 
analyses of fatalism, ontogenetic war, and ethical war in a number of ways. Like 
Ceadel, I study the history of war’s becoming a preventable problem, and like Ceadel 
and Zehfuss, I study “war” as it is produced by the actions of people trying to 
practically grapple with it. Like Bartelson, furthermore, I consider the idea of “war” as 
a productive historical force without, however, ascribing to this idea myself. Finally, 
like Bartelson and Zehfuss, I undertake my research to develop a critique of our ways 
of thinking about and relating to war: like Bartelson, I inquire into how war has been 
thought about in the past in order to recognize the limits of our contemporary ways of 
																																																						
27 For the distinction between war and “war,” cf. Astrid H. M. Nordin and Dan Öberg, “Targeting the 
Ontology of War: From Clausewitz to Baudrillard,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 43, no. 2 
(2015), 392-410, at 394. In this thesis, I am concerned solely with “war” as an object of our thinking and 
doing – yet for the ease of reading, I do not put it in quotation marks unless if this is necessary to 
avoid misunderstandings.  
28 Cf. Antoine Bousquet, “The Concept of War in World Politics,” in Berenskoetter, Felix (ed.), Concepts 
in World Politics (London, UK: SAGE, 2016), 91-106.  
29 Martin Ceadel, The Origins of War Prevention. On war as a “fact of life,” cf. Holsti apud Ceadel, ibid., 4. 
30 Jens Bartelson, War and International Thought (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
On the notion of “performative consequences,” cf. ibid., 15. 
31 Maja Zehfuss, War and the Politics of Ethics (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2018). 
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thinking; and like Zehfuss, I contend that we ought to reflect on and alter our ways of 
bearing responsibility for war. 
In the end, however, my prime concern in this thesis is not with fatalism, ontogenetic 
war, or ethical war, but with war as a problem of empirical knowledge and practical 
action. Therefore, the research I present in this thesis differs from and adds to Ceadel’s, 
Bartelson’s, and Zehfuss’ works in a number of central aspects. On the one hand, there 
are differences in my understanding and implementation of history. Generally, I take 
up the chronological thread from where Ceadel and Bartelson leave it off roughly in 
the middle of the nineteenth century and spin it to the middle of the twentieth. More 
particularly, I do not share Ceadel’s ambition to cover a historical period broadly and 
comprehensively.32 Rather, I opt for a focus on a handful of historical examples, which 
I use to ask more precisely defined and, or so I hope, more acute questions about the 
history of our present ways of rendering war problematic. Within these historical 
examples, however, I take a broader approach. First, and unlike Bartelson’s, my 
analysis combines the study of war as an object of thought with an inquiry into the 
practices and institutional forms through which war was rendered knowable and 
actionable. Secondly, insofar as I do study ideas of war, my gaze is not fixated on a 
particular view of war in the way that Zehfuss and Bartelson’s are. Instead, the 
genealogy developed in this thesis is principally open to any understanding of war 
raised in the primary sources, and it thereby produces insights not only into a number 
of different formulations of war as productive-yet-problematic, but also into how these 
formulations were replaced by understandings of war as a rationally soluble problem. 
In sum, my historical analysis of the emergence of the problem of war thus contributes 
to existing research in IR through focusing on a period of time as well as on a number 
of details of this emergence which have so far received relatively little attention. 
On the other hand, my thesis also differs from the aforecited authors in its 
understanding and practice of critique. For one, the targets of Bartelson’s critique are 
																																																						
32 Cf. Ceadel, Origins of War Prevention, 17f. 
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not only those contemporary political forces who mobilize an ontogenetic view of war 
to justify military interventions, but also the proponents of critical war studies33: 
highlighting the “looping effects” through which our concepts enable and constrain 
our thinking34, Bartelson charges this latter group with perpetuating a concept of war 
that limits our understanding of the emergence of the political to “violent 
imaginaries.”35 While I agree with Bartelson’s diagnosis, in this thesis I seek to broaden 
the reflexive scope of historically-based critique. To this end, and as I will begin to 
outline in the following section of this introduction, genealogy as history/critique 
addresses not only our analytical concepts and their presuppositions, but also our 
practices and ways of knowing. Meanwhile, Zehfuss’ critique is directed not only 
against those who take decisions about going to war, but also against the proponents 
of just war theory who, by “[allowing] us to think that if only the destruction could be 
reduced or ideally eliminated, war would be just fine,” in fact enable war and its 
violences.36 To Zehfuss’ finding that, in the problem of war’s contemporary 
constitution, “war arrives from what is imagined as the outside,”37 my thesis adds a 
number of insights about the historical antecedents of our present situation. Thereby, 
the genealogy I develop in this thesis ultimately goes beyond Zehfuss’ critique insofar 
as it calls to account not only just war theorists, but anyone engaged in the analysis of 
war. In sum, I concur with Bartelson and Zehfuss that we in IR would do well to forego 
further theorization of war until we have achieved a better understanding of how 
existing theories enable and constrain our ability to address war.38 However, the 
																																																						
33 E.g. Tarak Barkawi and Shane Brighton, “Powers of War: Fighting, Knowledge, and Critique,” 
International Political Sociology 5, no. 2 (2011), 126-143; Michael Dillon, Julian Reid (eds.), The Liberal 
Way of War: Killing to Make a Living (London, UK: Routledge, 2009); Vivienne Jabri, War and the 
Transformation of Global Politics (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
34 Bartelson, War in International Thought, 22ff. Cf. Ian Hacking, “The Looping Effects of Human 
Kinds,” in Dan Sperber, David Premack, Ann James Premack (eds.), Causal Cognition: A Multi-
Disciplinary Approach (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1995), 351-394. 
35 Bartelson, War in International Thought, 201, cf. 15. 
36 Zehfuss, War and Politics, 2f. For affirmative statements of just war theory, cf. Alex J. Bellamy, Just 
Wars: From Cicero to Iraq (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2006); Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars. For an 
internal critique of just war theory’s violence-enhancing properties, cf. Kimberly Hutchings, “War and 
Moral Stupidity,” Review of International Studies 44, no. 1 (2017), 83-100. 
37 Zehfuss, War and Politics, 3f.  
38 Cf. Bartelson, War in International Thought, 24; Zehfuss, War and Politics, 11.  
 
	 12 
problem with IR’s ways of problematizing war is not confined to theory, but pertains 
to our ways and practices of knowing war more generally – and to stand a chance at 
recognizing and getting to work on the limits of these ways, we need research that 
historicizes our contemporary ways in a way that does not exclude itself from the 
reflexive scope of its critique. 
Because the study of war has never been limited to any individual discipline39, this 
thesis also relies on literatures stemming from neighbouring disciplines. In elaborating 
the thesis, works falling broadly into the field of international law have been important 
first and foremost in the development of some of the individual chapters, and I will 
accordingly discuss their relevance to my research in Chapters 4 and 5. By contrast, a 
number of historical and social-theoretical studies on war as an object of thought and 
action have played a more general role in shaping my position on questions of the 
history and critique of the problem of war, and they therefore merit a brief discussion 
at this point.  
Historical research primarily orients this thesis by corroborating the feasibility and 
value of a historical analysis of our ways of understanding and problematizing war. 
Historian Annette Weinke, for instance, finds that over the course of the twentieth 
century, the changing discourses and practices by means of which different actors 
struggled to render war illegal had “constitutive effects on political realities.”40 
Likewise focusing on the twentieth century, Jay Winter shows how artistic depictions 
of war shifted from representing war as such to representing soldiers and civilians; 
this shift, Winter argues, “helped to undermine the legitimacy of war as an instrument 
of political life.”41 The individuals affected by war are also the focus of Svenja 
																																																						
39 Cf. Hans Joas, Wolfgang Knöbl, Kriegsverdrängung: Ein Problem in der Geschichte der Sozialtheorie 
(Frankfurt a.M., Germany: Suhrkamp, 2008), at 16. For an English translation, see Hans Joas, Wolfgang 
Knöbl, War in Social Thought, Translated by Alex Skinner (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2012). 
40 Annette Weinke, Gewalt, Geschichte, Gerechtigkeit (Göttingen, Germany: Wallstein Verlag, 2016), at 
10f. 
41 Jay Winter, War Beyond Words: Languages of Remembrance from the Great War to the Present 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017), at 3. 
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Goltermann, whose historical analysis of the interrelationship between the idea of the 
“victim of war” and different knowledge practices reveals how, during the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, this idea served sometimes to legitimate, sometimes to render 
problematic war and violence.42 Taken together, Weinke, Winter, and Goltermann’s 
research thus evidences the potential of an inquiry into the history of the problem of 
war and points to possible examples through which this history can be accessed.  
Social theoretical works on the problem of war, in turn, orient this thesis in two ways: 
by exemplifying different ways of critique, and by pointing to European modernity as 
the specific context in which this thesis’ genealogy of the problem of war is situated. 
With regard to the former issue, Hans Joas and Wolfgang Knöbl critically examine 
social theory’s historical “suppression” of war in order to offer pointers for a future 
sociological theory of war.43 A different approach to critique is taken by Judith Butler 
and Etienne Balibar. Demonstrating how our “frames of war” make some lives lost in 
war grievable by rendering others ungrievable, Butler seeks to enable a break with 
these frames and thereby a different kind of outrage against war.44 In a similar vein, 
Balibar’s discussion of theoretical concepts of war alongside the specific example of 
the so-called “War on Terror” seeks to fracture both the general (concepts) and the 
particular (example).45 As for the latter question, whereas Joas and Knöbl point to 
war’s constitutive role in European modernity, Butler and Balibar seek to expose the 
“profoundly Eurocentric” nature of our ways of making sense of war.46 This thesis 
takes much inspiration from Joas and Knöbl, Butler, and Balibar. Collectively, their 
works illustrate how a critique of the problem of war can point out the limits and 
constitutive exclusions of our contemporary present, yet also provide materials for 
																																																						
42 Svenja Goltermann, Opfer – Die Wahrnehmung von Krieg und Gewalt in der Moderne (Frankfurt a.M., 
Germany: S. Fischer, 2017), at 23-25. 
43 Joas, Knöbl, Kriegsverdrängung, 14f. Note that in the English translation, the authors’ concern with 
the suppression of war has been dropped from the book’s title. 
44 Judith Butler, Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? 3rd paperback ed. (London, UK: Verso, 2016 
[2001]). 
45 Etienne Balibar, “What’s in a War? (Politics as War, War as Politics),” Ratio Juris 21, no. 3 (2008), 365-
386. 
46 Ibid., 373. 
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getting to work on constructing a different future. In addition, they highlight that a 
genealogy of the problem of war developed for such critical purposes needs to pay 
particular attention to European modernity as the context in which it operates. 
In relation to these historical and social-theoretical analyses of the problem of war, the 
aim of my thesis is not so much to add to their respective findings, but rather to strike 
up a conversation. In particular, my thesis hopes to enable a conversation about the 
problem of war which, though conducted between IR and its neighbouring disciplines, 
does not take place on one or another discipline’s terrain. Such a conversation is 
currently still lacking: in IR as in its neighboring disciplines, inquiries into war as an 
object of knowledge and action are for the most part pursued along lines that 
emphasize how understandings of war interact with these disciplines’ core concerns. 
This tendency, however, is problematic – for it risks blinding us to those limits of the 
contemporary problem of war that result from the historical co-emergence of different 
understandings of war and different disciplines in charge of producing these 
understandings.47 In light of this, I suggest that a focus on war’s becoming problematic 
can provide an opening for conversations which are not as confined by disciplinary 
boundaries and concerns.48 
Overall, then, the first key aim of my thesis is to clarify, complicate, and provide 
materials for getting to work on our current ways of taking epistemic and practical 
action towards war. To this end, I undertake to historically investigate how war 
became a problem of international politics, and in particular how it became a problem 
that can be prevented through the production of empirical knowledge. To be clear, I 
do not make any claims about war’s ontology.49 Nor do I make an effort to examine 
																																																						
47 Cf. Richard K. Ashley, R. B. J. Walker, “Conclusion: Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: 
Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International Studies,” International Studies Quarterly 34, no. 
3 (1990), 367-416. 
48 On Foucauldian analyses as an antidote to disciplinarity, cf. Louise Amoore, “Foucault Against the 
Grain,“ International Political Sociology 2, no. 3 (2008), 274-276. 
49 For an argument about war’s changing character yet inherent nature, cf. Hew Strachan, Sibylle 
Scheipers (eds.), The Changing Character of War (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011).  
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the relationship between the phenomenon of war and our ways of knowing about it50, 
or to improve the “fit” between this phenomenon and these ways.51 Of course, this is 
not to suggest that war and the suffering it causes were somehow not real. Rather, as 
Bartelson puts it, what is at stake is “showing how these experiences [of war and its 
violences] became real in the first place.”52 To this end, by conducting a genealogy of 
war as an epistemic and actionable object, I develop questions and materials through 
which we can begin to un- and remake how we presently make sense of war and thus 
make war problematic. 
 
Doing genealogy: from ready-made method to reflexively critical praxis  
What, though, does conducting a genealogy actually consist in? On this matter, the 
aforecited Colin Koopman – a philosopher by trade – complains that while there are 
“many books and articles purporting to be genealogical in design,” only “few of them 
have said much, if anything at all, about what it means to be genealogical beyond a 
vague appeal to something called ‘history in philosophy,’ frequently combined with a 
reference or two to Foucault or Nietzsche.”53 In IR, where there are long-standing 
discussions of methodology and method54, Koopman’s charge does not apply in equal 
measure. For every genealogical study of international politics making a “vague 
appeal” to Foucault and Nietzsche, there seems to be another one which spells out the 
design and method of genealogy in a lot of thoughtful detail. Another complaint of 
Koopman’s, however, seems pertinent to genealogical works in IR, too: namely, that 
many self-purported genealogies, mumbling “something about how history shows us 
																																																						
50 For an example of a study of how ways of knowing have influenced the conduct of warfare, cf. 
Antoine Bousquet, The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on the Battlefield of Modernity (Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press, 2010). The converse argument – that changes in warfare influenced our 
ways of knowing about war – is, of course, at the heart of the “myth of 1919”; and in a more 
theoretical pronounciation, it is also at the heart of critical war studies (cf., in particular, Barkawi, 
Brighton, “Powers of War”). 
51 For an exemplary analysis of this kind of question, cf. Bousquet, “Concept of War.” 
52 Bartelson, War in International Thought, 3. 
53 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 5. 
54 For a recent overview, cf. Cora Lacatus, Daniel Schade, Yuan (Joanne) Yao, “Quo vadis IR: Method, 
Methodology and Innovation,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 43, no. 3 (2015), 767-778. 
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that taken necessities are really contingent,” are not sufficiently articulate on how the 
histories they trace enable or constitute a critique of the present.55 The question, 
therefore, is a more specific one: what does conducting genealogy as critique actually 
consist in? Developing an answer to this question is the second main purpose of this 
thesis.  
To accomplish this purpose, I propose to eschew genealogy as method in favour of 
genealogy as history/critique, problematization, and critical praxis. By “genealogy as 
method,” I am referring to a two-step procedure in which genealogy is first specified 
as an analytical tool and then wielded onto the world in the pursuit of knowledge and 
critique.56 Widespread and relatively uncontroversial in IR, this understanding and 
practice of genealogy in effect extracts itself from the world it is studying – and 
consequently, it becomes impossible for genealogy to apply its critical insights into the 
histories of our will to knowledge not only to others, but also to its own practices and 
conduct. In this way, genealogy as method risks exempting itself from the scope of its 
history and critique.  
To remedy this, it is necessary to find a way of understanding and practicing 
genealogy as part of the world that it studies. It is to this end that I put forth genealogy 
as history/critique, problematization, and critical praxis. As history/critique, 
genealogy is this-worldly by being historical in the same way in which its other objects 
of study are: it is in principle contingent and in flux and in practice continuously in the 
process of being made. As problematization, genealogy inquires into the emergence of 
problems in order to render them further problematic and thus becomes part of the 
processes of emergence that it studies. As critical praxis, finally, genealogy takes up its 
insights into the histories of our ways and practices of knowing, being and doing to 
experiment with its own ways and practices, probing their limits and pushing against 
them from the inside out.  
																																																						
55 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 5.  
56 For an example of the view of methods as “tools” to be chosen from a “toolbox,” cf. Lacatus et al., 
“Quo vadis IR,” 771f. 
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How to put this understanding of genealogy into practice? On the one hand, over the 
course of the thesis, I work to problematize – to establish, analyze, and render further 
problematic – not only the problem of war, but also the problem of genealogy as 
method. On the other hand, I make an effort to undo and redo some of the knowledge 
practices which my historical analysis identifies as central to the emergence of the 
problem of war. To this end, in the thesis’ three historical chapters I experiment with 
disciplinary practices of thinking, of writing, and of looking. Yet while the thesis thus 
puts into practice a certain understanding of genealogy, it is also through the practice 
of research that the thesis arrives at this understanding. In fact, it was through the 
process of the research that, little by little, I came to appreciate genealogy as the 
sustained and critical work on a problematization of which genealogy is itself a part, 
and as an experimentally probing praxis of doing genealogy’s practices differently. In 
conducting genealogy as critique, then, the practice of the research and the reflection 
upon this practice are necessarily interwoven – and insofar as this thesis sometimes 
disentangles practice and reflection, this is not to suggest that they were distinct or 
consecutive steps, but only to make the thesis writable and readable.  
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest for the way I propose in this thesis to be the only 
way in which genealogy could enable or constitute critique. Nor do I wish to claim 
that all genealogies ought to proceed exactly as I did.57 Rather, my contention is that 
genealogy as history/critique, problematization, and critical praxis, by rendering 
genealogy a part of the world and thus bringing it within the scope of critique, is one 
viable and expedient way of addressing the problem of genealogy as method.  
The thesis’ argument about genealogy as critique contributes both to the considerable 
genealogical literature in IR – a literature whose critical potential, pace Koopman, is 
often inhibited precisely by the diligence of its design and method – and to discussions 
of non-positivist and critical methods in IR more generally. I will provide a more 
																																																						
57 This is not least because I have conducted a genealogy in order to work on a specific problem – and 
thus, my “way of questioning limitations” is a reaction to a “local strategic situation” (Ashley, Walker 
“Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline,” 393).  
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extensive discussion of the first strand of literature in Chapter 1, where I draw on the 
example of genealogical research in IR to elaborate what precisely is problematic about 
genealogy as method. The thesis’ main contribution to this literature is to offer a 
counter-example of genealogy as a way of knowing that includes itself within the 
scope of its critique. To discussions of critical methods in IR more generally, in turn, 
the thesis contributes by proposing genealogy as an historically-founded and reflexive 
mode of research through which methods can be shown to be political and made to do 
critical work – and by giving an example of what this mode of research could look like 
in practice. 
The question of methods and their relationship to critique is not new to IR. Ever since 
post-positivism’s entry to the discipline in the 1980s and 1990s, some scholars have 
castigated “methodologism” and “scientism” as obstacles to critique58, whereas others, 
to loosen “the link between methodology and positivist epistemology,”59 have pointed 
out the “methodological approaches” offered by critical theory60 or provided how-to 
manuals on using critical methods such as discourse analysis.61 While these various 
non-positivist views of methods diverge on whether or not methods have a place in 
critical work, they actually share in common an understanding of methods as pre-
existing or given techniques that are not themselves affected by the (critical or not so 
critical) analyses they help realize.62  
																																																						
58 James Der Derian, “The Boundaries of Knowledge and Power in International Relations,” in James 
Der Derian, Michael J. Shapiro (eds.), International/Intertextual Relations (New York, NY: Lexington 
Books, 1989), 3-10; Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International 
Relations (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994). 
59 Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 
2006), at 2. 
60 Richard Price, Christian Reus-Smit, “Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and 
Constructivism,” European Journal of International Relations 4, no. 3 (1998), 259-294. 
61 Hansen, Security as Practice; Jennifer Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A 
Critique of Research and Methods,” European Journal of International Relations 5, no. 2 (1999), 225-254. 
62 As Aradau and Huysmans point out, to the extent that positivist IR scholarship has seized methods 
as techniques, critical scholarship has by and large shifted away from consideration of methods and 
towards elaborations of meta-theory or methodology (Claudia Aradau, Jef Huysmans, “Critical 
methods in International Relations: The politics of techniques, devices and acts,” European Journal of 
International Relations 20, no. 3 (2013), 596-619, at 597. 
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More recently, however, this understanding of methods as ready-mades has been 
challenged: against those in IR who employ – or write off – methods as techniques, 
authors writing from perspectives such as pragmatism, critical security studies, and 
assemblage thinking have put forward various proposals for understanding and 
practicing methods as not only impacting on, but also as part of the (social) world.63 
From a pragmatist perspective64, Jörg Friedrichs and Friedrich Kratochwil posit that 
the social world is not “ready-made to be discovered” and that the production of 
knowledge of this world “is a social activity taking place in communities of practice.”65 
On the basis of these premises, they develop abduction as a pragmatist research 
instrument constituting “a compromise between […] scientific methodology and the 
way we produce knowledge in everyday social practice”66: moving back and forth 
between the formulation of a problem, a set of observations, and a number of concepts, 
abduction consists in the continuous adaptation of these three elements to each other, 
all in an effort to produce knowledge that will be useful in dealing with the problem 
at hand. Although Friedrichs and Kratochwil do not to seek to offer another “critique 
of the critical critique,”67 they nonetheless conceive of abduction as a critical procedure 
which, in contrast to both positivist and critical and/or interpretive methods, does not 
																																																						
63 Of course, depending on one’s perspective, these perspectives might be seen as partially 
overlapping (cf., e.g., Christian Bueger, “Thinking Assemblages Methodologically: Some Rules of 
Thumb,” in Michele Acuto, Simon Curtis (eds.), Assemblage Thinking and International Relations 
(Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2014), 58-66, at 64). 
64 On pragmatism in IR, cf. Gunther Hellmann (ed.), “The Forum: Pragmatism and International 
Relations,” International Studies Review 11, no. 3 (2009), 638-662. On how to combine pragmatism and 
genealogy for an experimental analysis that involves the analyst in the work on problems, cf. 
Koopman, Genealogy as Critique; Paul Rabinow, “Dewey and Foucault: What’s the Problem?,” Foucault 
Studies 11 (2011), 11-19.  
65 Jörg Friedrichs, Friedrich Kratochwil, “On Acting and Knowing: How Pragmatism Can Advance 
International Relations Research and Methodology,” International Organization 63, no. 4 (2009), 701-
731, at 712f. Friedrichs and Kratochwil mostly draw upon the work of Richard Rorty and Charles 
Sanders Pierce (cf. Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism: Essays, 1972-1980 (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1982; Charles Sanders Pierce, Collected Papers, Vol. 1-7 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard Universiy Press, 1965)).  
66 Friedrichs, Kratochwil, “On Acting and Knowing,” 715. 
67 Ibid., 703. 
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“surrender all critical judgment” either to one’s analytical categories or to one’s 
sources of information.68  
In critical security studies69, meanwhile, Claudia Aradau, Jef Huysmans, Andrew Neal 
and Nadine Voelkner suggest to conceive of methods as practices that “act in and upon 
security worlds.”70 Extrapolating from understandings of security as performative, the 
authors maintain that methods, too, are performative rather than representational – 
that they are “inscribed by and bear upon power relations, struggles and habitual 
dispositions in the fields of both security and scholarship.”71 To address this political 
aspect of methods, Aradau and colleagues call not only for an analysis of methods as 
world-making practices, but also for “a more experimental move to and fro, of 
improvisation and bricolage” in our handling of methods.72 In a subsequent article, 
Aradau and Huysmans extend the argument to IR more generally.73 Inspired by John 
Law’s assertion that the productive ontology of the (social) world requires us to find 
methods with which “to make good difference in circumstances where reality is both 
unknowable and generative,”74 they propose a conceptualization of methods as 
devices and acts. This conceptualization, they argue, enables an analysis of how 
methods are political – how they make and disrupt worlds – and a practice of methods 
as critical – in which methods’ politicality is seized to effect change in the world. 
Finally, methods have also been regarded in a critical vein from the vantage point of 
assemblage thinking. As Michele Acuto and Simon Curtis explain, assemblage 
thinking eschews “general categories” and “abstract concepts” in favour of 
“conceptualizing the various entities of the natural and social world as assemblages of 
																																																						
68 Ibid., 714f. 
69 For an overview, cf. c.a.s.e. collective, “Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked 
Manifesto,” Security Dialogue 37, no. 4 (2006), 443-487. 
70 Claudia Aradau, Jef Huysmans, Andrew Neal, Nadine Voelkner, “Introducing critical security 
methods,” in Claudia Aradau, Jef Huysmans, Andrew Neal, Nadine Voelkner (eds.), Critical Security 
Methods: New frameworks for analysis (London, UK: Routledge, 2013), 1-22, at 15. 
71 Ibid., 15f. 
72 Ibid., 7. 
73 Aradau, Huysmans, “Critical methods in IR.” 
74 John Law, After Method: Mess in Social Science Research (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2004), at 7. 
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heterogeneous components that are always transient, open, and in process.”75 To think 
of ideas and materials, objects and subjects as entangled in ever-fluid assemblages 
means to think of them not in terms of categorical distinctions, but as compositions of 
and as nested within further assemblages, and moreover as having a different, 
distributed kind of agency. It is in this sense that methods, too, have been understood 
as assemblages.76 This line of thought implies that methods are no longer given tools: 
as Michael Williams argues, assemblage thinking entails that the “[methods] toolbox 
needs to be reimagined as a dynamic and transactional space – more akin to the fluid 
world of software design than the settled scene of the tool shed.”77 Thus, in assemblage 
thinking, methods are this-worldly by being composed of and nested within transient 
assemblages, raising the political question of how methods contribute to the 
momentary solidification of orders and entailing the critical imperative to practice 
methods in a way that refutes their stabilizing and ordering effects.78 
Against methods as ready-mades, pragmatism, critical security studies, and 
assemblage thinking thus undertake different theoretical, conceptual, and practical 
moves that conceive of and begin to put into action methods as political and critical. 
To these various discussions, this thesis adds by offering a historical and reflexive take 
on the politicality and criticality of methods. Based on an understanding of methods 
as composed of knowledge practices and coalescing into ways of knowing, the 
genealogy developed in this thesis inquires into the histories of these practices and 
ways, into their entanglement with formulations of war as an epistemic and actionable 
problem, and into the preconditions and limits of these practices, ways, and 
formulations. I then take up the findings of the historical analysis to reflexively turn 
																																																						
75 Michele Acuto, Simon Curtis, “Assemblage Thinking and International Relations,” in Michele 
Acuto, Simon Curtis (eds.), Reassembling International Theory: Assemblage Thinking and International 
Relations (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2014), 1-15, at 2, 4f. 
76 Cf. Bueger, “Thinking Assemblages Methodologically”; Debbie Lisle, “Energizing the 
International,” in Michele Acuto, Simon Curtis (eds.), Reassembling International Theory: Assemblage 
Thinking and International Relations (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2014), 68-74. 
77 Williams cited in Lisle, “Energizing,” 70. 
78 Cf. Bueger, “Thinking Assemblages Methodologically,” 65f.; Lisle, “Energizing,” 70. 
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them back on my own knowledge practices.79 Experimenting with practices of 
thinking, of looking, and of writing, I try to modify these practices so that they no 
longer serve quite so easily to reproduce what the historical analysis has highlighted 
as problematic about our ways of problematizing war, namely, the subject whose 
epistemic, ethical, and political capacity is founded upon a position outside of the 
problem of war. 
While the different strands of IR literature outlined above all mention in passing the 
potential role of history for the development of a critical take on methods, and while 
they all seem potentially sympathetic to including a reflexive element, they mostly do 
not pursues these matters further. As regards history, Aradau and Huysmans’ remark 
upon how the “promise” of a critical methodological turn is hindered by the tendency 
of much of the critical literature to “[relegate] methods to the dustbin of history (i.e. to 
that which is not really making history and is not part of the world),” yet they do not 
follow up on this remark.80 Likewise, Kratochwil and Friedrich’s affirmation of the 
“historical contingency of scientific knowledge”81 and Acuto and Curtis’ “insistence 
on the provisional nature of all assemblages as historically contingent entities”82 
remain, by and large, incidental comments.83 Overall, while it seems that pragmatism, 
critical security studies, and assemblage thinking would principally allow for and 
perhaps even welcome an historical take on methods and critique, they have thus far 
mostly pursued other lines of thought.  
																																																						
79 For an understanding of reflexivity as the “turning back” of thought and action onto itself, cf. Jack L. 
Amoureux, Brent J. Steele, “Introduction,” in Jack L. Amoureux, Brent J. Steele (eds.), Reflexivity and 
International Relations: Positionality, critique, and practice (London, UK: Routledge, 2016), 1-20, at 3; Mark 
A. Neufeld, The Restructuring of International Relations Theory (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995), at 40. Amoureux and Steele explicitly mention the possibility of pursuing reflexivity 
historically and in practice. 
80 Aradau, Huysmans, “Critical methods in IR,” 602. 
81 Friedrichs, Kratochwil, “On Acting and Knowing,” 713. 
82 Acuto, Curtis, “Assemblage Thinking and International Relations,” 4. 
83 Curiously, this is so although Acuto and Curtis repeatedly cite Saskia Sassen’s work on the nation-
state and modernity as historical assemblages (cf. Saskia Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From 
Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006)).  
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As regards reflexivity, of the above-cited strands of literature, Friedrich and 
Kratochwil’s formulation of pragmatism is the only piece to explicitly consider the 
issue. In these authors’ view, pragmatist research, by being “reflexive about 
[informants’] intersubjective rationalizations” as well as about “the conceptual 
instruments used for observation,” amounts to an operation of ‘double’ or even ‘triple’ 
hermeneutics.84 It would have been tempting to think that the notion of triple 
hermeneutics also captured critical security studies and assemblage thinking’s efforts 
at reconceptualizing methods as practices, devices and acts, and assemblages – were 
it not for Friedrichs and Kratochwil’s “conviction that warranted knowledge 
presupposes a degree of reflexive elaboration that is largely absent from everyday 
life.”85 Indeed, this conviction seems as far a cry from the anti-hierarchical stance of 
assemblage thinking as from the analogies that critical security studies draw between 
the fields of security and scholarship. However, while this stance and these analogies 
might indicate assemblage thinking and critical security studies to be open to an 
(egalitarian) reflexivity, the “turning back” of thought and action onto itself does not 
seem to constitute a central move within either of these two approaches to methods 
and critique. 
In contrast to pragmatism, critical security studies and assemblage thinking, this thesis 
heeds the call for “deepening the problematization of method throughout the practice 
of research”86 first and foremost through undertaking genealogical, i.e. historical and 
reflexive, work on its practices and ways of knowing. In its historical aspect, this take 
on methods and critique fleshes out and substantiates an argument about methods’ 
political and critical nature that, albeit brought up en passant in the different strands of 
the relevant IR literature, has thus far remained relatively undeveloped. In particular, 
I argue that the politicality and, hence, the critical potential of methods lie not only in 
																																																						
84 Ibid., 714. On reflexivity and double hermeneutics in IR, cf. Stefano Guzzini, “A Reconstruction of 
Constructivism in International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 6, no. 2 (2000), 
147-182. 
85 Friedrichs, Kratochwil, “On Acting and Knowing,” 703. 
86 Aradau et al., “Introducing Critical Security Methods,” 6, emphasis in original. 
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their entanglement in power relations and in political struggles. Rather, in this thesis 
methods are political insofar as they are historical: insofar, that is, as the historical 
emergence of our contemporary ways and practices of knowing enables and constrains 
these contemporary ways and practices. As for genealogy’s reflexive dimension, the 
thesis shuns the assumption of epistemological privilege often implied in practices of 
double and triple hermeneutics. Moreover, rather than being reflexive solely towards 
my concepts, as pragmatism and assemblage thinking seem to sometimes imply, I also 
seek to turn my thesis’ historical insights back unto my own knowledge practices. In 
sum, this thesis thus contributes to existing literatures on critical methods in IR by 
developing genealogy into a historical and reflexive mode of critique that brings 
within the scope of critique not methods in general, but our (critical) methods in 
particular, that urges us to get to work on these methods and provides us with the 
materials we need for commencing this work, and that offers an example of what this 
critical labour could, in practice, amount to.  
 
Research question, main arguments, and notes on periodization and 
chronology 
In a nutshell, through developing a genealogy of war as a problem of international 
politics, this thesis aims to interrogate and render problematic two contemporary 
conditions: the condition of war as an object of knowledge and action, and the 
condition of genealogy as a research method. To realize this twofold aim, I pursue the 
following research question: 
What does a genealogy of the problem of war in international politics do to our 
understanding of war and to our conception and practice of genealogy? 
In answer to this question, my thesis proposes, first, that such a genealogy clarifies, 
complicates, and facilitates the development of alternatives to our current ways of 
knowing about and taking action against war. To these ends, through an analysis of 
the historical becoming of the problem of war in the work of four “post-war initiatives” 
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that sought to know about war to prevent its recurrence, the genealogy offered in this 
thesis produces manifold empirical materials that can be taken up in order to get to 
work on our contemporary ways of rendering war problematic. More specifically, I 
use the materials provided by the historical analysis to argue that our contemporary 
understanding of the problem of war relies upon and reproduces the assumption that 
the capacity for meaningful epistemological and political action towards war 
presupposes a subject position to the outside of this problem. This assumption, I 
contend, is problematic not only for how it denies many people agency towards the 
problem of war, but also insofar as it inhibits those of us who regard ourselves as 
epistemologically capable vis-à-vis war from inquiring into how we are implicated in 
the problem that war constitutes.  
Secondly, the genealogy of the problem of war proposed in this thesis undoes 
genealogy as method and redoes it as history/critique, problematization, and critical 
praxis. Picking up on one of the main insights of the historical analysis, I point out how 
the understanding of genealogy as a method exempts its own ways and practices of 
knowing from the scope of its critique. Thereupon, I undertake a number of conceptual 
and practical moves to bring genealogy back into the ambit of its own historical and 
critical inquiry. On the one hand, a conceptualization of genealogy as problematization 
allows me to explicate how genealogy becomes a part of the processes of emergence 
that it studies. On the other hand, in an attempt to practically reflect upon my ways of 
knowing – the ways in which I have, in previous research, studied war and its 
violences, and the ways in which, in this thesis, I inquire into the history of our ways 
of knowing war – I experiment with my practices of thinking, of looking, and of 
writing. 
I develop these answers and undertake these experiments through an engagement of 
both secondary literatures and primary sources. In terms of the secondary literature, 
my analysis and argument are indebted first and foremost to the works of Michel 
Foucault – of which I therefore offer a detailed discussion in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
As regards primary sources, I collected and studied archival materials pertaining to 
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four historical examples of initiatives which sought to address the problem of war by 
producing knowledge about it. In order of their appearance in the chapters to follow, 
these are: the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the 
Balkan Wars (1912-1914); two proposals for an international tribunal to investigate and 
try violations of the laws of war which were discussed between different groups of 
international lawyers in the aftermaths of, respectively, the Franco-German War (1870-
1872) and the First World War (1920); and the International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East (IMTFE) (1946-1948).  
While I will explain the logic of genealogy as an exemplary rather than comprehensive 
history as well as the choice of examples in Chapter 2, I here want to briefly flag up 
questions of periodization and chronology. As to the first of these two, my thesis starts 
from the assumption that during the nineteenth century, there were two decisive 
changes in people’s understanding of war.87 First, in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century, war – which had previously been regarded as a fact of life or also 
as a misfortune – came to be seen as a problem addressable by civil society. In this 
context, the emergence of peace societies in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars can 
be seen as one early example of an idea of war as an actionable problem.88 And yet, as 
André Durand notes, during the first half of the nineteenth century, “the objective 
study of war as a phenomenon […] had not yet been invented.”89 This second change 
in people’s understanding of war only began to take shape somewhat later, during the 
second half of the nineteenth century.90 It is on this latter change, and on how it built 
																																																						
87 For recent statements on the nineteenth century more generally, cf. Barry Buzan, George Lawson, 
The Global Transformation: History, Modernity, and the Making of International Relations (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015); Jürgen Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World: A Global 
History of the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014). 
88 Ceadel, Origins of War Prevention, ch. 1; André Durand, “Gustave Moynier and the Peace Societies,” 
International Review of the Red Cross 36, no. 314 (1996), 532-550. Weinke locates the emergence of the 
idea that war was not a concern of (warring) states alone a little later, in the second half of the 19th 
century (cf. Weinke, Gewalt, Geschichte, Gerechtigkeit, 10, 103; see also Goltermann, Opfer, 19-21). 
89 Durand, “Gustave Moynier,” 535. 
90 Torbjørn L. Knutsen, “The Origins of International Relations: Idealists, Administrators and the 
Institutionalization of a New Science,” in Andreas Gofas, Inanna Hamati-Ataya, Nicholas Onuf (eds.), 
The SAGE Handbook of the History, Philosophy and Sociology of International Relations (London, UK: 
SAGE, 2018), 193-207, at 195. 
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upon and extended the former, that I focus in this thesis. My rationale for this focus – 
and my main reason for foregoing its alternative, a periodization striving to cover the 
history of the problem of war comprehensively91 – is twofold. On the one hand, my 
intuition is that the two changes in understandings of war identified above 
inaugurated the ways in which we still seek to know about and act upon war today.92 
On the other hand, I did not determine a priori the thesis’ focus on war as a problem of 
knowledge and action; rather, I arrived at this focus through my work with archival 
sources. This way of proceeding then led me to forego comprehensive periodization 
in favour of a more fine-grained analysis of the manifold and often minute alterations 
of which the two overarching historical changes in understandings of the problem of 
war that I postulate consisted.  
Periodization, in turn, depends on chronology. Of course, the notion of time as a 
universal, continuous, and linear sequence of events is an idea peculiar to modernity 
– and it is therefore another item to be historicized and problematized rather than 
taken for granted.93 Not least because my empirical inquiry does not extend to pre- or 
otherwise non-modern examples, however, the historicization of modern 
chronological time cannot make for the main thrust of my thesis. Given this limitation, 
I call attention to the issue of modern chronological time – by inquiring, in the different 
historical examples I study, into modernity as a location in time from which to know 
																																																						
91 Indeed, many, especially early genealogical studies in IR aim for a comprehensive periodization of 
their respective objects of analysis (e.g. Jens Bartelson, Genealogy of Sovereignty (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995); James Der Derian, On Diplomacy (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 
1987)). 
92 Of course, there were also other changes to “war” as an object of thought and action during the 
nineteenth century, for instance its decreasing functionality for inter-state politics (cf. Buzan, Lawson, 
Global Transformation, 265ff.). I will discuss these changes insofar as they impinge on the question that 
I am centrally concerned with in this thesis, namely war’s becoming an actionable problem for actors 
other than states. 
93 For a historical problematization of the temporal assumptions underwriting contemporary post-
conflict politics, cf. Berber Bevernage, History, Memory, and State-Sponsored Violence: Time and Justice 
(Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2012). On modern temporality in the context of understanding war, cf. 




and address war, and by making explicit the different chronologies at play in my 
thesis.  
Resulting from its dual focus on the problem of war and on genealogy, this thesis 
contains at least two chronologies: that of war’s becoming problematic, and that of the 
genealogical work which I undertake to analyze this becoming. Ultimately, neither of 
these two temporal processes was a fully linear or continuous one. With regard to the 
historical process of war’s becoming problematic, this assertion is substantiated 
theoretically in Chapter 2 and empirically corroborated in Chapters 3-5. As for my own 
research process, due less to methodological principles than to mundane 
organizational necessities, I did not study the different historical examples which my 
thesis engages in their chronological order.94 Furthermore, within this already non-
chronological process, my own understandings of the problem of war and of 
genealogy kept evolving. To give the reader an idea of how the twists and turns of this 
open-ended and, to be frank, rather challenging research process have felt, the order 
of the historical chapters of my thesis is not entirely chronological, as one might expect, 
but rather reflects how my research arrived at its understanding of and its arguments 
about the problems it studies, “war” and genealogy.95   
 
Plan of the thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is structured into five main chapters, three reflective 
vignettes96, an analytical conclusion, and an epilogue. Chapter 1 serves, by way of 
																																																						
94 I first studied the Advisory Committee of Jurists (1920), then the Balkan Commission (1912-14), then 
the international jurists debating the Franco-German War (1870-73), and finally the IMTFE (1946-48). 
95 In a recent discussion of James Der Derian’s genealogical work, Iver Neumann holds that it is 
“alright” for genealogy to be written fully chronologically because “readers are used to thinking from 
the past towards the future, and readers must be accommodated for a book to be legible.” I disagree 
with this view: while it should of course be legible and comprehensible, a genealogy need not, in fact 
must not cater to the ways of thinking to which its readers are used (cf. Iver Neumann, 
“Poststructuralists Also Have a Duty of Methodological Care,” New Perspectives: Interdisciplinary 
Journal of Central & East European Politics and International Relations 25, no. 3 (2017), 12-19, at 18). 




example, to set up as starting points the two main problems motivating this thesis: the 
problem of war as an object of knowledge and action, and the problem of genealogy 
as method. To this end, the first half of the chapter examines the example of the 
international politics of transitional justice. Specifically, I contend that transitional 
justice exemplifies a curious nexus of knowledge and action in which war constitutes 
a problem whose future recurrence can be prevented by means of knowledge about 
its past occurrence. Furthermore, I offer an initial argument in favour of genealogy as 
a way of producing critical insight into the preconditions and constitutive exclusions 
of this contemporary problem of war. The second half of Chapter 1 takes up this thread 
to consider the current condition of genealogy in IR as an example of the problem of 
method and critique. Here, I first argue that recent proposals of genealogy as a method 
in effect risk excluding genealogy’s own conduct from the historical and critical scope 
of its analysis. Secondly, I show how early genealogical works in IR eschewed an 
understanding of genealogy as method and sought to be reflexive both conceptually 
and in practice.  
As an alternative to genealogy as method, Chapter 2 proposes genealogy as 
history/critique, problematization, and critical praxis. First, through a consideration of 
Foucauldian genealogy in contrast to Foucauldian archaeology as well as to 
Nietzschean genealogy, I arrive at an understanding of genealogy as a kind of history 
which inquires into processes of emergence and as a kind of critique which aims to 
analyze the coming-about and the preconditions of our contemporary ways of being, 
knowing, and doing in order to render these ways changeable. Secondly, I discuss how 
the concept of “problematization,” referring to the process of the becoming of a 
problem, serves to make sense of the processes of emergence that genealogy studies 
as well as of genealogy itself as part of these processes. I also explain a number of 
further key concepts, including those of “practice,” “co-production,” and “critical 
praxis.” Thirdly, to explicate how the genealogy developed in this thesis amounts to a 
critical praxis, I explain key decisions I took in the course of my historical analysis, and 
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I offer a preview of my attempt, in conducting this historical analysis, to experiment 
with my own knowledge practices.  
In Chapter 3, I turn my attention to a first historical example, the so-called Balkan 
Commission. Sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, this 
commission conducted an inquiry into the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. The chapter 
analyzes contending formulations of war as a legal, economic, and moral problem, as 
well as how these rationally structured formulations of war as problematic were 
proposed to counter dialectically structured ones. Furthermore, the chapter inquires 
into the commission of inquiry as an institutional form, into the commissioners’ 
emerging practices of looking and of writing, and thus into their purportedly 
“scientific” way of knowing. Finally, the chapter explores the assumption, 
encapsulated in the commissioners’ notions of “civilization,” that European modernity 
made for a privileged spatio-temporal location from which to problematize war.97  
In addition, Chapter 3 also begins the experimentation with my knowledge practices. 
Here, I focus on and attempt to subvert one particular practice of thinking: the practice 
of formulating working hypotheses. In positivist research, the practice of formulating 
working hypotheses serves to distance us from that into which we inquire, producing 
us as epistemic subjects external to the objects of our inquiries. Countering this, I 
formulate working hypotheses that seek to pull us, as subjects of knowledge, back into 
to the analysis. To this end, the working hypotheses which I formulate, by bundling 
the chapter’s historical insights, make more acute the empirical materials which the 
chapter affords for enabling critical work on the contemporary problem of war.  
Following up on the findings of Chapter 3, Chapters 4 and 5 focus on legal 
formulations of the problem of war, on legal ways of knowing war, and on 
assumptions about “civilization” and the vanguard role of modern European subjects 
in overcoming the problem of war. Chapter 4 analyzes archival materials pertaining 
																																																						
97 This thesis does not look at science or civilization substantially, but only insofar as claims are being 
made about them in the primary sources – insofar as they are notions used by one or another 
commissioner, for instance. To indicate this, I use these terms in quotation marks.  
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to two ultimately unrealized schemes for an international criminal tribunal devised, 
some fifty years apart from each other, by two groups of international jurists 
congregating in the aftermath of the Franco-German War and the First World War. 
Studying the writings of these two groups, I trace different ways of rendering war and 
its violences into legal problems – into civil wrongs, illegalities, offenses, violations of 
the law, and finally, into crimes. I also discuss a number of differences between the 
two groups’ ways of knowing war, emphasizing in particular their divergent ways of 
taking into account empirical evidence. Lastly, I highlight in how far both groups 
understood themselves as epistemologically capable subjects by distinguishing 
themselves within a “civilizational” hierarchy. 
Thereupon, Chapter 5 zooms in even more closely on war as a particular kind of legal 
problem, namely, on war as crime. It was in the aftermath of the Second World War 
that war was fully criminalized for the very first time. Out of the over-abundant 
archives pertaining to this criminalization, I focus on the dissents which were issued 
by three judges on the bench at the IMTFE in Toyko – Henri Bernard from France, Bert 
Röling from the Netherlands, and Radhabinod Pal from India. On the basis of these 
primary sources, the chapter probes different approaches – and objections – to 
criminalization as a way of rendering war a legal problem, as well as different 
understandings of the international as the realm in which this criminalization was to 
be effected. Secondly, I consider the three dissenting judges’ contentions regarding 
their colleagues knowledge practices, and I discuss in how far, in the example of the 
IMTFE, the political nature of knowledge consisted not only in knowledge’s 
instrumentalization for political purposes, but also resided in the subject positions that 
made presumably true knowledge of Japan’s conduct of the war possible. Finally, I 
focus on how the three dissenting judges conceived of war not only as a legal problem, 
but more broadly as a problem of international politics, as well as on their and their 
colleagues views on “civilized” warfare and on these views’ underlying assumptions 
about war-time violence as rational, controllable, and ethical. 
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In addition, Chapters 4 and 5 also take up the findings of my analysis of the Balkan 
Commission in a practical way. To this end, Chapter 4 experiments with practices of 
writing. The chapter is written up as a collection of fragments, pieces, and shards of 
insights found within the archival materials. Rather than piecing these fragments 
together into a comprehensive analytical narrative, I only order them roughly, more 
or less according to the thesis’ three main historical themes (the problem of war, ways 
of knowing war, and “civilization” and European modernity as locations from which 
to know about and take action against war). Thereby, the chapter lays open and breaks 
with the practices through which I put together the other chapters of this thesis and 
attempts to counteract the notion, perhaps conveyed by these other chapters, that I 
wrote the thesis from a position outside the history I was writing. 
In Chapter 5, in turn, I get to work on my practices of looking. Whereas in previous 
chapters, I aimed for a comprehensive view of the relevant archives and often focused 
on the presumably most central primary sources, in this chapter I inspect the 
problematization of war through a very small number of documents which, moreover, 
are located on the margins of the vast body of primary sources. In this way, and as I 
further explain in the final reflective vignette, the chapter attempts to cast a look which 
aims not to identify, but rather to disperse its objects and dissipate its subjects, and 
which in doing so undoes the possibility of a stable perspective. Thereby, the chapter 
emphasizes that our view is always only partial, and that, as Foucault once put it, 
“knowledge is perspective.”98 
In the conclusion, I draw together the different threads running through the thesis. 
First, I gather the thesis’ insights on the historical emergence of the problem of war in 
international politics and propose these insights as materials for getting to work on 
our contemporary present. I point out some of the co-productions of formulations of 
the problem of war and ways of knowing war as well as some of the constitutive 
exclusions of how war has been conceived of and related to. I then raise a number of 
																																																						
98 Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Paul Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader (New 
York, NY: Penguin Books, 1991 [1984]), 76-100, at 90. 
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questions about how war constitutes a problem of international politics today. Finally, 
I argue that our contemporary ways of problematizing war rely on and reproduce the 
assumption that only those subjects who are not themselves part of the problem of war 
are epistemologically, politically, and ethically capable of addressing it.  
Secondly, I compile the thesis’ insights into genealogy as a way of studying 
international politics. In its labour to undo genealogy as method, I contend, the thesis 
contributes to a problematization of and constitutes an experimentation with our ways 
of knowing – and thereby offers an example of what it could mean to understand and 
practice genealogy as critique. The discussion concludes by charting out possible 
future lines of conversation between genealogy and pragmatism, critical security 
studies, and assemblage thinking. 
In the end, however, my project’s core concern lies with the problem of war itself and 
with the means we have to work on it. In light of this, what I first and foremost hope 
for my thesis to achieve is to provoke in its readers a curiosity about the hard and 
precarious, urgent and productive work on our problems, our ways, and our selves 
that a critical questioning of our contemporary problematization of war requires.  
Insofar as the “we” implied in this last sentence, and in this introduction more 
generally, is a somewhat oscillating one, this is because the thesis is written with 
different readers in mind. To the reader critically interested in war as an object of 
thought and action, the thesis proposes to subject to careful scrutiny not only 
conditionally positive conceptions of war as, for instance, politically productive or 
ethically good, but also understandings of war as genuinely problematic. To the fellow 
genealogist, the thesis suggests that in our efforts at history and critique, we ought to 
try even harder to not take as given our ways and practices of knowing. For the reader 
interested in issues of methods and critique in IR more generally, the thesis puts 
forward history and reflexivity as an additional mode of the political (and critical) life 
of methods. Finally, the reader coming to the thesis with a general background in IR – 
and, perhaps, a concern with the study and amelioration of the problem of war, or 
with a disquiet at what this study occludes – is also invited to come along. I hope that 
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in the pages to follow, they might find a few more things that give them pause, and 
that they might leave the thesis to reconsider the ways in which we all too often take 






Starting points: “war” and method as research problems 
 
The genealogy offered in this thesis starts from the assumption that, at present, “war” 
and method constitute problems – and that they therefore make for worthwhile 
subjects of critical inquiry. To offer a rationale for this starting point, in this chapter I 
discuss two specific literatures – the cross-disciplinary literature on transitional justice, 
and the IR literature on genealogy – with an eye towards elucidating how they 
exemplify what might be problematic about “war” and method.  
To explain this exemplifying procedure, I need to briefly anticipate an argument that 
I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 2. This is the argument that, as Bartelson puts 
it, genealogy is “effective by virtue of being episodical and exemplary.”1 As an effective 
analysis of the emergence of a problem, genealogy traces the production of this 
problem in different historical moments, starting with an analysis of its present 
formation. Moreover, to effectively contribute to rendering this existing problem 
further problematic, genealogy does not provide a comprehensive account of the 
emergence of a problem, but offers an analysis of different examples within each of 
the historical moments it analyses – including the present moment.2 In this chapter, 
therefore, I proceed by way of example to preliminarily clarify how “war” and method 
constitute problems and thereby make for this thesis’ two-fold starting point. 
At the same time, however, this chapter also undertakes to provide an account of how 
I came to this starting point. At the outset of this project, what is now a concern with 
“war” and with method looked decidedly different: I was interested in transitional 
justice’s assumption that knowing the truth about past violence could hinder future 
violence, and I was intrigued by the idea of writing a genealogy of this assumption, or 
																																																						
1 Bartelson, Genealogy of Sovereignty, 73, italics in original. 
2 Cf. Foucault , “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,“ 358ff. 
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a history of how it had come about and become taken for granted. Throughout the 
process of the research, however, these initial interests have reconfigured themselves 
more than once. Indeed, in later parts of this thesis I will develop an argument for 
genealogy as a continuous reconfiguration of its own interests, or for genealogy as 
curiousity. To set the scene for this argument, in this chapter I want to take on the task 
of explicating my project’s initial points of departure and attempting to locate within 
these points some features of the problems that, in the meantime, this thesis has come 
to be concerned with. 
The chapter comes in two parts. In the first part, I look at transitional justice as a 
particular kind of international post-atrocity politics3 to trace, within these politics, the 
contours of war as an object that can be known and acted upon. In the chapter’s second 
part, in turn, I review a range of genealogical works in the discipline of IR to propose 
method as a problem in and for critical IR scholarship. Overall, this chapter thus 
identifies two problems as starting points for the thesis: war as an object of knowledge 
and action, and methods as ready-made analytical instruments. At the same time, 
however, the chapter also bespeaks how doing a genealogy might lead one to see one’s 
initial starting points anew. 
 
Seeking truth to hinder war: the example of transitional justice 
In all different kinds of post-atrocity situations today, establishing the truth about 
what happened in order to address and deal with this past violence is one of the 
mainstays of the international politics of transitional justice. In response to violences 
such as torture, forced disappearances, violent conflict, genocide, colonialism, and 
indentured labour, actors ranging from civil society organizations and newly 
incumbent governments to donor countries and international organizations insist on 
																																																						
3 To refer to transitional justice as a politics concerned with the aftermaths of very different kinds of 
violence, I borrow the term “post-atrocity” from Claire Moon (Claire Moon, “Healing Past Violence: 
Traumatic Assumptions and Therapeutic Interventions in War and Reconciliation,” Journal of Human 
Rights 8, no. 1 (2009), 71-91). 
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transitional justice and its truth-seeking instruments, first and foremost criminal 
prosecutions and truth commissions. For instance, the United Nations have 
recognized the right to the truth as an emerging norm of customary international law 
and a human right in the making4 and have appointed a UN Special Rapporteur on the 
promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence.5 Those who call for 
and implement transitional justice’s instruments do not take truth as an end in itself, 
but – as the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur aptly illustrates – link the 
establishment of truth about past violence to the prevention of future violence. In 
Rosemary Nagy’s words, contemporary transitional justice is based on a “fairly settled 
consensus” about the purposiveness, indeed the essential necessity of truth for the 
non-recurrence of violence.6  
It was this “knowledge-action-nexus,”7 to borrow Claire Moon’s term, that initially got 
me interested in transitional justice. One of the reasons for this interest was that 
transitional justice’s consensus about the imperative of searching for the truth about 
past violence seemed to be built on empirically shaky ground: as research had begun 
to look into truth-seeking’s effects, the emerging evidence suggested that these effects 
were less unequivocally positive than truth-seeking’s advocates had assumed.8 If this 
																																																						
4 United Nations, “Right to the Truth,” A/RES/68/165 (2014); United Nations, “Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights: Study on the Right to Truth,” E/CN.4/2006/91 (2006). 
5 United Nations, “Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of 
non-recurrence,” A/HRC/RES/18/7 (2011). 
6 Rosemary Nagy, “Transitional Justice as a Global Project: Critical Reflections,” Third World Quarterly 
29, no. 2 (2008), 275-289. The UN Secretary General’s 2004 report on “The rule of law and transitional 
justice in conflict and post-conflict societies” defines transitional justice as “the full range of processes 
and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past 
abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include 
both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international involvement (or none 
at all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and 
dismissals, or a combination thereof” (United Nations, “The rule of law and transitional justice in 
conflict and post-conflict societies,” S/2004/616* (2004); cf. Ruti Teitel, “Transitional Justice 
Genealogy,” Human Rights Journal 16 (2003), 69-94. 
7 Claire Moon, “What One Sees and How One Files Seeing: Human Rights Reporting, Representation 
and Action,” Sociology 46, no. 5 (2012), 876-890. 
8 E.g. Erin Daly, “Truth Skepticism: An Inquiry into the Value of Truth in Times of Transition,” 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 1 (2008), 23-41; David Mendeloff, “Truth-Seeking, 
Truth-Telling, and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Curb the Enthusiasm?,” International Studies Review 6, 
no. 3 (2004), 355-380; Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, Andrew G. Reiter, “The Justice Balance – When 
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was so, however, then how had transitional justice’s consensus that knowing the truth 
about past violence would help prevent future violence become so taken for granted? 
This was what I wanted to write a genealogy of.  
Over the course of developing this genealogy, however, my preoccupation with 
transitional justice changed. My undiscriminating interest in the many kinds of 
violence that transitional justice seeks to address was replaced by a concern with war 
and war-time violence in particular, and my initial fascination with understandings of 
“truth” was substituted with a focus on “war” as an object of knowledge and action. 
Transitional justice turned from the example I was studying into one of many 
examples, and what I had found curious about transitional justice – namely, the 
knowledge-action-nexus it exemplifies – became a curiosity about how this nexus has 
parallels in the discipline in IR (in which we often claim that we study wars and violent 
conflicts not least to learn how to hinder their future occurrence).9 Throughout the 
project, that is, my interest in transitional justice contracted and expanded and in the 
end completely shifted.  
Therefore, by working through the example of the international politics of transitional 
justice, my aim in this first part of the chapter is twofold. On the one hand, to establish 
a starting point for the genealogical analysis to come, I seek to trace some of the 
contemporary contours of war as an object of knowledge and action within transitional 
justice. On the other hand, to render explicit the starting point of this starting point, I 
attempt to account for how my interest in transitional justice’s taken for granted 
assumption about the value of truth began to reconfigure into a curiosity about war as 
this kind of object.  
																																																						
Transitional Justice Improves Human Rights and Democracy,” Human Rights Quarterly 32, no. 4 (2010), 
980-1007. 
9 For examples of IR research on transitional justice, cf. Michal Ben-Josef Hirsch, “Ideational Change 
and the Norm of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions,” European Journal of International Relations 20, 
no. 3 (2014), 810-833; David P. Forsythe, Human Rights in International Relations, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012), ch. 4.; Leslie Vinjamuri, Jack Snyder, “Advocacy and 
Scholarship in the Study of International War Crime Tribunals and Transitional Justice,” Annual 
Review of Political Science 7 (2004), 345–362. 
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To this end, I first sketch a number of transformations of transitional justice’s 
understanding of “truth” (as well as of its related understandings of “justice” and 
“reconciliation”), showing how the meaning and valuation of knowledge about past 
violence have been subject to historical change. Secondly, I trace how, at the 
intersection of several broader developments within transitional justice, war has come 
to form an object that can be known and acted upon. Finally, discussing possible 
avenues for criticizing this taken for granted assumption about “truth” and its 
instrumentality for preventing future violence, I note how conventional criticisms 
leave undisturbed the political life of transitional justice’s analytical categories, and I 
outline a number of alternative paths of critique more capable of attending to what 
these categories do in the world. The section ends with an argument for a genealogy of 
the “knowledge-action-nexus” exemplified by transitional justice and its assumptions 
about the purposiveness of knowledge of past war for counteracting future war.  
 
A brief history of “truth” in transitional justice 
In the early years of transitional justice, “truth” was usually conceived of as a 
prerequisite for or a second-best alternative to “justice,” and furthermore as opposed 
to “reconciliation.” For instance, the Argentinian Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición 
de Personas (National Commission for the Disappearance of Persons, CONADEP), 
established in December 1983 to inquire into the disappearances ordered and carried 
out by the armed forces during the preceding seven years of military government, was 
mandated not only to prepare a final report, but also to pass on its findings to the 
courts10, leading to the trial and conviction of a number of senior members of the 
																																																						
10 In fact, over the course of its work CONADEP reinterpreted its mandate of being a mere 
“intermediary between the people and the justice system” to assume a more active role: it enlarged the 
scope of its inquiry to also include the identification of perpetrators, and it also debated, on its own 
initiative, whether the evidence collected should be handed over to military or to civilian courts 
(Emilio Crenzel, “Argentina’s National Commission on the Disappearance of Missing Persons: 
Contributions to Transitional Justice,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 2 (2008), 173-191, 
at 191).   
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junta.11 In other Latin American contexts, however, criminal trials were unattainable, 
and investigatory commissions were employed on their own, thus making of “truth” 
a substitute for “justice.”12 A case in point is Chile, where the Comisión Nacional de 
Verdad y Reconciliación (National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation), appointed 
in 1990 to investigate killings carried out by the Pinochet regime, was from the outset 
intended not in preparation, but in lieu of criminal trials.13 It was also in the Chilean 
context that “reconciliation” became, as Bronwyn Leebaw has shown, “invoked as a 
short hand for compromises and bargains with the old regime”14 – causing a 
prominent Argentinian lawyer and member of the human rights movement, Juan E. 
Mendez, to lament that “the word [reconciliation] has achieved a bad name.”15 Overall, 
transitional justice in the 1980s and early 1990s assumed that justice and truth were 
“intertwined demands”16 which were conjointly in opposition to reconciliation. The 
idea that the truth about past violence would help to prevent future violence, however, 
seems to have been nowhere in sight. 
During these early days of transitional justice, “truth” as an aim of transitional justice 
became associated with the instrument of the investigatory commission, while 
“justice” was firmly associated with trials in civilian or military courts. Investigatory 
commissions were a new kind of instrument: the Argentinian CONADEP, which had 
been designed as a “commission of ‘notables’” modelled after civil society 
commissions set up by the US Congress17, later itself became a model for investigatory 
commissions in other Latin American countries. As one contemporary commentator 
																																																						
11 Priscilla Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenges of Truth Commissions (London, UK: 
Routledge, 2001), at 34. 
12 Cf. Ben-Josef Hirsch, “Ideational Change,” 817; Saskia Nauenberg, “Spreading the truth: How truth 
commissions address human rights abuses in the world society,” International Sociology 30, no. 6, 654-
673, at 658f. 
13 Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 35f. 
14 Bronwyn Leebaw, “The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly 30, no. 
1, 95-118, at 102. 
15 Juan E. Mendez, “Accountability for Past Abuses,” Human Rights Quarterly 19, no. 2 (1997), 255-282, 
at 274. 
16 Weschler quoted in Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual 
History of Transitional Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2009), 321-367, at 353. 
17 Crenzel, “Argentina’s National Commission on the Disappearance of Missing Persons,” 177. 
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pointed out, the truth-seeking that these early commissions engaged in “often end[ed] 
up confirming widely-held beliefs about what has happened and who is responsible” 
so that “truth commissions might be described more accurately as acknowledging the 
truth rather than shaping it.”18 While these early truth commissions’ record in actually 
achieving “truth” was judged to be a mixed one, they were principally held to be able 
to achieve “a full and fair” account.19 By contrast, their capacity for delivering “justice” 
was seen as categorically limited: Chilean human rights lawyer José Zalaquett, for 
instance, maintained that truth commissions could achieve no more than “justice to 
the extent possible,”20 and his Argentinian colleague Mendez found that truth 
commissions made for “a poor alternative to justice.”21 In the end, that is, whereas 
truth commissions might deliver a full account of what happened, when it came to 
retribution and accountability they could be no more than second-best substitutes for 
trials.  
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), inaugurated in 
December 1995, and the so-called “Truth v. Justice”-debate which ensued in its wake, 
brought with them profound changes to this configuration of “truth,” “justice,” and 
“reconciliation” in transitional justice.22 In the practice of the TRC, individuals who 
confessed to having committed a violent felony of a political nature could thereupon 
be granted amnesty.23 Consequently, as Chandra Lekha Sriram argues, truth 
commissions began to be “understood to entail an exchange of truth for justice,”24 
leading to the emergence of a dichotomous view of “truth” and “justice.” At the same 
																																																						
18 Priscilla Hayner, “Fifteen Truth Commissions – 1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study,” Human Rights 
Quarterly 16, no. 4 (1994), 597-655, at 607. 
19 Hayner, “Fifteen Truth Commissions,” 600. 
20 Zalaquett cited in Ben-Josef Hirsch, “Ideational Change,” 821. 
21 Mendez, “Accountability,” 267. Similarly, Margaret Popkin and Naomi Roht-Arriaza concluded that 
in the Chilean case, “truth became in effect a substitute, not a complement, to justice.” (Margaret 
Popkin, Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “Truth as Justice: Investigatory Commissions in Latin America,” Law & 
Social Inquiry 20, no. 1 (1994), 79-116, at 113). 
22 Cf. Ben-Josef Hirsch, “Ideational Change,” 817. 
23 Cf. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, 43.  
24 Chandra Lekha Sriram, “Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding,” in Chandra Lekha Sriram, Suren 
Pillay (eds.), Peace versus Justice? The Dilemmas of Transitional Justice in Africa (Suffolk: James Currey, 
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time, the TRC successfully worked to do away with the notion of “reconciliation” as, 
in the words of its critic Mahmood Mamdani, “an unprincipled embrace of political 
evil.”25 Resulting from these shifts, many in the growing field of transitional justice 
began to think of truth commissions as no longer a lesser, but in fact a better alternative 
to trials.26 However, concurrently to the South African TRC, there had also been a 
number of efforts at implementing criminal accountability, most prominently through 
the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for 
Rwanda (ICTR)27, and hence the position that truth commissions were preferable to 
trials required explicit justification. During the “Truth v. Justice” debate28, a 
controversy waged mostly between political theorists and legal scholars, truth 
commissions were argued to be more efficient and more effective than trials: they were 
seen as less time-consuming, less expensive, and less socially divisive.29 Taken 
together, the South African TRC and the “Truth v. Justice” debate uncoupled “truth” 
from “justice” and linked it to “reconciliation,” entailing a revaluation of 
“reconciliation” as a goal and of truth commissions as instruments of transitional 
justice. 
In addition, the South African TRC also brought with it changes in the signification of 
the terms “truth,” “justice,” and “reconciliation.” Whereas previous commissions had 
worked on the basis of a more or less unitary idea of “truth” as objective fact, the TRC 
broke up the truth it sought into four different kinds30: “factual” and “forensic” truth, 
or objective knowledge established by means of social-scientific methods; “personal” 
and “narrative” truth, or the stories victims told in the TRC’s public hearings; “social” 
or “dialogue” truth, or the awareness and comprehension established through societal 
																																																						
25 Mahmood Mamdani, “Amnesty or Impunity? A Preliminary Critique of the Report of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (TRC),” Diacritics 32, no. 3-4 (2002), 33-59, at 33. 
26 Cf. Ben-Josef Hirsch, “Ideational Change,” 812.  
27 Cf. Christine Bell, “Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-
Field,’” International Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 1 (2009), 5-27, at 8. 
28 Indicatively, cf. Robert I. Rotberg, Dennis Thompson (eds.), Truth V. Justice: The Morality of Truth 
Commissions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Hayner, Unspeakable Truths, ch. 7.  
29 Ben-Josef Hirsch, “Ideational Change,” 819f.  
30 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South 
Africa Report (Cape Town, South Africa: Juta & Co, 1998). 
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interactions surrounding the TRC; and “restorative” truth, or acknowledgement and 
validation of what happened.31 This last kind of truth was furthermore linked to a new 
notion of “justice.” As formulated by Desmond Tutu, the Chair of the TRC,  
“retributive justice [...] is not the only form of justice [...] there is another kind of justice, 
restorative justice, which was characteristic of traditional African jurisprudence. Here 
the central concern is not retribution or punishment but […] the restoration of broken 
relationships.”32  
Within restorative justice thus conceived, the assumption was that amnesty and truth-
telling furthered “reconciliation” – implying, as its flipside, an equation of retributive 
justice with vicious cycles of violence.33 Overall, the TRC produced, as Moon shows, 
“a new set of creeds”: “truth, catharsis, healing, reconciliation.”34 It was within this set 
of beliefs that, for the first time, knowledge of past violence was prominently linked 
to the prevention of future violence. Here, then, was one of the origins of the taken for 
granted assumption which had gotten me interested in transitional justice in the first 
place.35 
However, the next major reversal of transitional justice’s composition was already in 
the offing: for in the beginning of the new millennium, the assumption of a dilemma 
of “truth versus justice” was displaced by the notion that the different aims and 
instruments of transitional justice were compatible with one another, indeed mutually 
																																																						
31 Cf. Audrey R. Chapman, Patrick Ball, “The Truth of Truth Commissions: Comparative Lessons from 
Haiti, South Africa, and Guatemala,” Human Rights Quarterly 23, no. 1, 1-43, at 10f. As Chapman and 
Ball highlight, “[t]he TRC's ‘forms of truth’ encode as ‘truths’ ideas that other commissions may have 
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(Chapman, Ball, “Truth of Truth Commissions,” 10): what was new were not these ideas as such, but 
their subsumption under the term “truth.” 
32 Tutu cited in Claire Moon, “Healing Past Violence,” 81, emphasis in original.  
33 Cf. M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Accountability,” 
Law and Contemporary Problems 59, no. 4, 9-28, at 23; Elizabeth Kiss, “Moral Ambition within and 
beyond Political Constraints,” in Robert I. Rotberg, Dennis Thompson (eds.), Truth V. Justice: The 
Morality of Truth Commissions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 68-99, at 73. 
34 Moon, Claire, “Healing Past Violence,” 71. 
35 Cf. Michal Ben-Josef Hirsch, And the Truth Shall Make You Free: The International Norm of Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions (Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, June 2009). 
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reinforcing.36 In this “holistic” take on transitional justice37, the idea, in Jon Elster’s 
terms, was that “all good things necessarily go together,”38 or as Kimberly Theidon put 
it, that “more truth = more justice = reconciliation.”39 Transitional justice’s instruments 
ceased being conceived of as alternative choices; instead, the question became how 
best to combine the work of criminal trials with that of truth commissions.40 What is 
more, “truth” was no longer associated exclusively with truth commissions, but was 
now seen as a goal of all of transitional justice’s instruments.41  
What can be gleaned from this brief history of “truth” in transitional justice? Most 
significantly, even in this circumscribed context, the above discussion shows that truth 
has a history – and that this history can be accessed in different ways. One could, as I 
had imagined at the outset, look at changing understandings and valuations of 
“truth.” But one could also look at the history of the instruments through which truth 
was to be found, i.e. at criminal trials and commissions of inquiry – and indeed, this is 
how I set out to research several of the chapters to come. Wondering about and looking 
into the history of these instruments, however, also opened up several additional paths 
of inquiry, and hence turned out to be one of the ways in which my interest in 
transitional justice began to shift and change.  
 
From “reconciliation through truth” to war as an object of knowledge and action  
To locate war as an object of knowledge and action within transitional justice, I here 
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want to look at three developments which characterize the field’s by now almost four 
decades long history: the heightening of the expectations associated with transitional 
justice’s search for “truth,” the broadening of its scope of application to include 
different kinds of violence, and the expansion of its spectrum of framings and 
formulations for deeming these violences problematic.  
A first noteworthy development within transitional justice – and one which the 
previous section has already hinted at – has been the expansion of the range of aims 
which truth-seeking is hoped to achieve. As Popkin and Roht-Arriaza explain, in the 
context of the early transitional justice processes in Latin America, truth-seeking was 
expected to contribute to  
“creating an authoritative record of what happened; providing a platform for the 
victims to tell their stories and obtain some form of redress; recommending legislative, 
structural, or other changes to avoid repetition of past abuses; and establishing who 
was responsible and providing a measure of accountability for the perpetrators.”42 
Notably, Popkin and Roht-Arriaza did not presume that knowledge of past violence 
would directly contribute to the prevention of future violence; rather, they imagined 
that the truths established by transitional justice could inform decisions about changes 
to a country’s political system. More generally, they sensed that there were “clear 
limits” to how much truth transitional justice could expect to establish, and they 
warned that calls for truth-seeking to contribute to accountability and reconciliation 
ought to be careful not to “raise unrealistic expectations.”43  
Soon, however, these comparatively modest expectations about what “truth” was 
capable of achieving within transitional justice processes were heightened markedly.44 
As Moon shows, within the South African TRC’s practice, both individual victims and 
perpetrators and the South African nation as a whole were understood to be 
“amenable to the application of therapeutic assumptions (denial, healing, catharsis, 
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43 Ibid., 116. 
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closure) and technologies (truth-telling, confession).”45 From this assumption, it was 
only a small step towards the presupposition that “truth” could facilitate not only 
“individual recovery,” but also “societal reconstruction.”46 At this juncture within the 
history of transitional justice, “truth,” through mechanisms ranging from social 
healing, justice, and public education to preemption and deterrence, came to be seen, 
in David Mendeloff’s terms, as “essential to achiev[ing] lasting, ‘self-enforcing’ 
peace.”47 It was in this sense that the report of the Sierra Leonean Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission declared that “[i]t is only through generating such 
understanding that the horrors of the past can effectively be prevented from occurring 
again. Knowledge and understanding are the most powerful deterrents against 
conflict and war.”48 Hence, as truth-seeking in transitional justice became exactly the 
kind of “panacea” of which Popkin and Roht-Arriaza had warned49, among the 
problems to which it was thought to constitute a remedy were violent conflict and war.  
A second development within transitional justice, closely entangled with the 
heightening of expectations associated with truth-seeking, has been the broadening of 
its scope of application to include different kinds of violence. The early transitional 
justice processes in Argentina and Chile were set up during negotiated transitions 
from military dictatorships to democracy and constituted a response to forced 
disappearances, torture, and summary killings carried out by agents of the state.50 
Since then, transitional justice has seen a progressive expansion of the range of 
violences in response to which it has been employed.51 In Guatemala, Rwanda, and the 
former Yugoslavia, for instance, transitional justice’s instruments have been used to 
investigate instances of genocidal violence.52 Transitional justice has also been used to 
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investigate different kinds of “historical” violence, such as the violence of settler-
colonialism in Australia and Canada or also the violence of slavery and indentured 
labour in Mauritius.53 Finally, transitional justice has also become a way of 
investigating, in the aftermaths of internal as well as international wars, instances of 
war-time violence against civilians including both individual homicides and 
massacres of entire communities.54 Hence, as transitional justice’s originally narrow 
focus on transitions to democracy broadened to include within its ambit post-conflict 
and peacebuilding situations55, it became increasingly conceivable to view war as a 
problem for transitional justice to address. 
Concurrently to these expansions of the expectations associated with truth-seeking 
and of the range of violences that transitional justice seeks to deal with, a third 
development within the field which is of relevance here is its broadening of the 
spectrum of frames and formulations through which it deemed these violences to 
constitute addressable problems. Unsurprisingly for a field founded mostly by jurists, 
the violences which transitional justice intended to counteract were initially framed as 
legal problems, and legal formulations of the problem at stake continue to play a key 
role in transitional justice today. From the very early days of transitional justice up to 
and including the South African TRC, its instruments were meant specifically to 
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respond to “gross human rights violations.”56 An additional legal framing of the 
problem was introduced into transitional justice by the ICTY and the ICTR’s 
prosecution and trial of instances of violence constituting different kinds of 
international crimes – including breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
violations of the laws and customs of war, and crimes against humanity. From around 
the turn of the millennium, transitional justice has regularly used the two legal lenses 
provided by human rights law and international criminal law conjointly.57 What is 
more, the two legal formulations of the problems of violence that transitional justice 
seeks to address have found a permanent institutional form in the jurisdictional 
practice of different regional human rights courts and the International Criminal Court 
(ICC).58 Finally, and of particular interest for this thesis, the jurisdiction of the ICC has 
recently been extended to include the crime of aggression, signifying the renewed 
criminalization of war as an instrument of inter-state politics.59 
At least since the South African TRC, however, there have also been attempts at 
broadening the range of frames and formulations through which transitional justice 
could deem problematic the different violences it sought to deal with. The TRC, for 
one, coupled its framing of the violences of apartheid as “gross violations of human 
rights” with religious and therapeutic tropes that made of these human rights 
violations problems necessitating redemption and healing. While this legal-religious-
therapeutic formulation was widely acclaimed as a model for other cases of 
transitional justice60, it has also been criticized for obliterating the collective, systemic 
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and racist nature of apartheid’s violence.61 In this vein, Mamdani has called attention 
to how the TRC “reduced apartheid from a relationship between the state and entire 
communities to one between the state and individuals,”62 and Leebaw has highlighted 
how the TRC “was able to focus on political violence committed by parties on both 
sides of the struggle because its mandate was designed to investigate crimes 
committed in excess of apartheid, rather than the violence of apartheid.”63 
Unlike Mamdani’s and Leebaw’s principled criticism of transitional justice’s framing 
of the problem at stake, the social scientists and peacebuilding practitioners who began 
to engage with transitional justice from the early 2000s onwards brought a more 
pragmatic kind of change to the field’s formulations of violence as problematic.64 For 
them, human rights violations and international crimes were not only legal problems, 
and moreover not the only problems that transitional justice could address. Mendeloff, 
for example, argued that transitional justice’s 
“‘truth-telling’ speaks to three distinct, yet overlapping issues: (a) the causes and 
prevention of war, (b) human rights violations during peacetime, and (c) the 
commission of crimes during wartime. The present essay is concerned with the first 
issue. The others are important and may have some implications for war prevention, 
but they are ultimately distinct. Thus, truth-telling may play a role in preventing 
human rights violations during peacetime or preventing the commission of crimes 
during wartime, but these concerns are analytically distinct from its role in preventing 
war.”65 
From Mendeloff’s social scientific perspective on transitional justice, legal framings 
were hence not the only ones through which the problems that transitional justice was 
to address could be conceived. What is more, the human rights violations and 
international crimes highlighted by such framings did not constitute the main problem 
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at stake in transitional justice’s quest for “truth” and “reconciliation.” Instead, the key 
issue was the prevention of war.66  
At the intersection of the three developments sketched in the preceding paragraphs, 
war today constitutes one of the problems that transitional justice is meant to deal 
with. As the ambit of transitional justice has broadened to include many different 
kinds of large-scale, state-sponsored violences, war has become a problem which falls 
into the remit of transitional justice. Moreover, as truth-seeking has assumed a status 
of a panacea in response to all of these violences, it is assumed that transitional justice 
can help to address the problem of war by producing knowledge about it. To this end, 
transitional justice has at its disposal a number of different frames and formulations 
for deeming war problematic, including in particular legal and social scientific frames. 
In this way, transitional justice is but one contemporary example of how our ways of 
knowing help to (re-)produce how war constitutes a problem of international politics.  
At the same time, however, the notion that within transitional justice there are 
available different formulations for rendering war and other violences problematic is 
informed by my research of other, historical examples as well as by my 
reconceptualization of genealogy as problematization (points which will be discussed 
in later chapters). In this way, this notion is thus also an example of what it might for 
mean to look at one’s genealogical starting point anew.  
 
Towards a genealogy of war as a problem of international politics 
As transitional justice has become an increasingly ordinary – i.e. normalized and 
standardized – approach within international post-atrocity politics, it has been 
suggested that there was “a growing unease” among practitioners and scholars over 
the nature of the field. In Christine Bell’s formulation, is transitional justice  
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“‘good’ (an extension of human rights discourse, or necessary to democratization or 
peace), ‘bad’ (imperialist, hegemonic, impunity serving or promoting a dangerous 
legal exceptionalism), or a value-neutral tool with which both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ goals 
can be pursued”?67  
As Bell’s question indicates, the most common kind of criticism of transitional justice 
is one that aims at definitive evaluation and judgment. With regard to the field’s 
assumptions about “truth” and its instrumentality for the prevention of war and 
violence, the two most often-raised concerns are that transitional justice’s underlying 
assumptions too regularly go unquestioned and that transitional justice’s impact is 
adjudicated on the basis of rather too scant empirical evidence.68 
In light of these desiderata, self-acclaimed critical transitional justice scholarship 
mostly conceives of “truth” as an empirical and/or theoretical problem. With the aim 
of better specifying the causal relationship in which “truth” stands to the non-
recurrence of war and other violences, empirical research into transitional justice 
disaggregates “truth” and its presumed effects to then engage in “scientific” (i.e. 
“systematic”) data collection and analysis.69 Meanwhile, theoretical research on 
transitional justice draws on legal and political philosophy to more exactly specify 
definitions of “truth” and its various effects.70 Overall, by taking a problem-solving 
																																																						
67 Bell, “Transitional Justice and the State of the ‘Field,’” 6. 
68 Cf. Daly, “Truth Skepticism,” 38; Lisa Laplante, Kimberly Theidon, “Truth with Consequences: 
Justice and Reparations in Post-Truth Commission Peru,” Human Rights Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2007), 228-
250, at 229; Mendeloff, “Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling,” 356f.; Nauenberg, “Spreading the Truth,” 655, 
659. 
69 Phuong Pham, Patrick Vinck, “Empirical Research and the Development and Assessment of 
Transitional Justice Mechanisms,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 1, no. 2 (2007), 231–248, at 
232, fn. 6; cf. Vinjamuri, Snyder, “Advocacy and Scholarship,” 346. For examples, cf. Kirsten Ainley, 
Rebekka Friedman, Chris Mahony, “Transitional Justice in Sierra Leone: Theory, History and 
Evaluation,” in: Kirsten Ainley, Rebekka Friedman, Chris Mahony (eds.), Evaluating Transitional 
Justice: Accountability and Peacebuilding in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015), 1-18; Brahm, “Uncovering the Truth”; Chapman, Ball, “Truth of Truth 
Commissions”; Hugo van der Merwe, Victoria Baxter, Audrey Chapman (eds.), Assessing the Impact of 
Transitional Justice: Challenges for Empirical Research (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 
2009). 
70 E.g. Leebaw, “Irreconcilable Goals”; Colleen Murphy, A Moral Theory of Political Reconciliation 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Andrew Schaap, Political Reconciliation (New 
York, NY: Routledge, 2005). Of course, some scholars also take an approach that combines empirical 
and theoretical research (e.g. Daly, “Truth Skepticism”; Mendeloff, “Truth-Seeking, Truth-Telling”). 
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approach, these empirical and theoretical variants of critical transitional research seek 
to judge and improve transitional justice and its take on “truth” on the basis of 
empirical evidence and logical rigour. 
In an important sense, however, the critical scholarship just sketched out undertakes 
no more than a limited critique of transitional justice and its assumptions about “truth” 
and the prevention of war. As Zinaida Miller points out, “rather than offering a critical 
exploration,” this kind of self-purported critical transitional justice research contents 
itself with discussing “the possible ‘toolbox’ or the ‘lessons learned.’”71 Within such a 
toolbox-approach, “truth” is either a theoretical problem of reaching – or rather, failing 
to reach – an abstract ideal, or else it is a practical difficulty that can be addressed and 
improved upon by means of evidence-based tweaking of truth-seeking processes. 
Striving to provide a determinative analysis of “truth” and its instrumentality for 
hindering war, such critical inquiries of transitional justice remain firmly within what 
Anne Orford calls “the register of truth and falsity”72: uninterested in the political life 
of their analytical terms and categories, they do not ask what “truth,” as a category of 
transitional justice research and practice, “makes possible, brings into being, or does 
in the world.”73 
What, then, could a “critical exploration” of transitional justice that sought to go 
beyond this limited critique actually consist in? One possibility would be to search for 
invisibilities surrounding the beacon of “truth,” such as structures of economic and/or 
gendered inequalities, and to point out these invisibilities’ political effects.74 Another 
possibility would be to analyze truth-seeking as performative and thereby as 
productive of a “reconciliation” of individuals and nations that is necessarily 
																																																						
71 Zinaida Miller, “Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the 'Economic' in Transitional Justice,” 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 2, no. 3 (2008), 266–291, at 290. 
72 Anne Orford, “Commissioning the Truth,” Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 15, no. 3 (2006), 851-
883, at 859. 
73 Ibid., 855. 
74 Cf. Kirsten Campbell, “The Gender of Transitional Justice: Law, Sexual Violence, and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 
1, no. 3 (2007), 411-432; Miller, “Effects of Invisibility”; Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, “Political Violence and 
Gender during Times of Transition,” Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 15, no. 3 (2006), 829-849. 
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understood in the exclusionary terms of liberalism and its ideals of statehood and 
modern temporality.75 While analyses developed along these lines have shed many 
valuable insights into the curiously “self-evident virtue”76 of truth-seeking, in this 
thesis I pursue a different route. Taking my cue from the foregoing discussion of “war” 
and its violences as variously formulated problems as well as of “truth” as a means for 
addressing these problems, I argue that another possibility for a critical inquiry into 
the political life of our analytical terms and categories is to proceed by seeking insight 
into these categories’ histories.  
More specifically, and using as my starting point the example provided by transitional 
justice77, the critique I aspire to in this thesis consists in a genealogy of how war became 
an object of knowledge and action and, as such, a problem of international politics. 
This means that this thesis is not a critique of transitional justice – not because 
transitional justice would not constitute a worthwhile topic, but rather because, as I 
hope the foregoing discussion has made clear, once I started to work on the history of 
some of what we see in transitional justice today, the subject matter of this history 
began to shift and change. Starting with an interest in transitional justice’s assumption 
that knowing the “truth” about past violence is crucial to the prevention of future 
violence, the genealogy I developed ended up focusing on war as an epistemic and 
therefore an actionable object. In a sense, then, the genealogy proposed by this thesis 
still attends to the knowledge-action-nexus which transitional justice exemplifies – to 
																																																						
75 Cf. Orford, “Commissioning the Truth”; Berber Bevernage, “Writing the Past Out of the Present: 
History and the Politics of Time in Transitional Justice,” History Workshop Journal 69, no. 1 (2010), 111-
131. 
76 Bevernage, “Writing the Past Out of the Present,” 111. 
77 Here, it could be argued that whereas transitional justice mostly deals with internal armed conflicts, 
my focus in the chapters to follow is on international war. However, as I have tried to show in this 
part of the chapter, transitional justice mechanisms – in particular criminal trials – are increasingly 
applied in the aftermath of international wars. Moreover, with the recent activation of the ICC’s 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, the problem of international war is potentially moving 
further to the centre of transitional justice’s attention. Finally, while the logics of these two kinds of 
war differ in many respects, the logics according to which knowledge is used to address these two 
kinds of war as problematic are not all that dissimilar – as evidenced not least by the fact that scholars 
of transitional justice often invoke initiatives for dealing with international wars, such as the 
International Military Tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo, as part of the “genealogy” of transitional 
justice (cf. Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy“) – a point to which I will return in Chapter 5. 
 
	 54 
the idea that knowledge of past war is necessary for prevention of future war, and to 
the practices attendant to this idea – but it goes beyond transitional justice in order to 
investigates this nexus. 
While a more detailed argument for genealogy as a particular kind of critique will have 
to wait until Chapter 2 of the thesis, what bears explication here is in how far a 
genealogical critique proceeds in a register different from that of truth or falsity, good 
or bad. The critical aim of a genealogy of the problem of war is not to issue a definitive 
account and judgment of our ways of dealing with war (such as, for instance, 
transitional justice), and most certainly it is not to suggest that we ought to stop 
seeking knowledge about and taking action against war. Rather, genealogy aims to 
render visible, reflect upon, and enable further work on the preconditions and the 
constitutive exclusions of our ways of problematizing war. To illustrate what is meant 
by this, think of the criticism that the South African TRC incurred for framing the 
violence it sought to address in a way that obfuscated the structural – historical, 
political, and social – nature of this violence: what was excluded from the formulation 
of the problem chosen by the TRC helped to define that which was included, namely 
violence as perpetrated by and carried out against individuals. Not unlike these 
criticisms of the TRC, the genealogy developed in this thesis hopes to recognize some 
of the constitutive exclusions of the problem of war in international politics. 
To set myself a final task to be taken on in the chapters to follow, I want to argue that 
genealogy constitutes a very suitable way for getting to work on the preconditions and 
constitutive exclusions of our ways of knowing about and acting against war. My 
genealogical interest in the problem of war and our ways of addressing it is similar to 
the targets pursued by some of the kinds of critique mentioned earlier, critiques which 
sought to demonstrate the invisibilities surrounding transitional justice and the 
productive effects of its language. Ultimately, however, the genealogy I propose 
pursues these issues in a different way: it focuses on the historical coming about of our 
ways of knowing war, on the practices which constitute these ways, and on the co-
productive relationship between these ways and practices and our formulations of the 
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problem of war. Through this focus, genealogy constitutes a prime way of getting to 
work on the first of the two problems this thesis deals with, the problem of war in 
international politics.  
At the same time, however, genealogy also constitutes the second problem that this 
thesis sets out to work on. How it does so is the subject of the second part of this 
chapter. 
 
Methods as ready-mades: the example of genealogy  
Since the late 1980s, genealogical analyses in IR have inquired into many of the 
research objects with which the discipline most centrally concerns itself. IR 
genealogists have scrutinized matters such as diplomacy78, sovereignty79, and various 
international norms relating to warfare and the use of force in international politics 
(e.g. the taboo against the use of chemical weapons in war80 and the distinctions 
between the combatant and the civilian81 and between the regular combatant and the 
irregular fighter82). Tracing histories where none had been assumed to exist, this kind 
of genealogical research in IR has successfully put into question international 
practices, institutions, and principles which had previously been all but taken for 
granted. Not least owing to these analytical achievements, genealogy is today often 
presented as a standard instrument for the interpretive and/or critical study of 
																																																						
78 Der Derian, On Diplomacy. 
79 Bartelson, Genealogy of Sovereignty; Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State and 
Symbolic Exchange (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
80 Richard Price, Chemical Weapons Taboo (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).	
81 Helen Kinsella, The Image Before the Weapon: A Critical History of the Distinction Between the Combatant 
and the Civilian (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011). 
82 Sibylle Scheipers, Unlawful Combatants: A Genealogy of the Irregular Fighter (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2015). 
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international politics – it is acclaimed as a “research tool,”83 a “heuristic guide,”84 or, 
most straightforwardly, as a “method.”85  
Originally, it was this idea of genealogy as a method for inquiring into the history of 
that which we take for granted which intrigued me. As I was interested in transitional 
justice’s curious assumption that knowing the “truth” about past violence is 
imperative for the prevention of future violence, my initial plan was to use genealogy 
as a method to study the history this assumption. Yet as I set out to put this plan into 
action, not only did my interest in transitional justice begin to reconfigure, but I soon 
also became preoccupied with what it actually meant to do a genealogy.  
Published during the late 1980s to mid-1990s, early genealogical analyses in IR had on 
the whole been reluctant to embrace genealogy as a method. Some of them were even 
outrightly hostile to what they perceived to be an excessive and undue 
“methodologism”86 – an expectation that proper research ought to specify its analytical 
procedures prior to applying them in practice.87 By contrast, more recent formulations 
of genealogy as a research instrument seemed to proceed in exactly the manner which 
early genealogists opposed: they carefully defined their main analytical steps prior to 
actually carrying out the analysis. This, they argued, was necessary to make genealogy 
usable for a critical inquiry into our problematizations, our disciplines, and ourselves 
as knowledgeable subjects.88 As I worked my way first backward from recent to early 
proposals for genealogical research in IR and then forward through the genealogy that 
																																																						
83 Srdjan Vucetic, “Genealogy as a Research Tool in International Relations,” Review of International 
Studies 37, no. 3 (2011), 1295-1312, at 1296. 
84 Scott Hamilton, “A Genealogy of Metatheory in IR: How ‘Ontology’ Emerged from the Inter-
Paradigm Debate,” International Theory 9, no. 1 (2016), 136-170, at 144. 
85 Philippe Bonditti, Andrew Neal, Sven Opitz, Chris Zebrowski, “Genealogy,” in Claudia Aradau, Jef 
Huysmans, Andrew Neal, Nadine Voelkner (eds.), Critical Security Methods: New Frameworks for 
Analysis (London, UK: Routledge, 2015), 159-188, e.g. at 160; Stefan Borg, “Genealogy as Critique in 
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Political Theory 14, no. 1, 41-59, at 43. 
86 James Der Derian, “The Boundaries of Knowledge,” 7. 
87 On methodologism, cf. Charles Guignon, “Williams and the Phenomenological Tradition,” in Daniel 
Callcut (ed.), Reading Bernard Williams (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2003), 166-188, at 169.  
88 Cf. e.g. Bonditti et al., “Genealogy,“ 178; Hamilton, “A Genealogy of Metatheory,“ 161f. 
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I was to add to this literature, I increasingly strayed from the idea of genealogy as 
method – so much so, in fact, that I am now finding myself opposed to it. 
Therefore, my aim in this second part of the chapter is again twofold. On the one hand, 
to establish a second starting point for the genealogical analysis to come, I want to 
explain what exactly I find problematic about the understanding and practice of 
genealogy as a method: namely, that insofar as method implies that we fix our 
procedures prior to having achieved the critical insights that we aim to produce, it also 
entails that these procedures cannot themselves be the subject of these insights. On the 
other hand, I want to account for how I came to this second starting point. Since my 
initial understanding of and practical prappling with genealogy were informed not 
least by some of the many genealogical studies which have been undertaken in IR, in 
this part of the chapter I therefore want to offer my reading of this particular literature.  
To achieve this dual purpose, I first survey a number of recent proposals on genealogy 
in IR as to their understanding of genealogy and of method.89 Here, I find that these 
proposals, by undertaking a two-step procedure in which genealogy is first specified 
and then applied, often tend to hold constant the practice of genealogy. Next, I ask the 
same questions of two examples of early genealogical works in IR, James Der Derian’s 
On Diplomacy90 and Jens Bartelson’s A Genealogy of Sovereignty.91 Teasing out the 
different ways in which these authors introduce a practically reflexive moment into 
their genealogies, I argue that this kind of moment is what current proposals for 
genealogy as method are lacking. In concluding, I elaborate why genealogy as method 
constitutes a problem for this thesis in particular and how genealogy as reflexive 
																																																						
89 There are myriad genealogical studies in IR today (for a few examples from different subfields of IR, 
cf. Claudia Aradau, Rens van Munster, Politics of Catastrophe: Genealogies of the Unknown (London, UK: 
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90 Der Derian, On Diplomacy. 
91 Bartelson, Genealogy of Sovereignty. 
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praxis can develop a farther-reaching critique of our problematizations, our 
disciplines, and ourselves.  
 
Genealogy in contemporary IR: methodologism and the limits of critique 
Today, genealogy is often construed as a method for IR. On the face of it, this construal 
might seem a rhetorical move. On the one hand, laying claim to “method” can wield 
considerable persuasive power in IR. Thus, Neumann labels genealogy a “method” to 
discipline poststructuralists92, and Bonditti and colleagues do so in order to subvert 
security as the foundational problem of critical security studies.93 On the other hand, 
in many of IR’s critical quarters “method” is considered a tainted term94, and hence to 
refrain from calling genealogy a “method” is a rhetorical act just as well. In this vein, 
to make genealogy seem more appealing to a wider audience without, however, 
alienating genealogy’s staunchly critical adherents, Hamilton speaks of genealogy as 
a “heuristic guide,” a “recipe” or a “toolkit,”95 and Vucetic refers to it as a “research 
tool” or also a “research strategy.”96 In sum, one reading of IR’s current understanding 
of genealogy as a method is to see these acts of labeling as attempts at persuading 
disciplinary audiences to take seriously genealogical analyses. 
My main concern in this part of the chapter, however, is less with the rhetoric than 
with the understanding and practice of genealogy as method, irrespective of whether 
or not one calls it thus. My contention is that genealogy as method consists, inter alia, 
in a particular practice: namely, the practice of specifying what genealogy is, and how 
one does it, to the effect of fabricating it as a tool to subsequently be applied in an 
analysis of international politics. This practice of genealogy as method is discernible, 
for instance, in the “methodological discussions of genealogy” which, according to 
																																																						
92 Neumann, “Poststructuralists also have a Duty.” 
93 Bonditti et al., “Genealogy,” 176ff. 
94 As noted by Aradau, Huysmans, “Critical methods in IR,” 601. 
95 Hamilton, “A Genealogy of Metatheory,” e.g. 144. 
96 Vucetic, “Genealogy as a Research Tool.” 
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Vucetic, have since the mid-2000s become “de rigeur” in IR.97 These discussions have 
been conducted through dedicated chapters or articles98 which usually have in 
common at least three elements: a definition of their particular aim in promoting 
genealogy in relation to one or another of IR’s major fault-lines; a reference to 
genealogy’s “different” nature; and a specification of the analytical steps and 
procedures that genealogy ought to consist in. Proceeding in this way, these 
methodological discussions of genealogy in some sense end up evacuating the 
contemplation and construction of genealogy’s analytical procedures from the actual 
analysis. In turn, this has the effect of limiting genealogy’s critical capacity: for it 
renders void genealogy’s ability to achieve practically reflexive insights into the 
entanglement of knowledge and power, or into how our genealogical practices and 
ways of knowing are productive of and in turn produced by our problematizations, 
our disciplines, and ourselves as knowledgeable subjects. 
To start with, how do contemporary proposals for practicing genealogy as a method 
define their aims? As a first example, consider Scott Hamilton’s plea for “the use of 
genealogical methodologies” for sounding out and transcending IR’s disciplinary 
limits.99 In particular, Hamilton employs genealogy to disengage from and go beyond 
the practice of conceiving one’s research in terms of one or another static ontology.100 
A second example is provided by Vucetic’s article, whose “purpose […] is to bring 
attention and discussion to genealogy as a research tool in IR.”101 In doing so, Vucetic’s 
wider aim is to put into perspective the difference between positivist and post-
positivist analyses, between a concern with causal as opposed to constitutive relations, 
or between – as formulated for IR by Hollis and Smith – explanation and 
																																																						
97 Ibid., 1305, italics in original. 
98 Vucetic notes approvingly that, for instance, Hansen’s Security as Practice “commits an entire 
chapter, and then some, on methodological trade-offs in genealogical scholarship” (ibid.). 
99 Hamilton, “A Genealogy of Metatheory,“ 140 
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understanding.102 Finally, the aim of a chapter by Philippe Bonditti and colleagues is 
to show “the value of genealogy as a critical method to study security.”103 Thereby, 
they inter alia hope to interrupt and render criticizable how “security” as a research 
object contributes to the constitution of authority and power within the discipline of 
(critical) security studies. 
Next, contemporary IR proposals for practicing genealogy as a method usually also 
contain an appreciation of genealogy as a “different” kind of history, and without fail 
include a reference to some of Nietzsche’s and Foucault’s famous pronouncements on 
the matter. Hamilton, for instance, repeatedly stresses that “a genealogy works 
differently”104: that it is a distinct and radical kind of historical analysis whose purpose 
it is to open to question all that we previously took for granted, making “no universals 
allowed” the cardinal rule of genealogical thinking.105 Vucetic likewise points to the 
well-rehearsed argument that genealogies show “that there were no universal truths 
in history.”106 Bonditti and colleagues, finally, juxtapose genealogy and “(mere) 
history” to argue that “genealogy does not aspire to representation but to a 
problematization of historical representation.”107 
Embedded within their appraisals of genealogy as a different kind of history, all three 
texts also develop an argument about genealogy as an analysis of knowledge. 
Hamilton, for instance, specifically emphasizes genealogy’s ability to show “how 
forms of knowledge […] that are considered to be universal or obvious are actually 
temporal and historical”108 and to thereby enable us “to think and do otherwise.”109 
Meanwhile, Vucetic holds that “genealogy is a distinctive historical, interpretative 
research tool suited for the making of epistemologically varied truth-claims”110 – 
																																																						
102 Cf. ibid., 1296, 1304ff. See also Hollis, Smith, Explaining and Understanding. 
103 Bonditti et al., “Genealogy,“ 159. 
104 Hamilton, “A Genealogy of Metatheory,“ e.g. 138, 142. 
105 Ibid., 144. 
106 Vucetic, “Genealogy as a research tool,“ 1295. 
107 Bonditti et al., “Genealogy,“ 162ff. 
108 Hamilton, “A Genealogy of Metatheory,“ 143. 
109 Ibid. 
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including both relatively standard kinds of claims about causality and unique claims 
about the causal interrelationship of power and knowledge and about “political 
histories of truth.”111 Lastly, for Bonditti and colleagues, genealogy as history “exposes 
the power relations and stakes involved in constituting ‘security’ as an object of 
knowledge to be studied by authoritative, knowledgeable subjects,” thereby aiming to 
“open up the field of action in the present.”112 
Having affirmed their disciplinary purposes and appraised genealogy as a distinctive 
kind of history of, amongst other things, power and knowledge, methodological 
discussions of genealogy within IR then proceed to specify the analytical moves that 
genealogy ought to undertake. These blueprints of genealogy as an enumeration of 
steps include different concepts to be used and/or different procedures for gathering 
and analyzing data. Since my contention is that this methodologism – the practice of 
comprehensively defining genealogy’s various measures prior to the empirical 
analysis – risks limiting genealogy’s potential for reflexive insight into and critique of 
its own entanglement within varied histories of knowledge, how different authors 
develop and implement genealogy as a tool or toolbox merits a closer look. 
While Hamilton emphasizes the historicity of forms of knowledge, the particular form 
of knowledge that is genealogy appears to be exempt from this onslaught on 
universalisms. Hamilton suggests for genealogy to have an “essence”113 and insists 
that there are “four crucial stages or steps” which “any genealogical analysis” must 
undertake, namely “problematization, practice, rationality, and emergence” (which he 
then elaborates at some length).114 He immediately qualifies the intention behind this 
definition of genealogy, clarifying that “this article is not a declaration of what every 
genealogy was, is, should, or can be, but is a recipe or toolkit that scholars may draw 
upon in the future when conducting their own [genealogies].”115 Nonetheless, his 
																																																						
111 Cf. ibid., 1312. 
112 Bonditti et al., “Genealogy,“ 162ff. 
113 Hamilton, “A Genealogy of Metatheory,” 143. 
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aspiration is to delineate a number of concepts so as to make them into ready-made 
analytical tools for other genealogists to pick up and employ on their empirics. And 
this is how Hamilton proceeded, too: “After outlining four crucial steps in every 
genealogical analysis, [the article] applied these to IR’s philosophy of science debate 
by conducting a genealogy of metatheory in IR.”116 In this fashion, the “genealogical 
eye” – the analytical instrumentarium with which Hamilton seeks to look afresh at that 
which seems timeless and universal – is itself fixed prior to and held static throughout 
the analysis.  
For Vucetic, genealogy is, ideally and unapologetically, a method. More specifically, it 
is one of Foucault’s methods for researching discourses to show how they constitute 
subjects, how they produce what is thinkable, and how their multiplicity begets power 
and resistance, contestation and change.117 Vucetic concedes that it is possible to 
understand genealogy, as any other research tool, to be a “social item.”118 However, he 
gives rather short shrift to this view: since Foucault based his claims about the 
impossibility of truth as a universal on systematic empirical research and not on “some 
unfettered, subjective opinion,” Vucetic argues, it follows that one can sensibly 
construe and practice genealogy as a method.119 As a method, Vucetic then defines 
genealogy by “the well-known ‘three E’” – Bartelson’s episodes, examples, and 
effectiveness cited in the introduction of this chapter.120 These serve as criteria for the 
selection of data to be included in the analysis, and also as “a discourse analysis of 
historical documents” which allows the genealogist to draw comparisons within and 
across the selected examples and episodes.121 On the whole, Vucetic maintains that 
“[t]he mechanics of writing genealogy are similar to an interpretative study based on 
historical case studies.”122 His understanding of and argument for genealogy are thus 
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not unlike Hamilton’s: he defines what doing genealogy consists in prior to carrying 
out the analysis, thus holding constant genealogy’s conduct itself.  
For Bonditti and colleagues, “[t]he method [of genealogy] is to question the complex 
mechanisms in which a ‘particular truth’ becomes ‘the truth.’”123 To denote the two 
main “elements of a genealogy” by which to analytically implement this questioning, 
they propose two concepts, problematization and dispositif.124 Utilizing these two 
concepts, Bonditti et al. presume for genealogy to consist of four analytical steps: first, 
the identification of a contemporarily and/or historically contentious object; next, the 
determination of key moments of this phenomenon’s emergence as a solution to a 
problem; then, the analysis of the power struggles that took place surrounding these 
key moments of emergence; and finally, the evaluation of how the contentious object 
sits within a wider dispositif. The authors also explicate their methods for gathering 
and analyzing data and their selection criteria in deciding on sources.125 Though 
Bonditti and colleagues are driven by a more explicitly critical inclination than both 
Hamilton and Vucetic, they thus also engage in the self-same practice of specifying 
genealogy as a method prior to engaging in the empirical analysis.126 
Taken together, the texts by Hamilton, Vucetic, and Bonditti and colleagues exemplify 
what I refer to as the practice of genealogy as method: the two-step move in which a 
comprehensive definition of what doing genealogy consists in is provided prior to the 
actual doing of it. My contention is that this practice of genealogy as a method deprives 
genealogy of some of its reflexive and practical potential for critique. As the authors 
reviewed in this section also maintain, genealogical critique works by showing our 
ways of knowing to be historical and hence malleable: it is in this way that genealogy 
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enables us “to think and do otherwise.” However, conceiving and practicing 
genealogy as a method means, for many IR genealogists, to specify and hone their 
analytical tools before employing them on their empirical materials. In this way, recent 
methodological discussions of genealogy in IR run the risk of evacuating the practice 
of genealogy from the historicization of knowledge and power that it effects. In this 
way, the practice of genealogy as a method can end up restricting genealogy’s 
reflexively critical capacity.127  
This is not to say that the authors just reviewed did not consider questions of 
reflexivity – but rather that the practice of genealogy as method limits their capacity 
for taking action on such questions. For Hamilton, for instance, genealogy is a “de-
naturalization […] of ourselves in the present moment” which “asks how we are 
continuously constituted as historical subjects, and thus how we may think 
otherwise.”128 In the end, however, this reflexive “ethos”129 of genealogy turns out to 
be a passively contemplative rather than an actively political one, as in Hamilton’s 
view, genealogy helps us “to understand how we have come to think the way we do 
in the present moment, and to accept with humility that this moment will change. Just 
as thought is always ongoing and in process, and thus changes, so does its history.”130 
For Vucetic, because genealogy as a method can be neatly distinguished from 
genealogy as a political intervention, it is ultimately not necessary to consider it 
reflexively. Though genealogy’s task is “to suggest, directly or indirectly, alternative 
ways to constitute the aspect of humanity under study,”131 this task apparently does 
not extend to genealogy as a way of knowing, and rather than being (potentially) 
embodied within genealogical practice, “our political and ethical commitments […] 
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follow our analysis.”132 The most overtly practically reflexive understanding of 
genealogy is proposed by Bonditti and colleagues. Since genealogy “is always 
immanent to struggles and self-consciously political”133 and since it seeks “to intervene 
in history from within history,”134 the authors contend that it would be a “fallacy” to 
assume “that supposedly knowledgeable subjects (in this case, us) exist fully formed 
prior to encountering their object of analysis.”135 Therefore, they argue, genealogy 
ought to focus on the analyst’s inevitable entanglement in the relationship between 
power and knowledge.136 However, their reflexive concern does not seem to extend to 
genealogy as method: they do not seem to consider, that is, how genealogy as the 
practice of research is a productive part of the entanglement of objects, subjects, 
disciplines and problematizations that they seek to critically point out and work on.  
This is what, in the chapters to follow, I aim to do differently: unlike those who render 
genealogy a method, I seek to reflect on how the practice of genealogical analysis is 
intertwined with that which it analyzes, to expose this practice to the critical insights 
that it produces, and to actively try and alter this practice and its entanglement with 
our problematizations, our disciplines, and ourselves. To this end, in seeking to 
understand and practice genealogy as historical, in flux, and continuously in the 
making, I draw much inspiration from the first generation of IR genealogists who, in 
fact, built various practically reflexive dimensions into their analyses. How they did 
so – and what is to be learned from this today – is the subject of the next section of this 
part of the chapter. 
 
Conceptual and practical reflexivity in early IR genealogies 
Raised by contemporary proponents and critics of genealogy alike, a standard 
complaint about the first generation of genealogists in IR holds that their analyses were 
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deficient in terms of method. Neumann, for instance, admonishes “a certain lack of 
acknowledgement of the principle that poststructuralists have the same duty to care 
about the specifications of methodology as do all other scholars,”137 and Vucetic 
bemoans how “the authors of IR genealogies themselves,“ in what he considers to be 
an “anti-methodological” posturing, had a “tendency […] to provide no more than a 
couple of paragraphs on their research tool of choice.”138 Agreeing with these 
criticisms, Hamilton attributes the alleged shortcomings to the example set by 
Foucault, whose “inconsistent use of the term [method] makes a genealogical method 
difficult to pin down.”139 And while Bonditti and colleagues take a slightly more 
generous view of their genealogical predecessors, crediting them with having “opened 
the study of international relations to new ways of working and thinking,” they also 
find that early IR genealogies "downplayed questions of method.”140 
Here, I want to suggest a different reading of early genealogical works in IR, one which 
looks for lessons to be learned rather than for deficiencies to be deplored.141 To this 
end, I focus on how two of these works – Der Derian’s On Diplomacy and Bartelson’s 
Genealogy of Sovereignty – constituted reactions to what they took to be one of the most 
pressing disciplinary problems of their time142, namely positivism’s inability to account 
for the political nature of knowledge, and how in response to this problem they 
conceived of and implemented genealogy as an in practice reflexive analysis which 
historicized and processualized not only its objects, but also itself. To be sure, not all 
of the first generation of genealogies in IR included such a practically reflexive aspect. 
Richard Price’s genealogy of the chemical weapons taboo, for instance, is a 
“meditation” on technology, science and morality143, but does not include an explicit, 
let alone a practical feedback loop between its insights and its own conduct. Hence, 
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my review of Der Derian and Bartelson does not intend to suggest them as 
representative of the first decade of genealogy in IR. Rather, they constitute examples 
of the reflexive and practical critical potential that genealogy holds for research into 
knowledge and (international) politics, and it is in this sense that I will build on them 
in the chapters to come. 
For Der Derian, genealogy is an alternative to positivism insofar as it makes for a 
different kind of theory, or rather, a different way of doing theory. Using genealogy in 
tandem with dialectics, Der Derian seeks to conduct a “theoretical enquiry” into 
diplomacy’s forgotten past, problematic present, and (im-)possible future.144 In On 
Diplomacy, genealogy’s historical approach to knowledge and politics thus serves 
theoretical ends, or as Der Derian argues, “it takes a radical defamiliarization of 
diplomatic (pre-)history to resurrect questions which traditional diplomatic theory has 
failed to ask.”145 His genealogy of diplomacy forms part of his intervention into the 
debate between positivism and postpositivism in IR146, in which Der Derian “posits 
heterological, multipolar grids of knowledge and practice” against “monological, 
totalizing theory”147 to thereby provide “theoretical approaches which are new to the 
discipline.”148 In the context of this quest for postpositivist theory, genealogy is one of 
a variety of analytical means – “not so much a method as an intellectual activity” – 
through which analysts can “disturb habitual ways of thinking and acting in 
international relations” in order “to provide new intelligibilities and alternative 
possibilities for the field.”149  
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As such an intellectual activity, genealogy is not only “an open-ended” way of doing 
theory rather than an approach that requires fixing one’s theory prior to the analysis.150 
It is also a way of doing theory which takes theory itself to be “a knowledge practice” 
which has been “historically and often arbitrarily separated from ‘events’, that is, the 
materially inspired practices comprising the international society.”151 To remedy this 
state of affairs, Der Derian makes sense of his object of analysis, diplomacy, and of his 
own analytical practice, genealogy, through one and the same concept: alienation, or 
more specifically “the Hegelian notion of alienation” which, as Der Derian explains, 
“deals with the mutual production of power and truth.”152 While diplomacy is a 
response to and a mediation of the alienation that arose from the estrangement of men 
from men [sic] and of states from states153, genealogy seeks to respond to and mediate 
the alienation of theory (i.e., of theorists and their knowledge practices) from the 
world.154 Hence, Der Derian’s purpose in conducting his genealogy is not so much “to 
mediate between the data and the world,” as Neumann argues to then fault Der Derian 
for not doing this data-mediation properly.155 Rather, genealogy is to act as a broker 
between theory and the world, to bring theorization back into the world, and to make 
possible new ways of doing theory.156 Against a positivist understanding of theory as 
knowledge about the world that is not itself of the world, Der Derian, through the 
concept of alienation, proposes genealogy as a reflexive kind of theory which requires 
theorists to think themselves and their practices within the world they are 
theorizing.157 
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For Bartelson, genealogy is a different kind of history of ideas which allows him to 
take a position on the problem of positivism while positioning himself outside of the 
debate between positivism and postpositivism. By conducting a genealogy of 
sovereignty, Bartelson occupies himself not only “with the history of international 
political theory, which is a rather short one, but with the formation of the necessary 
constituents of such a discourse, and their relation to its emergence and later 
scientification.”158 As the term scientification already indicates, Bartelson’s analysis is 
centrally concerned with knowledge. More precisely, his interest lies with “political 
knowledge” and in particular with the question of “sovereignty and its relationship to 
truth.”159 In Bartelson’s view, both positivism and postpositivism in IR are unable to 
make sense of this relationship. While positivism fixes sovereignty to such an extent 
that it can no longer perceive the enabling role which sovereignty has played for 
knowledge160, postpositivism, in addressing the “twin fallacies of finalism and 
presentism,”161 goes too far and thus deteriorates into an “epistemic or conceptual 
relativism” which cannot comprehend this role either.162 In this way, Bartelson does 
not situate his own analysis within IR or the social sciences more generally, but takes 
these disciplines as “empirical discourses”163 or empirical contexts in which the 
relationship between sovereignty and knowledge can be analyzed. Instead, he situates 
himself in history in a dual sense of the term. For one, Bartelson conducts genealogy 
as a different kind of history of ideas that belongs to the genre of “histories of the 
present as inside stories,”164 as opposed to “histories of the past as outside stories”165 
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such as sociology of knowledge and contextualist or Cambridge School intellectual 
history.166 In turn, this positioning of genealogy as an “inside story” within history as 
an academic discipline implies that genealogy is also situated within history more 
generally.167  
From this location of genealogy within history stems its practically reflexive 
dimension. As “the main thesis of the book is that sovereignty and knowledge 
implicate each other logically and produce each other historically”168, Bartelson 
contends that to study this relationship between sovereignty and knowledge we need 
to find a way to “situate ourselves as detached spectators within history.”169 He 
achieves this by taking history to consist of text, here understood as discourse or also 
as narrative.170 If history is text, then genealogy, as a genre of the academic discipline 
of history and as part of history more generally, can be seen as a way of writing. 
Genealogy as “a study of history as narrative,” Bartelson argues, “must itself be a 
historical narrative, and follow a narrative course which to an extent reflects the 
structure of the investigated narrative.”171 While positivists might therefore criticize 
genealogy for being circular and tautological, Bartelson maintains that it is only by 
assuming “cyclical recurrence at the level of narrative” that genealogy “can account 
for the formation of its own point of view” and find a modicum of analytical 
distance.172 Therefore, the way in which he reasons for and constructs the reflexive 
dimension of his genealogy – his view of history as text and of genealogy as a mode of 
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writing – enables a practically reflexive analysis of the relationship between 
sovereignty and knowledge which can simultaneously recognize and implement this 
observation. 
“‘[R]eflexivity,’” Inanna Hamati-Ataya argues, “appeared [in IR as well as in other 
social sciences] when positivism’s epistemic premises” – its correspondence theory of 
truth, its representational understanding of knowledge, and its Cartesian view of the 
subject – “were challenged by historicist analyses of knowledge.”173 Like other 
historicist analyses of knowledge during the late 1980s to mid-1990s, the first 
generation of IR genealogies conceived of itself as a response to the problem posed by 
positivism and its underlying assumptions. In the two genealogies reviewed here, 
differing understandings of the problem of positivism went hand in hand with 
differently constructed and implemented reflexive dimensions to genealogy as a way 
of knowing. Der Derian, for whom the problem with positivism was its “totalizing” 
claim to and conduct of theory, posed genealogy as an alternative, postpositivist mode 
of theorization that could open up new ways of thought. In so doing, his genealogy 
reflexively made sense both of its object and of itself (and thus of the knowing and 
theorizing subject) through the concept of alienation. Bartelson, for whom the problem 
with positivism was that its foundational assumptions obstructed it from grasping the 
political nature of knowledge, proposed genealogy as a kind of historical analysis that 
could situate itself outside the positivism-postpositivism debate, yet inside history. In 
this, genealogy’s practically reflexive aspect lay in its mode of writing, which in its 
emplotment could not but repeat the narrative structures of the histories it studied. 
What are we to make of this? While Der Derian and Bartelson differ over what exactly 
genealogy is and does with respect to positivism, they agree that it is about de-
naturalization: that genealogy “[disturbs] many of the conventions that have long 
stood as the natural truths of the field,” as Der Derian writes174, and that it “seeks to 
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put everything that is evident at present into historical motion,” as Bartelson puts it.175 
However, as the idea of seemingly ahistorical objects being socially constructed has by 
now become widely recognized in the social and historical sciences176, genealogies 
aiming merely to de-naturalize that which is presumably taken for granted can 
arguably no longer reckon on having a surprise effect for positivists, and might even 
“be greeted as redundant” by postpositivists.177 In this context, I contend that what the 
first generation of genealogies in IR has to offer to us today is not a manual of how 
exactly genealogical methods should or should not be implemented, but an example 
of how genealogy can be something other than a ready-made method, of how it can 
amount to a critical praxis. From Bartelson, we can gather that “historical knowledge 
itself is an object of inquiry rather than a ready possibility,”178 whereas from Der 
Derian, we can learn that “at a certain moment, therefore, it is necessary to turn against 
Method, or at least to treat it without any founding privilege.”179 To take seriously and 
make good on these insights, genealogy can, through its concepts and through its 
practices, inquire into the interrelated formation of objects and subjects of knowledge 
in a way which recognizes that “we are historical beings all the way down.”180 Taken 
together, genealogy thus emerges from Der Derian’s and Bartelson’s examples as a 
way of doing research, or of “doing our knowing,” in which reflexivity is practically 
embedded throughout and within the analysis to the effect that genealogy itself is 
processualized and put into motion.  
 
Towards genealogy as critical praxis 
Thus far, this second part of the chapter has done two things. First, I have discussed 
the tendency of contemporary proposals for genealogy in IR to practice genealogy as 
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a research method, i.e. as a two-step procedure in which genealogy is first specified 
and then applied to empirical materials. I have argued that this “methodologism,” or 
outsourcing of a genealogist’s knowledge practices from the actual analysis, limits the 
critical scope of genealogy: it risks exempting our ways of knowing as well as their 
preconditions in and their effects on our problematizations, our disciplines and 
ourselves from the purview of genealogical critique. Thereafter, I have delineated the 
ways in which the first generation of genealogies in IR, exemplified by the works of 
Der Derian and Bartelson, put into question genealogy within its analyses of the 
relationship between politics and knowledge. In particular, I have shown how the two 
authors under review used the concepts (“alienation”) and modes (discourse, 
narrative, writing) through which they sought to produce knowledge of their research 
objects to simultaneously put into motion genealogy itself. Now, two tasks remain: to 
explain why the practice of genealogy as method is problematic for this thesis in 
particular, and to begin to clarify the link between genealogy’s capacity for practical 
reflexivity and its critical purpose. 
In the main, there are three reasons why an understanding of genealogy as method 
constitutes a problem for this thesis. First, as the first part of this chapter has hinted at 
and as the remainder of this thesis will argue in detail, our ways of knowing war have 
historically helped to produce and reproduce how war constitutes a problem of 
international politics. Therefore, understanding and practicing genealogy as a method 
– as specified prior to the analysis and thereby exempted from critique – would make 
for a genealogical analysis of war’s problematization that would fail to live up to its 
own insights. Secondly, such an analysis would also fail to make good on several of 
the most thought-provoking aspects of Foucault’s genealogical analyses. As I will 
discuss in Chapter 2, amongst these aspects are not only Foucault’s insights, 
emphasized by many of the genealogists discussed in this chapter, into the inevitable 
entanglement of knowledge and power, but also his way of working out his concepts 
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and his knowledge practices through his engagement of empirical materials.181 Finally, 
insofar as recent proposals of genealogy as a research method fall short of realizing 
genealogy’s reflexive potential, they might be but one example of IR’s more general 
failure to treat methods as part of the world and thereby to grasp them as sites for and 
objects of politics and critique.182 As one of the aims of this thesis is to spell out what a 
historical and reflexive dimension to this understanding of methods as this-worldly 
could look like, to practice genealogy as a method would be self-contradictory.  
How, then, does the practical reflexivity exemplified by Der Derian’s and Bartelson’s 
analyses contribute to critique? The question is more controversial and complicated 
than it might seem at first sight. Aradau and colleagues, for instance, argue that 
“[m]aking the political life of methods a central component of [our analytical 
frameworks] allows critical approaches to engage with methods-focused 
developments in ways that sustain a reflexive disposition.”183 Bartelson, however, is 
sceptical of whether his genealogy can be critical: his view of history as text and of 
genealogy as a mode of writing leads him to argue that “either a genealogy […] would 
be confined within the limits of discourse,” in which case it would lack the “external 
foothold from which to criticize the discourse it analyses,” or that it would have to 
“transcend the logical limits of discourse,” but thereby become itself an exercise of 
power.184 Therefore, Bartelson seeks to do no more than “to comment upon and to 
criticize existing philosophical and historical accounts of sovereignty.”185  
At this point, I can do no more than restate my argument and refer the reader to the 
remainder of this thesis. For a genealogy to develop a farther-reaching critique of our 
problematizations, our disciplines, and ourselves, it needs to make sense of the 
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interrelationship between our ways and practices of knowing and these other subjects 
of critique. To do this, genealogy needs to make sure not to exempt its analytical 
procedures from the insights of its analysis. As suggested by my reading of Der Derian 
and Bartelson, one way of doing this is to build a practically reflexive dimension into 
the genealogical analysis. In this way, as I will further explain in the next chapter and 
as I hope the rest of the thesis will demonstrate, it is possible to at least try to subject 
our ways of knowing to genealogy’s critical insights – not only to disrupt these ways, 
but also to produce empirical materials with which to get to work on our ways of 
knowing and being, and to in fact begin to do our knowing differently.  
To reiterate, the problem about genealogy as method is not that some elements of 
genealogy are fixed before the actual analysis. Indeed, in the remainder of this thesis I 
will use quite a few of the concepts and practices suggested and relied upon by the IR 
genealogies reviewed in the first section of this part of the chapter, and I do not claim 
to have derived all of these concepts and practices inductively, or to use all of them in 
reflexive ways only. Rather, the problem of genealogy as a method, I want to suggest, 
begins when we do not make enough of an effort to systematically create, or 
incidentally leave open, a space in which genealogy could conceive of itself and its 
conduct as in principle historical and contingently in flux, let alone as in practice 
continuously in the process of being made.  
 
Conclusion 
My aim in this chapter has been twofold. First, I wanted to offer a rationale for what 
this thesis takes as its dual starting point: namely, that “war” and method currently 
constitute problems, and that it would therefore be a worthwhile endeavour to submit 
them to a sustained genealogical inquiry. To this end, I sought to locate and trace these 
two respective problems in two different examples.  
On the one hand, I looked at transitional justice, taken here as an example of 
contemporary international post-atrocity politics, to sketch war’s becoming a problem 
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of these particular politics. Specifically, I argued that transitional justice constitutes an 
example of a curious knowledge-action-nexus in which war can be acted upon insofar 
as it can be known about, and I pointed out different frames which help produce war 
as a particularly formulated problem.  Following up on this example, the historical 
chapters to come all revolve around the question of war’s becoming an epistemic and 
actionable object, yet they take this question in many different directions – indeed, in 
as many directions as the primary sources and the temporal and practical constraints 
of a research project such as this one allow for.  
On the other hand, I looked at genealogy, understood as one particular among IR’s 
myriad ways of doing research, to delineate in how far method constitutes a problem 
for critique. Here, I argued that recent genealogical research in IR, through its practice 
of first specifying and then applying genealogy as an analytical tool, tends to exempt 
genealogy’s practices and procedures from the purview of its critical insights. I then 
discussed how a first generation of IR genealogies practiced genealogy as conceptually 
and practically reflexive. In the chapters to follow, I take inspiration from this first 
generation to develop genealogy into a critical praxis which seeks to actively try and 
alter its own practices and its entanglement with the problematizations it studies. 
Next to providing starting points for the analysis to come, my second aim in this 
chapter has been to begin to account for how I first came to these starting points. In 
this vein, I have discussed how my concern with “war” as an object of knowledge and 
action was originally an interest in transitional justice’s curiously taken for granted 
assumption about the purposiveness of searching for the “truth” about past violence 
for the prevention of future violence. I have also pointed out how my take on 
genealogy as a reflexive and practical way in fact developed out of a fascination with 
genealogy as a method for studying the histories of that which we take for granted. 
The chapter has not only offered some starting points for the genealogy which the 
remainder of this thesis will develop, but it has also, or so I hope, indicated how 





“The action thought takes en route to being”: Genealogy as 
history/critique, problematization, and critical praxis 
 
The previous chapter has proposed two problems for this thesis to work on, or two 
objects to be subjected to critique: the idea that war constitutes a problem whose future 
recurrence can be prevented by means of knowledge about its past occurrence, and 
the understanding and practice of genealogy as a method. Taking up these threads, 
my intention in this chapter is to begin to spell out how the proposed genealogy of war 
as a problem of international politics proceeds. What kind of history and what kind of 
critique does genealogy as developed here consist in? How can a genealogy work on 
the emergence of the problem of war while simultaneously taking itself to be an 
emergent problem? How can genealogy be comprehended on the same terms as the 
object it is intended to work on – as in principle contingent and in flux and as in practice 
continuously in the process of being made? This chapter addresses these 
methodological, conceptual and practical questions to suggest genealogy as 
history/critique, problematization, and critical praxis. 
Before getting started on the task at hand, a clarification seems in order. In IR, 
methodology is usually not only understood as a systematic reflection about methods, 
but also taken to be of a higher order than and necessarily antecedent to the use of 
methods in the actual practice of research.1 In his article on genealogy as a research 
tool, for instance, Vucetic defines methodology as “a theory on how research is or 
should be done, given the assumptions regarding the status of reality (ontology) 
and/or its place in a knowledge domain (epistemology),” while “[m]ethods, in turn, 
are techniques for accessing data on that which exists to be known.”2 However, this 
																																																						
1 Cf. Aradau, Huysmans, “Critical methods in IR,” 601.  
2 Vucetic, “Genealogy as a Research Tool,” 1297. 
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assumption about the primacy of methodology has recently come under criticism.3 For 
Aradau and Huysmans, for instance, the kind of reasoning which Vucetic exemplifies 
relegates methods “to the dustbin of history,”4 while methodology is presumably 
“rescued […] from the tyranny of method” by being “reframed as an overarching 
epistemological and methodological reflection.”5 On the whole, IR’s most common 
take on methodology and methods risks rendering both of them apolitical and 
uncriticizable. Yet if, as this thesis sets out to do, methods are no longer taken as ready-
made tools, but as this-worldly, historical, and subject to critique, where does this 
leave methodology?  
An alternative notion of methodology to the one just sketched out is provided by Mary 
Hawkesworth.6 Hawkesworth argues that methodologies, in light of their role in the 
historical emergence of distinct academic disciplines and of their specificity to these 
disciplines as social communities, are of a political nature. The argument is prefaced 
by an etymological discussion of how “the term ‘methodology’ arises from the 
conjunction of three Greek concepts: meta, hodos, and logos,” a conjunction which can 
be translated to mean, inter alia, “the way a group legitimates knowledge claims,” or 
also “the action thought takes en route to being.”7 For the purposes of this thesis, these 
understandings of methodology are very helpful indeed: while the former indicates 
the social and political nature of knowledge and its criteria, the latter hints at the 
processes through which knowledge comes about and thus at our ways of knowing in 
the literal sense of the phrase. With this two-fold understanding in mind, it becomes 
possible to conceive of methodology as a reflection on methods which is neither strictly 
																																																						
3 E.g. Araday, Huysmans, “Critical methods in IR”; Roland Bleiker, “Pluralist Methods for Global 
Visual Politics,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 43, no. 3 (2015), 872-890. For a similarly 
sceptical statement about the presumed primacy of methodology from the perspective of philosophy, 
cf. Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 27, 59. 
4 Aradau, Huysmans, “Critical Methods in IR,” 602. 
5 Ibid., 597. 
6 Mary Hawkesworth, “Contending Conceptions of Science and Politics: Methodology and the 
Constitution of the Political,” in Dvora Yanow, Peregrine Schwartz-Shea (eds.), Interpretation and 
Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn (London, UK: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), 27-49. 
7 Hawkesworth, “Contending Conceptions,” 28. On methodology as “the logos of method,” cf. 
Aradau, Huysmans, “Critical Methods in IR,” 604.  
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separate from the practice of research nor encompassing it, which is systematic 
without aiming for closure, and which is itself an ongoing process and thereby aware 
of its politicality.8  
This clarification of what methodology could be once we let go of methods as ready-
made is simultaneously a disclaimer and a programmatic statement. The disclaimer: 
while this chapter compiles many of my reflections about how this thesis arrives at its 
findings and arguments, I did not actually undertake all of this reflective work prior 
to the research that went into the following chapters. Rather, a lot of my thinking about 
genealogy happened through my work on archival sources and empirical examples, 
and it is brought together in this chapter not to create the impression that it had 
happened in anticipation, but rather to make the thesis writable and readable. 
However, one might still say that this is what most research processes look like. Hence, 
the programmatic statement: the processes through which methodologies are 
constructed need to be undertaken consciously and made explicit. This means that in 
this thesis, there is more to the research process than the back and forth between 
induction and deduction of which most research consists: I interweave the practice of 
the research and the reflection upon this practice to appreciate the processual and 
political nature of methods and of methodologies. 
This chapter reports and reflects on the actions my thinking has taken en route to being 
in three main sections. Since the thesis draws on the work of Michel Foucault for 
inspiration, orientation and practical know-how, I begin this chapter by putting 
Foucauldian genealogy into two contexts – that of Foucault’s methodologies, and that 
of Nietzsche’s genealogies – to make sense of genealogy as a particular kind of history 
and a particular kind of critique. In the second section, I turn to a number of concepts 
through which the findings and argument of the thesis unfold. Next to 
																																																						
8 Cf. Aradau, Huysmans, “Critical Methods in IR,” 598; Bleiker, “Pluralist Methods,” 881. If one 
wanted to take on board this understanding of methodology yet continue to think about methodology 
as a kind of theory of methods, this might be achieved via Der Derian’s understanding of “meta 
theory” as “a form of reanalysis that disturbs the complacency of received knowledge” (Der Derian, 
“The Boundaries of Knowledge,” 7).  
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problematization, the key concept which I use to make sense of genealogy and its 
object, I also rely on the concepts of practice, co-production, and critical praxis. In the 
third and final section, I then begin to move the discussion towards this praxis. To this 
end, I explain a number of crucial decisions I have taken over the course of the research 
process, decisions concerning the historical period and examples I focus on, the kinds 
of primary sources I use, the methods by means of which I collect and analyze these 
sources – and the ways in which I seek to break with these methods. The chapter 
concludes with a reflection on genealogy as a mode of curiosity. 
 
In context: genealogy as history and critique 
To clarify what kind of history and what kind of critique genealogy aspires to be, in 
this section I consider Foucauldian genealogy in two contexts: that of Foucault’s 
methodologies, and that of Nietzsche’s genealogies.9 This reading assumes that 
although Foucault developed his methodologies (e.g. genealogy) in tandem with his 
concepts (e.g. governmentality), it is feasible to focus on the former without 
simultaneously engaging with the latter.10 At the same time, my reading is aware that 
in an important sense, genealogy is a concept just as well: as Foucault’s work does not 
contain a neat and unambiguous definition of genealogy, our understanding that one 
or another part of this work constituted a genealogy cannot avoid amounting to, in 
Gary Gutting’s terms, a “retrospective (and usually idealized) [description] of 
Foucault’s complex efforts to come to terms with his historical material.”11 Not least 
for this reason, my aim in this section is not to offer an exegetical reading of Foucault, 
but rather to look at Foucault’s writings in order to spell out what genealogy as history 
																																																						
9 This reading takes its inspiration from Colin Koopman’s Genealogy as Critique, esp. ch. 1 and 2.  
10 Colin Koopman, Tomas Matza, “Putting Foucault to Work: Analytic and Concept in Foucaultian 
Inquiry,” Critical Inquiry 39, no. 4 (2013), 817-840. For a countervailing statement, cf. Martin Saar, 
Genealogie als Kritik (Frankfurt a.M., Germany: Suhrkamp, 2007), at 252. In Focauldian IR, conceptual 
engagements of Foucault seem to far outnumber methodological engagements (indicatively, cf. 
Nicholas J. Kiersey, Doug Stokes (eds.), Foucault and International Relations: New Critical Engagements 
(Oxford, UK: Routledge, 2011)). 
11 Gary Gutting, Foucault: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2005), at 6f. 
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and as critique can be and to relate how I have made use of this basic understanding 
of genealogy in developing the thesis. 
The relationship between archaeology and genealogy within Foucault’s work has been 
the subject of a considerable debate.12 In the context of this debate, Koopman suggests 
to understand Foucault’s move from archaeology to genealogy as a “methodological 
expansion” rather than a repudiation or a rupture.13 Unsurprisingly, seen through this 
lens archaeology and genealogy have a lot in common. Notably, they share what 
Bonditti and colleagues refer to as Foucault’s “epiphenomenal” approach14, and what 
Paul Veyne has called Foucault’s eluding of “natural objects”15: both genealogy and 
archaeology do not take their research objects to be unified or given, but rather 
describe and analyze them as dispersed within (discursive) orders or spaces.16 
And yet, there are important differences between genealogy and archaeology. For one, 
while archaeology aims to describe the continuity of its research objects17, genealogy 
seeks to account for both continuities and changes in them.18 This is not to say that 
Foucault’s archaeological analyses did not recognize discontinuities; The Order of 
Things, for instance, identifies three subsequent orders of knowledge.19 However, 
archaeology does not attempt to provide the analytical means for making sense of the 
																																																						
12 For an example from IR, cf. Andrew Neal, “Foucault in Guantánamo: Towards an Archaeology of 
the Exception,” Security Dialogue 37, no. 1 (2006), 31-46.  
13 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 30, cf. 131; cf. Paul Rabinow, Hubert Dreyfus, Michael Foucault: 
Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd ed. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1983), at 84ff. 
For a similar take on genealogy and archaeology within IR, cf. Bonditti et al., “Genealogy,” 166f. 
14 Bonditti et al., “Genealogy,” 166.  
15 Paul Veyne, “Foucault Revolutionizes History,” in Arnold Ira Davidson (ed.), Foucault and His 
Interlocutors (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 146-182, at 149f. 
16 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith (London, UK: 
Tavistock Publications 2000 [1969]), at 10; cf. Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 97f.; Neal, “Foucault in 
Guantánamo,” 37; Bentley Allan, “From Subjects to Objects: Knowledge in International Relations 
Theory,” European Journal of International Relations 24, no. 4 (2018), 841-864. 
17 Cf. Michel Foucault, Die Wahrheit und die juristischen Formen, translated by Michael Bischoff 
(Frankfurt a.M., Germany: Suhrkamp, 2003 [1973]), at 150f. (The appendix to Truth and the Juridical 
Forms is not reproduced in the English edition in Faubion’s edited volume Essential Works, Volume 3 – 
hence, I cite from the German translation.) 
18 Cf. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: The Will to Knowledge, Translated by Robert 
Hurley (London, UK: Penguin Books, 1998 [1978]), 10f. 
19 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York, NY: Vintage 
Books, 1994 [1970]).  
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waning of one order and the onset of the next.20 This is different for genealogy. In 
Discipline and Punish, for example, Foucault’s aim is to explain how the prison became 
a dominant way of disciplining in the modern, Western world.21 To accomplish this 
kind of analysis, genealogy, unlike archaeology, has not one, but always at least two 
analytical foci. Hence, Discipline and Punish is a “genealogy of the contemporary 
science/justice complex” which endeavours to offer a “correlative history of the 
modern soul and of a new power to judge.”22 While Foucault’s archaeologies are 
singularly focused on knowledge and its history, his genealogies always attend to 
knowledge in relationship to something else – to power, as one of Foucault’s most 
famous concepts has it – and their analytical focus is less on these two objects than on 
the relationship between them and on what this relationship produces.23 In this way, 
genealogy seeks to go beyond the descriptions of different orders offered by 
archaeology and to account for discontinuities between them.24  
In hindsight, fathoming Foucault’s “epiphenomenal” approach and figuring out my 
genealogy’s actual foci was one of the most challenging aspects of my research process. 
As Chapter 1 has explained, my original interest was in “truth,” and more precisely in 
the history of what I thought of as the curiously taken for granted will to true 
knowledge about war that characterizes contemporary international post-atrocity 
politics.25 The process that took me from this initial interest to a genealogy of war as 
problem of international politics has been as contingent as any of the processes I study 
in this thesis. It hinged upon lucky coincidences of conceptual ideas and archival 
																																																						
20 Cf. Koopman, Genealogy as Method, 36f.; Gutting, Foucault, 12f. 
21 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Translated by Allen Lane (London, UK: 
Penguin, 1991 [1975]). 
22 Ibid., 23. 
23 Cf. Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 31.  
24 Genealogy is often criticized for being unable to account for change (e.g. Milliken, “The study of 
discourse,” 246ff.). However, this criticism is perhaps more appropriately directed at different 
examples of genealogical analyses rather than at genealogy per se. 
25 I was also guided by Philipp Sarasin’s categorization of Foucault’s genealogies as a variant of 
History of Knowledge (Philipp Sarasin, “Was ist Wissensgeschichte?,” Internationales Archiv für 
Sozialgeschichte der deutschen Literatur 36, no. 1 (2011), 159-172). Cf. Johan Östling, David Larsson 
Heidenblad, Erling Sandmo, Anna Nilsson Hammar, Kari H. Nordberg (eds.), Circulation of Knowledge: 
Explorations in the History of Knowledge (Lund, Sweden: Nordic Academic Press, 2018). 
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materials that I could not have planned for, as when in working on the sources I had 
gathered on the Balkan Commission, I suddenly found differently structured 
formulations of war as a problem (see Chapter 3). At the same time, however, it was 
also an incremental process – as Foucault writes, genealogy “requires patience and a 
knowledge of details”26 – that often evolved through multiple iterations, as 
exemplified in the numerous attempts it took me to wrestle through the sources I had 
collected on the Advisory Commission of Jurists (see Chapter 4).  
These last points already speak to another crucial difference between archaeology and 
genealogy: namely, their differing capacity for making sense of how their research 
objects are situated in history. Here, Koopman suggests that while archaeology can 
only understand change within its research objects through a “single temporality of 
rupture,” genealogy can conceive of its objects within multiple “temporalities of shift, 
evolution, continuity, event, and problem.”27 Whereas archaeology is a history of its 
objects’ (albeit dispersed and multifarious) being in different epochs, genealogy is a 
history of (potentially contradictory) becomings and emergences that treats its objects, 
Foucault wrote, as “[resulting] from substitutions, displacements, disguised 
conquests, and systematic reversals.”28 In a way, my research process’s above-
mentioned sudden changes and incremental evolutions mirror the complex temporal 
configuration of what I researched. To keep things manageable, the thesis focuses on 
one historical change in particular, namely on the transformation of “war” from a 
relatively readily available means of international politics into a problem to be tackled. 
While I will discuss this decision in more detail in the final section of this chapter, what 
bears mentioning here is that as I subjected this transformation to closer scrutiny, it 
morphed into a multiplicity of transformations. Hence, the genealogy of the 
																																																						
26 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 76. 
27 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 31, 132. Neal’s reading of The Archaeology of Knowledge is different: 
he argues that in this archaeological work, Foucault’s understanding of change within his research 
objects was already shifting, with the effect that “the figures of both the ‘new’ and the ‘same’ lose their 
transcendental qualities” (Neal, “Foucault in Guantánamo,” 37). Nonetheless, it was only in Foucault’s 
genealogical works that the multiplicities of ways in which change can figure in history was spelled 
out more fully. 
28 Foucault, “Nietzsche Genealogy History,” 86. 
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emergence of “war” as a problem of international politics proposed in this thesis finds 
its research object to be constituted of different kinds of overarching and minute, 
abrupt and cumulative, deliberate and accidental changes.  
Incidentally, Foucault’s first discussion of his understanding of emergence can be 
found in his essay Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, a text which is often cited to argue for 
reading Foucault and Nietzsche together.29 And indeed, Nietzsche’s and Foucault’s 
genealogies have a lot in common.30 It is not without reason that Foucault, in Truth and 
the Juridical Forms, calls Nietzsche’s work an analytical “model”31: as Foucault explains, 
it was Nietzsche who first turned against the Platonic idea of knowledge as the 
antithesis of power and who first sought to point out that “behind all knowledge […] 
there is a struggle for power.”32 In Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, Foucault draws on 
Nietzsche’s work to distinguish emergence (Entstehung) from descent (Herkunft) and 
thereby to refute an understanding of history as a search for the origin and the 
identity/sameness of a research object in favour of genealogy as a history not of the 
past, but of the present.33 Importantly for the purposes of this thesis, genealogy as a 
history of the present demands a reflexive dimension: as Foucault writes, again with 
reference to Nietzsche, genealogy must “create its own genealogy in the act of 
cognition.”34   
However, there are also several aspects in which Foucault’s and Nietzsche’s 
genealogies diverge. For one, Nietzsche and Foucault differ on the meaning of critique 
as well as on the value of historical analysis for critique.35 Nietzsche’s genealogies 
																																																						
29 Bartelson, Genealogy of Sovereignty, ch. 3; Der Derian, On Diplomacy, ch. 4; Vucetic, “Genealogy as a 
Research Tool,” 1302.  
30 Cf. Saar, Genealogie als Kritik. 
31 Michel Foucault, “Truth and the Juridical Forms,” in Michel Foucault, Essential Works, Volume 3: 
Power, Edited by James Faubion, Translated by Robert Hurley et al. (London, UK: Penguin Books, 
1994), at 6. 
32 Ibid., 32, cf. 12, 51f.; cf. Michel Foucault, Lectures on the Will to Know: Lectures at the Collège de France, 
1970-1971, Translated by Graham Burchell (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
33 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 77ff. 
34 Ibid., 90. 
35 Cf. Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, ch. 2. For a more general discussion of the role of history for 
critique, cf. Reinhart Koselleck, “Wozu noch Historie?,” Historische Zeitschrift 212, no. 1 (1971), 1-18. 
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study the coming-into-being of moral values in order to judge, subvert, or even destroy 
these values: “what meaning does our being have, if it were not that that will to truth 
has become conscious of itself as a problem in us? . . . Without a doubt, from now on, 
morality will be destroyed by the will to truth’s becoming-conscious-of-itself.”36 
Foucault clearly perceived Nietzsche’s ultimately destructive intentions vis-à-vis truth 
and the knowledgeable subject, and he agreed with Nietzsche that genealogy, as a kind 
of historical research which could “[have] value as a critique,” needed “to discover 
that truth or being does not lie at the root of what we know and what we are.”37 Yet 
Foucault’s own genealogies mostly do not seek to judge, subvert, or destroy.38 Rather, 
their critical aim is focused on the logical antecedents of judgement and on describing 
the preconditions that enable and constrain our present ways of knowing and being.  
The point about critique as a concern about the preconditions of our present ways has 
been made in various inflections. In Foucault’s own words, it means that “critique is 
not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out 
on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered 
modes of thought the practices that we accept rest.”39 For Ann Laura Stoler, this critical 
orientation leads to a concern “with the legitimating social coordinates of 
epistemologies: how people imagine they know what they know and what institutions 
validate that knowledge, and how they do so.”40 Meanwhile, for Judith Butler, it 
implies that “the primary task of critique will not be to evaluate whether its objects – 
																																																						
36 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic, Translated with an Introduction and 
Notes by Douglas Smith (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1996 [1887]), at III.27, italics in 
original. 
37 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 81. 
38 However, see the discussion in the appendix of “Truth and the Juridical Forms” Foucault seems to 
affirm a need to destroy the will to truth (Foucault, Die Wahrheit, 138). In the context of his preceding 
remarks on philosophy, linguistics and rhetoric, it seems to me that what is to be destroyed here is not 
science or philosophy as such, but philosophy’s metaphysical ambitions – i.e. not the will to truth as 
such, but a specific formation of it. 
39 Michel Foucault, “Practicing Criticism,” in Michel Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews 
and Other Writings, 1977-1984, Translated by Alan Sheridan et al. (London, UK: Routledge, 1990 
[1988]), 152-156, at 154; cf. Ian Hacking, Historical Ontology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2004), at 24f.; Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 17, 95. 
40 Ann Laura Stoler, Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), at 95. 
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social conditions, practices, forms of knowledge, power, and discourse – are good or 
bad, valued highly or demeaned, but to bring into relief the very framework of 
evaluation itself,” entailing the question of how “our epistemological certainties turn 
out to support a way of structuring the world that forecloses alternative possibilities 
of ordering.”41 And for Ian Hacking, it means that it is the processes through which 
“our present conceptions were made” that “constrain our present ways of thinking.”42 
These different formulations of critique as a concern with the preconditions of our 
ways of knowing and being have been very influential in the development of the 
genealogy presented in this thesis. A genealogy of the will to knowledge about war, 
when implemented as an inquiry into the antecedents of our contemporary ways of 
knowing about and acting against war, is not about judging post-war truth-seeking 
efforts to be good or bad. Rather, it serves to raise questions about the ways in which 
we make war a problem and about how these ways produce subjects more or less 
affected by war and therefore more or less capable of addressing it.43  
What are we more generally to make of the differences between Nietzsche’s and 
Foucault’s critical intentions? We might say, as Koopman does, that the comparison 
makes Foucauldian genealogies appear “normatively modest”44: while Nietzsche 
delivered a damning judgment of the will to truth – “[s]cience itself now needs a 
justification (which is not at all to say that there is one for it)”45 –, Foucault’s more 
humble aim was to raise critical questions.46 We could also note that, insofar as in 
																																																						
41 Judith Butler, “What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue,” in David Ingram (ed.), The 
Political: Readings in Continental Philosophy (London, UK: Basil Blackwell, 2002), 212-227, at 214. 
42 Hacking, Historical Ontology, 24f. 
43 For a similarly inclined critical-genealogical work, cf. Kinsella, The Image Before the Weapon. 
44 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 61. Foucault spoke of this aspect of his critique not as modesty, but 
as a “prudent attitude”: “Prudent in my analysis, in the theoretical and moral postulates that I use. I 
try to figure out what’s at stake” (Michel Foucault, “Power, Moral Values, and the Intellectual, an 
interview with Michael Bess,” History of the Present 4 (1980), at 12).  
45 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, III.24, italics in original. 
46 At stake in the proposal that Foucauldian genealogy is “normatively modest” are several larger 
arguments about the viability of this kind of critique. On the one hand, Koopman thereby defends 
Foucauldian genealogy against the charge of committing a genetic fallacy – or the idea that something 
can be judged as good or bad (solely) on the basis of its origin or history (Koopman, Genealogy as 
Critique, 62ff.). On the other hand, against critical theorists such as Habermas, Koopman maintains 
that it is possible – for Foucauldian genealogy and in general – to be “critically effective” without 
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Foucault’s genealogical works “[t]he critique of what we are is at one and the same 
time the historical analysis of the limits imposed on us and an experiment with the 
possibility of going beyond them,”47 Foucauldian genealogies are productive rather 
than destructive. Or finally, compared to the pessimistic thinker that Nietzsche is often 
considered to be48, we could see in Foucault a more positive spirit, as Foucault himself 
claims: “My optimism would consist rather in saying that so many things can be 
changed, fragile as they are, bound up more with circumstances than necessities, more 
arbitrary than self-evident, more a matter of complex, but temporary, historical 
circumstances than with inevitable anthropological constants…”49 Yet whatever we 
make of Foucault’s understanding of genealogy as critique, the contrast between 
Nietzsche’s and Foucault’s works hopefully leaves us less passive and more inclined 
to take practical action than the currently prevailing reading of genealogy in IR (see 
Chapter 1) might have us think. 
How does this understanding of genealogy as critique figure in this thesis? In the 
Genealogy of Morals, Friedrich Nietzsche demands that “the value of truth 
is tentatively to be called into question.”50 Over the course of my research project, I 
kept wondering what heeding Nietzsche’s call could consist in and lead to. While I did 
not pursue the destructive aims that Nietzsche arguably had in mind, it turns out that 
I did follow up on that little qualifier, “tentatively.” The term “versuchsweise,” as 
Nietzsche put it in the German original51, could also be translated as “by way of 
experiment.” And indeed, to act on the insights which the genealogy I was conducting 
																																																						
being “normatively robust”: “We can show that practices are problematic, dangerous, fraught, and in 
need of additional attention without making any normative claims about them” (Koopman, Genealogy 
as Critique, 91f.; cf. Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Translated by Frederick 
Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987 [1985]), esp. ch. 9, 10, 12).  
47 Foucault, “What is Enlightenmen?,” 319.  
48 Cf. Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 75. However, note that this view of Nietzsche is not uncontested 
(e.g. Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, Translated by Hugh Tomlinson (New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press, 2006 [1962])). 
49 Foucault, “Practicing Criticism,” 156. 
50 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, 3.24. 
51 Friedrich Nietzsche, “Zur Genealogie der Moral,“ in Friedrich Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse / 
Zur Genealogie der Moral, Kritische Studienausgabe, edited by Giorgio Colli, Mazzino Montinari 
(Munich, Germany: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1999 [1887]), 1.24. 
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was beginning to produce, I began to experiment with the knowledge practices 
through which I was doing this genealogy.  
While the workings of this experimentation will become clearer over the course of the 
thesis, a final point I want to clarify here is how Foucault’s ambition to enable such an 
experimentation is related to another noteworthy difference between his genealogies 
and those written by Nietzsche. Whereas Nietzsche’s genealogies are worked out on 
the basis of a small number of often enough speculative examples, Foucault’s 
genealogies command copious amounts of empirics; they draw on, as Foucault writes, 
“a vast accumulation of source materials.”52 For Nietzsche’s aim of denouncing our 
moral values, it suffices to show that these seemingly natural and universal values had 
not always existed in their present form and content. For Foucault, however, merely 
demonstrating that our present could have been otherwise is not enough. In order to 
be critically effective, his genealogies aim to “provide some of the materials people 
will need to remake themselves,” as Koopman notes.53 By providing us with fine-
grained knowledge of the historical processes through which our present came about, 
Foucauldian genealogy’s excessive engagement with empirical materials is ultimately 
intended to enable an experimentation with our contemporary ways, practices, and 
selves – and with the preconditions thereof.  
How important these various differences between Foucault and Nietzsche are, and 
what we are to make of them with regard to the question of genealogy as critique, is 
ultimately a matter of perspective. For Martin Saar, the commonalities shared between 
Nietzsche’s and Foucault’s genealogies are more decisive. Since in both bodies of 
work, “[f]rom the destabilization of a certain moral consciousness follows a general 
call for transformation, not a concrete new proposal for a new form of ethical 
orientation,” Saar argues that both Nietzsche and Foucault ultimately develop a 
critique which is as “ethically urgent as it is underdetermined.”54 For Koopman, by 
																																																						
52 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 76f.; Cf. Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 61f.; Saar, 
Genealogie als Kritik, 260. 
53 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 143. 
54 Saar, Genealogie als Kritik, 254, own translation. 
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contrast, the divergences between Nietzschean and Foucauldian genealogy are key. 
These divergences come to “[t]he difference between the that and the how of 
contingency,” a point which is crucial because “it makes all the difference between a 
genealogy that simply reveals our bottomless freedom and a genealogy that gives us 
the material we need for working on our complexly constituted selves.”55 In this 
context, my point here is neither that reading Foucault and Nietzsche together is 
wrong, nor that the understanding of genealogy I propose by reading Foucault in 
contrast to Nietzsche is the only valid understanding of genealogy. Rather, I want to 
suggest that a differentiating reading can yield an awareness of the different purposes 
that genealogy as critique can pursue as well as of the multiple forms that it can take.56  
Amongst these diverse purposes and forms, it is perhaps Foucault’s notion of 
genealogy as an “infinite reflection” which comes closest to what this thesis is 
attempting to achieve.57 My initial interest was in Foucauldian genealogy as “a model 
of reflexive social critique” located “at the intersection of reflection and intervention.”58 
When contrasted with Foucauldian archaeology, genealogy emerges as a particular 
kind of history which intends to make sense not only of continuity and change as 
(potentially) co-occurring, but also of processes of becoming. Therefore, genealogy has 
not one, but at least two foci, in the sense of two research objects which co-produce 
each other. Furthermore, when contrasted with Nietzschean genealogy, Foucauldian 
genealogy appears as a particular kind of critique: by analyzing the coming-about as 
well as the antecedent conditions of our contemporary ways of being, knowing, and 
doing, it aims to render changeable these conditions and these ways. By processing a 
large amount of empirical material, Foucauldian genealogy identifies more precisely 
the conditions that would have to be addressed to enable us to experiment with and 
push against the limits of our current ways of thinking and judging. And yet, as I have 
																																																						
55 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 140, italics in original; cf. Koopman, Matza, “Putting Foucault to 
Work.” 
56 Cf. Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 59. 
57 Foucault, “Power, Moral Values,” 12 
58 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 91, 26. 
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also discussed, how the particular understanding of genealogy as history and critique 
derived from these contrasting readings is to be put into action is yet another question.  
Another apt way of summarizing the particular understanding of genealogy as history 
and critique which I take in this thesis, therefore, is to think of it, in Koopman’s 
felicitous yet foreboding turn of phrase, as “the difficult labour of actually coming to 
recognize something as problematic.”59 With this in mind, the next section will 
elaborate the concepts through which I came to recognize both our ways of knowing 
about war and genealogy itself as problems to be worked on.  
 
Concepts: problematization, practice, co-production, critical praxis 
The previous section has argued that genealogy does not take the things it inquires 
into to be unified or given; rather, it seeks to describe and analyze them as dispersed 
within different orders or spaces. From this arises the challenge of finding concepts 
which can make sense of how genealogy’s research objects cohere without requiring 
for them to be coherent, concepts which can help us to analytically come to terms with 
the heterogeneity of these objects without, however, relying on transcendental 
categories of thought.60 In this section, I will explicate the key concepts which this 
thesis employs for this purpose: problematization, practice, co-production, and critical 
praxis. While these concepts did not “emerge from the archive” quite to the same 
extent that many of Foucault’s concepts did61, they are informed not only by my 
readings of different secondary literatures, but also by my engagement with primary 
sources and, most crucially, by the problems this thesis finds, raises, and works on. To 
paraphrase the matter in the terminology about to be introduced: since concepts have 
to be relevant to problems, problematization needs to come before conceptualization.62 
																																																						
59 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 242 
60 Cf. ibid., 53. 
61 Cf. Simon Ganahl cited in Colin Koopman, “Ways of Doing Genealogy: Inquiry after Foucault. A 
Group Interview with Verena Erlenbusch, Simon Ganahl, Robert W. Gehl, Thomas Nail and Perry 
Zurn,” Le foucauldien 3, no. 1 (2017).  




Towards the end of his life, Foucault coined the concept of “problematization” to grasp 
his research project in its entirety:  
“What I tried to do from the beginning was to analyze the process of ‘problematization’ 
– which means: how and why certain things (behavior, phenomena, processes) became 
a problem... I am studying the problematization of madness, crime, or sexuality.”63  
According to this understanding, the term problematization refers to the processes 
through which problems emerge, through which things come into being as problems, 
or through which something becomes “an object of concern.”64 The question, for 
Foucault, is “[w]hy this ‘problematization’?” – and following this question, his 
genealogies seek to inquire into “the conditions in which human beings ‘problematize’ 
what they are, what they do, and the world in which they live.”65 
Understood to refer to the process of the emergence of problems, the term 
problematization can be used to think about both the research object and the practice 
of the research. As Koopman explains, “problematization was for Foucault both an act 
of critical inquiry (expressed in the verb form as ‘to problematize’) and a nominal 
object of inquiry (expressed in the noun form ‘a problematization’).”66 Thus 
understood, Discipline and Punish, for instance, inquired into the disciplinary 
problematization to problematize power/knowledge. Indeed, the upshot of the 
proposition to use the noun “problematization” to refer to the processual becoming of 
problems and to employ the verb “to problematize” to signify the practice of research 
																																																						
63 Michel Foucault, Fearless Speech, edited by Joseph Pearson (Los Angeles, CA: semiotext(e), 2001 
[1983]), at 171, italics in original. Cf. Bonditti et al., “Genealogy,” 169; Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 
93. Whether or not Foucault’s project in its entirety should be read through the concept of 
problematization, or indeed through any one concept in particular, is the subject of a heated 
discussion amongst Foucault scholars (for an affirmative view, cf. Koopman, Genealogy as Critique; for 
a negative view, cf. Gutting, Foucault). For my purposes here, however, the answer one gives to this 
question is besides the point: what matters is that the concept is useful for my project. 
64 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2: The Use of Pleasure, Translated by Robert Hurley 
(New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1990 [1985]), at 23f. 
65 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, 10. 
66 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 98. 
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is that research can be conceived of as part of the emergences of problems that it 
analyzes. Since “[t]he role of the critical inquirer [...] is therefore not to produce a 
problematization that does not already have some basis in practice but rather to 
contribute to the ongoing reproduction of problematizations already under way,”67 the 
concept of problematization helps genealogy to realize its reflexive critical potential: 
understood as a problematizing practice, genealogy achieves this potential by 
describing (and hence clarifying) as well as by criticizing (and hence intensifying) 
existing problematizations.68 In this vein, genealogy both articulates our 
problematizations and pushes against their limits from the inside out.  
The concept of problematization thus understood can clarify this thesis’ object and 
practice of inquiry. As regards the former, Chapter 1 has put forth that I would work 
on the “knowledge-action-nexus” whereby war is a problem that can be addressed 
insofar as it can be known. Rendered into the terminology just developed, I seek to 
inquire into the problematization of war in international politics. To recast this object 
of inquiry as a problematization helps to make clear, I hope, not only what exactly I 
am interested in with regard to this object – namely, war’s becoming the problem that 
it is today – but also what motivates this interest. In pointing to the historicity of war 
as an object of knowledge and action, I do not mean to insinuate that the problem is 
somehow less “real” or “true.” I also do not wish to make the problem of war an object 
of normative judgment, to suggest that we should refrain from trying to address war, 
or otherwise to denounce the ways in which we currently seek to deal with war. 
Rather, my intention is to seek out the limits of our understanding of war as a problem, 
to provide us with some of the materials and some of the impetus needed for getting 
to work on these limits, and finally, albeit in a small way, to commence this work.  
Instead of conceiving of my research object as afflicted by a “lack, need, omission, or 
sin,” thinking of it in terms of a problematization which research simultaneously 
																																																						
67 Ibid., 99; cf. Bonditti et al., Genealogy, 169. 
68 The terminology is Koopman’s (Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 48, 100). The term “intensification” 
is particularly appealing to me because translated into German, it can mean both “intensivieren” (to 
make more intense/more difficult) and “zuspitzen” (to taper/make more precise). 
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clarifies and intensifies makes of it a base “for the elaboration of thought.”69 To this 
end, my interest in the problem of war can be further specified: it is an interest in how 
war has been formulated as a problem, in how it has become an epistemic and actionable object.  
I am interested, firstly, in how war as a problem has been structured or contextualized, 
or also in the kinds of problems it has come to be described as. Secondly, while I use 
the term “epistemic” in a broad sense to connote war as an object of knowledge70, I am 
specifically interested in how, within the context of the historical split between 
philosophy and science, and hence between theoretical and empirical knowledge of 
social and political phenomena, war emerged as an object of empirical knowledge.71 
Thirdly, by “actionable,” I refer to war as something that can be acted upon, an object 
of practical action or of practice.72 In legal discourse, an object “is said to be actionable 
when there are legal grounds for basing a lawsuit on it,”73 whereas in the social 
sciences, the term has been used to discuss how data (and the uncertainty inherent in 
																																																						
69 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 135. 
70 To clarify, my usage thus differs from the stricter, Aristotelean sense in which the episteme, or 
scientific knowledge of unchanging objects, is a kind of knowledge that can be distinguished from 
other such kinds, among them techne (art or craft) and phronesis (prudential practical judgment) (cf. 
Richard Parry, “Episteme and Techne,” in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/episteme-techne/ (last accessed 29 July 
2018)). For an IR discussion of this Aristotelean distinction, cf. Hayward Alker, Rediscoveries and 
Reformulations: Humanistic Methodologies for International Studies (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), ch. 2; for an application, cf. Christian Bueger, “Making Things Known: 
Epistemic Practices, the United Nations, and the Translation of Piracy,” International Political Sociology 
9, no. 1 (2015), 1-18. 
71 Cf. Dvora Yanow, “Thinking Interpretively: Philosophical Presuppositions and the Human 
Sciences,” in Dvora Yanow, Peregrine Schwartz-Shea (eds.), Interpretation and Method: Empirical 
Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn (London, UK: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), 5-26, at 8. 
72 As regards its theoretical scope, the term “actionable” might be thought of as falling somewhere 
between the more specific (Foucauldian) “governable” and the more general (Bourdieusian) 
“objectivating.” On the former, cf. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, Peter Miller (eds.), The Foucault 
Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991); for an application in 
IR, cf. Bentley Allan, “From Subjects to Objects.” On the latter, cf. Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice 
(Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1980). 
73 And further: the adjective actionable applies “when enough facts or circumstances exist to meet the 
legal requirements to file a legitimate lawsuit. If the facts required to prove a case cannot be alleged in 
the complaint, the case is not ‘actionable’ and the client and his attorney should not file a suit” (cf. 
Collins Dictionary of Law, “actionable,” (2006), https://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/actionable (last accessed 29 July 2018)). Thanks to Marijn van der 
Sluis for helping me to clarify the legal meaning of “actionable.” 
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them) can be made into grounds for action.74 Taken together, I am thus attempting to 
write a genealogy of the problematization of war in international politics: of how war 
has been formulated as a problem and of how it has, for this purpose and in effect of 
this, been made into an object of knowledge and action. 
In the previous chapter, I have proposed that genealogy, taken as a reflexive 
endeavour rather than a ready-made tool, constitutes a particularly suitable way of 
conducting this research – and I have noted that one of the ways in which early IR 
genealogies achieved this reflexivity was through their conceptualizations. On the one 
hand, to recast the genealogy offered by this thesis as an act of problematization 
restates the aims I have just mentioned: my thesis not only seeks to describe how war 
has emerged as a problem, but thereby also to render our ways of addressing this 
problem further problematic, and ultimately to enable the development of alternatives 
to these ways. On the other hand, to conceptualize genealogy as problematization also 
means to understand genealogy as a process, as emergent, and moreover as part of the 
processes of emergence that it studies and problematizes. This understanding is not 
only directed against the textbook conception of genealogy as a pre-specified 
analytical instrument. It also implies that to genealogically analyze (i.e., to 
problematize) the problematization of war in international politics, I cannot but 
proceed on the basis of the historical materials offered by this existing 
problematization. Yet these materials include the ways of knowing on which I myself, 
trained in the social sciences (and now perhaps turned into an apprentice historian) 
also rely. The same ways of knowing which constitute a condition of possibility for 
critical work on the emergence of the problem of war in international politics are also 
part of this emergence. In this way, the concept of problematization can help to clarify 
not only my research object and my research practice, but also the inevitable 
entanglement between these two.  
																																																						
74 E.g. Louise Amoore, “Data Derivatives: On the Emergence of a Security Risk Calculus for Our 
Times,” Theory, Culture & Society 28, no. 6 (2011), 24-43. 
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A final point worth noting about the concept of problematization is how it provides 
for an alternative to the terminology – and, allegedly, the ontology – of war and 
violence of which Foucault’s earlier works have been accused.75 Consider, for instance, 
Foucault’s historical argument, presented in Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, that 
“[h]umanity does not gradually progress from combat to combat until it arrives at 
universal reciprocity, where the rule of law finally replaces warfare; humanity installs 
each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to 
domination.”76 My intention here is not to side with Foucault or with those who 
criticize this “hypothesis of war.”77 However, since this thesis scrutinizes how we have 
made war into a problem in order to learn how we can change for the better our 
contemporary ways of problematizing war, I prefer not to found my reasoning on a 
terminology or also an ontology of forces and of combat.78 Here, the concept of 
“problematization” offers an alternative. Curiously, the term “problem” originates 
from a military context – it goes back to an ancient Greek term which initially denoted 
a protective barricade used by soldiers, yet which “soon came to be used to mean any 
obstacle,” quandary, or difficulty.79 Nonetheless, insofar as genealogy does not assume 
that the true identity of a thing – or a notion – can be found at its origin, the notion of 
“problematization” seems more appropriate for conceiving of a genealogy of how war 
became a problem of international politics. 
 
Practices  
Next to emergent problems or problematizations, practices are my second primary 
unit of analysis. The understanding of practices this thesis proposes is derived from 
																																																						
75 Cf. Borg, “Genealogy as Critique in IR”; Dean, “Foucault in Guantánamo,” 40; Johanna Oksala, 
Foucault, Politics, Violence (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2012). 
76 Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, 85. Cf. Foucault, “Truth and the Juridical Forms,” 14. 
77 Colin Gordon, “Introduction,” in Michel Foucault, Essential Works, Volume 3: Power, Edited by James 
Faubion (London, UK: Penguin Books, 1994), xi-xli, at xxi. 
78 For a similar argument, cf. Bartelson, War in International Thought, 21ff.  
79 Giuseppe Bianco, “The Misadventures of the ‘Problem’ in ‘Philosophy,’“ Angelaki: Journal of 
Theoretical Humanities 23, no. 2 (2018), 8-30, at 9. 
 
	 96 
Foucault and his interlocutors.80 Foucault never offered a precise definition of the term 
“practice,” yet others have helpfully chimed in on the matter. According to Paul 
Veyne, what Foucault as a historian of practices “is talking about is the same thing 
every historian talks about, namely, what people do.”81 Practices, that is, are neither 
intended as explanatory, nor are they explananda. Rather, and relating back to 
Foucault’s “epiphenomenal” approach mentioned above, they make for a different 
way of making sense of objects. As Veyne explains, “our practice determines its own 
objects in the first place. Let us start, then, with that practice itself, so that the object to 
which it applies is what it is only in relation to that practice.”82 For short, practices 
make objects, or – in the terminology of this thesis – produce problematizations. 
It is with recourse to practices that problematizations become analyzable. As Saar 
points out, problematizations are complicated objects of inquiry: descriptively, they 
can hardly be rendered “as one becoming or even as one historical event,” while 
explanatorily, they are bound to be causally “overdetermined.”83 Faced with the 
difficulty that “there is no analytically most simple unit of analysis or synthetically 
most complete unit of analysis” on the basis of which to describe or explain 
problematizations, Koopman suggests to alleviate the analytical challenge by studying 
practices.84 How might this work? Reflecting on this question in the introduction to 
The History of Sexuality, Vol. 2, Foucault writes that “[i]t was a matter of analyzing, not 
behaviors or ideas, nor societies and their ‘ideologies,’ but the problematizations 
																																																						
80 To borrow the title of Arnold Ira Davidson’s edited volume Foucault and His Interlocutors (Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press, 1997).  
My understanding of practice differs from what has been discussed, in IR and adjacent disciplines, 
under the label of “practice theory,” whether inspired by Bourdieusian sociology or by Science and 
Technology Studies (for the former, cf. Emmanuel Adler, Vincent Pouliot (eds.), International Practices 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011); for the latter, cf. Christian Bueger, Frank 
Gadinger, International Practice Theory: New Approaches (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
Unlike these works, my intention in studying “what people do” is not to emphasize the habitual and 
iterative aspect of practices. For me, practices are a more neutral analytical category – they can be 
repetitive or changing – intended more simply to make problematizations researchable. 
81 Veyne, “Foucault Revolutionizes History,” 156. 
82 Ibid., 155. 
83 Martin Saar, “Genealogische Kritik,” in Rahel Jaeggi, Tilo Wesche (eds.), Was ist Kritik? (Frankfurt 
a.M., Germany: Suhrkamp, 2013), 247-265, at 255; cf. Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 103. 
84 Koopman, Genealogy as Criqiue, 108; cf. Koopman, Matza, “Putting Foucault to Work,” 827. 
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through which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought and the practices on the 
basis of which these problematizations are formed.”85 Practices may concatenate into 
problematizations, by which they are conditioned and which, in turn, they condition. 
Therefore, while we will not be able to make sense of either practices or 
problematizations in isolation, we can attempt to understand the coming about of one 
of them in terms of the coming about of the other. Koopman elaborates this point well: 
as problematizations “act as a kind of hinge by way of which we transition out of old 
practices and into new ones,” we can “treat problematizations as that by virtue of 
which we are able to understand the emergence and recession of present practices”; 
vice versa, we can grasp practices “as emerging in and through problematizations and 
the reconstructive responses provoked by these problematizations.”86 This means that 
“[t]he units of analytical significance for the genealogist are neither micro- (smallest) 
nor macro- (biggest) realities, but are rather practices (smaller) and problematizations 
(bigger).”87 It also means that as an act of problematization, genealogy is, in Foucault’s 
words, “a theoretical practice, if you will. It’s not a theory, but rather a way of 
theorizing practice.”88 
For the purposes of this thesis, what I am particularly interested in with regard to the 
problematization of war are knowledge practices and the contexts in which these arise: 
I study the practices and institutional forms through which war becomes an epistemic 
and hence actionable object. In this, I take my cue from Duncan Bell’s proposal to 
understand knowledge practices as  
																																																						
85 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, 11, italics in original. Foucault then recasts his earlier works in the 
terminology of practices and problematizations: “There was the problematization of madness and 
illness arising out of social and medical practices, and defining a certain pattern of ‘normalization’; a 
problematization of life, language, and labor in discursive practices that conformed to certain 
‘epistemic’ rules; and a problematization of crime and criminal behavior emerging from certain 
punitive practices conforming to a ‘disciplinary’ model. And now I would like to show how, in 
classical antiquity, sexual activity and sexual pleasures were problematized through practices of the 
self, bringing into play the criteria of an ‘aesthetics of existence’” (ibid: 12). Cf. Michel Foucault, 
“Questions of Method,” in Michel Foucault, Essential Works, Volume 3: Power, Edited by James Faubion, 
Translatedby Robert Hurley et al. (London, UK: Penguin Books, 1994), 223–238, at 229ff.  
86 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 101. 
87 Ibid., 108.  
88 Foucault, “Power, Moral Value,” 12. 
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“articulations of thinking, and of claims to valid knowledge, encompassing (indeed 
demarcating) both ‘empirical’ and ‘theoretical’ domains. This includes theories, 
arguments, conceptual schemes, specialized vocabularies, political ideologies and 
policy prescriptions, as well as the numerous ways in which knowledge is constructed 
and validated, expertise assigned and intellectual legitimacy distributed.”89  
Moreover, Bell argues that knowledge practices ought to be analyzed in conjunction 
with the “institutions, networks, organizational structures” from and in which they 
emerge, and “in which knowledge is fertilized, rendered intelligible and 
disseminated.”90 As suggested by Bell’s conceptualization of knowledge practices, in 
my work with primary sources I look at everything that was done to make war an 
epistemic object: at methods or tools for gathering and analyzing data, at procedures 
for evaluating knowledge claims and distributing knowledge, at the theories and 
philosophies (of knowledge and of war) on which these tools and procedures rested, 
and at the ways of knowing into which these different practices coalesced.91 I also look 
at different institutional forms in which knowledge about war was produced, 
specifically at the commission of inquiry and the criminal trial. Finally, to make good 
on the suggestion to study practices through problematizations and problematizations 
through practices, in the historical chapters to follow I analyze knowledge practices 
and the institutional forms in which they occurred as interlinked with what I have 
referred to earlier as formulations of the problem of war. 
																																																						
89 Bell, “Writing the World,“ 12. Bell is at best a sceptical Foucauldian (ibid, fn. 40.), yet his definition of 
knowledge practices fits the general understanding of practices proposed by Foucault very well.  
90 Bell, “Writing the World,” 12. For an alternative definition of “epistemic practices” and the “nodal 
points” at which they come to the fore, derived from Science and Technology Studies, cf. Bueger, 
“Making Things Known.” 
91 My initial understanding of the term “ways of knowing” came from one of the textbooks by means 
of which I was introduced to methodology in the social sciences (Jonathon W. Moses, Torbjorn 
Knutsen, Ways of Knowing: Competing Methodologies in Social and Political Research (London, UK: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007)). It has also taken some inspiration from Hacking’s “styles of reasoning” – 
although I am very sceptical about Hackings’s ambition to offer an exhaustive account of a 
progressive history of ways of knowing (cf. Ian Hacking, “Language, Truth and Reason,” in Martin 
Hollis, Steven Lukes (eds.), Rationality and Relativism (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1980), 48–66; cf. Ian 
Hacking, “‘Language, Truth and Reason’ 30 years later,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 43, 




To think about the relationship between different analytical elements, for instance 
between practices and problematizations, I rely on the concept of “co-production.” In 
Discipline and Punish, Foucault undertakes to conceive of relations between different 
analytical elements in terms of “production,” so to  
“abandon the belief that […] the renunciation of power is one of the conditions of 
knowledge. We should admit rather that power produces knowledge (and not simply 
by encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that 
power and knowledge directly imply one another.”92  
Faced with a multiplicity of emergent research objects which are ultimately always 
causally overdetermined, Foucault’s “coproductionist” approach offers a way of 
focusing the historical analysis and at the same time carries a specific critical 
intention.93  
Genealogists94 and social scientists more generally95 have widely taken up the idea of 
co-production, yet what is still relatively under-appreciated is how exactly this notion 
can enable critique.96 Indeed, because of Foucault’s anti-teleological stance on history 
and his emphasis on the causal roles of accidents and happenstances, many 
genealogists limit themselves to showing that things which are usually taken for 
granted are in fact historically malleable, thus opening them to interruptive critique.97 
However, and as argued in the previous section, genealogy can also amount to a more 
(re-)constructive kind of critique: by focusing not on the mere fact of historical 
emergence, but instead on the processes of which this fact is comprised, genealogy can 
																																																						
92 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 27. Cf. Foucault, Truth and the Juridical Forms, 32. 
93 Cf. Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 35f. 
94 For instance, cf. Bartelson, Genealogy of Sovereignty, 5, 80f. 
95 For instance, Sheila Jasanoff actuates “co-production” for Science and Technology Studies, 
proposing it as “shorthand for the proposition that the ways in which we know and represent the 
world (both nature and society) are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to live in it” (Sheila 
Jasanoff, “The Idiom of Co-Production,” in Sheila Jasanoff (ed.), States of Knowledge: The Co-Production 
of Science and Social Order (London, UK: Routledge, 2004), 1-12, at 2). 
96 Cf. Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 140f. 
97 For examples of this kind of argument within IR, cf. Bonditti et al., “Genealogy,” 163f.; Price, 
Chemical Weapons Taboo, 86. 
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provide the empirical materials we need to work on our problematizations, our 
practices, and ourselves.98 The concept of co-production, by directing our attention to 
the manifold productive relations between different analytical elements and by linking 
this take on causality to a specific critical purpose, can help to realize this analytical 
aim. Or at least, this is what the example of Foucault’s own successive analyses 
suggests, as Foucault’s critical insights into power and knowledge, enabled by the 
notion of “production,” first made him enlarge archaeology into genealogy and later 
led him to take up work on a different kind of ethics.99 
To my mind, this thesis contains at least three co-productive relationships between 
different analytical elements. First, there are several relationships between 
problematizations and knowledge practices. For one, as an inquiry into the problem 
of war, the thesis focuses on the relationship between how war has been formulated as a 
problem and how it has been made into an object of knowledge. Secondly, as an inquiry into 
genealogy, the thesis is also curious about the relationship between my formulation of the 
problems my research addresses and the practices through which I conduct this research. 
Finally, there is the co-productive relationship between these two strands or aspects of my 
research. By allowing me to treat these two strands of the thesis as on par with each 
other, the concept of co-production has helped me to develop a reflexive dimension to 
the research which does not depend on my ways of knowing being somehow less 
problematic than the ways of knowing I analyze.100  
																																																						
98 Cf. Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 140ff. Koopman puts it very well: “Contingency was for 
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as the result of our inquiry, but we inquire to investigate the specific events that have constituted the 
contingent form into which we are inquirying” (ibid, 141).  
99 I prefer to speak of “co-production” rather than “co-constitution” not only because “co-constitution” 
emphasizes the stability of historical objects (cf. Aradau, Huysmans, “Critical methods in IR,” 604), 
but also because “co-production” associates the historical insight into the made nature of objects with 
a call to get to work on their transformation – and hence constitutes an anti-thesis to the notion of “co-
constitution.” 
100 This notion of reflexivity goes beyond the constructivist/pragmatist assumption of a “double 
hermeneutic” according to which “not only do observers rely on first-hand interpretation, but their 
interpretation, in turn, can itself have a feedback effect on the former” (Guzzini, “A Reconstruction of 
Constructivism,” 162). Instead, I try to account for the relationship between myself as a (social 
scientific) knower, my objects of analysis, and the knowledges (and knowers) that inform my analysis 
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This leads me to a final point about the concept of co-production: it captures not only 
the relationships between the different analytical elements, but also allows the analysis 
to branch out and include other co-produced entities. Most notably, the concept 
enables an analysis of the production of subjects. In Truth and the Juridical Forms, for 
instance, Foucault asks “how social practices may engender domains of knowledge 
that not only bring new objects, new concepts, and new techniques to light, but also 
give rise to totally new forms of subjects and subjects of knowledge.”101 Following 
Foucault, from the relationship between practices and problematizations arise not only 
objects, but also subjects.102 It is along these lines that my research tries to gain insight 
into the formation of subjects: specifically, the thesis’ historical chapters look at how 
the problematization of war in international politics produces hierarchies of 
epistemologically and politically capable subjects. 
 
Critical praxis 
In order to develop the findings shed by my inquiry into problematizations, practices, 
and co-productions into the direction of critique, I draw on the notion of “critical 
praxis.” Previously, I have argued that genealogy as problematization, rather than 
denouncing its objects as bad or wrong, seeks to clarify and intensify them and to 
thereby make them into bases for the elaboration of thought. Here, I want to elaborate 
on this by thinking through critique – in line with my understanding of knowledge 
practices spelled out above – not (only) as thought, but also as practice. In What is 
Enlightenment?, Foucault describes genealogical critique as an attempt to “separate 
out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer 
																																																						
without assuming for myself a superior observational and interpretive faculty (cf. Robbie Shilliam, 
“‘Open the Gates Mek We Repatriate’: Carribean Slavery, Constructivism, and Hermeneutic 
Tensions,“ International Theory 6, no. 2 (2014), 349-372). 
101 Foucault, “Truth and the Juridical Forms,” 2. Foucault later undertook a more discernible 
“theoretical shift” to study the subject by looking “for the forms and modalities of the relation to self 
by which the individual constitutes and recognizes himself qua subject” (Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, 
6). 
102 Cf. Allan, “From Subjects to Objects,” 14. 
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being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think.”103 Critique, then, becomes an 
“attitude” or an “ethos” which is “at one and the same time the historical analysis of 
the limits imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond 
them.”104 Taking up this line of thought, I argue that there are two interrelated aspects 
to critique. On the one hand, it probes the preconditions of our ways of knowing and 
being. On the other hand, it also experiments with these ways, or rather, with the 
practices of which these ways are comprised. In order to distinguish this specific idea 
of critique as practical doings from the more general notion of practice specified above, 
I speak of “critical praxis.” 
As regards the idea of critical praxis as the probing of preconditions, I take my bearings 
from Butler’s demand “to rethink critique as a practice in which we pose the question 
of the limits of our most sure ways of knowing.”105 As “certain kinds of practices which 
are designed to handle certain kinds of problems produce, over time, a settled domain 
of ontology as their consequence,” Butler argues, “this ontological domain, in turn, 
constrains our understanding of what is possible.”106 Our “ontological horizon,” as 
Butler calls it, is produced as much by what lies within it as by what lies without it – it 
is constituted both by what it includes and by what it excludes.107 Hence, probing the 
preconditions of our ways of knowing and being means to seek out the composition 
as well as the blindspots and limitations of our contemporary problematizations, and 
the constraints these problematizations place on our political imaginaries. 
For the purpose of the twofold critique proposed by this thesis – a critique of how we 
presently treat war as a problem, and of how we conduct genealogy as a method – my 
aim is, in particular, to question the preconditions of our present ways of knowing. 
																																																						
103 Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?,” in Michel Foucault, Essential Works, Volume 1: Ethics, 
Subjectivity, and Truth, Edited by Paul Rabinow, Translated by Robert Hurley et al. (New York, NY: 
New Press, 1997 [1994]), 303-320, at 315f. 
104 Ibid, 319. 
105 Butler, “What is Critique?,” 215. 
106 Ibid., 216. 
107 For a similar usage of the term “inclusions and exclusions,” cf. Patrica Owens, “Decolonizing Civil 
War,“ Critical Analysis of Law 4, no. 2 (2017), 160-169, at 162. 
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For example, many of our formulations of war as a problem depend on the existence 
of knowing and acting subjects who are capable of recognizing and addressing the 
problem of war precisely insofar as they are situated to the outside of it, thus limiting 
how we can imagine our entanglement with war and how we can therefore act upon 
it. Not dissimilarly, the use of genealogy as a method, i.e., as a tool which is first 
specified and then applied in our engagement with the world, presumes that our 
practices of knowing are somehow not part of the world that we analyze and seek to 
change, thus excluding these practices from the analytical and political scope of our 
inquiries. It is these kinds of insights into the constitutive inclusions and exclusions of 
our contemporary problematizations which offer us the materials for getting to work 
on changing the horizons of our imaginaries by experimenting with our practices. 
For experimenting with our practices is, I suggest, the second aspect of genealogy as a 
critical praxis. To make this argument, I once more take my cue from Koopman, who 
proposes that “Foucault did not aim only to historically problematize our present, for 
his aim was to problematize our present so to reveal conditions we must work on to 
experimentally create an improved future.”108 However, whereas Koopman merely 
suggests that genealogy provides us with the “tools” and “materials” we need to get 
to work on our practices and problematizations109, in this thesis I try to take things one 
step further and hence to use the historical insights shed by the genealogical analysis 
to experiment with my own knowledge practices. The intention behind this 
experimentation is not, or at least not first and foremost, to live up to genealogy’s 
reputation as a “playful” and “improvised” kind of analysis.110 Although there is an 
element of playfulness to it, the experimentation I engage in in this thesis is above all 
an attempt to redo, in a systematic manner, some of the knowledge practices which 
																																																						
108 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 139. On the idea of Foucauldian genealogy as experimentation, cf. 
Gilles Deleuze, ”A Portrait of Foucault,” in Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations 1972-1990, Translated by 
Martin Joughin (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1995 (1986)), 102-118, at 106. 
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110 Felix Berenskoetter, “Approaches to Concept Analysis,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 
45, no. 2 (2017), 151-173, at 169f. 
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my historical analysis identifies as playing an important role within the emergence of 
the problem of war in international politics. My experimentation loosely follows 
Bartelson’s notion, explicated in Chapter 1, of genealogy as a mode of writing that in 
practice situates itself inside the history it is studying. Similarly loosely, it also follows 
the example of Koskenniemi’s Gentle Civilizer of Nations, which, as the author argues, 
constitutes “a kind of experimentation in the writing about the […] past in which the 
constraints of any rigorous ‘method’ have been set aside” in order to provide an 
historical analysis “that hopes to make our present situation clearer to us and to 
sharpen our ability to act […] as we engage in our practices and projects. In this sense, 
it is also a political act.”111 Not least since Koskenniemi’s work is explicitly inspired by 
Foucauldian genealogy112, one way of reading the Gentle Civilizer is as an experiment 
with disciplinary practices of writing which in its experimentation is informed by the 
historical analysis of international law also presented in the book. Looking to these 
examples to find my own way, in the chapters to follow I experiment with several 
disciplinary knowledge practices: with practices of thinking, of looking, and of 
writing.  
Genealogy, in Foucault’s words, is “a historico-practical test of the limits we may go 
beyond, and thus a work carried out by ourselves upon ourselves.”113 In this spirit, the 
critical praxis to which this thesis aspires, the probing of preconditions and the 
experimentation with practices, is hoped to both provide us with the materials to get 
to work on our practices and problematizations and to begin this difficult work, albeit 
in a small way. In addition to a clarification and intensification of the problematization 
of war in international politics, the thesis thus also constitutes an encounter between 
an object of inquiry, a subject of knowledge and a bundle of epistemic practices – an 
encounter, moreover, from which all emerge altered. How this encounter has been set 
up is what I discuss in the chapter’s next section.  
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(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010 [2001]), at 9f.  
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Towards a genealogical praxis 
The previous sections have come at genealogy from various angles. First, by putting 
genealogy in context, I have probed it as a particular kind of history and a particular 
kind of critique. Next, I have discussed how the concept of “problematization,” 
together with a number of ancillary concepts, makes sense of genealogy’s objects as 
well as of genealogy itself. In this third and final section, I want to begin to move this 
discussion towards the critical praxis which the previous section has explicated in the 
abstract. To this end, I explain a number of crucial decisions that I have taken over the 
course of the research process – decisions concerning the historical period and the 
empirical examples to focus on, the kinds of primary sources to use, and my approach 
to and practices for collecting and analyzing these sources. The section concludes with 
a brief preview of my attempt at challenging these practices. 
The genealogy presented in this thesis focuses on one period of time only and on 
multiple examples of emergences within it. This approach differs from the majority of 
genealogical treatises in IR. Most commonly, genealogies in IR have studied a number 
of successive historical periods in order to produce evidence and statements about the 
“identifiable regularity” of their research objects within those periods.114 However, the 
historical interest of this thesis lies with an emergence rather than with a state of affairs, 
or with war’s becoming rather than with its being a problem. As Bonditti and colleagues 
put it, “the event of emergence is a distributed one.”115 In order to make sense of my 
research object as a dispersedly emergent one, I therefore focus on a single instance of 
what Neumann calls “the problem-solving period” or “the break in [a] phenomenon’s 
social existence.”116  
For the “phenomenon” of war, I argue, one particularly interesting and relevant 
“problem-solving period” lasted roughly from the mid-19th to the mid-20th century: it 
																																																						
114 Bartelson, Genealogy of Sovereignty, 86; for a similar approach, cf. Der Derian, On Diplomacy. 
115 Bonditti et al., “Genealogy,” 163. 
116 Neumann, “Post-Structuralists also Have a Duty,” 14. 
 
	 106 
was during this time that war became a practically actionable and empirically 
knowable thing. As to the first of these two emergences, scholars disagree about its 
exact starting point. Ceadel’s and Durand’s respective analyses of the history of 
Western European peace societies suggest that the idea of war as a problem which can 
be addressed by human action already began to take its course in the aftermath of the 
Napoleonic Wars.117 By contrast, Weinke locates the emergence of the idea that war 
was a problem of concern not only to states, but also to civil society in the second half 
of the 19th century.118 In any case, the development of the peace movement over the 
course of the 19th century entails, as Bell points out, that at the end of the century, “[f]or 
the first time in history, it was widely believed that war could be eliminated through 
concerted human action.”119 It is to this particular debut of war as a problem against 
which non-state actors could take practical action that my thesis attends. 
Yet while an awareness of war as an actionable problem might have begun to emerge 
as early as the late 18th century, it was only during the second half the 19th century that 
war began to be understood as an object of empirical knowledge. In the beginning of 
the century, as Durand explains, “[w]ar was regarded as a distortion of human nature 
[…] which could be cured by a return to reason,” and the early peace societies’ “pacifist 
propaganda was still inspired by idealistic considerations.”120 In Durand’s somewhat 
curious wording, “[t]he objective study of war as a phenomenon […] had not yet been 
invented.”121 From about the mid-19th century onwards, however, and in the more 
general context of the emergence of empirically-based social science122 and criminal 
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law123, war began to become an object that could be known “scientifically,” i.e. 
empirically and systematically. This, therefore, makes for the approximate moment 
that I take as the starting point of my historical inquiry. 
However, although it became in principle possible to think of war as an object of 
empirical knowledge and practical action during the second half of the 19th century, 
many of the elements that we today associate with the problem of war only emerged 
at later moments in time. As but one example, consider the idea that the death of 
soldiers in war is problematic. As Zambernardi shows, in the aftermaths of the US 
Civil War, the Franco-German War, and the First World War, combatant deaths for the 
first time took on a social meaning. However, while they signified heroic and 
nationalistic sacrifices, they were not yet the indefensible losses as which we know 
them today (at least insofar as it is soldiers from “our” societies who are killed in 
war).124 This latter kind of signification of combatant deaths only began to become 
conceivable after the Second World War. And this is not yet to say anything about the 
idea that the death of civilians in war is part of the problem at stake, nor of the many 
other aspects that make up the problem of war as we know it today. To enable the 
analysis to capture the emergence of at least some of these different aspects – without, 
however, hypothesizing in advance precisely what these aspects would be – I decided 
to study empirical materials spanning from the aftermath of the Franco-German War 
to the aftermath of the Second World War.  
To pin down more precisely what I would look at, I resolved to focus on a number of 
examples of initiatives that sought to do something against war by producing 
empirical knowledge about it. Specifically, I looked for international and post-war 
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endeavours at knowing and addressing war – though the initiatives I ended up 
studying differed in what it meant for them to be “international” and “post-war.” 
Moreover, since I did not want to unquestioningly take IR’s (or, for that matter, any 
other discipline’s) dealing with war as my point of departure, I chose to study 
initiatives undertaken by actors whom we might today think of as “practitioners,” yet 
who in their own times, in which the boundaries between scholarship and practice, 
insofar as they were drawn at all, were not yet drawn in the same way as today, often 
combined scholarly and practical-political roles.125 Finally, and as mentioned above, 
my particular interest was in how war became a problem against which non-state 
actors could take action, and I chose examples accordingly. 
As to the logic of selecting examples to be studied, I did not choose initiatives for their 
representativeness, with a view to drawing more general inferences about a larger 
universe of cases. Nor did I intend to focus on the key points in the emergence of the 
problem of war – in fact, I often deliberately looked for the becoming of the problem 
of war in places and moments that are not often considered in IR analyses. The 
distributed nature of the emergence of problems, the understanding of history as 
contingent and haphazard, and the assumption that genealogy is inextricably part of 
the histories it studies and writes mean that neither representativeness nor centrality 
are of central concern for genealogical research.126 Instead, Foucault suggests that 
genealogies are constructed from “discreet and apparently insignificant truths.”127 In 
this spirit, I chose different initiatives as examples of what the problematization of war 
in international politics had looked like in the past, so to be able to examine the 
different forms, shapes, and guises in which war emerged into a problem, to probe the 
historically constituted preconditions of our contemporary ways of thinking about and 
taking action against war, and to hopefully produce materials for enabling the 
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experimentation with these ways. 
In the order of appearance within the thesis, the first example I study, in Chapter 3, is 
the so-called “Balkan Commission” which, sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace (CEIP), inquired into the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913. Insofar as 
the commission is known among scholars of IR, it is seen as an example within the 
history of the concept of civilization which gained renewed prominence when, in 1993, 
the CEIP reissued the commission’s report as a historical commentary on the ongoing 
wars in Yugoslavia.128 By contrast, my interest in the commission’s work was originally 
sparked because some of the extant secondary literature in international law 
mentioned it as an example of a truth commission avant la lettre129, and also because 
the commission understood itself as an attempt to produce a “scientific” study of the 
phenomenon of war in order to contribute to war’s elimination. My engagement with 
the available archival sources pertaining to the commission’s work turned out to be 
crucial in figuring out my project’s focus on the problem of war: for among many other 
things, these sources discuss, both explicitly and in-between the lines, the question of 
how war should be framed. Was war a legal, an economic, a moral problem? Or was 
it not a problem so much as a way of progressing in history?  
From the manifold leads offered by the analysis of the Balkan Commission’s work, in 
the following two chapters I decided to focus on formulations of war as a legal problem 
– not least because the commission itself had sidelined this formulation. To this end, 
Chapter 4 studies two ultimately unsuccessful attempts at devising an international 
criminal institution: a debate, in the aftermath of the Franco-German War, between 
international jurists hailing from Belgium, France, and Germany; and another debate, 
in the aftermath of the First World War, held by the so-called Advisory Committee of 
Jurists (in which leading voices came from Belgium, France, the United States, and 
Japan). Initially, one main reason for my interest in the legal debates surrounding the 
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Franco-German War was the empiricist stance which the secondary literature 
attributes to international lawyers of the mid- to late nineteenth century, casting them 
as “amateur sociologists”130 and highlighting how they “[took] pride in the strength of 
their grip on reality.”131 Incidentally, the debate following the Franco-German War also 
featured the earliest formulation that I could find of an idea for retrospectively 
producing knowledge about war in order to address some of war’s problematic 
aspects.132 Meanwhile, the secondary literature suggests that by the time of the 
Advisory Committee of Jurists, international law’s epistemological principles and 
epistemic practices had changed.133 In addition, a first glance at the primary sources 
offered the committee’s proposition that an international criminal tribunal would have 
a “considerable preventative effect” on war.134 Finally, I was keen to follow up on the 
example of the Balkan Commission with an analysis of reactions to distinctly 
“European” wars – which is not to suggest that the First World War was not fought 
and felt globally, but rather that I was interested in seeing reactions to wars that could 
not so easily be made sense of by the kind of “civilizational” reasoning that underlay 
much of the Balkan Commission’s work.  
In Chapter 5, to look more closely at war as crime, I turn my attention to the post-
Second World War International Military Tribunals (IMTs). While my initial interest 
in the IMTs was, once more, aroused by the secondary literature’s interpretation of 
these tribunals as early example of transitional justice135, the chapter ended up 
counteracting precisely this idea. Instead, I studied the IMTs as an instance within the 
genealogy of the problematization of war in international politics – as the first time 
that war received a fully-fledged treatment as a particular kind of legal problem, 
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namely an international crime, and as an instance featuring several novel practices for 
retrospectively knowing war. For this chapter, I decided to focus the analysis on the 
three dissents issued by the French, Dutch, and Indian judges on the bench of the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) in Tokyo. Dipping into the 
primary sources and the secondary literature, it struck me that these three judges had 
distinctive understandings of the international order, of war, and of legal (and other) 
ways of knowing. To follow up on the “civilizational” reasoning that played such 
distinct roles in the examples covered by previous chapters, it was especially 
interesting to see how the Indian judge made sense of these matters and how his 
colleagues criticized his points of view.  
Insofar as all of the historical examples I study are composed partly or wholly of 
international jurists, this is because for much of the period under study, jurists were 
amongst the most active in the business of wondering about how one could produce 
empirical knowledge about war in order to delimit, prevent, or even eradicate entirely 
this gruesome phenomenon. Historians were usually preoccupied with wars dating 
back many centuries, and would-be scholars of international politics had, for much of 
the time under study, yet to witness the “birth” of their discipline. Moreover, as 
Aalberts and Golder remind us, “from a Foucauldian perspective, law is not the vis-à-
vis of power, […] but in fact a form of power itself that produces a truth regime 
through legal knowledge claims.”136 From this perspective, studying the ideas and 
practices of international jurists is but one particular way of studying knowledge and 
its history in international politics. Finally, while this focus on international law did 
mean that I often found myself studying ways of knowing and being that were wholly 
unfamiliar to me, these seemingly strange ways are, at least if we take seriously the 
argument that 19th-century international jurists were “amateur sociologists,” 
precursors to our contemporary ways of knowing war. And as our contemporary ways 
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might be more legally shot through than we (non-jurists) would like to believe137, it 
will be helpful to have insight into their historical constitution. 
To study these scattered emergences of the problem of war, I draw on different kinds 
of primary sources. I collected materials from archives both physical and digital, and 
I also collected articles, reports, opinion pieces, and other kinds of published texts. 
Many of these materials are what Foucault once referred to as “‘prescriptive’” or 
“‘practical’” rather than “theoretical” texts: “texts written for the purpose of offering 
rules, opinions, and advice,” and moreover texts “which are themselves objects of a 
‘practice’ in that they were designed to be read, learned, reflected upon, and tested 
out.”138 For each chapter, I took a deliberate decision on how to delimit the archive of 
texts I would base my analysis on. Chapter 3, for instance, is based on one “complete” 
archive: it takes into account all of the records on the Balkan Commission that are 
available in Columbia University’s Rare Book and Manuscript Library (which holds 
the pre-1945 archives of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace). Not least for reasons of 
feasibility, Chapter 5, by contrast, is based almost exclusively on just three primary 
sources: namely, the dissents of the judges from France, the Netherlands, and India. 
Chapter 4 falls somewhere in-between these two extremes, yet it has to cope with the 
added difficulty of handling sources from two distinct moments in time.  
Foucault, of course, uses the term “archive” to refer not to a building and the records 
it stores, but to an order of things and the “system of its enunciability”139 – a structural 
focus which, as this chapter has already discussed, was later converted into an analysis 
of historical emergences. Taking up this line of thought, the aim of my analysis of 
primary sources is to understand the emergence of war as an epistemic and actionable 
object. To do this, I follow Stoler’s suggestion to read sources not only “against” but 
also “along the archival grain.”140 This is an interpretive reading which, rather than 
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trying to find a meaning lying hidden behind or beneath the texts, tries to make sense 
of the meaning the texts carry overtly. This is not to say that my reading of the sources 
blindly follows the archive’s categories and classifications – to the contrary, I probe 
how they were produced and, in turn, how they became productive. Drawing on this 
reading, I then develop an analytical narrative which, or so I hope, not only offers a 
history of the problematization of war, but also provides materials for us to get to work 
on the preconditions of this problematization and on the practices through which it is 
actuated today. 
And yet, my ways of working with primary sources are made up of practices of 
collecting, reading, thinking, and writing which are not principally different from the 
knowledge practices I analyze. They are just as fraught, just as potentially problematic, 
and – if I am to take seriously the idea of genealogy as a way of getting to work on our 
contemporary problematizations – just as much in need of being changed. However, 
taking seriously the insights shed by this analysis also means that more than anything, 
it is my practices that are keeping the project together. How, then, to practice 
genealogical research without taking this practice for granted?  
I work out my answer to this question over the course of the three following chapters. 
Here, I merely want to issue a brief announcement: what I will try to do is to 
experiment with – to take up and do differently – three practices that are quite common 
in our research (not least in IR’s research into war and violent conflict). In Chapter 3, I 
do differently a practice of thinking, namely the practice of formulating working 
hypotheses. In Chapter 4, I get to work on a practice of writing, namely the practice of 
developing an overarching narrative into which all of the findings are integrated. In 
Chapter 5, finally, I turn on two practices of looking: the practice of looking at an 
archive in its entirety, and the practice of taking a bird’s-eye view to figure out and 
then focus on the most central aspect of an object, a case, an example under study. Each 
chapter is followed by a vignette in which I explain and reflect upon this “doing 
differently.” Instead of using genealogy as a method, or as a technical tool to be first 
specified and then wielded onto the material, I thereby in part construct what it 
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practically means to do a genealogy during the process of the research. The practice of 
thinking with which I experiment in Chapter 3 is one that, in an afterthought to the 
“methods training” that I underwent during previous studies, I had already been 
wondering about prior to commencing this project. The practices of writing and of 
looking on which the following two chapters turn, however, are practices about which 
I began to think during my work on Chapter 3 – which deals, amongst many other 
things, with how the Balkan Commission invented practices of direct observation and 
of report-writing. Through these experimentations, I try to render the knowledge 
practices of which genealogy consists part of the research process, and thereby to turn 
to good account genealogy’s insight into the historical and emergent nature of our 
ways of knowing.  
 
Doing genealogy as becoming curious 
The purpose of this chapter has been to report and reflect on the actions my thinking 
about genealogy and about the problem of war has taken en route to being. As a first 
step, I have discussed my reading of Foucauldian genealogy in contrast to archaeology 
as well as to Nietzschean genealogy. This reading has arrived at an understanding of 
genealogy as a kind of history which inquires into processes of emergence and which, 
to this end, has at least two research foci, as well as at an understanding of genealogy 
as critique which, digesting a large amount of empirical materials, aims to analyze the 
coming-about of our contemporary ways of being, knowing, and doing in order to 
render these ways changeable. Next, I have proposed a number of concepts through 
which to conduct genealogy as this kind of history/critique. Centrally, I have discussed 
the idea of “problematization,” referring to the process of the becoming of a problem, 
as a way to make sense both of genealogy’s research objects and of genealogy itself. In 
addition, I have suggested the notions of “practice,” “co-production,” and “critical 
praxis” as ancillary concepts  to account for, respectively, the stuff of which 
problematizations are assembled, the relationships between different analytical 
elements, and the (re-)constructive, probing, and practical critique that this genealogy 
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aspires to. Finally, I have provided an overview of how I went about this critical 
genealogical praxis. In this regard, I have pointed out and explained my decisions as 
to the period of time under study, the choice of examples of study, the choice of sources 
and the delimitation of the archive, and the approach to and practices for collecting 
and analyzing these sources. I have ended this discussion with a short preview of how, 
in the following chapters, I will attempt to experiment with and “do differently” some 
of these practices. This experimentation, together with the work done by the concept 
of problematization and its ancillaries, is my answer to the question of how to “put 
genealogy as a critical stance into motion alongside the empirical material.”141 It is my 
suggestion for making good on the specific notion of history/critique proposed by 
Foucault’s genealogical work, as well as my proposal for how we could do our 
knowing – our methods and methodologies – in an historically reflective and thereby 
critically conscious way.  
None of this is meant to imply that this is the only possible way of conducting a 
historical critique. I do not want to suggest that the way in which the genealogy offered 
in this thesis proceeds is the only valid approach to genealogy; quite to the contrary, 
in reading others’ genealogical treatises, I have been struck by the variety of ways of 
doing genealogy, and I have come to believe that one of the strengths of genealogy is 
that each genealogical project must find its own way of conducting itself. Nor do I 
more generally wish to argue for genealogy, however specified, as the best or even the 
only way of doing research that is critically reflexive. In fact, I hope that genealogy and 
related historical approaches can proceed in conversation with other critical to 
research, and I will sketch out some possible lines of conversation in the thesis’s 
conclusion. What I do want to argue, however, is that genealogy as sketched in this 
chapter and as proposed by this thesis – genealogy as history/critique, 
problematization, and critical praxis – makes for an insightful and sound way of 
thinking about, inquiring into, and getting to work on our ways of knowing. 
																																																						
141 Koopman, “Ways of Doing Genealogy.” 
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Before turning to the first historical example, I would like to momentarily conclude 
this chapter’s various lines of argument by proposing genealogy as a mode of 
curiosity.142 “As for what motivated me,” Foucault writes, “it is quite simple; I would 
hope that in the eyes of some people it might be sufficient in itself. It was curiosity.”143 
Taking up this cue, genealogist Simon Gehl contemplates curiosity as a complex 
approach to inquiring into and extending our epistemological and political 
imaginaries: 
“as much as I find curiosity an invitation, it's also a source of unending frustration. 
How does one actually do it? How does one become curious? Or practice curiosity? It's 
not as simple or as romantic as it sounds. [...] curiosity has already been harnessed, 
directed, primed. [...] To practice curiosity in Foucault's sense would be precisely to 
work against its institutionalized modes; that is, to combat some patterns and habits 
with others. But which ones? And why?“144 
To me, this stance on curiosity – the exhilaration and the frustration that comes with 
genealogy as a critical praxis – offers a very poignant summation of this chapter’s 
discussion. It captures both the unceasing “uncertainty and apprehension”145 and the 
rigour146, both the creativity and the systematicity that genealogy as history/critique, 
problematization, and critical praxis requires. In this spirit, the next chapters turn to 
the history of the problematization of war in international politics – starting with an 
analysis of the Balkan Commission’s inquiry into the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913.  
																																																						
142 For related takes on curiosity in IR, cf. Cynthia Enloe, The Curious Feminist: Searching for Women in a 
New Age of Empire (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2004); Cynthia Weber, Queer 
International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge (Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 2016), ch. 2. See also Luis Lobo-Guerrero, “Wondering as a Research Attitude,” in Mark B. 
Salter, Can E. Mutlu (eds.), Research Methods in Critical Security Studies: An Introduction (London, UK: 
Routledge), 25-28. 
143 Foucault, The Use of Please, 8. On the “principle of curiosity,” cf. Foucault, “Power, Moral Values.” 
144 Gehl, cited in Koopman, “Ways of Doing Genealogy.” 
145 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, 7. 




The problem of war and the will to knowledge: 
The example of the Balkan Commission, ca. 1912-1914 
 
In the late summer of 1913, the Balkan Commission, a group of “men of the highest 
standing” nominated and sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace (CEIP), set out to inquire into the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 and to produce 
a report which would educate “the civilized world” about the problem of war. The 
First Balkan War, from October 1912 to May 1913, had pitted the Balkan League, an 
alliance comprised of Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia, against the Ottoman 
Empire; the Second Balkan War, from June to July 1913, had been waged between the 
former members of the Balkan League, and later on also Romania and the Ottoman 
Empire. Both wars had generated a lot of international interest, as a large number of 
mostly Western European and US-American journalists and photographers had 
covered the wars extensively.1 In reaction to these news stories2, Nicholas Murray 
Butler, the Director of the CEIP’s Division of Intercourse and Education, sent a 
telegram to Elihu Root, the President of the CEIP:  
“Amazing charges of Bulgarian outrages attributed to King of Greece give us great 
opportunity for prompt action. If you approve I will send notable commission at once 
to Balkans to ascertain facts and to fix responsibility for prolonging hostilities and 
commencing outrages.”3  
																																																						
1 Cf. Dzovinar Kévonian, “L’enquête, le délit, la preuve: Les ‘atrocités’ balkanique de 1912-1913 à 
l’épreuve du droit de la guerre,“ Le Mouvement Social 222, no. 1 (2008), 13-40, at 15; Eugene Michail, 
“Western Attitudes to War in the Balkans and the Shifting Meanings of Violence, 1912-91,“ Journal of 
Contemporary History 47, no. 2 (2012), 219-239, at 223. 
2 Cf. Frances Trix, “Peace-mongering in 1913: The Carnegie International Commission of Inquiry and 
Its Report on the Balkan Wars,“ First World War Studies 5, no. 2 (2014), 147-162, at 149. 
3 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York and Washington Offices Records, 1910-1954  
(Columbia University, Rare Book and Manuscript Library Collection), Vol. 200, Telegram Butler to 
Root, 19 July 1913. 
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When Root approved immediately4, Butler cabled Paul Henri d’Estournelles de 
Constant, the head of the CEIP’s European Bureau in Paris, to explain that a 
commission was to “proceed promptly” in order to “fix responsibility” for the 
“hostilities” and to “report facts concerning alleged atrocities,“ all in an effort to 
provide “guidance” for public opinion in “Europe and America.”5  
The commission was constituted under the presidency of d’Estournelle. Including its 
president, it consisted of eight members, of whom, however, only four travelled to the 
Balkans: Henry Noel Brailsford, a British journalist; Samuel Train Dutton, a head of 
school at Columbia University with a legal background; Justin Godart, a French lawyer 
and politician; and Paul Milioukoff, a Russian historian and member of parliament. 
While a series of misunderstandings prevented the fifth member, the German law 
professor Walther Schücking, from joining the commission in Belgrade, two further 
members, the Austrian law professor Paul Redlich and the British editor of the 
Economist, Francis W. Hirst, never intended to go to the Balkans and only collaborated 
afterwards.6 The four travelling members of the commission left Paris on August 20, 
1913, ten days after the Treaty of Bucharest had concluded the Second Balkan War. 
After stops in Belgrade and Salonika, they parted ways: whereas Brailsford and Dutton 
stayed in Salonika, Godart and Milioukoff went to Athens, from where Milioukoff 
soon set off for Constantinople. Thereupon, the commissioners reunited in Sofia and 
finally returned to Paris on September 28, 1913.7 In a meeting with d’Estournelles 
immediately afterwards, they decided on a structure for the report, on who would 
author which chapter8, and on late November of the same year as the date of 
																																																						
4 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Telegram Root to Butler, 19 July 1913. 
5 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Telegram Butler to d’Estournelles, 19 July 1913. 
6 Cf. Kévonian, “L’enquête,” 24ff.; Trix, “Peace-mongering in 1913,” 150f. 
7 For detailed accounts of these travels, cf. Kévonian, “L’enquête,” 27ff.; Trix, “Peace-mongering in 
1913,” 151f.  
8 According to the secondary literature, Milioukoff wrote chapters I, III, IV and V; Brailsford chapter 
II; Godart chapter VI; and Dutton chapter VII. This is in line with the primary sources I consulted. For 
a chapter outline with individual author’s names, cf. CEIP Archive, Vol. 201, Letter Prudhommeaux to 
Haskell, 12 February 1914. For the handwritten drafts of the chapters, cf. Carnegie Endowment for 
International European Center Records, 1911-1940 (Columbia University, Rare Book and Manuscript 
Library Collection), Boxes 9-11. 
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publication. Yet this deadline was not met, nor were several later ones – in the end, the 
report was only published in May 1914.9  
In this chapter, I take the Balkan Commission and its work as a first example within 
the genealogy of war’s becoming an epistemic and actionable object offered by this 
thesis. Within this genealogy, the commission makes for a pertinent example insofar 
as it constituted an international as well as retrospective effort at taking action against 
war by producing knowledge about it.10 In the commissioners’ understanding, their 
report was “directed not against one or the other of the belligerents, but against the 
war in which all have been more or less the victims,”11 and their inquiry overall 
amounted to “an admirable work of justice, of science and of truth.“12 To analyze this 
work, the chapter uses different kinds of primary sources. A first key primary source 
is the published report, which – after a single-paged preface by Butler and a lengthy 
introduction by d’Estournelles – is composed of seven chapters for which the members 
of the commission assumed collective authorship.13 Furthermore, I also use materials 
collected from the archives of the CEIP’s New York and Washington Offices and from 
its Centre Européen (European Centre). These materials date from October 1912 to July 
1914 and comprise letters, telegrams and personal notes written by staff of the CEIP’s 
New York and Paris offices as well as by members of the commission; correspondence 
between the CEIP and various interlocutors in the United States and Europe (including 
the Balkan countries); planning documents and reports; and newspaper clippings. 
Within the thesis, this chapter serves a twofold purpose. As the previous chapter has 
explained, the genealogy conducted by this thesis constitutes a particular kind of 
history and critique: with the aim of clarifying and intensifying our contemporary 
																																																						
9 It was mostly Milioukoff who held up the publication of the report (cf. Trix, “Peace-mongering in 
1913,” 153).  
10 Cf. Kévonian, “L’enquête,” passim; Michail, “Western Attitudes,” 227; Trix, “Peace-mongering in 
1913,” 151. 
11 CEIP Archive, Vol. 201, D’Estournelles to Butler, 19 February 1914.  
12 CEIP Archive, Vol. 201, D’Estournelles to Butler, 3 March 1914.  
13 For a summary and critical appraisal of the respective individual chapters, cf. Trix, “Peace-




problematization of war, I seek to provide historical materials by means of which we 
can recognize and get to work on our practices of knowing about war as well as on 
these practices’ conditions of possibility; in addition, I also endeavour to undertake 
this work on our knowledge practices. On the one hand, therefore, the chapter 
reconstructs how, in the example provided by the Balkan Commission’s work, war 
was rendered into an epistemic and actionable object. To this end, the chapter’s first 
section delineates various formulations of the problem of war: rational formulations 
of war as a legal, an economic, and a moral problem, as well as dialectical formulations 
of war as expressive of class conflict and as a driver of progress. The second section 
attends to the institutional form of the commission of inquiry and to the commission’s 
knowledge practices and ways of knowing. Exploring the spatial and temporal 
character of the problematization of war, the third section not only scrutinizes the 
categorization of the Balkan Commission as a post-war initiative, but also probes the 
assumption of European modernity as a uniquely suitable spatio-temporal location 
from which to problematize war. Taken together, this reconstruction of how, in the 
work of the Balkan Commission, war became an object that could be empirically 
known and practically acted upon yields manifold insights into the different elements 
of the problematization of war, as well as into these elements’ co-production, 
preconditions, and constitutive exclusions.  
On the other hand, the chapter constitutes a methodological experiment. In the 
preceding chapter, I have argued for methodology as an ongoing process of reflecting 
about the practice of research while being engrossed in this very practice, and I have 
also made the case for genealogy as an experimentation with our knowledge practices. 
Taking up these arguments, in this chapter I experiment with a particular practice of 
thinking: the practice of formulating working hypotheses. As tools for wagering 
conjectures about our research objects and for proposing these objects for further 
examination, working hypotheses are – as I will explain in more detail in the reflective 
vignette following this chapter – typically a means for keeping our research objects at 
arm’s length. In this chapter, however, I point the practice of formulating working 
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hypotheses in the opposite direction. At the end of each main section and again in the 
conclusion, I compile the central findings of my historical analysis into a number of 
working hypotheses. My aim in providing these hypotheses is to make it both more 
straightforward and more imperative to take up and use the materials offered by this 
chapter to get to work on our contemporary problematization of war. Hence, the 
working hypotheses I offer invite a different kind of conjecture: rather than serving to 
maintain our distance from our research objects, they seek to push us towards getting 
to work on changing our knowledge practices and, ultimately, our knowledgeable 
selves. 
 
Converging and competing formulations of the problem of war 
Two days after the telegram to d’Estournelles in which he had first proposed the 
Balkan Commission, Butler followed up with a letter containing more detailed 
instructions:  
“The chief points to examine and report upon are these: Responsibility for the outbreak 
of hostilities between the Allies; the truth, or falsity, of the reported outrages, and the 
responsibility for those outrages that are committed; the moral and economic losses 
due to this war.“14  
In this early formulation, the problem of war was potentially many-pronged. Butler’s 
concern with “the outbreak of war” suggested that the problem might lie with war per 
se. But war’s problematic character also resided in two more specific aspects: in certain 
kinds of war-time violence (“outrages”), and in the moral and economic consequences 
or costs of war (“losses”). In this section, I describe how these different possible 
formulations of the problem of war found expression in the example of the work of 
the Balkan Commission. I also point out two further formulations which at the time 
were generally in circulation and which the commission sought to subdue: war as 
expressive of class struggle, and war as heroic and a driver of progress. In the section’s 
																																																						
14 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter Butler to d’Estournelles, 21 July 1913. 
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conclusion, I formulate a first few working hypotheses regarding the constitutive 
exclusions of the problematization of war in the example under study. 
In the international politics of problematizing war of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, two formulations of the problem were in competition with each 
other: the problem of war per se, and the problem of excessive violence within war. 
Both formulations can also be found in the source material pertaining to the example 
of the Balkan Commission. The notion of the problem of war as such attracted only 
scant sympathy among the CEIP and the commissioners. Some of the correspondence 
originating from the CEIP’s Paris Bureau references “la guerre elle-même” as the 
problem which the Balkan Commission was to tackle15, and some of the members of 
the commission toyed with this idea, too. Godart, for instance, declared the 
commission’s report to be aimed “against war in general.“16 Ultimately, however, the 
commission found that claiming war per se to be problematic would undermine its 
intention of rendering war a problem that could be addressed by practical means: “If 
[the commission] discovers that the atrocities were inevitable, inseparable from the 
condition of war, what an exposure of the powerlessness of civilization!”17  
A focus on certain violent acts within war promised to make for a better addressable 
problem. The idea that the problem of war consisted in excessive war-time violence is 
widespread both in the early correspondence of Butler and d’Estournelles18 and in the 
final report, whose second and third chapters are dedicated to a detailed description 
and systematic enumeration of instances of excessive violence – “outrages” or 
“atrocities” – against civilians.19 At the same time, the primary sources also betray just 
																																																						
15 CEIP Archive, Vol. 201, Letter Prudhommeaux to Haskell, 6 January 1914. Cf. CEIP Archive, Vol. 
201, Letter d’Estournelles to Butler, 19 February 1914. 
16 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, L’Humanité, La mission Carnegie poursuit son enquête, 9 September 1913. 
17 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the 
Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
1914), at 3. 
18 See, for instance, CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter Butler to Root, 19 July 1913.  
19 This kind of violence included the murder of civilians (CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter Butler to 
d’Estournelles, 21 July 1913. Cf. CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, e.g. 72f., 76ff., 103); arson 
(CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter Butler to d’Estournelles, 21 July 1913. Cf. CEIP, Causes and Conduct of 
the Balkan Wars, e.g. 19, 91, 131, 139); pillage (CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, e.g. 71, 75, 
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how hard-won an achievement this way of problematizing war was. A first draft of 
Godart’s chapter of the report, for instance, initially argued that “[t]he devastations 
were of two kinds, those made necessary by war, [and] those that were irregular,“ but 
was then revised to read “[t]he havoc committed was of two kinds, one lawful and the 
other directed against private property.”20 The added emphasis on the actual 
perpetration of war-time violence (instead of just amounting to a “devastation,” it was 
a “havoc committed”) as well as on the distinction between legal and illegal instances 
of such violence exemplifies the many and minute decisions that went into the 
commissioners’ elaboration of war into a specific kind of legal problem. 
The struggle between these two legal formulations of the problem of war – the problem 
of war as such and the problem of war-time violence – played out with reference to 
the framework provided by international law. By the time of the Balkan Commission, 
the various arguments and counter-arguments had been rehearsed so many times that 
there was a standard repertoire of legal reasoning on which the commissioners and 
their critics could draw. Thus, one of the commission’s critics contended that “[t]here 
is no Recht des Unrechts (no right of unright) […]. When war is outside the boundary 
of law, war is ‘wrong’. Consequently to try to meliorate warfare is to lose one’s time 
and efforts!”21 As a participant of the two Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, 
d’Estournelles had also held this view: “To humanize war seemed to me then a 
hypocrisy and a satire, leading to its being too easily accepted.” However, 
d’Estournelles had since changed his mind and now believed that “[t]he armies are 
only instruments in the hands of the governments; and these armies are recruited 
among the youth of each country. […] To refuse to humanize war for fear of making it 
too frequent, is to let the weight of the governments’ fault fall upon the soldier.”22 The 
																																																						
81, 282); massacres (ibid, e.g. 13, 19, 69; cf. CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, D’Estournelles, “Une Mission de la 
Dotation Carnegie dans les Balkans,” 9 September 1913); and rape (CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the 
Balkan Wars, e.g. 34, 75, 99, 103f.). 
20 CEIP European Center Records, Box 11, Folder 11.5, Godart, Draft of chapter VI, 9a; cf. CEIP, Causes 
and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 244. 
21 CEIP Archive, Vol. 121, Letter Léon Montluc to Butler, 10 December 1914. 
22 CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 14. 
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commission overall sided with d’Estournelles. The final report’s chapter on questions 
of international law arising from the Balkan wars weighs the prospects of rendering 
the opening of hostilities and/or excessive war-time violence into crimes against 
international law.23 Ultimately, the report rejects the former and embraces the latter, 
leading to its famous conclusion that “there is no clause in international law applicable 
to land war and to the treatment of the wounded, which was not violated, to a greater 
or lesser extent, by all the belligerents.”24  
This pointed conclusion notwithstanding, on the whole the Balkan Commission’s 
work emphasised the economic and moral problem of war over war’s legally 
problematic dimensions. Butler, for one, had from the outset been “much less 
interested […] in the juristic development than in the psychological and ethical 
development of peoples.”25 Hence, when d’Estournelles suggested to Butler that the 
commission should frame instances of excessive violence as criminal acts26, Butler 
urged a different framing: “My recommendation would be, to dwell, as much as 
possible, upon the moral and economic, disasters of the war, and to use the atrocities, 
when proved, rather as evidences of moral bankruptcy, than as ordinary crimes.”27 
What did war as a “moral and economic” problem consist in? 
																																																						
23 See also CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter d’Estournelles to Butler, 15 September 1913. Of course, 
framing war-time violence as “criminal“ was not the only way of rendering it a legal problem – infact, 
and as Chapter 4 will discuss, other ways of legally problematizing war were far more pervasive 
during the early decades of the 20th century. 
24 CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 208. By applying the law stipulated in the Hague 
Conventions to the Balkan wars, “[t]he Commission has done its duty in contending that in spite of 
the Hague Conventions, the cruelty and ferocity and the worst outrages remained in the Balkans as 
the direct heritage of slavery and war” (CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 14). What 
d’Estournelles meant by this was that the legal framework which sought to prevent war through 
arbitration and adjudication had failed. 
25 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter Butler to d’Estournelles, 29 September 1913. 
26 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter d’Estournelles to Butler, 15 September 1913.  
27 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter Butler to d’Estournelles, 16 September 1913. Earlier mentions of this 
problem include a proposal by the Délégation Permanente des Sociétés Francaises de la Paix of 
October 1912, which asks the CEIP to support an inquiry into “the economic and demographic 
consequences” of the First Balkan War (CEIP Archive, Vol. 198, Letter Prudhommeaux to Haskell, 26 
October 1912), as well as a suggestion by Haskell to conduct “an inquiry [...] into the losses of men and 
of money in the war of the Orient” (CEIP Archive, Vol. 199, Letter Prudhommeaux to Haskell, 29 
December 1912).  
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As the opening line of chapter VI of the final report puts it, “[f]rom the economic point 
of view, war is a destruction of wealth.”28 The chapter goes on to outline the problem 
as follows. Already “before war is declared the prospect of conflict between the 
countries […] affects the financial situation,” as “[c]redit facilities are restricted; 
monetary circulation disturbed; production slackened; orders falling off to a marked 
degree; and an uncertainty prevails which reacts harmfully on trade.” With “the 
declaration of war and mobilization,” “able bodied men” are drafted, and “work stops 
in factories and in the fields.” This has negative repercussions for individual 
households as well as for the national economy. “Not only does the country cease to 
produce, but it consumes with great expense in the hurry of operations.” Once “the 
fighting begins,” “[t]housands of human lives are sacrificed,” in particular the lives of 
those most capable of “fruitful labor.” But the economically destructive nature of war 
is not limited to the annihilation of human lives: “highly expensive supplies of cannon, 
gun carriages and arms are ruined,” and “there is destructive bombardment of towns, 
villages in flames, the harvests stamped down or burned, bridges, the most costly 
items of a railway, blown up.” “Outrages” against civilians are accompanied by 
further economic destruction, as “noncombatants have to suffer […] invasion, excesses 
and it may be flight, with the loss of their goods.”29 In sum: “Hundreds of thousands 
of deaths, soldiers crippled, ruin, suffering, hatred and, to crown all, misery and 
poverty after victory. War results in destruction and poverty in every direction.”30 Of 
																																																						
Moreover, in the report’s preface, Butler rhetorically puts the legal problem of war into its place by 
assigning it a specific and limited argumentative function. He first asserts that “the persistent rumors 
[...] as to violations of the laws of war by the several combatants” had been one main reason for the 
invocation of the commission, and then declared that the purpose of the report was “a contemplation 
of the individual and national [moral and economic] losses due to war“ (CEIP, Causes and Conduct of 
the Balkan Wars, Preface). The author of the report’s final chapter, Dutton, had a less subtle rhetorical 
approach: “The bearing of international law upon the conduct of war and the treatment of people and 
of private property by belligerents has already been discussed. It is the larger moral question which is 
here raised” (ibid., 272, my emphasis).  
28 CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 235. On the economic problems of war, cf. Nadine 
Akhund, “The Two Carnegie reports: From the Balkan Expedition of 1913 to the Albanian Tip of 
1921,” Balkanologie: Revue d’études pluridisciplinaires 14, no. 1-2 (2012). 
29 CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 235. D’Estournelle’s introduction echoes these 
statements drawn from chapter VI without adding anything new to them (see ibid., 4, 14). 
30 Ibid., 264. 
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this rendition of the economic problem of war, a number of aspects are particularly 
noteworthy. For one, war was divided into distinct bits of time in which the economy 
was negatively affected, with an emphasis on moments just before and after the 
outbreak of war. Furthermore, war was problematic specifically for an economy in 
which many of the most valuable items were markers of modernity. Finally, the 
economic dimension of an object seems to have been inherently positive: even in the 
case of an “expensive” weapon, its destruction was problematic insofar as it amounted 
to a loss of economic value.  
The commission’s consideration of war as a moral problem, in turn, hinged on the 
notion that excessive war-time violence would yield negative consequences for “the 
psychological and ethical development of peoples.”31 The commission’s concern with 
the “moral effects of the atrocities” lay with individuals and collectivities, and 
moreover with “the sufferers as well as those guilty of committing them.”32 For 
instance, speaking of soldiers who were given orders to commit violence against 
civilians, the report notes these orders’ “moral effect upon hundreds and thousands of 
young men” and declares that “the moral loss is irretrievable.”33 This concern was also 
applied to the collective level, as the deleterious effect of the “revolting” events of the 
war was feared to manifest itself “in the inner consciousness of moral deterioration 
and in the loss of self respect that the nations will chiefly suffer.”34 This formulation of 
the problem of war is notable not least for its curious combination of normative 
reasoning with psychology: it fuses the notion that an object, an action, or a state of 
being could be deemed good, right, or proper with ideas about external stimuli and 
mental and behavioural responses and applies the resulting amalgamation to both 
																																																						
31 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter Butler to d’Estournelles, 29 September 1913. 
32 CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 266f. 
33 Ibid., 267. 
34 Ibid., 269. Or, for a slightly different formulation: “The most serious difficulty which remains to be 
overcome, is the state of mind of the population.“ By “state of mind,” the author is referring to 
individuals and collectives whose psychological constitution is free of resentment and mutual hatred, 
thus allowing for “freedom and toleration”: “we repeat, the condition is ‘autonomy for the religious 
communities and freedom for the schools,’ — a return, that is to say, to the minimum of liberalism 
which did up to the last few years exist in fact, guaranteed by international treaties, even in old 
absolutist Turkey” (ibid., 185f.). 
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individuals and collectivities. Thereby, war becomes a moral problem not only insofar 
as certain events within war are of a normatively problematic nature, but more 
importantly because it has hugely negative “moral” (or, as it would be called today, 
psychological) consequences. However, in comparison to the detailed and systematic 
spelling out to which the economic problem of war was treated, the notion of war as a 
moral problem overall remains quite opaque. While the commissioners seem to have 
been receptive to concurrent developments in disciplines such as experimental 
psychology35, they struggled to bring these to bear on the problem of war.  
Next to this notion of war as an at once legal, economic, and moral problem, the 
primary sources pertaining to the Balkan Commission contain two further 
formulations of the problem of war which, albeit subdued, are traceable between the 
lines: the Marxist formulation of war as expressive of class struggle, and the Hegelian 
formulation of war as heroic and a driver of progress.36 As to the idea of war as a 
problem of class, a letter by Victor Bérard, a member of the French peace movement37, 
interpreted the Balkan wars as an example of the broader struggle “between the farmer 
and the exploited slave and the Greek proprietor or exploiter.” The letter’s author felt 
that the wars “have revived the days of our France between 1570 and 1589 [sic]. And 
the towns of this Balkan […] have revived the life of our Paris, between March and 
May 1871.”38 In effect, this understanding of war as an expression of class struggle 
made war and violence into a smaller part of a larger problem. What is more, it 
																																																						
35 Cf. George Mandler, A History of Modern Experimental Psychology: From James and Wundt to Cognitive 
Science (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007). 
36 The somewhat anachronistic terms “Marxist” and “Hegelian” do not come from the primary 
sources, but are my own. On the understanding of war in Marxist political theory, cf. Joas, Knöbl, 
Kriegsverdrängung, 11f., 136-143; on Hegel’s “bellicism,” cf. ibid, 20, 145-153.  
37 Victor Bérard was a French classicist, politician, and member of the International Peace Bureau. 
Early on, Bérard made known a number of “objections” to the commission’s composition, timing, and 
objective (cf. CEIP European Center Records, Box 189, Letter D’Estournelles to Butler, 23 July 1913). 
Nonetheless, D’Estournelles had asked Bérard to join the commission (CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter 
d’Estournelles to Butler, 27 August 1913). This was Bérard’s letter of refusal. It is noteworthy that 
Milioukoff, in particular, regretted not having Bérard join the commission (CEIP European Center 
Records, Box 189, Letter to D’Estournelles, 20 August 1913). 
38 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter Bérard to d’Estournelles, 18 August 1913.  
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potentially rendered war not only part of a problem, but equally part of this problem’s 
solution.  
The CEIP and the commissioners by and large ignored this alternative formulation of 
the problem of war.39 Those more radical parts of the European peace movements 
which subscribed to this view were not among their target audience40, and at least 
some of the members of the commission deemed Marxism itself to be highly 
problematic.41 Where it did not ignore it, the commission’s work countered this 
Marxist formulation of the problem of war by first renaming and then subverting the 
problem. Thus, when D’Estournelles sent a copy of Bérard’s letter to Butler42, he 
commented that in the author’s opinion, “the massacres have their origin in social 
hatred more than in religious or political ones.”43 Bérard himself had, in fact, also 
referred to war as a “social” problem, but what he had meant by this was that war was 
a problem of class relations. In the usage of the CEIP and the commission44, however, 
the “social” problem of war had nothing to do with class:  
“There is one other fact, partly economic but distinctly social, which should not be 
overlooked. […] upward of a million and a half of men have been under arms during the 
																																																						
39 In the available primary sources, there is one exception to this in the second chapter of the 
commission’s report: “To the hatred of races there was added the resentment of the peasantry against 
the landlords (beys), who for generations had levied a heavy tribute on their labor and their harvests. 
The defeat of the Turkish armies meant something more than a political change. It reversed the 
relations of conqueror and serf; it promised a social revolution” (CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan 
Wars, 71).  
40 In fact, there were instructions not to get this part of the peace movement involved in the 
commission’s work: “There ought to be no professional pacifist upon the commission. This is no work 
for man like La Fontaine, or Fried” (CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter Butler to d’Estournelles, 21 July 
1913). 
41 D’Estournelles, for one, was an unashamed elitist and an outspoken opponent of Marxism (cf. CEIP 
Archive, Vol. 200, Explicatory note d’Estournelles to Bacon, 18 September 1913.) Furthermore, the 
report was clearly addressed to elites (cf. CEIP Archive, Vol. 201, Letter Prudhommeaux to Haskell, 21 
November 1913). 
42 D’Estournelles most strongly rejected the Marxist understanding of the problem of war: “The real 
struggle in the Balkans, as in Europe and America, is not between oppressors and oppressed. It is 
between two policies, the policy of armaments and that of progress” (CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the 
Balkan Wars, 16). 
43 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter d’Estournelles to Butler, 27 August 1913. Emphasis in original. 
44 Butler sometimes referred to war as a “social” problem, and so did the final report (c. CEIP Archive, 
Vol. 200, Letter Butler to Carnegie, 25 October 1913; CEIP Archive, Letter Butler to d’Estournelles, 7 
October 1913; CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 268f.). 
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past year. […] to the large contingents which are kept in the service, composed mostly of 
young men, there is a probability of permanent harm. To be withdrawn from useful 
productive labor is bad enough; but life in the barracks, with much idleness in the streets 
of cities and large towns, is sure to be demoralizing and harmful. […] War causes many 
kinds of human waste and this is one of them. The life of the recruits who are kept in service 
under present conditions in the Balkan States is unnatural and not favorable to moral 
growth…”45  
Here, “labor” did not constitute the point in which exploitative class relations 
crystallized and revolution would take its origin. Rather, the removal of individuals 
from “useful productive labor” was seen as a mechanism through which war gave rise 
to economic and moral difficulties. In this sense, those instances in which the report 
mentions war to be a social problem can be read as attempts to refute, by subversion, 
the Marxist idea of war as an expression of class struggle.  
Much more than any Marxist-inspired formulation of war, the idea of war as heroic 
and as a driver of progress was – or so the commission believed46 – the conventional 
view of war at the time. On the one hand, war was assumed to offer ample 
opportunities for bravery: to many of the commission’s contemporaries, war was an 
“open door to glory and renown” and provided “a certain glamor.”47 On the other 
hand, war was also held to be a driver of individual and societal progress in that it 
stimulated the development of a “class of better human traits.”48 Inherent in this idea 
of war as heroic and a driver of progress was a dialectical formulation in which war’s 
problematic element, namely the ontology (or nature) of battle, would eventually 
transcend itself.49 In the primary sources, this understanding of the problem of war 
shines through, for instance, in some of those of the final report’s passages which were 
originally written by Milioukoff. In his words, one problem of war was that because 
																																																						
45 CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 269. 
46 E.g. ibid., 236, 265. 
47 Ibid., 266; cf. 236, 265. 
48 Ibid., 265. 
49 On the “dialectical element” of, for instance, a Clausewitzian understanding of war, cf. Balibar, 
“What’s in a War,” 374, passim, italics in original. 
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of “[t]he intoxication of combat,“ soldiers were sometimes not “able to deliberate and 
choose” in a rational or enlightened way: caught in the “horrors of battle itself, […] 
men were actuated and dominated solely by [battle’s] fury.”50 Yet because the nature 
of combat ran counter to human nature, battle’s inevitable excesses would bring about 
a progressive counter-reaction: “The things we have described, horrible as they are, 
show in their very horror abnormal conditions which can not last. Fortunately for 
humanity, nature herself revolts against ‘excesses.’”51 Through this dialectic of 
intoxication and revolt, the problem of war transcended itself and ultimately furthered 
human progress.  
To accommodate both public opinion and the CEIP’s institutional perspective, the 
Balkan Commission’s take on this Hegelian notion of war ultimately remained an 
ambiguous one. On the one hand, the commissioners agreed with public opinion that 
the First Balkan War had been a heroic and progressive “war of liberation,”52 yet at the 
same time, they also emphasized that “this first war […] was only the prelude to the 
second fratricidal war” which, in any case, had been “the more atrocious of the two.”53 
On the other hand, the commission took great care not not stray too far from the CEIP’s 
general condemnation of war.54 While the Hegelian view of war can sometimes be 
made out between the lines, the commission carefully redacted out of the report 
arguments that would have explicitly contradicted the CEIP’s wholesale 
condemnation of war. For instance, the first draft of Godart’s chapter argued that 
																																																						
50 CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 141, cf. 137, 142. Another member of commission, 
Godart, seems to also have held this idea: “And once started, how is it possible to hold back the 
soldiers? They set fire to everything, pillage and destroy for destruction’s sake” (ibid., 245). 
51 Ibid., 147. 
52 CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 4, 265. 
53 Ibid., 1; cf. Michail, “Western Attitudes,” 224). More generally, some of the peace movements at the 
time had not entirely let go of the idea of war as “honorable“ and progressive – Montluc, for instance, 
wrote about the Franco-German War: “It was an honorable war! It is time to cease recriminating!” 
(CEIP Archive, Vol. 41, Letter Montluc to James Brown Scott, 5 August 1913). 
54 As expressed by its sponsor, Andrew Carnegie: “As long as men kill their fellow-men in war, we are 
not civilized but remain barbaric. Time was, when the profession of arms was the only profession 
worthy the gentleman, the time comes apace when no gentleman will enter a profession which makes 
the killing of men an affair of hire and salary” (CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Andrew Carnegie, Entry into 




“reprisals” were “expressions of uncontrolled passion in the ardour of the struggle, 
angry blows [?] in the excitement of victory, and exhibitions of violence, very much 
like the most odious vengeance, against things and people.” In a subsequent round of 
editing, the reference to uncontrolled passion was dropped, and “reprisals” were 
rendered into particularly condemnable instances of violence: “they are often an 
excuse for odious vengeance, for unpardonable violence against things and people.”55 
In this way, the commission made sure to give a nod to those who thought of the First 
Balkan War as an emancipatory undertaking, yet also sought to counter the 
commonplace view of war as an opportunity for heroism and as a driver of progress.56  
Instead, the commission’s work promoted the idea that peace provided for exactly this 
kind of progress: 
“War is exhibited as an operation of twofold patriotism, of moral benefit, because it 
exalts heroism, and of material profit because it increases several important industries. 
A little more, and we shall be told that it nourishes the population!  
We have replied to these sophisms over and over again. […] It is false that peace 
encourages slothfulness. To speak only of France living under a rule of peace that has 
lasted for forty-three years, never has youth been more enterprising, more daring, more 
patriotic than in our day. In default of a war, courage applies itself to fertile invention, 
towards exploration, to dangerous scientific experiments, to aerial and submarine 
navigation.”57  
Yet in order to successfully claim that peace furthered courage and progress as well as 
to be able to address war by practical means, mere declarations in favour of peace did 
not suffice. For if there was a dialectic inherent in war which brought about individual 
and social progress, attempts to solve the problem of war through practical, this-
																																																						
55 The full passage now read: “Then there are the reprisals: made as they are in the ardour of the 
struggle, in the heat of victory, and in a moment of anger, they are often an excuse for odious 
vengeance, for unpardonable violence against things and people.” For the initial formulation and the 
corrections, cf. CEIP European Center Records, Box 11, Folder 11.5, Godart, Draft of chapter VI, 9a; for 
the final formulation, cf. CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 244f. The different handwriting 
and different colours of the ink suggest that it was not Godart himself who made these corrections. 
56 Cf. Todorova, Imagining the Balkans, 4. 
57 CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 4. 
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worldly action were unnecessary and possibly even self-defeating. Therefore, the 
commission’s work employed different arguments to challenge the dialectical 
formulation of the problem of war. For one, the commission diluted the ontological 
claim about the “nature” of combat by emphasizing questions of responsibility or 
“culpability”58 as well as of the “roots” or “causes” of war.59 Moreover, the 
commission’s work drew a distinction between normal and excessive war-time 
violence and denied the latter an ontological status as “natural.” Finally, the 
commission’s work relocated the ontological claim from the moment of combat to 
combat’s consequences: what was “natural” about war was the fact that people, during 
and after war, would be faced with dire economic and moral (psychological) 
consequences. Taken together, these arguments allowed the commission to counter 
the dialectical logic underlying the view of war as a driver of progress through a 
dialectical claim of its own: “violence carries its own punishment with it and 
[therefore] something very different from armed force will be needed to establish 
order and peace in the Balkans.”60 
Summing up the insights this section has shed, I would like to capture some initial 
ideas regarding the practices, preconditions, and constitutive exclusions of the 
problematization of war in the work of the Balkan Commission in the form of working 
hypotheses.  
																																																						
58 “The real culprits in this long list of executions, assassinations, drownings, burnings, massacres and 
atrocities furnished by our report, are not, we repeat, the Balkan peoples. Here pity must conquer 
indignation. Do not let us condemn the victims. Nor are the European governments the real culprits. 
They at least tried to amend things and certainly they wished for peace without knowing how to 
establish it. The true culprits are those who mislead public opinion and take advantage of the people's 
ignorance to raise disquieting rumors and sound the alarm bell, inciting their country and 
consequently other countries into enmity“ (Ibid., 19, cf. 68). 
59 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter Butler to d’Estournelles, 15 August 1913. “Prof. Prince, who is now 
here in Newport, and who greatly regrets that family considerations prevented his joining the 
Commission, tells me that the root of the struggle is really not religious at all, but racial.” Milioukoff 
also looked into the “causes” or “reasons” of the first Balkan war (CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the 
Balkan Wars, 49). In Milioukoff’s native Russian, the terms “reasons” and “causes” are not necessarily 
interchangeable, but they can be used thus. Thanks to Francesca Vantaggiato for clarifying this point 
for me. 
60 Ibid., 15.  
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(1) To problematize war, the Balkan Commission (re-)produced a specific structuring in 
which the problem at stake was one of corrigible deviance from a behavioural norm.  
For the moment, I will refer to this as a rational formulation of the problem of war. As 
the foregoing discussion has shown, the Balkan Commission rejected dialectical 
formulations of the problem of war, whether the idea of war as expressive of class 
struggle or the idea of war as a driver of historical progress, in favour of formulations 
in which war was problematic insofar as its economic costs and moral downsides 
outweighed its benefits and advantages61: “Today, war is condemned by all the great 
countries as an outdated instrument, not only immoral, but ineffective.”62 Dialectical 
and rational formulations of the problem of war differed with regard to what it 
actually meant for something to be a problem, or what the principal set-up or structure 
of a problem was. In dialectical formulations, a problem was something to be 
transcended – it was a driver for getting from one state of being to the next, better state. 
Although war itself could be problematic, it was usually merely indicative of another, 
bigger problem at stake.63 By contrast, in the rational formulations which the 
commission preferred, a problem was not something to be transcended, but something 
which could be corrected, or to which there could be a solution. While this did not rule 
out the possibility that war per se might be problematic, in the commission’s work, the 
actual problem of war was mostly smaller than war itself: it lay in certain kinds of 
violence within war, and in this violence’s legal, economic, and moral wrongness. 
(2) Within this rational set-up of the problem of war, the commission’s specific formulation 
of the problem amounted to an exclusion of alternative possibilities.  
One way to understand the commission’s preference for rational formulations of the 
problem of war is as exemplifying a liberal politics of problematizating war. In this 
																																																						
61 My argument is not that the commissioners were cognizant of or even intentionally decided in 
favour of this aspect of their work. Rather, within their concern to practically address war, a move 
away from and against dialectical (and, as the next section of the chapter will discuss, metaphysical) 
notions of war was implied. 
62 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Explicatory note d’Estournelles to Bacon, 18 September 1913.  
63 As exemplified by Bérard’s letter.  
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context, it is interesting to note Michail’s argument that at the time of the Balkan 
Commission, there was an important “shift of focus in the moral standards of the 
liberal camp from liberty to non-violence.”64 In the commission’s work, this shift 
arguably found expression in the crowding out of the understanding of the First 
Balkan War as a war of liberation by the general understanding of war as problematic: 
within “the fundamental distinction” which the commission drew “between the war 
of liberation and the war of conquest, [or] between patriotism and crime,”65 the balance 
was tipping towards understanding war as potentially criminal. Concurrently, instead 
of seeing the main problem to lie with a lack of freedom, the commission’s foremost 
concern was with excessive war-time violence.66  
(3) The commission’s formulation of the problem of war facilitated the exclusion of the 
Balkan states’ governments and citizens from agency in and responsibility for the 
problem of war.  
In the primary sources under study, the commissioners and their various 
interlocutors67 took the two Balkan Wars to constitute a problem first and foremost for 
western European governments and these governments’ citizens68 – a problem “of the 
ignorance and indifference of public opinion, as well as […] of the resistances of the 
great Powers.”69 Only secondarily were the wars considered as a problem for the 
governments and citizens of the Balkan states. Moreover, insofar as the commission 
formulated the problem of war as one which could be solved, in charge of this solution 
were again, exclusively, the western European governments. This sweeping 
assumption of responsibility can be traced back to more general ideas about European 
modernity – a line of argument on which I will expand in the third section of this 
																																																						
64 Michail, “Western Attitudes,” 227. 
65 CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 12. 
66 The same could perhaps be argue about dialectical structurings of the problem of war. For instance, 
insofar a Marxism had both “scientific” and “utopian” strands (cf. Jackson, Conduct of Inquiry, 53), 
how did these different strands make sense of and position themselves towards war? 
67 Though see Bérard’s letter to Butler. 
68 “[T]he problem to be examined is a European one“ (CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter Butler to 
d’Estournelles, 21 July 1913; CEIP Archive, Vol. 121, Letter Dutton to Butler, 5 January 1914). 
69 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter d’Estournelles to Carnegie, 15 September 1913. 
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chapter. Here, I want to point out that the way in which the commission excluded the 
governments and the general population of the Balkan states from agential and ethical 
capacity was also congruent with the general set-up of the problem of war in the 
commission’s preferred formulations. For whereas in dialectical formulations of a 
problem, transcendence was ultimately achieved through actions taken by those who 
were situated within the problem, rational formulations required someone situated 
outside of the problem to recognize and correct the deviance. 
Practically speaking, the Balkan Commission sought to live up to the presumed 
imperative of taking responsibility for and action against the problem of war through 
producing and disseminating knowledge about the Balkan wars. How they did so is 
the subject of the next section.  
 
A “scientific” way of knowing war 
This section looks at how the Balkan Commission set out to take action on the problem 
of war by producing knowledge about it. My focus is on the array of forms, practices, 
and ideals that together made for what the commission understood to be its 
“scientific” way of knowing war, as well as on this way’s conditions of possibility and 
on the political projects attached to it. Primarily, the commission intended to use the 
Balkan Wars as examples by means of which “to inform public opinion and to make 
plain just what is or may be involved in an international war carried out under modern 
conditions.”70 If their report was successful, the commissioners imagined “that such a 
reaction would result as to make another war impossible.”71 To this end, the 
commission’s report was addressed “to the attention of the governments, the people 
and the press of the civilized world.“72 Out of these audiences, it was “public opinion” 
																																																						
70 CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, Preface. 
71 CEIP Archive, Vol. 121, Letter Dutton to Butler, 23 July 1913. 
72 CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, Preface. 
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– the elites as well as “the masses of the people”73 – whom the CEIP was most 
concerned to influence: 
“Public opinion needs to be directed and held to this point. It is too easily carried away 
by admiration for feats of arms, exalted by historians and poets; it needs to be made to 
know all the butchery and destruction that go to make a victory; to learn the absurdity 
of the notion, especially at the present time, that war can enrich a country; to 
understand how, even from far off, war reacts on all nations to their discomfort and 
even to their serious injury.”74  
A second purpose of the commission and the report was to promote the position of the 
CEIP.75 Founded in 1910, the CEIP was a young organisation and trying to establish 
itself within an already rather crowded Western European and US-American peace 
scene.76 While the CEIP was financially much better endowed than most of its 
competitors, it still had to define its exact role and position. Butler, for one, hoped that 
the commission would “go far toward fixing in the minds of Europe, and of America, 
the true role of the Carnegie Endowment” and was “convinced that this commission, 
offers us a great opportunity to extend our influence and authority.”77  
The secondary literature has highlighted the innovative character of the institutional 
form, methods, and sources by means of which the commission produced the 
knowledge it deemed necessary for realizing its twofold purpose. While Michail has 
stressed the novelty of “the idea of an international commission,”78 Kévonian has 
emphasized the multiplicity of sources used by the commissioners, including oral 
																																																						
73 “[H]ow hard it is in a modern Democracy to get the plain, un-colored facts before the masses of the 
people. Their emotions are skillfully played upon by self-seeking interests, and such facts as are 
allowed to reach them, are carefully arranged so as to contribute toward reaching a predetermined 
end” (CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter Butler to d’Estournelles, 18 August 1913). 
74 CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 236. 
75 Cf. Trix, “Peace-mongering in 1913,” 148f. 
76 On the animosities surrounding the establishment of the CEIP, cf. CEIP European Center Records, 
Box 189, Letter Butler to D’Estournelles, 3 January 1913: “Nothing has disappointed me more than the 
small calibre and the extreme egotism and selfishness of many of those associated with the movement. 
This has explained to me more adequately than anything else, why the movement has made so little 
progress during the past twenty-five years.”  
77 CEIP Archive, Vol. 39, Letter Butler to d’Estournelles, 21 July 1913. 
78 Michail, “Western Attitudes,” 221.  
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depositions and interviews, consultations with experts, governmental reports, written 
depositions, photography, in situ investigation, press articles, medical reports, private 
correspondence, and statistics.79 However, while my substantive concerns in this 
section are also with the “idea” of the commission, its methods, and its sources, my 
analytical emphasis is a different one: I seek to examine the commission’s way of 
knowing war without, as Stoler puts it, “treat[ing] the conventions and categories of 
analysis […] as innocuous or benign.”80 Rather, I want to pose these ostensibly 
epistemological forms and practices as historical and political, and moreover as co-
productive of the commission’s formulations of the problem of war. In the first part of 
the section, I therefore attend to the institutional form of the commission of inquiry; in 
the second, I delineate two crucial and novel knowledge practices and discuss how 
these congealed into different ways of knowing war. Both parts examine the 
relationship between these aspects of the commission’s work and the commission’s 
formulations of the problem of war. Again, the section concludes with a number of 
working hypotheses. 
 
The institutional form of the commission of inquiry  
The Balkan Commission was an instantiation of an at the time widely known 
institutional form: the commission of inquiry. To the members of the commission and 
the CEIP’s staff, it was clear – if not in the particulars, then at least in a general sense – 
what Butler’s idea of a “commission of notable men” would amount to.81 Moreover, 
the form of the commission of inquiry was also recognizable to the people with whom 
the commissioners interacted during their journey through the Balkans.82 Against this 
																																																						
79 Kévonian, “L’enquête,” 30.  
80 Stoler, Along the Grain, 95. For Stoler, this focus amounts to a way of asking “historical questions 
about accredited knowledge and power – what political forces, social cues, and moral virtues produce 
qualified knowledges that, in turn, disqualified other ways of knowing, other knowledges.“  
81 For instance, in the letter with which he accepted the invitation to join the commission, Dutton 
wrote to Butler: “The plan of sending a commission to the Balkans for the purposes mentioned in your 
letter seems to me quite commendable” (CEIP Archive, Vol. 121, Letter Dutton to Butler, 23 July 1913). 
82 “Some peasants who thought that we were a government commission, sent to inventory their losses, 
brought us long lists of them. Here are some of the papers which we kept for information, after 
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background, I wonder about what, with Stoler, I call “the content evident in [the] 
form.”83 How did the Balkan Commission, as an instantiation of the general form of 
the commission of inquiry, contribute to a specific problematization of war in 
international politics? How did the form of the commission help to make war into an 
object of empirical knowledge and a problem for practical action with particular 
possibilities and blind spots? 
Domestically, as Stoler has explained, commissions of inquiry had long been a means 
through which states asserted their “authority to make judgements about what was in 
society’s collective and moral good.”84 The facts which commissions produced divided 
societies into their “normal” and “deviant” members and helped establish the state as 
differentiated from and alone able to truly know about society. States’ use of 
commissions of inquiry was not limited to the domestic realm, however. On the one 
hand, in the context of colonial rule and analogous to how they functioned in domestic 
contexts, commissions of inquiry consolidated states’ imperial power by 
differentiating and hence producing different kinds of colonial subjects.85 On the other 
hand, in inter-state politics, “mixed” commissions of inquiry, consisting of 
representatives of the disagreeing state parties to a conflict, settled those questions of 
fact which were perceived to be pertinent to foreign policy yet not to touch upon states’ 
vital interests. Rather than marking off and thereby producing certain people as 
deviant or normal, these commissions marked off and produced certain questions as 
non-vital or vital. Moreover, insofar as they consisted of both of the state parties to a 
conflict, these commissions reinstated international politics as inter-state politics.86   
When, in 1895, a commission made up of official representatives of England, France, 
and Russia investigated into the so-called Hamidian massacrers, the form of the 
																																																						
explaining to the villagers the mistake they made” (CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 139). 
This “mistake” was only possible because the form of the commission of inquiry was known and 
recognizable to the “peasants” who committed it.  
83 Stoler, Along the Archival Grain, 105.  
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid, ch. 5. 
86 Cf. Kévonian, “L’enquête,” 36.  
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commission of inquiry entered the realm of vital international questions.87 In the 
context of the emergence of humanitarianism88, this commission not only helped to 
locate some states’ “vital” interests in the domestic politics of other states, but invoked, 
for a group of European states, the authority to intervene into and to issue moral and 
political judgments about an “Eastern” empire’s internal affairs. Shortly thereafter, the 
First Hague Conference of 1899 recommended commissions of inquiry as an 
instrument in addition to what were, at the time, the two main means of dealing with 
inter-state conflicts that diplomacy had failed to settle: mediation and arbitration. Like 
mediation, commissions of inquiry would not issue a binding decision; like arbitration, 
they were to be voluntarily constituted by the parties to the conflict and to contain an 
additional, neutral member.89 This last point was the main difference between 
previous inter-state commissions of inquiry and the commission of inquiry as it was 
invented in The Hague. The Hague instantiation of the commission of inquiry also 
borrowed from the pre-existing inter-state commissions of inquiry: like these, it was a 
means of dealing with international conflicts “involving neither honor nor vital 
interests”90; such matters “of serious disagreement or conflict” were, “before an appeal 
to arms,“ to be addressed by mediation.91 The second Hague Conference of 1907 
essentially maintained this form of the commission of inquiry.92 
Thus, when the CEIP decided to initiate a study of the Balkan wars, the commission of 
inquiry was an available form for implementing this study. However, it was not the 
only such form: two other forms were contemplated but, ultimately, not undertaken. 
																																																						
87 Ibid., 35. Also referred to as the Armenian massacres, these were massacres of the Ottomann 
empire’s Armenian population committed by agents of the empire (cf. Bengi Bezirgan, Reframing the 
Armenian Question in Turkey: News Discourses and Narratives of the Past and Present (Ph.D. dissertation, 
London School of Economics, 2015); Selim Deringil, “‘The Armenian Question Is Finally Closed’: Mass 
Conversions of Armenians in Anatolia during the Hamidian Massacres of 1895-1897,” Comparative 
Studies in Society and History 51, no. 2 (2009), 344-371). 
88 Cf. Davide Rodogno, Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815-1914 
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
89 Kévonian, “L’enquête,” 35f. 
90 Hague Convention of 1899, Title III, Art. 9. Cf. Kévonian, “L’enquête,” 35f.  
91 Hague Convention of 1899, Title II, Art. 2. 
92 Kévonian, “L’enquête,” 36. 
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In October 1912, shortly after the outbreak of the First Balkan War, the Permanent 
Delegation of the French Peace Societies proposed for the CEIP to send 
“correspondents” charged with collecting materials to “illustrate all the disasters 
which a great modern war causes.”93 These were to be “‘Peace Correspondents’ as 
opposed to ‘War Correspondents.’”94 Furthermore, they were meant to be 
“representatives”95 of the CEIP. The CEIP rejected the proposal, and d’Estournelles 
later claimed that he had “refused even to listen at these suggestions”96 not least 
because in the understanding of the CEIP, these peace correspondents “would have 
the air of instituting themselves as judge between the belligerants.”97 D’Estournelles 
and Butler did, however, continue to ponder the idea of initiating a study into the First 
Balkan War. “I note,” Butler wrote to d’Estournelles in early December 1912,  
“that your Committee did not think well of the proposal to send representatives to 
make studies at the five capitals of the Balkan states. […] What would you think, 
however, of instituting a careful inquiry into the personal and property losses in 
connection with this war?”98  
In reply, d’Estournelles mused that “it would be within the role of the [CEIP] to 
undertake […] the inquiry of which you speak,“ but that “it remains to be determined 
in which form and by whom this inquiry can be undertaken.”99 Thereupon, the 
possibility of initiating a scientific study – “an exhaustive search into this matter” – 
was considered.100 But in the end, this form was not utilised101: when, in July 1913, 
																																																						
93 CEIP Archive, Vol. 198, Letter Prudhommeaux to Haskell, 22 October 1912. 
94 CEIP Archive, Vol. 198, Letter Prudhommeaux to Butler, 25 October 1912.  
95 CEIP Archive, Vol. 199, Letter Butler to d’Estournelles, 2 December 1912; CEIP Archive, Letter 
Prudhommeaux to Haskell, 20 December 1912. 
96 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter d’Estournelles to Carnegie, 15 September 1913.  
97 CEIP Archive, Vol. 198, Letter Prudhommeaux to Butler, 25 October 1912. Other reasons might 
include the interpretation of the First Balkan War as a war of liberation which was actually seen in a 
partly positive light as well as the institutional rivalry between the CEIP and the Permanent 
Delegation of the French Peace Societies. 
98 CEIP Archive, Vol. 199, Letter Butler to d’Estournelles, 2 December 1912. 
99 CEIP Archive, Vol. 199, Prudhommeaux to Haskell, 20 December 1912, my emphasis. 
100 CEIP Archive, Vol. 199, Letter Haskell to Prudhommeaux, 3 January 1913. 
101 However, it continued to be under consideration even as the Balkan Commission was initiated and 
began to do its fieldwork. In September 1913, the CEIP’s Division of Economics and History was 
entertaining a “very extensive plan of investigation in the Balkan countries” which would “take two 
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Butler resolved to implement the long-pondered idea of an inquiry of the Balkan wars, 
he called neither for peace correspondents nor for a scientific inquiry, but for a 
“notable commission.”102 
As a specific instantiation of the historically emergent form of the commission of 
inquiry, the Balkan Commission both reproduced and reinvented this form.103 First, by 
distinguishing normal from deviant war-time violence, the commission produced war 
as a certain kind of legal, economic, and moral problem to be addressed through 
practical action, but also, as a by-product, the population of the Balkans as deviant 
subjects of further international action. Secondly, the Balkan Commission claimed this 
epistemic and moral power not for states, but for an international civil society which 
was only just beginning to emerge as a self-conscious constituency within the 
international. In this respect, the commissioners seem to have been unsure how to 
understand their undertaking and the knowledge it produced vis-à-vis the “official”104 
knowledge of war produced by governments: were they a “private” initiative105, an 
“unofficial” one106, or did they, albeit not “official,“ nonetheless “render a public 
service”?107 Notwithstanding this ambiguity, however, the commissioners asserted for 
themselves a unique capacity for knowing about and addressing the problem of war.108 
Thirdly, the Balkan Commission, like previous commissions of inquiry, constituted an 
intervention into other states’ politics, and what is more, it was an application of the 
form of the commission to the “vital” interests of these states. The final report 
constituted a condemning commentary on the Balkan states’ foreign and security 
																																																						
and a half years and involve a total expenditure […] of 15900 francs.” For this reason, the head of the 
Division, Clark, wondered whether Butler could tell him more about the “delegation” which, 
according to his sources, “has been sent by the Endowment to the Balkan States to make investigations 
in connection with the Balkan Wars” (CEIP Archive, Vol. 39, Letter Clark to Finch, 17 September 
1913). 
102 CEIP Archives, Vol. 200, Telegram Butler to Root, 19 July 1913 
103 Cf. Kévonian, “L’enquête,” 37f. 
104 CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 12, passim. 
105 Ibid., 234. 
106 CEIP Archive, Vol. 121, Letter Dutton to Butler, 5 January 1914. 
107 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter d’Estournelles to Carnegie, 15 September 1913. 
108 Cf. Kévonian, “L’enquête,” 14.  
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politics, and insofar as it sought to study war-related problems of health, education, 
and migration, it also constituted an intervention into their domestic politics of 
population.109 Lastly, like the commissions of inquiry imagined by the Hague 
Convention of 1899, the Balkan Commission claimed all the more epistemic and moral 
authority for being impartial.110 Being international (none of its members came from 
one of the Balkan states) and non-governmental (its members, though citizens of states 
with a vested interest in the Balkans, were emphatically not official representatives of 
their governments), the commissioners were “owing obedience to no one, to no word 
of command, to no party or government, to no journal, to no representation, Balkan or 
European.”111 
Finally, how did the form of the commission of inquiry contribute to the Balkan 
Commission’s specific problematization of war in international politics? Here, I again 
want to end with a few working hypotheses.  
(1) Insofar as the Balkan Commission established war as a problem of deviance (of deviant 
violence and, secondarily, of deviant subjects) from a behavioural norm, the form of the 
commission of inquiry helped along this structuring of the problem.  
In establishing the problem to be one of deviance, the commission resorted to a 
framing of the problem which had long been part of the general form of commissions 
of inquiry and which, in this sense, was quite readily available.  
(2) The form of the commission of inquiry also facilitated the move with which the 
commission claimed moral and epistemic authority in questions of war for an emerging 
																																																						
109 Consider, for instance, the commission’s concern about “whether education [in the Balkans] has 
been effective in improving healthfulness, thrift and good taste as seen in the homes; in modernizing 
commercial and industrial methods; and raising standards of public health and sanitation“ (CEIP, 
Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 270). Cf. Hansen, Security as Practice, 91. 
110 “When you return and publish your opinions, which I hope will be unanimous and which will 
certainly have the greater authority in that they are exceptionally disinterested, you will contribute to 
the better understanding in both hemispheres, of a very simple truth” (Letter d’Estournelles to 
Brailsford, Dutton, Godart, Milioukoff, Schücking, 21 August 1913, reprinted in CEIP, Causes and 
Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 8). 
111 CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 5. 
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international civil society, but excluded from this civil society the citizens of the Balkan 
states it studied.  
Historically, the form of the commission of inquiry had excluded from epistemic and 
moral authority the subjects it counted, judged, and thereby produced, and the Balkan 
Commission assumed this particular exclusionary aspect without any apparent 
hesitation. Furthermore, the form of the commission of inquiry had historically been 
an instrument for governing society by producing it as different from the state.112 As 
part of an emerging international civil society, the CEIP subverted this aspect of the 
form of the commission of inquiry: it appropriated it from governments and, by using 
it to render war a problem before international public opinion, directed it against 
traditional inter-state politics.113 To effect this subversion, however, the Balkan 
Commission excluded the subjects/societies about whom it produced knowledge from 
the broadened international politics it sought to establish. In this way, the form of the 
commission of inquiry helped make possible a problematization of war in 
international politics in which those most directly affected by war were not only a 
merely secondary part of the problem, but crucially not at all part of its solution. 
 
Knowledge practices and ways of knowing 
While Brailsford, Dutton, Godart and Milioukoff were on their journey around the 
Balkans, d’Estournelles wrote to Butler: “I hope that we will reach our goal, that is, 
that they will return to Paris with the material for a report in which we can put faith 
																																																						
112 Or, if one wanted a more Foucaultian formulation of this, commissions of inquiry were an 
instrument of biopolitics/the government of populations. 
113 In choosing the commission of inquiry as its means for addressing the problem of war, the CEIP 
aimed to overcome the logic of governmental approaches to addressing war, too. According to the 
categories proposed by the slogan of the peace movement – “War rather than slavery; Arbitration 
rather than war; Conciliation rather than arbitration” – while governments were at best capable of 
arbitration, the commission fell under the rubric of conciliation and hence surmounted the logic of 
war in a way which was not open to governments: “Arbitration repairs, conciliation prevents. 
Conciliation substitutes the spirit of fruitful cooperation for the sterile routine of antagonisms” (CEIP 
Archive, Vol. 200, Explicatory note d’Estournelles to Bacon, 18 September 1913). 
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[…]. The important point in the whole matter is to arrive at a reliable conclusion.”114 In 
the paragraphs to follow, I make sense of d’Estournelles’ concern by exploring the 
knowledge practices through which the commission collected “materials” and reached 
“conclusions” as well as the ways of knowing into which these practices coalesced. To 
begin with, out of the variety of knowledge practices of which the commission’s 
methods consisted, I single out two which were particularly central to the 
commission’s work and which in turn contributed to a novel way of knowing war. 
Next, I briefly discuss some of these knowledge practices’ historical preconditions. 
Finally, I reconstruct how knowledge practices and ways of knowing congealed into 
the main conclusions of the commission’s final report to thereby ponder in how far the 
commission’s formulation of the problem of war and its ways of knowing war co-
produced each other.  
To start with, the commission’s aforecited methods for gathering “materials”115 
consisted of a number of practices such as collecting, visiting, talking, and looking. Out 
of these, I here focus on a specific practice of looking: the practice of direct observation. 
Direct observation was crucial to the commission’s approach to knowing war. It 
constituted the epistemological ideal after which all of the commissioners’ methods 
for gathering materials were modelled. Thus, the CEIP assumed that the 
commissioners should travel to the Balkans “in order that they might see for 
themselves what the conditions are”116 and that they would return with “observed 
facts.”117 The final report is full of statements such as this one: “to gain a personal idea 
of events in Thrace in the course of the two wars, a member of the Commission went 
to see the villages situated to the east of Adrianople.”118 In this as in many similar 
																																																						
114 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter d’Estrounelles to Butler, 5 September 1913. The following day, 
d’Estournelles sent another letter to Butler: “I hope that the Commission will [...] reach conclusions 
that will justify the initiative taken by the Carnegie Endowment.“ (CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter 
d’Estournelles to Butler, 6 September 1913).  
115 Today, we would probably refer to these materials as “sources“ or “data.“ Yet as these terms do not 
have the exact same meaning, and I therefore prefer to use the term used by the commissioners 
themselves.  
116 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter Butler to d’Estournelles, 21 July 1913. 
117 CEIP Archive, Vol. 201, Letter Butler to d’Estournelles, 10 February 1914. 
118 CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 123.  
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instances, direct observation was itself a method for producing materials. Where it was 
impossible for the commissioners to directly observe, alternative methods had to 
“supply the defect of personal observation,”119 and within almost all of these methods 
– in photography, in the collection of eyewitness accounts, and in the close study of 
written documents120 – the practice of direct observation played a crucial role in the 
production of truthful materials.  
Arguably, the practice of direct observation was not only central to the Balkan 
Commission’s work, but also a new development within the trajectory of this work. 
The French peace movement’s proposal of October 1912 had urged the practice of 
“going there” and had suggested a variety of empirical methods for gathering 
information. Yet it had understood these methods not as practices of looking, but as 
practices of collecting: it demanded that the CEIP “send to the Balkans, to the theatre 
of the war, correspondents charged with collecting on site […] documents 
(informations, interviews, photographies, statistics, etc…).”121 This is not to suggest 
that the commissioners did not also engage in multiple practices of collecting. Rather, 
in the vein of genealogy as a history of multiple and contingent emergences, it is to 
highlight that the commissioners added to these the practice of direct observation.  
With its materials thus gathered, the commission used several methods of inference to 
bring these materials to bear on each other and to reach conclusions: the generalization 
from individual examples122; the eliminating comparison123, juxtapositioning124, or 
testing of “materials” against each other125; and the cumulative combination of 
																																																						
119  Cf. ibid., 128. 
120 On this latter point, consider how the commissioners dealt with a number of letters, written by 
Greek soldiers, which evidenced that their authors had been given order to commit “atrocities,” and 
had complied with this order. The commissioners reported that they had been “permitted to examine 
these documents at our leisure,” and that to ensure the letters’ authenticity, they “satisfied ourselves,” 
through meticulous study, “that the interesting portions of the letters were the same handwriting as 
the addresses on the envelopes (which bore the official stamp) and the portions which related only 
personal news; [and] that no tampering with the manuscripts had been practiced” (ibid., 104f.). 
121 CEIP Archive, Vol. 198, Letter Prudhommeaux to Haskell, 22 October 1912.  
122 CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 140, 143. 
123 Ibid., 78. 
124 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter d’Estournelles to Butler, 19 August 1913. 
125 CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 187. 
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“materials,”126 often of different kinds (for instance, of material, written, oral, and 
photographic) evidence.127 Again, these methods consisted of different practices, inter 
alia practices of sorting, of weighing, and of writing. Here, I focus on the commission’s 
use of this last kind of practice. Each of the report’s chapters was initially written by a 
single author, by hand128, in English or in French, and involving a continuous back and 
forth between the draft and the materials.129 The initial drafts were then circulated 
between the CEIP’s offices and among the commission’s members, commented upon 
and discussed, and revised.130 Next, the chapters were touch typed, translated into the 
respective other language, and set in type.131 A lot of thought also went into the 
spelling of place-names which, or so it was claimed, were “written for the first time.”132 
Finally, the proofs of the entire report were read and corrected by d’Estournelles, 
“word for word and quill in hand,”133 as well as by a specially constituted “commission 
de rédaction.”134 This protracted process attests to the central role different practices of 
writing played for the commission’s production of knowledge about war.  
In addition, and once more in the vein of genealogy’s grasp of complex processes of 
emergence, there were also aspects to the commission’s practices of writing which had 
																																																						
126 In some instances, the commissioners looked for “mutually consistent” materials or for an 
additional “element of confirmation” to arrive at an as completely truthful conclusion as possible 
(ibid., 90). In other instances, however, the bringing to bear on each other of two materials found that 
“[b]oth narratives contain inaccuracies, and neither of them tells more than a part of the truth. Nor are 
we satisfied that the whole truth can be reached by the simple method of completing one story by 
means of the other” (ibid., 93).  
127 Ibid., 90. 
128 CEIP European Center Records, Boxes 9-11.  
129 For in the end, all of the reports conclusions were “buttressed by documents and citations from 
official papers” (CEIP Archive, Vol. 121, Letter Butler to Pupin, 5 June 1914). 
130 For an example, cf. CEIP Archive, Vol. 201, Letter Haskell to Prudhommeaux, 8 December 1913. 
Milioukoff’s chapters required the most extensive revision, as “the French of Milioukoff is more 
difficult to translate into true French than any other known language” (CEIP Archive, Vol. 201, Letter 
d’Estournelles to Butler, 30 January 1914; cf. CEIP Archive, Letter Prudhommeaux to Haskell, 23 
December 1913; CEIP Archive, Letter Prudhommeaux to Haskell, 3 February 1914). 
131 E.g. CEIP Archive, Vol. 201, Letter Haskell to Prudhommeaux, 8 December 1913; cf. CEIP Archive, 
Letter Prudhommeaux to Haskell, 23 December 1913. 
132 CEIP Archive, Vol. 201, Letter Prudhommeaux to Haskell, 27 March 1914; cf. CEIP Archive, Letter 
Prudhommeaux to Haskell, 19 December 1913. 
133 CEIP Archive, Vol. 201, Letter d’Estournelles to Butler, 3 March 1914; cf. CEIP Archive, Letter 
d’Estournelles to Milioukoff, 2 March 1914. 
134 CEIP Archive, Vol. 201, Letter d’Estournelles to Butler, 3 March 1914. 
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originally not been foreseen and which only developed over the course of the inquiry. 
The French Peace Society’s proposal of October 1912 had imagined that the peace 
correspondents would collect documents allowing for the drawing of conclusions and 
that these documents would be published, but it had not mentioned for the 
correspondents themselves to produce longer pieces of text.135 Nor had the 
commissioners or the CEIP initially expected the “making” of the report to constitute 
a major and prolonged part of their work.136 According to a letter by d’Estournelles 
written before the commissioners set off for the Balkans, the plan was for them to 
collect “testimonies,” “opinions” and other official – i.e., government-issued – 
documents, to compile these into “éxposés” representing the views of the different 
parties to the war137, and finally to juxtapose these “elements of the report” in a way 
that was similar to how juridical exhibits would be organized and used in a court case. 
Once on their journey, however, the commissioners encountered various difficulties 
that led to a change of plans and practices. The Serbian government, for instance, was 
indignant about the appointment of Milioukoff, whom it perceived to be biased138, and 
was therefore unwilling to officially communicate with the commissioners, and the 
Greek government, “anxious” not to betray its Serbian allies, only “welcomed [the 
commission] under the strictest reservations.”139 Meanwhile, the Turkish government 
had not kept the kinds of statistics which the commissioners were looking for.140 In the 
face of these difficulties, the idea of “elements” to be collected, compiled, and 
																																																						
135 Cf. CEIP Archive, Vol. 198, Délégation Permanente des Sociétés Francaises de la Paix, “Voeu à 
Transmettre aux Bureaux de Washington et de Paris de la Dotation Carnegie,” Appendix to the letter 
of Prudhommeaux to Haskell, 25 October 1912. 
136 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter Butler to D’Estournelles, 21 July 1913. D’Estournelles, for one, was 
expecting for the commissioners to “return and publish your opinions” (Letter d’Estournelles to 
Brailsford, Dutton, Godart, Milioukoff, Schücking, 21 August 1913, reprinted in CEIP, Causes and 
Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 8). Another indication of the original idea that the commissioners were 
providing their opinions on the collected “elements” is the handwritten draft of Dutton’s chapter, 
which he concluded as one would sign a letter: “Yours truly” (CEIP European Center Records, Box 10, 
Folder 2, Dutton, undated, “The Moral and Social Consequences of the War and the Outlook for the 
Future of Macedonia,” 18). 
137 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter d’Estournelles to Butler, 19 August 1913.  
138 CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 7. 
139 Ibid., 9f. 
140 Ibid., 243f. 
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juxtaposed came to be replaced by one of “materials” to be produced and analysed by 
the commissioners.141 In consequence, the commissioners themselves wrote large parts 
of the report, drawing on practices of writing that were neither legal nor journalistic. 
For while the materials for some of the chapters of the final report were originally 
arranged according to the structure of a court case – the materials on which chapter III 
is based, for instance, were organized into an “accusation,” a “defense,” and 
“depositions”142 – the chapters of the report themselves are not written according to 
this kind of legal logic. Moreover, the process through which the final report was 
written was also very different from how war correspondents produced newspaper 
articles. A writing process which had been anticipated, in late September 1913 and 
hence after the commission’s return to Paris, to take no more than a few weeks 
gradually turned into an almost year-long procedure more akin to the kinds of writing 
undertaken by the CEIP’s Division of Economics and History. Taken together, the 
commissioners’ practices of writing thus constituted a different and in many ways 
new, neither journalistic nor legal, genre for writing about war. 
In the understanding of the commission, the commissioners’ practices of direct 
observation and of writing amounted to a novel, “scientific” way of knowing war. To 
appreciate this, it helps to take another look at the afore-mentioned letter by Butler, 
dated early December 1912. In this letter, Butler commented on the proposal of the 
French peace societies that whereas the correspondents envisioned by this proposal 
would “make studies” of the Balkan wars, he was looking for a different kind of 
“careful inquiry.”143 Almost a year later, after the commissioners’ return from their 
journey through the Balkan states, Butler followed up on this train of thought. To 
Carnegie, Butler wrote that the commission’s work was  
“[t]he first study ever made by the same scientific method that would be used in a 
laboratory, of the moral, social and economic effects of the war. […] Through [the 
																																																						
141 Cf. ibid., 12). 
142 Ibid., 326-255; CEIP European Center Records, Box 10, Folder 10.1, “Le manuscript du chapitre IV 
de M. Miliukoff est entre ses mains,” 1 May 1914. 
143 CEIP Archive, Vol. 199, Letter Butler to d’Estournelles, 2 December 1912. 
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commissioners’] generous and devoted efforts, we are to give to the world not a 
political or a military history of the war, but a scientific study of the effect of a war.”144  
At roughly the same time, a letter to d’Estournelles set out in more detail what Butler 
had in mind by the “scientific” and “laboratory method”: 
“[W]hat has been accomplished in the Balkan inquiry and something which [the] report 
might well emphasize is that it represents the first instance in history of a study of the 
results of war by the laboratory method and by a company of trained and disinterested 
observers who have only the highest interests of humanity to serve. We have had 
philosophical articles on war and we have had descriptions of battles, but this is the 
first time that trained men have ever gone into territory war has devastated and studied 
its moral, economic and social [word missing] by the inductive method of 
observation.”145 
Here, “science” and “the laboratory method” were defined in several ways: they 
consisted of the specific practice of direct observation; furthermore, they consisted of 
“the commissioners’ efforts”; and their result, the written report, was different from 
“philosophical articles” and “descriptions of battles.“ One could read this invocation 
of “science” and “the laboratory method” as a rhetorical claim – after all, Butler 
suggested that it was “something which [the] report might well emphasize.” Albeit 
not incorrect, however, such a reading would fall short of recognizing the claim’s 
wider implications. For, or so I want to argue, Butler’s claim was indicative of a novel 
way of knowing war, a way whose supposedly “scientific” character resided in the 
Balkan Commission’s very practices of direct observation and of writing. This way of 
knowing war resembled the “scientific” work of the CEIP’s Division of Economics and 
History.146 Yet whereas this division studied “topics most directly relating to the 
subjects of peace and war,”147 the Balkan Commission – contrary to Butler’s just-cited 
																																																						
144 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter Butler to Carnegie, 25 October 1913. 
145 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter Butler to d’Estournelles, 7 October 1913. 
146 This division was “scientific” in contrast to the “popular” Division of Intercourse and Education (cf. 
CEIP Archive, Vol. 123, Letter Butler to Carnegie, 21 April 1913). 
147 CEIP Archive, Vol. 5, Undated memorandum. Indeed, the Division of Economics and History had 
also developed a “very extensive plan of investigation in the Balkan countries,” yet this plan was 
apparently not put into practice (CEIP Archive, Vol. 39, Letter Clark to Finch, 17 September 1913). 
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letters, and as I have discussed in the previous section – studied war itself.148 The 
commission’s self-proclaimed “scientific” way of knowing war was even picked up by 
some of its critics, who then subsumed their criticism under this way of knowing.149 
Overall, the Balkan Commission is an example of the emergence not merely of new 
knowledge practices such as direct observation and report-writing, but of a new way 
of knowing war “scientifically.” It was through a specific idea of “science” as based on 
empirical observation undertaken by “trained” and “disinterested” observers that the 
commission made sense of its practices of looking and of writing, and through these 
practices that the idea of “scientifically” knowing war was re-produced. 
At this point, a few things call for clarification. For one, the new, “scientific” way of 
knowing war which the commission invented is not the only way of knowing which 
it exemplifies – it is also an example of a legal way of knowing war.150 D’Estournelles 
claimed that the report was “an admirable work of justice, of science and of truth”151; 
Butler thought that it was “coldly scientific and judicial in character”152; and Godart 
understood it to be “a prosecution speech.”153 One might even say that in the 
commission’s effort to problematize war, scientific and legal ways of knowing war 
became entangled insofar as the commissioners found themselves unable to produce 
knowledge about the Balkan wars without issuing a judgment: “We can not 
authenticate these sacrifices without protesting, without denouncing their cost and 
																																																						
148 The commission, it was reported at the time, “will investigate not the reasons for certain actions but 
the actions themselves will be fairly and clearly set forth” (CEIP Archive, Vol. 123, Korrespondenz des 
Verbandes für Internationale Verständigung, “The Carnegie Commission”). 
149 “I do not realize that [the report] did afford a great deal of light, or that we seem to derive a great 
benefit from that very hard work and most intricate investigation. The concern looks perhaps more 
confused than beforehand. No doubt, the maps elaborately drawn up, and most artfully engraved, are 
very interesting and convenient, only if they are a very grand and useful illustration of the matter, I 
must say they are rather ‘pretentious’ maps, than real scientific geographical graphia. […] What is the 
good of pointing it out again?” (CEIP Archive, Vol. 121, Letter Montluc to Butler, 10 December 1914). 
On the other hand, the CEIP also invoked the claim to “science” in order to forestall criticism (e.g. 
CEIP Archive, Vol. 121, Letter Butler to Pupin, 5 June 1914). 
150 Cf. Kévonian, “L’enquête.” 
151 CEIP Archive, Vol. 201, Letter d’Estournelles to Butler, 3 March 1914.  
152 CEIP Archive, Vol. 121, Letter Butler to Pupin, 5 June 1914, my emphasis.  
153 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, L’Humanité, La mission Carnegie poursuit son enquête, 9 September 1913.  
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their danger for the future.”154 Moreover, direct observation and writing were not the 
only knowledge practices which went into the commissions’ scientific and legal ways 
of knowing war. A similarly important practice, for instance, was that of documenting. 
Butler’s argument about the report’s “scientific and judicial” character was based on 
the fact that “[e]very statement that it makes is buttressed by documents and citations 
from official papers,”155 and Godart believed that as a “prosecution speech,” the report 
was particularly “impressive for its documentation.”156 My argument in the foregoing 
paragraphs, therefore, is not that its presumably “scientific” way of knowing war was 
the commission’s only such way, or that the practices of direct observation and of 
writing were the only practices it utilised. Rather, I have focused on this way of 
knowing war and on these two knowledge practices because I find that these are, 
within the example of the Balkan Commission’s work, particularly pertinent aspects 
of the emergent international politics of problematizing war.  
What I have done so far was to break down the Balkan Commission’s methods for 
gathering materials and drawing inferences into knowledge practices and to 
reassemble these into ways of knowing. This has allowed me to show that, within the 
CEIP’s initiative, the will to knowledge about war has a history. Expanding this line 
of reasoning, a further way to get at the historicity of this will would inquire into the 
preconditions of the commission’s knowledge practices and ways of knowing. Here, I 
only want to briefly allude to a few possible directions such an inquiry could take. For 
one, studies in the history and sociology of knowledge have argued that truth is a 
social product157, and this social aspect of truth is apparent in the Balkan Commission’s 
work, too. The members of the commission were recruited exclusively through 
existing contacts and networks.158 Once constituted, the commission amounted to “a 
																																																						
154 CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 5. 
155 CEIP Archive, Vol. 121. Letter Butler to Pupin, 5 June 1914.  
156 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200,  L’Humanité, La mission Carnegie poursuit son enquête, 9 September 1913.  
157 I.e., that “truth” relies on collaborative practices in the laboratory and on a consensus about what 
constitutes trustworthy knowledge (Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 1994)). 
158 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter d’Estournelles to Butler, 1 August 1913: “du moment que nous ne 
voulons pas la composer avec la troupe habituelle des journalistes ou des voyageurs sans autorité 
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company of […] observers,”159 “remaining united in their labors, in spite of their great 
differences of temperament and of race”160 and working, or at least pretending to work, 
in “complete harmony.”161 During their journey through the Balkans, the 
commissioners mostly avoided separating and traveling on their own.162 The 
commission’s practices of writing were similarly collaborative, and it was to express 
their alleged “spirit of unity” that the commissioners decided against indicating the 
authors of individual chapters and instead assumed collective authorship for the final 
report.163 The collective aspect of the Commission’s knowledge practices, moreover, 
also helped to ensure its impartiality: “even supposing Brailsford and Milioukoff 
capable of partiality, the presence of Godart and Dutton, on whom no suspicion 
whatever rests, should have been sufficient to make it possible for them to get at the 
truth.”164 As for ideational preconditions, as the discussion of the commission’s 
formulations of the problem of war has hinted at, it was through ideas stemming from 
different, themselves emergent academic disciplines that the commissioners knew 
what to observe and what to draw inferences about in order to problematize war. For 
instance, from experimental psychology stemmed the idea of stimulus and response165, 
from sociology and criminology, the notion of deviance166, and from all of these new 
empirical disciplines, the desire for the observability of the problematic aspects of war. 
																																																						
particulière, nous sommes à la merci de la bonne volonté plus ou moins active de nos amis.” Similarly, 
the distribution of the report proceded within the CEIP’s existing networks (cf. CEIP Archive, Vol. 
201, Letter Prudhommeaux to Haskell, 21 November 1913). Cf. Kévonian, “L’enquête.” 
159 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter Butler to d’Estournelles, 7 October 1913, my emphasis. 
160 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter d’Estournelles to Butler, 15 September 1913. 
161 CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan War, 11. In this, each of them was meant to make a particular 
contribution to the collective effort (cf. CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Butler to d’Estournells, 13 October 
1913). 
162 Trix, “Peace-mongering in 1913,” 151f. 
163 CEIP 1914, 11. Cf. Trix, “Peace-mongering in 1913,” 152. 
164 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter d’Estournelles to Butler, 5 September 1913; cf. CEIP, Causes and 
Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 7). 
165 Cf. Mandler, History of Modern Experimental Psychology. 
166 Cf. Jacqueline Urla, Jennifer Terry, “Introduction: Mapping Embodied Deviance,” in Jacqueline 
Urla, Jennifer Terry (eds.), Deviant Bodies (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996), 1-18; 
Milos Vec, “Sichtbar/Unsichtbar: Entstehung und Scheitern von Kriminologie und Kriminalistik als 
semiotische Disziplinen,” in Rebekka Habermas, Gerd Schwerthoff (eds.), Verbrechen im Blick: 
Perspektiven der neuzeitlichen Kriminalitätsgeschichte (Frankfurt, Germany: Campus, 2009), 383-414. 
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Lastly, we could also look at the material preconditions of the commission’s 
knowledge practices and ways of knowing. As such, we could ask in how far the 
commission’s practice of direct observation was enabled, inter alia, by new 
technologies such as photography167, or also whether its practices of writing – for 
instance, Milioukoff’s practice of adding footnotes by gluing little scraps of paper to 
the pages of his hand-written draft chapters168 – extended or broke with pre-existing 
practices such as the practice of newspaper clipping.169 
Finally, can one speak, in the example of the Balkan Commission, of a co-production 
of the problem of war and practices and ways of knowing war? To contemplate this 
question, I reconstruct how the commission’s knowledge practices and ways of 
knowing congealed into the three main conclusions put forth by the commission: that 
all sides had violated the laws of war; that war was an economic problem; and that 
war was a moral problem. Preceding these conclusions was the fact, presumed more 
or less from the outset, that all parties to the wars had committed atrocities.170 While 
the commissioners and the staff of the CEIP were all committed to further evidencing 
this fact, it remained for them to work out over the course of their inquiry how to 
interpret it. How could the legal, economic, and moral problems of war be made 
observable in the atrocities, and how did the commissioners, through practices of 
																																																						
167 Cf. Michael Griffin, “The Great War Photographs: Constructing Myths of History and 
Photojournalism,” in Hanno Hardt, Bonnie Brennen (eds.), Picturing the Past: Media, History and 
Photography (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1999), 122-157. 
168 For instance, see the hand-written drafts of the chapters authored by Milioukoff in CEIP European 
Office Records, Box 9, Folder 9.5; Box 10, Folders 10.1 and 10.2. 
169 Cf. Lorraine Daston, “Warum sind Tatsachen kurz?,“ in Anke te Heesen, Barbara Büscher, 
Christoph Hoffmann, Hans-Christian von Herrmann (eds.), Cut & Paste um 1900: Der 
Zeitungsausschnitt in den Wissenschaften (Berlin, Germany: Kaleidoskopien, 2012), 132-144; Anke te 
Heesen, The Newspaper Clipping: A Modern Paper Object (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 
2014). 
170 In the telegram with which he started the initiative, Butler linked this to news reports of atrocities 
committed by the Bulgarian army (CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Telegram Butler to d’Estournelles, 19 July 
1913). Yet in the first longer statement of the CEIP’s European Office, the argument was about 
atrocities committed by all of the parties (CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter of the European Office to 
Butler, 22 July 1913). Then, according to d’Estournelles’s programme for the commission, the 
commissioners seem to have begun their investigations by trying to verify reports of atrocities 
committed by all sides (CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, D’Estournelles, “Une Mission de la Dotation Carnegie 
dans les Balkans,” 19 August 1913). The hypothesis that all parties to the war had in fact committed 
atrocities began to become a conclusion soon thereafter. 
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writing, build from individual observations of atrocities to intermediate statements 
and from these to full conclusions?  
With regard to war as a legal problem, the commission shied away from concluding 
that international law’s rules concerning the opening of hostilities had been violated171, 
but believed to be “on much firmer ground when we pass to the law and custom of 
land warfare, violated by all the belligerents despite the existence of an international 
convention [the Second Hague Convention] signed by them all.”172 In order to 
conclude that all sides to the wars had violated the rules of land warfare173, this general 
statement was broken down into more specific claims according to which one or 
another state party had committed excessive violence, and then into even more specific 
claims regarding individual incidents of excessive violence – for instance, that “[o]f 
this particular squad of Greek cavalry, it is not too much to say that they were 
slaughtering Bulgarian peasants at sight.”174 In order to conclude that a specific act of 
violence such as this one had been excessive and had violated the laws of war, it was 
necessary not only to prove that it had actually happened175, but furthermore to impute 
base motives176: that the act was motivated by vile intentions, or that the victims “were 
killed in cold blood.”177 To establish base motives, the commission sought to make 
																																																						
171 CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 210. 
172 Ibid., 211. 
173 In addition, the commission assumed that the applicable law of land war was unknown to most of 
the belligerents (cf. ibid., 101).  
174 Ibid., 101. 
175 Which, for some of the incidents of violence reported in the newspapers, turned out not to have 
been the case (see, for instance, ibid., 78). 
176 As Nicola Lacey has shown, in both the theory and practice of criminal law in general, 
“‘factualised’ conceptions of intentions and recklessness […] begin to emerge in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century” (Lacey, “In Search of the Responsible Subject,” 369, fn. 73). By the time of the 
Balkan Commission, knowledge of the mens rea, or the subjective will to doing wrong, had become a 
requirement of guilty verdicts in criminal trials – and even if the commissioners discussed specific 
atrocities as violations of the law rather than as crimes, this requirement informed their ways of 
knowing these atrocities.  
177 “If they [victims] were killed in cold blood an ‘atrocity’ was perpetrated, but during a confused day 
of street fighting they may possibly have been killed by accident” (CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the 
Balkan Wars, 93). Some specific acts of violence, however, did not require the actual establishment of 
base motives, but were considered to always be driven by base motives and to be excessive: “the 
violation of women admits of no excuse; it can only be denied” (ibid, 104). Interestingly, this might 
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intentions observable. For example, the conclusion that a member of the Greek army 
had committed an atrocity was confirmed both by an eyewitness’ testimony and by 
“material corroboration” in the form of a wound which the commissioners had been 
able to see for themselves: 
“The essential points are (1) that [the witness] saw his village burned, and (2) that 
another Greek cavalryman whom he met later in the day all but killed him with a 
revolver shot and a saber cut at close quarters […]. The material corroboration of this 
story is, that [the witness] still bore the marks of his wounds. A shot wound may be 
accidental, but a saber wound can only be given deliberately and at close quarters. A 
trooper who wounds a boy with his sword can not plead error. He must have been 
engaged in indiscriminate butchery.”178 
In another instance, the base motives allegedly leading to excessive war-time violence 
were inferred from a “popular battle picture” showing “a Greek soldier gouging out 
the eyes of a living Bulgarian. […] As an evidence of the feeling which animated the 
Greek army these things have their importance. They mean […] that Greek soldiers 
wished to believe that they and their comrades perpetrated bestial cruelties.”179 Finally, 
the commission then built from their conclusions regarding individual incidents of 
excessive violence to more general statements. While  
“[w]e should hesitate to generalize from this [evidentiary] basis […], but we are able to 
add in the appendix a summary of a large number of depositions taken from refugees 
by Professor Miletits of Sofia University. […] This great mass of evidence goes to show 
that there was nothing singular in the cases which the Commission itself 
investigated.”180  
																																																						
criminalize almost exactly that “irrational” element of war/fighting which in what I called the 
Hegelian view of war constituted the driver of progress.  
178 Ibid., 101. 
179 Ibid., 97. A final example of the “visibility“ of base motives: “The sacrilegious intention was even 
more clearly visible in the way in which the cemetery was treated. ‘All’ the headstones were not 
broken, as Mr. Loti states, but some of them were. It is likewise true that one of the graves is open. In 
the bottom of the trench the member of the Commission found the remains of a brandy bottle; relic of 
a joyous revel!” (ibid., 124) 
180 Ibid., 103. 
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In sum, the commission’s practices of direct observation and of writing and the legal 
problem of war were co-productive. For one, the commission’s ambition to render 
observable base motives made it impossible to think, as Godart had proposed, of “war 
in general [as] the great responsible of all the excesses”181 and instead required that this 
responsibility be attributable to the individuals who had committed atrocities. Yet the 
fact that the commissioners only arrived to the Balkans after the end of the second war 
and could not observe the atrocities as they happened also made it necessary for them 
to incorporate into their practice of direct observation an element of interpretation. 
A similar co-production of formulation and knowledge practices also occurred with 
regard to the economic problem of war. That the commissioners “arrived in the 
Balkans after the fighting was over” did not impede them from observing this 
economic problem: 
“the traces of the war were still fresh. The Commission noted them. If the corpses of 
the victims were not visible their countless graves were everywhere, the mounds not 
yet invaded by the grass that next summer will hide them away. Visible too were the 
wounded in the hospitals and the mutilated men in the streets and on the roads; the 
black flags, hanging outside the doors of the hovels, a dismal sign of the mourning 
caused by the war [...]. The members of the Commission saw towns and villages laid 
in ashes, their walls calcined, the house fronts torn open by shell or stripped of their 
plaster by riddling shot.”182  
To systematize what they had observed, the commissioners intended “to make an 
estimate of the cost of the double war,”183 a “sinister inventory” that would ideally take 
the form of a “balance sheet of the war.”184 However, the attempt to conclude an exact 
count of each side’s killed and wounded soldiers failed185, and the commission also 
found that “[i]t is not possible to compute, chapter by chapter, the extent of the 
																																																						
181 Cf. CEIP Archive, Vol. 200. L’Humanité, La mission Carnegie poursuit son enquête, 9 September 1913). 
182 CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 236.  
183 Ibid., 236. 
184 Ibid., 243. For some of the commission’s attempts at drawing up tables detailing the costs of the war, 
cf. CEIP European Office Records, Box 11, Folders 11.4 and 11.5. 
185 Cf. CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 243f. 
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material losses by destruction of property.”186 In instances in which it was thus 
impossible to determine exactly the material and human “cost” of the wars, the 
commissioners resorted to extrapolating more general figures from individual 
examples. For instance,  
“[f]rom the losses here sustained by a single family, — father and two sons – amounting 
to fr. 19,500 […], some idea may be formed of the enormous figures of the estimated cost 
of the Balkan War to the inhabitants. The loss caused the Servian peasants by the Bulgarian 
invasions at Knjazevac is rated in the document we publish at fr. 25,000,000 or 
30,000,000.”187  
Thus, the commission’s practice of direct observation helped produce the economic 
problem of war as principally empirical – as perceivable, countable and estimable. At 
the same time, however, insofar as the full scale of the economic problem of war was 
unknowable, the problem also required an adaptation of the commissioners’ 
knowledge practices, in particular its practices of writing and of drawing inferences. 
Finally, the commission held war to be a moral problem. Compared to the empirical 
detail which went into the establishment of the legal and economic problems of war, 
the morally problematic aspect of war – which consisted of its effect on individual and 
collective psychology – was empirically elusive: even when broken down to the level 
of individual examples, the moral problem of war for the most part did not lend itself 
to direct observation, estimation and description. There were a few instances in which 
the commissioners thought that war’s moral effect was immediately observable.188 
More generally, however, their notion of war as a moral problem was so little specified 
that they were at a loss as to how to make this problem observable189 and concluded 
that war’s “moral consequences […] can not be estimated.”190 They mused that it was 
																																																						
186 Ibid., 246. 
187 Ibid., 140. 
188 For instance, the report spoke of people who were “stunned by the enormity of their losses. Despair 
is written on their faces” (Ibid., 267). 
189 Ibid., 269. On the collective level, the experience of excessive violence was deemed to be “something 
which the nations have absorbed into their very life,—a sort of virus which, through the ordinary 
channels of circulation, has infected the entire body politic.” 
190 Ibid., 267.  
 
	 158 
the nature of the moral problem of war which rendered it unobservable: “[t]he 
unrestrained and barbarous methods of carrying on war employed by all the Balkan 
nations [had] moral consequences to all concerned so terrible that they can hardly be 
appreciated.”191 The moral problem of war was also exceedingly difficult to write about, 
for “no language can describe the tortures and griefs [of war].”192 Furthermore, because 
of their failure at rendering observable war’s deleterious moral effects, the 
commissioners’ writing about the moral problem of war often had to leave an 
inferential gap between an observation they had made and a conclusion they drew193, 
and they cautioned that their report in the end provided “only a partial and abstract 
picture of the war.”194 On the one hand, therefore, the commission’s new, “scientific” 
way of knowing war and its adherent practices of observation and of writing produced 
the moral problem of war as unknowable – empirically unobservable, indescribable, 
quite literally unwritable. Yet on the other hand, war’s “moral effect  […] can not easily 
be effaced”195: as a moral problem, war demanded to be observed and written about 
and thereby made the commission’s practices of looking and of writing all the more 
urgent.196 Thus, there was an inherent tension within the newly available, “scientific” 
way of knowing war: as a moral problem, war demanded that science’s new 
instruments and practices should be utilized to know and address it, yet as an object 
of knowledge, it was not fully accessible to these instruments and practices.  
One way of summarizing the insights of the foregoing discussion would be to point 
out, as a common denominator of the commission’s knowledge practices and ways of 
																																																						
191 CEIP Archive, Vol. 201, Letter Dutton to Butler, 5 January 1914, my emphasis; cf. CEIP Archive, Vol. 
200, Letter d’Estournelles to Carnegie, 15 September 1913: “I know these atrocities are worse than any 
report can describe them.” 
192 CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 267. 
193 For instance: “There is evidence to show that in some cases these acts were committed by soldiers 
acting under orders. It is to be feared that many a young man learned for the first time to commit acts 
of violence and crime not permitted in civilized warfare” (ibid., 265). 
194 Ibid., 108. 
195 Ibid., 267. 
196 Symptomatically, the above-cited statement about the indescribability of war’s grief was 
immediately followed by an attempt to put exactly this aspect of war into writing: “Repeated 
instances of death by fright of girls and young children attest to the horror of the orgy of crime which 
was enacted” (ibid.). 
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knowing war, a marked tendency away from metaphysics and towards empiricism. 
In light of this, a first working hypothesis I want to propose here is that, 
(1) The Balkan Commission exemplifies the co-production of several aspects of the 
problematization of war in international politics: seemingly all at once, war was 
becoming this-worldly, empirically knowable, and a practically addressable problem.  
For one, war’s becoming an object of empirical knowledge was intertwined with what 
Kévonian has called its “desacralization,”197 or war’s becoming this-worldly. As a 
contemporary description of the Balkan Commission put it, “when ‘holy’ wars are 
brought forward it is time to test with careful investigation the motives and results, 
the measures and means of such wars,”198 and further: 
“No organized court of justice pronounces judgment upon the destruction and waste 
brought about by war. This is left to history. History indeed passes the final judgment, 
but history is not fate, a blind Nemesis, - history is in the last analysis also only a human 
judgment of human deeds. Human reason is called to judge the action and conduct of 
peoples and of governments. Here finally human reason has recognized that this 
judgment is the high and difficult task [of humans today].“199 
This dual desacralization of war and of knowledge about war was furthermore 
intertwined with the CEIP’s and the commissioners’ preferred structuring of the 
problem of war as soluble, or as consisting in the corrigible deviance from a 
behavioural norm. The CEIP assumed that empirical knowledge about war was 
uniquely able to solve the problem of war because it was capable, more so than 
theoretical or philosophical knowledge, of educating people about war’s economic 
and moral wrongness. “For the education of public opinion, nothing compares to 
precise examples taken directly from reality,”200 and in fact, the Balkan wars were “the 
																																																						
197 Kévonian, “L’enquête, 30.” 
198 CEIP Archive, Vol. 123, Korrespondenz des Verbandes für Internationale Verständigung, “The 
Carnegie Balkan Commission,” 20 September 1913.  
199 Ibid., my emphasis. 
200 CEIP Archive, Vol. 199, Letter Prudhommeaux to Haskell, 20 December 1912. Regarding the 
commission’s convictions about the difference between “philosophical” treatises and their own 
inquiry, see also CEIP Archive, Vol. 121, Letter Dutton to Butler, 23 July 1913; CEIP Archive, Vol. 199, 
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most true to original specimen copy of the atrocities of war.”201 It seems impossible to 
completely disentangle or to make individually thinkable these three emergent aspects 
of the problem of war, yet perhaps this is exactly what this points to: that the ways in 
which we seek to know about war are deeply enmeshed with what we believe the 
problem of war to consist in, and furthermore, with how we believe for this problem 
to be structured. 
(2) At the time of the Balkan Commission, this take on war as an at once this-worldly, 
empirically knowable, and practically addressable problem was not yet a taken for 
granted notion.  
At least, this is suggested by the letter with which Léon Montluc, a prominent member 
of the French peace movement202, articulated with “Breton frankness” his criticism of 
the commission’s work: 
“With reference to the evils of war, common sense suffices to teach us that war is 
inseparable with frightful proceedings, all sorts of delinquencies, crime and atrocities? 
[…] Moreover, it is clear that it is a very hard and almost unattainable task, to aim at 
evidencing atrocities, crimes, delinquencies committed during a period of warfare! 
Every lawyer, and especially judges, have experienced how difficult it is to ascertain 
facts even in peace on all civil or criminal cases! To make peace, when one undertakes 
to investigate into events, which took place in time of wars, some months prior to the 
inquiry. Therefore my humble opinion is the Commission took a great deal of trouble 
to meet with a very puny benefit, a benefit which is no other than to circulate and 
enhance horrid effects of war […]. No doubt the Inquiry and its Report will convince 
every body that mankind is unfortunately far from progressing! Sad, very sad indeed! 
But it looks as if Science had proved to incur into Bankruptcy, or at least Failure! People 
are learning all sort of things, indeed, but prescinding of the clear notion of moral 
																																																						
Letter Prudhommeaux to Haskell, 17 January 1913; CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter Butler to 
d’Estournelles, 7 October 1913.  
201 CEIP Archive, Vol. 201, Letter Prudhommeaux to Butler, 6 January 1914.  
202 Montluc was “one of the correspondents of the Division of International Law, member of the Court 
of Appeals of France, and member of the Institute of International Law, and also President of the 
‘Breton Group of Peace and Liberty’” (CEIP Archive, Vol. 41, Letter Butler to North, 26 August 1913). 
 
	 161 
duties founded on true philosophy or Christian religion, I am afraid no good can be 
derived from the diffusion of extensive but shallow knowledge all over the people.”203 
I quote Montluc’s letter at length because it challenges all three of the elements of the 
Balkan Commission’s notion of war as problematic. For one, the author clearly did not 
believe in the power of science and empirical knowledge of war to change people’s 
minds and spur them into action. Moreover, he held it to be difficult, if not impossible, 
to empirically know war. Furthermore, Montluc had no intention of desacralizing “the 
evils of war” and feared that the empirical knowledge of war which the CEIP was 
disseminating was actually harmful: it distracted people from the kind of “clear notion 
of moral duties” that could be found in metaphysical systems such as philosophy or 
religion.204 A final point worth noting is the timing of Montluc’s Philippic. His letter 
was written in France in late 1914, i.e. in the same moment in which others were taking 
up the form of the commission of inquiry to document German war crimes in Belgium 
and France. In this context, Montluc’s letter casts doubt on any assumption according 
to which there was a direct causal link between the phenomenon of war and the notion 
of war as an object of empirical knowledge and practical action. 
A final working hypothesis I want to propose is that, 
(3) The commission’s knowledge practices were not inherently empiricist. 
As I have discussed before, the commissioners, notwithstanding their general 
preference for empirical knowledge, sometimes incorporated empirically 
unobservable elements into their formulations of the problem of war. Here, I would 
like to add that there was also at times a metaphysical aspect to the commission’s 
knowledge practices. Butler, for instance, believed that one sometimes had to “[look] 
beneath the surface” in order to “[get] the real spirit of what passed before your 
eyes.”205 The commission’s practice of direct observation, that is, was not confined to 
applications within the experiential realm, but could yield insights into realities lying 
																																																						
203 CEIP Archive, Vol. 39, Letter Montluc to Butler, 10 December 1914. 
204 On the waning of metaphysical views of war, cf. Weinke, Gewalt, Geschichte, Gerechtigkeit, 104. 
205 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter Butler to d’Estournelles, 14 July 1913. 
 
	 162 
beyond the boundaries of the empirically knowable, too. More generally, this suggests 
that there was nothing naturally inherent to the commission’s knowledge practices 
and ways of knowing war – rather, these practices were what was made of them. 
However, while the development and application of new ways of knowing does 
bespeak the commissioners’ creativity, this is not to suggest that the commissioners 
were deliberately at work on their knowledge practices. Nor were they creative under 
conditions of their own choosing – rather, their knowledge practices hinged on pre-
existing conditions of possibility to whose reproduction, in turn, they contributed. To 
sound out this argument, the next section of the chapter attends to one particular set 
of conditions of possibility: to the spatio-temporal dimensions of the commissioners’ 
work, and specifically to European modernity as a location from which to know about 
and take action against war.  
 
“European-modernity” and the production of epistemic and ethical subjects 
The spatial and temporal positioning of the problem of war vis-à-vis different ways of 
knowing about and taking action against war is a curious aspect of the Balkan 
Commission’s work. For one, the commission’s various formulations of the problem 
of war derived much of their persuasive power from being located simultaneously in 
particular locales and within the international. While the commission intended to 
problematize “international war”206 or war “as a method of settlement of international 
questions,”207 the more specific problems of war that it formulated were problems with 
both international and local ramifications.208 Likewise, the commission’s ways of 
																																																						
206 CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, Preface. 
207 CEIP Archive, Vol. 201, Letter Haskell to Prudhommeaux, 9 March 1914. 
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knowing war were simultaneously locally and internationally grounded. Since “[t]o 
the man who sits at home, […] war assumes a certain glamor,”209 the commission 
stressed how its report was based on observations made “on the spot”210 or “sur 
place.”211 Yet the commissioners also hoped that their report would be all the more 
compelling for being issued “from the standpoint of humanity”212: “[t]he impartial 
juxtaposition of these diverse statements in the same international document, will be 
a powerful means of serving the truth and of disproving the accusation of injustice on 
our part.”213  
As regards questions of time, the work of the Balkan Commission conceived of war 
and peace as distinct temporal periods, with peace being the general condition to 
which war constituted an interruption.214 An additional kind of temporal condition, 
referred to as “the hour of the settling of accounts”215 or also as a “period of 
disorder,”216 was located “immediately after the war” and thus wedged between war 
and peace.217 This delineation of war, immediate aftermath, and peace into separate 
temporal conditions then allowed the commission to structure the legal, economic, and 
moral problems of war it proposed into problems that were temporally distinct from 
their potential solutions. In turn, this temporal structuring of problems and solutions 
was aligned with the commission’s way of knowing war. On the one hand, the initial 
idea had been for the CEIP to conduct an inquiry not into a past, but into an ongoing 
war, and it was only at a later stage of the planning process that Butler and 
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d’Estournelles decided that the research should take a retrospective approach.218 On 
the other hand, what mattered to the commissioners was not that their initiative took 
a retrospective approach to knowing war, but rather that in contrast to historical 
research at the time, they did not undertake their study decades or even centuries after 
the fact: “here finally human reason has recognized that this judgment [of war] is the 
high and difficult task not only of ‘future generations.’”219 Nonetheless, the 
commissioners in the end remained dissatisfied with their retrospective approach to 
the study of war. Having “seen all the horrors of war except the battles themselves,” 
as Dutton put it220, the commissioners mused that it would be preferable to establish a 
permanent commission of inquiry to accompany “the belligerent armies […] during 
war” and “foresee offences, instead of condemning them after they had taken place.”221 
Against the background of these general reflections about the spatial and temporal 
aspects of “war” and knowledge in the work of the Balkan Commission, in the 
remainder of this section I want to explore the workings of European modernity as a 
uniquely privileged spatio-temporal location from which to know about and take 
action against war. In the primary sources pertaining to the Balkan Commission, one 
finds “Europeans who are searching for the truth”222 about the Balkan wars as well as 
“peasants [who] were telling the truth.”223 Yet while the commissioners readily 
assumed for themselves, as “European” truth-seekers, the ability to recognize when 
																																																						
218 Cf. CEIP European Office Records, Box 132, Folder 132.2, Letter Lucien Le Foyer to D’Estournelles, 
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truth was told to them, they generally did not believe that the “peasants” on whose 
truth-telling their work relied possessed the faculties necessary for recognizing the 
truth of their own accounts. As I have argued in section 1 of this chapter, in the 
commission’s preferred formulation of the problem of war, the citizens of the Balkan 
countries were not part of the solution to this problem, and as I have shown in section 
2, the form of the commission of inquiry contributed to this exclusion. To pursue this 
line of argument further, I here examine the commission’s presuppositions regarding 
who could and who could not recognize and take responsibility for true knowledge 
about war. To begin with, I delineate the figures of the “European” truth-seeker, the 
“peasant” truth-teller, and the “foreign” or “international” truth-teller. Thereupon, I 
recast the hierarchical ordering of these three figures in light of the assumption that 
European-modernity was a unique spatio-temporal location from which to achieve 
and responsibly handle knowledge. I point out how the CEIP’s universalist-
civilizational understanding of European modernity denied the citizens of the Balkan 
states epistemological and ethical agency, and I examine how this paradigm 
reverberated in the commission’s work: in the decision to use the knowledge gathered 
about the Balkan wars exclusively for the purpose of educating international public 
opinion, in the difficulty of maintaining what Stoler has called a “studied ignorance” 
towards the neither European nor modern truth-tellers the commissioners 
encountered224, and in the challenge of rendering the Balkan wars examples of at once 
European modern and not-European-modern war. The section concludes with a final 
few working hypotheses. 
As for the “European” truth-seekers, d’Estournelles claimed to “have chosen the best 
men it was possible to choose for such a difficult and ingrate work.”225 These were 
“men of eminent moral and intellectual virtues,”226 qualities which in turn rested on 
the commissioners’ “experience,” “conscience,” and “responsibility.”227 Butler 
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225 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter d’Estournelles to Carnegie, 15 September 1913.  
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formulated the prerequisites required of the “European” truth-seekers slightly 
differently: he was concerned that the commission would consist of “trained and 
disinterested observers.”228 While the mark of “trained men”229 was that they possessed 
academic degrees from Western European or US-American institutions and “technical 
qualifications” such as being able to speak “Balkan languages,”230 “disinterested 
observers” were those who had “only the highest interests of humanity to serve.”231 In 
the example of the commission, experience or training on the one hand, and 
conscience, responsibility, and disinterestedness on the other were not so much the 
preconditions of truth in the abstract232 but, first and foremost, the prerequisites of 
knowledge practices such as direct observation and scientific writing.233 In turn, when 
“[m]en of great worth and of the sincerest good will” engaged in these knowledge 
practices to conduct their inquiries, “[t]hese words, truth, independence and 
disinterestedness” were actualized and hence were no longer “vain words.”234 Thus, it 
was through capable subjects of knowledge such as the commissioners that epistemic 
ideals and practices produced each other.  
In their quest for knowledge about the Balkan wars, the “European” truth-seekers 
interacted with two kinds of witnesses or truth-tellers. The first kind were “peasants” 
as well as “plain people, such as shop-keepers, workmen, private soldiers, and 
others.”235 Presumably, these witnesses spoke the truth because they were incapable of 
																																																						
228 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter Butler to d’Estournelles, 7 October 1913. 
229 Ibid. 
230 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter Butler to d’Estournelles, 21 July 1913. 
231 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter Butler to d’Estournelles, 7 October 1913. 
232 Though cf. CEIP Archive, Vol. 201, Letter d’Estournelles to Butler, 27 November 1913. 
233 Consider once more, for instance, Butler’s claim that “this is the first time that trained men have ever 
gone into territory war has devastated and studied its moral, economic and social [word missing] by 
the inductive method of observation” (CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter Butler to d’Estournelles, 7 October 
1913, my emphasis; for further examples, cf. CEIP Archive, Vol. 201, Letter d’Estournelles to Butler, 24 
November 1913; CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 11).  
234 CEIP, Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars, 5. 
235 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter Butler to d’Estournelles, 31 July 1913. This was another inventive 
aspect within the commission’s work. Originally, the commission had been intended to “conference 
with leading personalities and with representative persons,” and the idea of talking to “plain people“ 




lying: “It was impossible to doubt that these peasants were telling the truth. Most of 
them were villagers, simple, uneducated, and stunned by their sufferings, and quite 
incapable of invention.”236 Hence, these witnesses were unable to recognize the truth 
or falsity of their own accounts not only because they had not been “sufficiently 
removed from the events to judge them fairly”237 but also because of their lack of what 
the commissioners thought of as “moral and intellectual virtue.” And when the 
commissioners did encounter “plain people” who seemed to possess what, in 
“Europeans,” would have been considered such virtues, these faculties were taken as 
the exception that proved the rule.238 Since the “peasants” were deemed to be unable 
to take responsibility for the truth of their accounts, “the Commission assumes 
responsibility, in the sense that it believes that the witnesses told the truth; and, 
further, that it took every care to ascertain by questioning them whether any obvious 
excuse […] could be adduced.”239 
The other kind of witness were “foreigners,” who were generally considered to be 
“reliable”240 and “honest”241 and whose testimonies were far more valuable than those 
of the “peasants.” Not only did the commission take “as a point of departure of its 
work” the newspaper articles “published by an elite of European and American 
travellers who have followed the events on site,”242 the commissioners also relied 
heavily on testimonies given to them by “foreign” witnesses.243 Furthermore, 
“foreigners” were often asked to vouch for the truth of testimonies given by 
“peasants.” For example, “a confidential statement made to us by an American 
gentleman” – who was “a cautious and fair-minded man, with a long and intimate 
experience of Macedonia” – was able to confirm the “inevitably biased and 
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exaggerated” testimonies of the Turkish and Greek inhabitants of a town in which a 
particularly brutal massacre had occurred.244 Unlike that of “peasant” witnesses, these 
“foreigners’” ability to recognize and take responsibility for the truth of their 
testimonies was not hampered by the fact that they had directly experienced the war, 
not even when they had been victims of the atrocities about which they were then 
asked to testify. However, they were nonetheless not as capable subjects of knowledge 
as the commissioners themselves – for in comparison to these, they were no longer an 
elite, but became the “usual suspects, the journalists or the travellers without any 
particular authority.”245  
This hierarchical ordering of truth-seekers and truth-tellers according to their ability 
for recognizing and taking responsibility for truth was based on a version of what 
Shilliam refers to as the “twofold delineation of the modern condition (and its 
associated ethos)” in “what might be termed the ‘European-modern’”246: 
“First, temporally speaking, pre-/yet-to-be-modern subjects are assumed to be unable 
to adequately dialogue with their modern interlocutors; however, the latter can 
provide the more universal meaning of the former’s condition and thus prescribe 
techniques through which they might cultivate a sufficient ethical adeptness. Second, 
in terms of spatiality, because modernity is assumed to have gestated within European 
history, it is European ancestry – the more intimately ‘white’ the better – that marks 
the authentic community of interlocutors.”247 
Developed as a critique of the contemporary Western academy, Shilliam’s formulation 
of “European-modernity” as a purportedly privileged and unique spatio-temporal 
location from which to responsibly know, judge, and communicate also resonates with 
the example of the Balkan Commission. The commissioners deemed the citizens of the 
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Balkan states whose testimonies they heard to be not yet “civilized.”248 As Hansen 
explains, the commission’s understanding of civilization was a universalist one in 
which several civilizations coexisted in the world, but only the European/US-
American civilization could lay claim to being modern and “truly civilized.”249 The 
Balkans were not European-modern and in this sense not civilized, but “primitive”250: 
“these countries, not far from us, were then, and are still, unlike Europe, more widely 
separated from her than Europe from America.”251 Yet insofar as it was possible to 
think of the Balkans as a part of Europe252, their difference from European-modernity 
was not a natural or innate one.253 Rather, their inhabitants’ “backwardness”254 was 
due to “the historical conditions”255 – the fact that during the Ottoman Empire’s rule 
over the Balkans, peoples’ “minds have been molded for centuries by the law of 
reprisal and the practice of vengeance [and] tend to a common level of degradation.”256 
This made for a backwardness that could in principle be overcome: the citizens of the 
Balkan states were not yet modern and not yet European, but if their breaking free 
from the Ottoman Empire could be maintained, and if their new “patrons, the Great 
Powers of Europe,” gave them “roads, and railways, and waterways, schools, 
laboratories, museums, hospitals and public works,”257 they could become civilized 
and European-modern. For the moment, however, their lack of civilization meant that 
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the “peasants” and “plain people” who the commissioners encountered were 
incapable of recognizing, let alone taking responsibility for the truth of their accounts 
of the Balkan wars. Instead, this task fell to the squarely European-modern 
commissioners. 
Although the universalist-civilizational worldview of the commission and the CEIP in 
general entailed that the most advanced civilizations had a responsibility towards 
those who were less civilized258, helping those who had suffered during and after the 
Balkan wars was at best a secondary purpose of the CEIP’s initiative. Originally, the 
commission had planned to recommend a further conference which would address 
the problem of war in the Balkans, but because of the deteriorating international 
situation, this idea remained unrealized.259 The commissioners had also been meant to 
“assist each government in repairing [the problems caused by war], by making known 
by your report the real aims and resources of the country,”260 yet the available primary 
sources contain hardly any further mention of this idea. The commission did not 
consider educating public opinion in the Balkan states about the problems of war – 
instead, it was exclusively concerned with public opinion in the “civilized“ world. 
When Dutton, the US-American member of the commission, suggested that to enhance 
the chance of peace in the region, measures should be taken to educate the 
governments and the citizens of the Balkan states about the problem of war, this 
proposal went largely unheeded.261 Nor was the CEIP willing to take on a 
humanitarian role in alleviating the plight of those whom the wars had left without 
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shelter, food, and medical assistance.262 To return to Shilliam’s concept of the 
European-modern, while the commissioners clearly aspired to assign universal 
meaning to the observations they had made in the Balkans, they were not concerned 
with improving the condition, epistemological or otherwise, of the people they 
encountered. 
Instead, the commission’s main purpose in inquiring into and disseminating 
knowledge about the Balkan wars was to educate “international” public opinion – a 
European-modern audience at home in what were considered to be the most 
internationally influential countries – about the problem of war as well as about the 
CEIP’s contribution to the cause of peace. In order to achieve this central aim, the 
commission’s work had to successfully meet two challenges ensuing from the idea of 
European-modernity.  
First, the commissioners had to reconcile two contradictory demands on their 
interaction with “peasants”: they had to simultaneously keep their distance from and 
closely interact with these truth-tellers.263 The force of the knowledge the 
commissioners sought to produce and disseminate depended on their credibility 
towards their main target audience, which in turn depended both on the degree to 
which the commissioners were able to affirm their status at the top of the hierarchy of 
truth-seekers and truth-tellers and on the degree to which they managed to 
approximate the epistemological ideal of direct observation. This put conflicting 
demands on the commissioners: on the one hand, they had to safeguard “the 
distinction of being a scholar,”264 and for the knowledge they produced to be true, it 
had to depend as little as possible on “peasant” truth-telling. On the other hand, the 
commissioners’ research sur place would have been impossible without the help of 
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local “travel companions,”265 and the truth claims their final report made inevitably 
relied at least in part on the “intimate and profound knowledge of local conditions”266 
which only “peasant” truth-tellers could offer. The contradiction between these two 
demands is exemplified by the frequent criticism of Milioukoff, the Russian member 
of the commission, as partial.267 While his background and linguistic knowledge – 
“Professor Milioukov […] not only knows the Balkan nations thoroughly, but their 
languages as well” – enhanced the commission’s ability to base its knowledge claims 
on direct observations, Milioukoff “has been reproached” for this knowledge.268 In 
sum, as European-modern subjects of knowledge, too much access to “peasants” 
would have made the commissioners unconvincing to their target audience because it 
would have made them suspicious of partiality. Yet without access to “peasant” 
knowledge, the commissioners would have been unconvincing to their target audience 
because their knowledge of war would have lacked the element of direct observation. 
A second challenge for the commissioners consisted in having to frame the Balkan 
wars as examples of at once European-modern war and “uncivilized” war. On the one 
hand, in order for the commissioners to achieve their aim of influencing public opinion 
in the West, they had to render the Balkan wars examples of “just what is or may be 
involved in an international war carried on under modern conditions,” to show “the 
shocking horrors which modern warfare entailed”269 and thereby expose “the nature 
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of war itself in modern times.”270 Yet on the other hand, the Balkan wars were fought 
between countries and people whom the commissioners and their target audience 
considered to be not modern and not fully European. Even the First Balkan War – 
which, as I have discussed in section 1 of this chapter, was commonly seen as a “war 
of liberation” by means of which the Balkan countries had freed themselves from the 
oppression of the Ottoman Empire – in the end lend itself to being deemed 
“uncivilized,“ too: “On a close view [...], this War of Liberation assumes a more sordid 
and familiar aspect. It unleashed the accumulated hatreds, the inherited revenges of 
centuries.”271 The commission sought to meet this challenge in several ways. Firstly, 
the commissioners distinguished between two causes of excessive war-time violence. 
While some of the most “extreme barbarity” was attributed to “local circumstance” or 
said to have “its root in Balkan history,” the majority of instances of excessive violence 
were deemed to be due to the fact that “the essence of [modern] war” was to “suspend 
the restraints of civil life.”272 Secondly, the commissioners claimed that “some of the 
combatants and some of the civil officials” had tried to adhere to the “European ideal 
of humanity.”273 This ambiguous casting of the Balkan states’ soldiers and government 
officials as potentially, but not yet actually European-modern allowed for making the 
Balkan wars into examples of both “uncivilized” and “modern” war. Finally, the 
commissioners emphasized how the Balkan wars had ruined what budding 
beginnings of European-modernity there had been in the Balkan countries. One 
particularly interesting example of this is a report on how the war had “utterly 
destroyed” a school’s “physical, chemical, and zoological laboratories equal, if not 
superior, to any others in that region.”274 Following this line of reasoning, war was in 
conflict with modernity, and in particular with the modern tools of knowledge which 
the commissioners were so eager to apply to the study of war.275 
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Wrapping up, how did the understanding of European-modernity underlying the 
commission’s work and the hierarchy of subjects of knowledge it produced relate to 
the commission’s formulation of the problems of war? Rather than deriving additional 
working hypotheses, the foregoing discussion can serve to refine a few previously 
conceived ones. First, insofar as the commission generally preferred rational to 
dialectical understandings of war, it ought to be clarified that understanding war as a 
European-modern problem did not necessarily imply understanding it in the rational 
terms of the commission. Nor did war as a European-modern problem have to be 
addressed through the commission’s chosen means of conducting an international 
inquiry into wars that took place elsewhere. A good example of this is the 
aforementioned Marxist formulation of the problem of war suggested by Bérard, who 
likened the Balkan Wars to the French Revolution of 1789 and the Paris Commune of 
1871. While this comparison implied that the Balkan wars were examples of modern 
war insofar as they were examples of class conflict and sought to overcome and replace 
oppression, in the same letter Bérard also cast the “Balkan people” as yet to be 
civilized:  
“I do not see what the [CEIP] can have to inquire in these religious and social struggles 
[the Balkan wars]. I am convinced, in particular, that such an inquiry can only let burst 
the bubble of a renewed Balkan war, in that it revives and excites the hatreds […]. If 
we want, in the eyes of the Balkan people, to have our role as civilized older brother, 
we must work with all our forces towards the progressive eradication of these hatreds, 
and not towards their maintenance.”276  
If one wanted to conduct an inquiry, Bérard argued, one ought to conduct it into the 
“brutalities no less revolting” which happened in Europe as well as in Europe’s 
imperial dominions: “I am of the opinion that prior to inquiring into the others, we 
must inquire at home [chez nous] and, above all, we need to publish at home the results 
of these inquiries.”277 The general point to be made here is that the rational and the 
																																																						
276 CEIP Archive, Vol. 200, Letter Bérard to d’Estournelles, 18 August 1913.  
277 Ibid.  
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Marxist problematization of war differed in terms of the spatio-temporal relationship 
they assumed between the problem of war and knowledge about war, yet were 
similarly founded upon civilizational assumptions about European-modernity as a 
privileged spatio-temporal location from which to take action against war. 
Earlier parts of the chapter have also alluded to the fact that the citizens of the Balkan 
states were not deemed to have any agency or responsibility in the problem of war 
and its solution, and have discussed how, in the same move with which the Balkan 
Commission claimed authority in anti-war politics for an emerging international civil 
society, it excluded the citizens of the Balkan states from these politics. What the 
discussion in this part of the chapter has added to this is a detailed delineation of how 
this exclusion from agency, responsibility, and political authority worked within the 
commission’s approach of problematizing war by producing and disseminating 
knowledge about it. Based on a universalist-civilisational understanding of European-
modernity, this exclusion was realized by differentiating purportedly capable from 
purportedly incapable subjects of true knowledge and amounted to denying the 
Balkan countries’ citizens the practical capacity to recognize and take responsibility 
for the truth of their own accounts of the wars.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has analyzed the Balkan Commission as a first example within this thesis’ 
genealogy of the problematization of war in international politics. The chapter’s first 
purpose has been to reconstruct how the problematization of war is configured in the 
primary sources. To this end, I first delineated two kinds of formulations of the 
problem of war to be found in these sources. On the one hand, and as espoused by the 
commissioners and the CEIP, what I refer to as rational formulations posed the 
problem of war to be one of deviance from a behavioural – a legal, economic, or moral 
– norm, and as corrigible or soluble. Within this category, the legal problem of war lay 
in instances of war-time violence which violated written rules of international law; the 
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economic problem of war resided in war’s violent destruction of wealth, or of human 
lives and material resources; and finally, the moral problem of war consisted not 
merely in the moral wrongness of violence but also, and more importantly, in the 
psychological consequences of war-time violence for perpetrators and victims, 
individually and collectively. On the other hand, and as repudiated by the 
commissioners and the CEIP, dialectical formulations rendered war part of a larger 
problem to whose transcendence war could in turn contribute. Thus, in what I have 
labelled a Marxist formulation, war was expressive of class struggle, whereas in a 
Hegelian formulation, war, as a dialectic of the “intoxication” of battle and the “revolt” 
against this intoxication, was a driver of progress.  
In the second main part of the chapter, I attended to what, for short, I have sometimes 
referred to as the will to knowledge about war. Here, I firstly wondered about the form 
of the commission of inquiry. I sketched this form’s general history in domestic, inter-
state, and international politics, and I discussed its particular history in the example 
under study: how the CEIP decided to initiate a commission of inquiry and how the 
Balkan Commission, as an instantiation of the historically emergent form of the 
commission of inquiry, both reproduced and reinvented this form for the purpose of 
an international politics of problematizing war. Secondly, I broke down the 
commission’s methods for gathering material and drawing inferences into discreet 
knowledge practices and showed how these practices congealed into different ways of 
knowing war. Thereafter, I briefly alluded to the social, material, and ideational 
preconditions of the commission’s knowledge practices and ways of knowing. Finally, 
I reconstructed how the commission’s knowledge practices and ways of knowing 
came together with the three main problems of war which the commission sought to 
put forth.  
The third main part of the chapter addressed how, in the example of the Balkan 
Commission, the problematization of war was spatially and temporally configured. 
After pointing out some of the general aspects of this configuration, I examined the 
commission’s presuppositions regarding who could and who could not recognize and 
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take responsibility for true knowledge about war. I traced a hierarchy of “European” 
truth-seekers, “foreign” truth-tellers, and “peasant” truth-tellers, and I pointed out 
how this hierarchy was constructed upon an assumption of European-modernity as a 
unique spatio-temporal location from which to seek and speak truth. Finally, I 
discussed the contradictory demands which this assumption of European-modernity 
created for the commissioners if they were to be convincing to their audience: they had 
to simultaneously maintain their distance from and closely interact with the “peasant” 
witnesses they encountered, and they had to engage the Balkan Wars as examples of 
both “modern” and “uncivilized” war. 
The chapter’s second purpose has been to experiment with what it might mean to 
practice genealogy as history/critique and problematization. As I have argued in 
Chapter 2, genealogy achieves its critical aims by providing historical materials that 
allow for recognizing and experimenting with an existing problematization’s inherent 
limitations and blind spots. In furtherance of this argument, in this chapter I have 
experimented with a specific practice of thinking, namely the practice of formulating 
working hypotheses. The working hypotheses with which I have concluded each of 
this chapter’s main sections are, on the one hand, meant to present some of the main 
upshots of the historical analysis in a form that enables, indeed prompts us to get to 
work on our contemporary ways of knowing about and taking action against war. On 
the other hand, these working hypotheses are not merely meant to provide historical 
materials: rather, they are an attempt to already begin the work on our knowledge 
practices that the genealogy presented by this thesis seeks to invite. As I will further 
explain in the reflective vignette following this chapter, the hypotheses I have offered, 
rather than working to create distance between myself and the object of my analysis, 
seek to make of genealogy as history/critique and problematization a critical praxis of 
changing our ways of knowing – of changing the objects, practices, and subjects of 
knowledge, and of changing the relationships between them. 
With this in mind, let me now try to bring some order to the working hypotheses I 
have proposed over the course of the chapter. To start, there are two overarching 
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points to be made. First, the Balkan Commission is an example of the co-production of 
several aspects of the problematization of war in international politics: in the 
commission’s work, war all at once became this-worldly, empirically knowable, and 
an addressable and potentially soluble problem for an international civil society which 
was just beginning to claim authority in matters of international politics. At the time 
of the Balkan Commission, none of the individual elements of this take on war was 
taken for granted. Moreover, then as now, it is difficult to think of any one of these 
elements independently. 
Secondly, in the example of the Balkan Commission’s work, the problematization of 
war emerged in a number of contexts which were themselves emergent. In the context 
of liberalism as both a current of political thought and a political movement, there was 
a shift from a concern with unfreedom to a concern with violence. In international law, 
an understanding of war as violating international law was slowly replacing an 
understanding of war as a legitimate if unfavourable means of international statecraft. 
Within this replacement, there remained the question of whether it was preferable to 
legally problematize war per se or excessive war-time violence, and it was all but clear 
what this legal problematization of war could or should look like – whether, for 
instance, it should take the form of a criminalization. Academic disciplines, technical 
instruments, and philosophies of knowledge were developing, making new practices 
and ways of knowing available. Finally, the assumption of European modernity as a 
privileged spatio-temporal location in and from which to know and to take action on 
one’s knowledge was also an ever-emergent context. 
With these two overarching points in mind, the chapter generated a number of 
working hypotheses about the problematization of war in the example of the Balkan 
Commission and about this problematization’s main elements – the practices through 
which it was produced, the preconditions which made it possible and which, in turn, 




(1) The Balkan Commission produced war as a rationally structured problem, or a 
problem of corrigible deviance from a behavioural norm, to the exclusion of 
dialectically structured problems of war.  
This implied that the commission problematized exactly that aspect of war as 
deviant/corrigible which, in dialectical formulations of the problem, made for the 
possibility of transcendence. 
(2) The Balkan Commission produced an array of forms, practices, and ways of knowing 
war empirically, to the exclusion of metaphysical approaches to knowing war.  
One might say that this will to experience-based knowledge about war was blind 
towards exactly those aspects of war which it deemed to be the most problematic: in 
those instances in which war-time violence itself turned out to be “unobservable” and 
“unwritable,” the commission instead turned to empirical considerations of war’s 
causes and effects. 
(3) In the move with which it claimed political, epistemic, and moral authority in 
questions of war for an emerging international civil society, the Balkan Commission 
excluded the Balkan states’ governments and citizens from this authority and this 
society – and simultaneously excluded itself from the various problems of war it had 
formulated.  
What to make of these hypotheses? For one, we could also note that none of the 
constitutive exclusions of the ways in which the Balkan Commission made war into 
an epistemic and actionable object were fully conclusive. In spite of their overall 
preference for rational formulations of the problem of war, the commissioners did not 
fully repudiate or abandon dialectical formulations. Nor did the commission’s 
endeavour to know war empirically entirely avoid metaphysical elements.  
Moreover, there are many ways in which we could line up and organize these different 
hypotheses. For instance, the rational structuring of the problem at stake was 
facilitated by the form of the commission of inquiry (insofar as commissions of inquiry 
had long been instruments for recognizing and correcting deviance), the knowledge 
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practices of direct observation and of writing (insofar as it was through these practices 
that deviant war-time behaviour was rendered observable and describable, and 
insofar as these practices required a subject of knowledge to be external to the problem 
to be observed and described), and the context of European modernity (which 
provided for the distinction between capable and incapable, responsible and 
irresponsible subjects of knowledge). Yet this is only one example of how the working 
hypotheses produced by this chapter could be organized. In the end, the co-production 
of the different elements of the problematization of war implies that each hypothesis 
could be made to subsume the others. 
Ultimately, both of these points return us to genealogy as a specific way of conducting 
history/critique and problematization. Through rendering historical our 
contemporary problems, the practices through which these problems are produced as 
knowable and actionable, and the preconditions that enable these practices, genealogy 
constitutes a critical praxis of clarifying, intensifying, and getting to work on our 
problematizations without, however, telling us what this work should consist in or 
what change exactly it should aspire to. It is in this reflexive and open-ended sense 
that the historical materials provided in this chapter are meant to allow for, indeed 
invite and urge further work on our contemporary ways of knowing and addressing 
war.  
Out of the many directions in which this chapter’s analysis of the Balkan Commission 
points us, the remainder of the thesis can only take up but a few. Therefore, in the next 
two chapters, I focus on the emergence of war as a legal problem, in particular as a 
crime. In addition, I use the chapters to experiment with two further knowledge 
practices of mine which, in fact, have been flagged up in this chapter’s analysis of the 
Balkan Commission: practices of looking and practices of writing. Before I get to this, 
however, a first reflective vignette will briefly explain the working hypotheses offered 





Reflective vignette 1 
On practices of thinking 
 
One of my purposes in the preceding analysis of the Balkan Commission’s work has 
been to ponder what exactly conducting a genealogy might consist in. How to conduct 
genealogical research in a way that brings thought to bear on itself and enables us to 
learn how it might be possible to think differently? To begin to work out an answer to 
this question, in the preceding chapter I have experimented with a practice of thinking 
which has had quite a central place both in my studies in political science and in my 
work in applied peace and conflict research: the practice of formulating working 
hypotheses.1 
As Patrick Jackson argues, the practice of formulating hypotheses to be falsified by 
means of empirical evidence constitutes “a well defined intellectual operation” – or, in 
the terminology of this thesis, a knowledge practice – especially within neopositivist 
IR.2 Certainly, this practice has already received its share of criticism – be it on account 
of its inappropriateness in the kinds of post-atrocity situations that, for instance, 
transitional justice seeks to deal with3, its inapplicability in social-scientific research 
pursuing interpretive or critical purposes4, its dominant and largely taken for granted 
																																																						
1 Studying political science at a German university, how to formulate ceteris paribus hypotheses was 
one of the most important lessons to be learned during my first year of study. The only comparably 
central practice that comes to mind is that of specifying and operationalizing independent and 
dependent variables. To be clear, nothing in the primary sources suggests that the Balkan Commission 
formulated or tested causal hypotheses - and given that that practice’s history from Descartes via the 
Vienna Circle to Popper (cf. Jackson, Conduct of Inquiry, 44-59), this is hardly surprising: at the time of 
the Balkan Commission, the practice as it exists today had simply not yet been invented. 
2 Ibid., 8; cf. Laura Shepherd, “Activism in/and the Academy: Reflections on ‘Social Engagement,’” 
Journal of Narrative Politics 5, no. 1 (2018), 45-56, at 47. 
3 Within the literature on transitional justice, arguments in favour of hypothesis-testing, falsification, 
and the generalizations these enable (e.g. Chapman, Ball, “Truth of Truth Commissions”) have been 
met with counter-arguments emphasizing the importance of adopting a “posture of faith” towards 
survivors’ testimonies (Orford, “Commissioning the Truth,” 858). 
4 Cf. Jackson, Conduct of Inquiry, 42f.; Dvora Yanow, “Neither Rigorous Nor Objective? Interrogating 
Criteria for Knowledge Claims in Interpretive Science,” in Dvora Yanow, Peregrine Schwartz-Shea 
 
	 182 
status in IR and adjacent disciplines5, or the fact that it is a “stylized” practice which 
no one “actually follows.”6 To these criticisms, I would like to add two points. 
First, the practice of formulating hypotheses is political in more ways than we usually 
think. Critics have rightly pointed to its disciplining and disciplinary effects – to how, 
in IR as in the social sciences more generally, the formulation and testing of hypotheses 
are associated with neopositivist claims to “science” as exclusively concerned with the 
production of law-like generalizations about causal relationships. In addition, 
however, the practice’s politicality also lies in how it helps produce us in relation to 
the objects of our knowledge, and these objects in relation to us. If, as Jackson argues, 
“[m]ind-world dualism enables hypothesis-testing, insasmuch as testing a 
hypothetical guess to see whether it corresponds to the world makes little sense in the 
absence of a mind-independent world against which to test that hypothesis,”7 then it 
is the practice of formulating and testing hypotheses that puts into action the Cartesian 
split between the subject and the object of knowledge. In this way, the practice of 
formulating hypotheses works to distinguish and distance the knower from the 
known.  
Secondly, we could do more to counter the practice of formulating hypotheses in 
practical terms. For want of proposals for alternative practices of thinking, Jackson 
notes, critically minded scholars still often end up succumbing to “the seemingly 
reasonable offer to being taken seriously […] as long as they formulate testable 
hypotheses.”8 (I have once been made this offer this, too: that I could hold whatever 
epistemological commitments I fancied so long as I rendered my research into the form 
of a few hypotheses.) Hence, I decided to engage in practical experimentation to ask: 
Supposing that it were no longer intended to produce knowledge in the form of law-
																																																						
(eds.), Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn (London, 
UK: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), 67-88, at 68ff. 
5 Cf. Jackson, Conduct of Inquiry, 43. 
6 Friedrichs, Kratochwil, “On Acting and Knowing,” 710. 
7 Jackson, Conduct of Inquiry, 42. 
8 Ibid., 8, 43. 
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like generalizations about causal relationships, and the knowledgeable subject as fully 
external to the object of their knowledge – what could the formulation of working 
hypotheses instead amount to? 
My answer to this question once more takes its inspiration from Foucault, who once 
claimed that the aim of his work was  
“to open up a space of research, try it out, and then if it doesn’t work, try again 
somewhere else. On many points […] I am still working and don’t yet know whether I 
am going to get anywhere. What I say ought to be taken as ‘propositions,’ ‘game 
openings’ where those who may be interested are invited to join in.”9 
The working hypotheses I have proposed in the previous chapter are intended as such 
game openings. Unlike the neopositivist kind of hypothesis that calls for being tested 
against empirical data, these working hypotheses seek to draw us into the analysis, to 
close the distance between us and the objects of our research. They present the 
historical materials shed by the chapter’s analysis in a way that, I hope, provokes us 
to take them up and use them on our ways of knowing about and taking action against 
war. More generally, they invite us to question the practices of thinking by means of 
which we conjecture about the world, and to try and change these practices so that 
they are also conjectures about ourselves. Further unlike neopositivist hypotheses, the 
previous chapter’s working hypotheses do not tell us how they are to be taken up, or 
what alternative practices of thinking to engage in precisely. If anything, they hope to 
be met in a spirit that is the opposite of neopositivism’s falsificationist scepticism and 
that leads us to formulate a new kind of if-then clause: if these working hypotheses are 
historically accurate, and if, moreover, they do have a bearing on our present – then 
what are we to do?  
																																																						
9 Michel Foucault, “Questions of Method,” 224. See also Foucault’s “Nietzsche hypothesis” in Michel 
Foucault, Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976, Translated by David 
Macey (London, UK: Penguin Books, 2004 [1997]), at 46f.). For a critique cf. Borg, “Genealogy as 
Critique,” 52f. For an IR genealogy providing a similar kind of Nietzschean “Herkunftshypothesen,” 
cf. Der Derian, On Diplomacy, 54. 
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Within the process of conducting the research that has now become this thesis, the 
moment in which I cast my findings about the Balkan Commission’s problematization 
of war in the form of working hypotheses was the moment in which, as I put it in the 
conclusion of Chapter 2, I began to become curious. In that moment, I also imagined 
that I would engage in this practice in all of my historical chapters, and that the form 
of the working hypothesis would become a heuristic for the remainder of the thesis. 
As it turned out, however, what was a useful practice for becoming curious was not 
so useful for remaining curious – not least because the materials shed by my analysis 
of the Balkan Commission’s work prompted me to get to work on several other 






“Fragments even before they were buried”: War and war-time 
violence as problems of international law,  
ca. 1870-1872 and 1920 
 
This chapter has had many beginnings.  
At one point, it began with a footnote. Analyzing international jurists’ debates about 
the Franco-German War, Daniel Marc Segesser mentions that one of the jurists 
contended to have reached his conclusions about the matter “on the basis of a properly 
scientific analysis,”1 and annotates, in a footnote, Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns’ 
methodological primer on “the way of appreciating, from the point of view of 
International Law, the facts of the last war.”2 At the time, Rolin-Jaequemyns was one 
of the instigators behind a concerted move to make international law a profession in 
its own right: a founding member of the Institut de Droit International, Rolin-
Jaequemyns belonged to an international group of jurists whom Martti Koskenniemi 
describes as “amateur sociologists”3 concerned with cultivating what they thought of 
as “the legal conscience of the civilized world.”4 Coming from Belgium, England, 
France, and Germany, Koskenniemi suggests that for these jurists, “war – the ‘war 
phenomenon’ – was an enigma”5 that could be addressed by “educating European 
men to develop their sentiments towards peacefulness and moderation.”6 Taken 
together, Segesser’s and Koskenniemi’s secondary accounts and Rolin-Jaequemyns’ 
methodological manual suggested the undertaking of the jurists debating the Franco-
																																																						
1 Segesser, Recht statt Rache, 89. 
2 Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns, “De la Manière d’apprécier, au Point de Vue du Droit International, les 
Faits de la Dernière Guerre,” Revue de Droit International et de Législation Comparée 4 (1972), 481-525. 
3 Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer, 95.  
4 Ibid., 11, passim.  
5 Ibid., 83. 
6 Ibid., 85. 
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German War as an early historical example of an attempt at empirically knowing and 
practically adressing war. Hence, I decided to take a closer look. 
The chapter also once began with a quest for history. The debates between Rolin-
Jaequemyns and his colleagues can be accessed through their published articles, all of 
which are now available digitally. However, I was eager to conduct what, at that time, 
I thought of as “proper” historical research, and I was therefore looking for a reason 
to visit archives and gather unpublished primary sources. It was in this context that, 
in Mark Lewis’ study of the internationalization of crime and punishment7, I came 
across the Advisory Committee of Jurists, a gathering of ten international jurists who 
met in The Hague in the summer of 1920 to devise a scheme for a Permanent Court of 
International Justice. The committees members hailed from Brazil, Japan, the United 
States, and different Western European countries and included legal scholars and 
practitioners, some of whom also held political offices.8 The Advisory Committee of 
Jurists had taken up its work at the request of the League of Nations, and the League’s 
archive still holds many of these jurists’ materials. The committee’s debates centrally 
revolved around how the to be designed court could provide international justice with 
permanence and tangibility.9 Yet within the jurists’ elaborations on this question, one 
can also find different takes on war as an actionable problem, such as the notion that 
“the prevention of War” was “the practical end of the establishment of the Court,”10 as 
well as on international law as a way of knowing, for instance the idea that the future 
court would be a “scientific legal structure.”11 These seemed as good a lead to pursue 
as any, and soon I went off to the archives. 
																																																						
7 Mark Lewis, The Birth of the New Justice: The Internationalization of Crime and Punishment, 1919-1950 
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014), at 4. 
8 For instance, Rafael Altamira, the Spanish member of the committee, was a professor of law and a 
senator, and the committee’s president, Edouard Descamps from Belgium, was a professor of law, a 
senator, and a member of the Belgian government. 
9 Cf. Léon Bourgeois, “Report on the Organisation of a Permanent Court of International Justice,” 
13.02.1920, File 21/3007/88, Archive of the League of Nations Secretariat. 
10 Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès-Verbaux, 222. The quote refers to a statement by Lord 
Phillimore.  
11 Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès-Verbaux, 27 (de Lapradelle). 
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At one time, however, the chapter also started with the assumption that research ought 
to be systematic, and that in practice, systematicity consisted in devising and 
implementing a research design. My idea was that genealogy could proceed by taking 
a contemporary institution to write its – contingent, accidental, and de-naturalizing – 
history.12 Besides the truth commission, I thought, another contemporary international 
institution which seeks knowledge of past violence for the purpose of preventing 
future violence was that of the international criminal tribunal. On that score, the two 
groups of international jurists just introduced interested me because both groups’ 
debates featured a proposal for a kind of international tribunal to pass sentence on 
unlawful aspects of war. In 1872, Gustave Moynier, the president of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and a professional acquaintance of Rolin-Jaequemyns, 
suggested the creation of an “international judicial institution” to investigate and 
sentence violations of the Geneva Convention of 1864.13 Roughly half a century later, 
Edouard Descamps, the Belgian president of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, 
proposed that the international court which he and his colleagues were tasked with 
devising should include “a High Court of International Justice” to try war as well as 
other “crimes against international public order and against the universal law of 
nations.”14 Both proposals ultimately remained unrealized. Nonetheless, I wondered: 
what questions did the ways in which the problem of war and knowledge about war 
had been assembled in these proposals for prosecuting war and/or war-time violence 
raise about international criminal justice’s role in the contemporary problematization 
of war? 
Next, the chapter began with periodization. In his history of understandings of war in 
international law, Stephen C. Neff distinguishes four periods: the Middle Ages and up 
to circa the end of the sixteenth century, during which time war was seen “as a means 
																																																						
12 This was inspired inter alia by Price, Chemical Weapons Taboo. 
13 Gustave Moynier, Note sur la création d’une institution judiciaire internationale propre à prévenir et à 
réprimer les infractions à la Convention de Genève, lue au Comité international de secours aux militaires blessés 
dans sa séance du 3 janvier 1872 (Geneva, Switzerland: Soullier et Wirth, 1872). 
14 Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès-Verbaux, 498. 
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of enforcing [natural] law” and hence as divine will; a period of transition, lasting 
roughly from 1600 to the Congress of Vienna, during which war transformed “from a 
tool of God to a tool of men”; the nineteenth century, a period in which war was seen 
“unashamedly as a clash of rival national interests”; and finally, starting in 1919, the 
period in which we still live today – in which “a reversion to the medieval just-war 
outlook” led from the League of Nation’s category of unlawful war to the post-Second 
World War criminalization of war and finally to war as self-defence and the War on 
Terror.15 This aroused my curiosity, for it suggested that comparing the two legal 
debates I had identified should yield contrasting findings. 
Then again, this chapter also began as an attempt at coming to grips with international 
law. As I have discussed in the final section of Chapter 2, during the period on which 
I focus in this thesis, international jurists were often in the vanguard of efforts to render 
war into an epistemic and actionable object. To get a hold of international law as the 
wider context in which the two groups of international jurists in the 1870s and 1920s 
operated, I turned to writings by scholars of international law, such as Gerry Simpson 
and Miloš Vec.16 While for Simpson, international law is by now naturalized as a “way 
of thinking about war,”17 Vec understands it as a tool by means of which states can 
settle their international conflicts, and as such as one of a range of tools which also 
includes diplomacy and war. Both understandings lead on to the same substantial 
question: how has international law been able to establish its contemporary position 
vis-à-vis war? How, as Vec might put it, did it become possible for one tool of conflict 
settlement to attempt to usurp another, and what, as Simpson might have it, enabled 
international law to evolve into a way of thinking about war? For Vec, the answer is 
that over the course of the past two centuries, the “intensification” of inter-state 
																																																						
15 Neff, War and Law, 3f. 
16 Miloš Vec, “Verrechtlichung internationaler Streitbeiligung im 19. Und 20. Jahrhundert? 
Beobachtungen und Fragen zu Strukturen völkerrechtlicher Konfliktaustragung,” in Serge Dauchy, 
Miloš Vec (eds.), Les conflits entre peuples: De la résolution libre à la résolution imposée (Baden-Baden, 
Germany: Nomos, 2011), 1-21; Simpson, Law, War and Crime; cf. Agatha Verdebout, “The 
Contemporary Discourse on the Use of Force in the Nineteenth Century: A Diachronic and Critical 
Analysis,” Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 1, no. 2 (2014), 223-246. 
17 Simpson, Law, War and Crime, 4. 
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relations and the emergence of an international community enabled the 
“judicialization” of international conflict resolution. Insofar as this intensification and 
this judicialization entailed that states had to (legally) justify their international 
conduct, war ceased to be a sovereign prerogative and could become a problem for 
international law to address. Simpson’s concern, by contrast, is more specifically with 
international criminal law. He argues that it was only after the Versailles Peace 
Conference that it became possible to think of international law as having something 
to say about war, and of what is more, of calling war a crime. How would the two 
groups of jurists in whose debates I had become interested fit within the broader 
context sketched by Vec and Simpson? 
Most recently, this chapter began with Bartelson’s War in International Thought. As the 
introduction to this thesis has discussed, Bartelson’s is an inquiry into “war” as an 
object of thought and into the role that “war” has been ascribed in producing social 
and political order. With respect to international law, Bartelson suggests for “war,” 
international law, sovereign statehood, and international order to have been co-
emergent. In particular, he argues, the idea of war as productive of order has enabled 
international law’s reproduction of itself and its ways of knowing – while international 
law, in turn, has made it possible for “war” to continue to be thought of as productive 
of order.18 Albeit not quite turning Vec and Simpson’s question on its head, Bartelson 
thus finds ways to analytically hold international law at bay. Yet his analysis left me 
wondering: how did international law get from war as an object of thought to war as 
an empirically knowable and practically addressable problem? And insofar as war’s 
becoming a practical problem implied a challenge to the view of war as productive of 
order, what, in turn, did this challenge produce?  
From all of these starting points, in this chapter I look at the problematization of war 
in international law: at how two groups of jurists, conversing in the aftermath of two 
																																																						
18 Bartelson, War in International Thought, ch. 4. Against Neff, Bartelson argues that the transition 




major wars, understood war and knowledge, and at how in two early and ultimately 
abandoned proposals for an international criminal tribunal, war and war-time 
violence were rendered into epistemic and actionable objects on which international 
law could practically get to work.  
In terms of historical analysis, the chapter thus both widens and narrows the focus of 
the preceding one. On the one hand, I broaden the historical scope of the analysis to 
look at examples of the problematization of war which predated and followed the 
Balkan Commission’s report. On the other hand, out of the many different 
formulations of the problem of war which this report suggested, I focus more 
specifically on legal formulations. Moreover, I also follow up on the preceding 
chapter’s finding that for the Balkan Commission, the notion of “civilization” brought 
with it the challenge of having to make sense of the Balkan Wars as examples of both 
European-modern and non-European-modern warfare. To this end, in this chapter I 
consider what prevailing beliefs about “civilization” meant for the efforts of the 
overwhelmingly Western European jurists attempting to take action in the aftermath 
of two far more unambiguously “European” wars.19 
In addition, this chapter also picks up on the preceding one in another way: namely, 
in terms of knowledge practices and critical praxis. Following up on the previous 
chapter’s findings about the emergence, within the Balkan Commission’s work, of the 
practice of writing a report, in this chapter I experiment with what writing a chapter 
consists in. In this, my aim is to reflect upon and put into practice two genealogical 
postulates.  
First, it is often argued that rather than searching for the ultimate origin and identity 
of its objects, genealogy studies their manifold emergences, accidental turns, and 
fortuitous processes of becoming. The same, I believe, is true of genealogy itself: 
																																																						
19 Obviously, this is not to argue that the First World War did not involve theatres of war not located 
in Europe, however defined, not that it did not have ramifications across the globe. Rather, it is to 
appreciate that in the Advisory Committee of Jurists’s ways of problematizing war, the First World 
War featured as an undeniably European-modern war – which was, as the chapter will go on to argue, 
one of the reasons why the committee elided almost any explicit mention of it. 
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genealogical analysis is a process whose different elements are themselves processual, 
never fully fixed, ever becoming. Most certainly, the process of researching and 
writing this chapter (and this thesis) has been one of fits and starts, of ideas first 
embraced and then dropped, of sources and literatures pulling me now in this, now in 
that direction, of chance encounters and happenstance. In fact, this process has 
consisted of many different processes – some simultaneous, some consecutive, some 
overlapping, some widely diverging. Yet genealogy as itself a tangle of processes is 
rarely made explicit: when genealogy is taken to be a method, it is presumably fixed 
at the outset of the research, externalized from that research’s processes, and shielded 
from the critical insights these processes shed. To counteract this tendency, I decided 
to use this introduction not only to present the examples, the actors, the sources, the 
secondary literatures to be studied, but also to report on the chapter’s manifold 
beginnings – and thereby on some of this thesis’ messy processes of becoming. 
Secondly, as Nicholas Onuf explains, Foucault’s genealogies assume not only “that 
whatever we excavate will be fragmentary – shards that resist assembly into 
recognizable objects,” but also that “[t]he fragments to be excavated were fragments 
even before they were buried.”20 If things are ever-emerging in frequently coincidental 
ways, and moreover, if the only perspective on history open to us is likewise 
fragmentary, then there are no overarching wholes to be found and recounted.21 And 
yet, the way in which so many genealogies in IR are written up as encompassing 
narratives, as analytical storylines which make sense of all the fragments as if these 
had once formed a single and comprehensible edifice, does not reflect genealogy’s 
philosophy of history. What would it look like, I wondered, to write up genealogy’s 
findings as fragments, snippets, shards? In this chapter’s three main sections I set out 
to answer this question by presenting fragments of understandings of war and war-
																																																						
20 Nicholas Onuf, “The Figure of Foucault and the Field of International Relations,” in Philippe 
Bonditti, Didier Bigo, Frédéric Gros (eds.), Foucault and the Modern International: Silences and Legacies for 
the Study of World Politics (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 15-31, at 20. 
21 On Foucauldian genealogies as histories which assume unpredictability and eschew “grand internal 
logic,” cf. Joseph Mackay, Christopher David Laroche, “The conduct of history in International 
Relations: rethinking philosophy of history in IR theory,” International Theory 9, no. 2, 203-236, at 224. 
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time violence as legal problems, of assumptions about how international law could 
know these problems, and of notions of “civilization.” 
 
War and war-time violence’s becoming problematic 
War as a relationship between states. The international jurists debating the Franco-
German War believed that it was only the governments – but not the individual 
citizens22 whom these governments represented or the soldiers who fought each other 
on the battlefield – who were each other’s foes in war: “[c]urrently, war is considered 
as a relation of State to State and not of individual to individual.”23 More generally, as 
Lewis points out, these jurists “viewed the state as a positive [historical] 
development.”24 What this understanding implied for law’s potential bearing on war 
can be gleaned from the metaphors which the jurists put forth to make sense of war as 
a relationship between states. Some argued that war had lost its “ancient character of 
a feud [querelle]” and had become “a duel between two governments.”25 Others found 
that war had “much closer analogies” with a “trial by combat [combat judiciaire],”26 an 
institution of medieval Germanic law. While the trial by combat had been a way of 
settling conflicts between contradictory truth claims within the context of a judicial 
procedure, the duel, though having developed out of the trial by combat, was an extra-
																																																						
22 On the “language of citizens” (which, in the aftermath of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic 
Wars, had taken over from the notion of people as subjects or Untertanen of the state), cf. Ute Frevert, 
“German conceptions of war, masculinity and feminity in the long nineteenth century,” in Sarah 
Colvin, Helen Watanabe-O’Kelly (eds.), Women and Death 2: Warlike Women in the German Literary and 
Cultural Imagination since 1500 (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2009), 169-185, at 172. 
23 Cf. Gustave Moynier, Étude sur la Convention de Genève pour l’amélioration du sort des militaires blessés 
dans les armées en campagne (1864 et 1868) (Paris, France: Librairie de Joel Cherbuliez, 1870), at 11; 
Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns, La guerre actuelle dans ses rapports avec le droit international, Extrait de la 
Revue de Droit internationat et de légistation comparée, 4" livraison 1870 (Gent, Belgium: I.-S. van 
Doosselaere, 1872), at 24; Gustave Rolin-Jaequemyns, “Note sur le Projet de M. Moynier, relatif à 
l’Establissement d’une Institution Judiciaire Internationale, Protectrice de la Convention, avec lettres 
de MM. Lieber, Ach. Morin, de Holtzendorff et Westlake,” Revue de Droit International et de Législation 
Comparée 4 (1872), 325-346, at 327; Neff, War and Law, 189. 
24 Lewis, Birth of the New Justice, 23. 
25 Richard Combden apud Moynier, Étude sur la Convention de Genève, 11f. 
26 Moynier, Étude sur la Convention de Genève, 35.  
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judicial mechanism for settling conflicts impinging the honour of parties to a conflict.27 
Hence, if war was like a duel, all that international law could do was to “stand aside 
while they [the warring parties] fight the quarrel out.”28 The argument that war was 
more akin to a trial by combat challenged this notion and its corollaries, the ideas that 
wars were fought for the purpose of defending a state’s or nation’s honour and that 
they were a conflict between private parties who could themselves set the rules of 
engagement.  
War as a relationship between individuals. As Léon Bourgeois said in his opening speech 
before the Advisory Committee of Jurists in 1920:  
“It needed, however, without doubt that a terrible object-lesson [the First World War] 
should be given to the world in order that into the minds not only of governments but 
of peoples there might sink the essential truth that it is not in the conflicts of force that 
one can ever discover the foundations of peace between States any more than between 
individuals.”29 
Hence, in the aftermath of the First World War, the jurists understood war as a 
relationship not only between states or between governments, but also between 
individuals.  
War as fateful. Whether as a relationship between states or between individuals, war 
was a product of human decision-making. At the same time, however, the primary 
sources also contain a sense of war as an ill-fated phenomenon beyond the reach of 
human action. In 1920, the French member of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, 
Ferdinand de Lapradelle, expressed his hope that the to be designed international 
court would remain “capable in the unhappy event of war between two Members of 
the League of Nations,” or in the French original, “apte à fonctionner si le malheur d’une 
																																																						
27 Cf. Ute Frevert, Men of Honour: A Social and Cultural History of the Duel (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 
1995). 
28 Westlake apud Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer, 85. On war as a private and contractual relationship 
between states, cf. Neff, War and the Law of Nations, 137. 
29 Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès-Verbaux, 6. 
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guerre entre deux Membres de la Société des Nations se produisait.”30 Lost in the official 
translation31, de Lapradelle’s phrase implied war not simply as an “unhappy event,” 
but as a “malheur,” a fateful misfortune.32 Curiously, a similar understanding of war 
can be found in the primary sources discussing the Franco-German War, which the 
French jurist Griolet once called “the greatest malheur of the century.”33  
War as inevitable. Writing in the aftermath of the Franco-German War, Rolin-
Jaequemyns saw in war an “inevitable extremity,”34 and Moynier referred to war as 
“an involuntary [forcé] state of affairs, […] an inevitable hardship.”35 However, this 
claim about war’s inevitability was immediately qualified, for as Moynier added,“[i]n 
our days, one no longer considers war as a [generally] inevitable evil; as the only way 
of settling an international conflict. The goal of a just war, as already Vattel said, is ‘to 
obtain by force a just cause which one could not obtain in other ways.’”36 The notion 
of a “just cause” of war had first made an appearance in medieval just war thinking, 
where it pertained to wars fought “for the subduing of evil and the promotion of good” 
in the name of a divinely ordained kind of international justice.37 For Rolin-
Jaequemyns and Moynier, however, it was states’ right to self-defense and -protection 
that constituted a just cause of war.38 In a situation in which all other means of settling 
																																																						
30 Ibid., 510. 
31 With the exception of Elihu Root, the members of the Advisory Committee of Jurists debated in 
French. From the notes taken by the committee’s secretariat staff, a draft verbatim report was 
compiled and given to the members of the committee for corrections before the next session. 
Frequently, these drafts were passed back and forth multiple times, and sometimes also discussed in 
the subsequent session. The translation usually took place immediately after the first draft.  
32 In the Dictionnaire de l’Academie française (Paris, France: Hachette, 1932), the entry for “malheur” 
reads “Mauvaise fortune, mauvaise destinée” (bad fortune, bad destiny). Similarly, Émile Littré’s 
Dictionnaire de la langue française, Tome 3 (Paris, France: Hachette, 1873) explains the term “malheur” as 
a “Mauvaise destinée” (bad destiny) or also an “Événement fâcheux” (unfortunate event).  
33 Gaston Griolet, “Communication relative a l'influence de la dernière guerre sur les progrès du droit 
des gens,” Bulletin de la Société de Législation Comparée 3, no. 2 (1872), 26-47, at 46. 
34 Rolin-Jaequemyns, “Note sur le Projet,” 325.  
35 Moynier, Étude sur la Convention de Genève, 14. On the idea of war as an inevitable feature of 
international relations, cf. Neff, War and Law, 197. 
36 Moynier, Étude sur la Convention de Genève, 6. 
37 Neff, Law and War, 29. 
38 For Rolin-Jaequemyns, for instance, war was an “extreme measure for the enforcement of rights 
[revendication] or for national defence” (Rolin-Jaequemyns, La guerre actuelle, 12; cf. Rolin-Jaequemyns, 
“De la Manière,” 509; see also Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer, 86). 
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an international conflict and achieving self-protection – political means such as 
diplomacy and mediation, but also legal means such as arbitration39 – had been to no 
avail, war could become a kind of last resort of conflict settlement, objectively 
inevitable and hence just.40  
War as possible. In 1920, the Advisory Committee of Jurists’ efforts at legally 
problematizing war started from the assumption that “even under the régime of the 
League of Nations, war is possible.”41 Unlike their predecessors in the 1870s, these 
international jurists had the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 to look back upon – 
and in light of the recent experience of the First World War, they found them to have 
constituted seriously flawed attempts at putting war in its place. The Hague 
Conferences had gathered existing rules for international arbitration into the 
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes and had founded a 
Permanent Court of Arbitration42, yet as the First World War had shown, this 
codification and institutionalization of arbitration had not sufficed to make of 
arbitration a real alternative to war. In the Advisory Committee of Jurists’ evaluation, 
the decisive factor was that the Hague Conferences had not made arbitration 
mandatory – which is why the majority of the committee wanted the jurisdiction of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice to be compulsory. The compulsory nature 
of the court’s jurisdiction changed the emphasis of what it meant for war to be an 
extreme measure: under the League of Nations system, war was, in Neff’s words, “an 
exceptional act requiring affirmative justification”43 – it was still possible, but no longer 
inevitable. 
																																																						
39 Whether arbitration amounted to a political or a legal means was a matter of interpretation – and of 
disciplinary convenience. The majority of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, for instance, sought to 
differentiate arbitration from adjudication and therefore emphasized that “[t]here was at times a 
tendency for the arbitrators to consider themselves as mediators rather than as faithful interpreters of 
Law, as diplomats rather than judges” (Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès-Verbaux, 694).  
40 Cf. Neff, Law and War, 162. 
41 Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès-Verbaux, 509 (de Lapradelle), cf. 511 (Descamps). See also 
Neff, Law and War, 293. 
42 Hague Conventions of 1899, Title IV. 
43 Neff, Law and War, 279. 
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War as criminal. For a minority among the members of the Advisory Committee of 
Jurists, however, the idea of granting the Permanent Court of International Justice 
compulsory jurisdiction was anathema. They preferred Descamps’ proposal for a High 
Court of International Justice, “the very existence of [which],” they concurred with 
Descamps, “might have a considerable preventative effect.”44 Modelled upon the 
Belgian Court of Cassation45, this High Court would have been authorized to try 
“crimes of such a nature that the security of all States would be imperilled by them”46 
– a category which, next to piracy and attacks of “Sovietists”47 against members of the 
League’s organs, also included aggressive war, or “the crime of having made war.”48 
Descamps believed that the League of Nations had brought about “a more advanced 
régime of international organisation”49 to the effect that it was now possible “to define 
crimes against International Law.”50 Therefore, while recognizing that “the Covenant 
of the League of Nations acknowledges the existence of wars which are not considered 
as illegal,” Descamps argued that “it does not follow from that that there cannot be 
wars which actually constitute crimes.”51 But Descamps’ proposal for a High Court did 
not have majority appeal, and many of his colleagues found that erecting a penal court 
before defining war as a crime would mean to “[begin] at the wrong end of the 
problem.”52 For one, for the majority of the jurists, the idea of a High Court had no 
place in an international realm which they still took to be defined by state sovereignty: 
against Descamps’ belief to the contrary, many of his colleagues “did not think it was 
																																																						
44 Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès-Verbaux, 498 (Descamps). 
45 In the Belgian example, as Descamps explained to his colleagues, “the House of Representatives 
may bring charges against the Ministers,” and the Court of Cassation then had the “power to define 
the offence and to determine the punishment” (ibid., 512). In Descamps’ High Court, the Assembly 
and the Council of the League of Nations could have passed cases to the court, which would then 
define and investigate the exact crimes.  
46 Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès-Verbaux, Ibid., 498f. 
47 Ibid., 513. Cf. Lewis, Birth of the New Justice, 84. 
48 Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès-Verbaux, 507 (Phillimore), cf. 505 (Root). The “subtext” to this 
was Germany's attack on Belgium (Lewis, Birth of the New Justice, 84; cf. Advisory Committee of 
Jurists, Procès-Verbaux, 511 (Descamps)). 
49 Ibid., 512. 
50 Ibid., 503, cf. 511f. (Descamps). 
51 Ibid., 511 (Descamps). 
52 Ibid., 504 (Loder). 
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possible in international affairs to make a distinction between civil law and penal law 
as was done in national law.”53 Some therefore worried that the proposal would create 
“a ‘super-State […], a great central authority exercising its power over States which, 
up to that time, had been independent.”54 Others found that since “[a] State which 
considers itself wronged will always consider that its adversary is a criminal and, 
often, it will even go to war to punish it,”55 a High Court which “would be a danger to 
the sovereign rights of States” might constitute “a menace to peace.”56 Morever, to 
many of the jurists, Descamps’ proposal risked re-opening the question of the 
criminality of the First World War – which, at the Paris Peace Conference, had been a 
highly contentious one, and which they worried might lead to further discord and 
enmity.57 Although de Lapradelle endorsed Descamps’ proposal and stressed that “[i]t 
was now a question of building up the future and not raking up the past,”58 as the 
Italian member of the committee, Arturo Ricci-Busatti, remarked,  
“[a]ll the members who had already spoken on the subject [of Descamps’ proposal] 
had referred to the nightmare of the past, though they all wished to exclude any 
remembrance of it from the work of the Committee. This showed that the past was 
necessarily bound up in the question.”59 
Finally, the idea of a High Court was “out of step” with a zeitgeist for which, as Lewis 
argues, “[t]he main means of preventing violent conflicts were […] political, arbitral, 
																																																						
53 Ibid., 503 (Ricci-Busatti). 
54 Ibid., 505 (Root). Descamps responded that “[t]here is no need whatever to imagine that the 
institution of a High Court would amount to the creation of a super-State, and would involve an 
unjustified abdication of sovereign powers,” and that rather, “the new Court involves a joint and 
enlightened use of the attributes of sovereignty and that, under a set of conditions which are in some 
respects new, it may, in the common interest, be incumbent upon all to give their adherence to certain 
perfectly justified measures” (ibid., 512). 
55 Ibid., 507 (Phillimore) 
56 Ibid., 504 (Fernandes). 
57 See, for instance, Hagerup and de Lapradelle’s back-and-forth about Descamps’ proposal (Advisory 
Committee of Jurists, Procès-Verbaux, 499ff.). During the Paris Peace Conference, only the violence 
perpetrated by the central powers had been criminalized – to the chagrin of the German and Austrian 
governments, who had pushed for an “impartial” and “neutral” inquiry or an international court that 
would address the “crimes” of both sides.  
58 Ibid., 500 (de Lapradelle). 
59 Ibid., 502 (Ricci-Busatti); cf. 505 (Root). 
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and judicial processes to resolve interstate disputes.”60 After a brief debate, therefore, 
the Advisory Committee of Jurists rejected out of hand Descamps’ proposal for a High 
Court and with it the idea of war as crime. 
War as an economic and social problem. The international jurists debating the Franco-
German War were in principle perceptive to war’s having a destructive impact upon 
economic affairs, yet this was not a main theme of their discussions. Moynier 
mentioned the “economic shock that war engenders and which disrupts all the cogs of 
society,”61 and Rolin-Jaequemyns urged that they ought to bear in mind war’s “rapid, 
violent, and sterile destruction of people and of goods, of that which lives and that 
which makes live.”62 Hence, insofar as war came into view as an economic problem, 
this was always entangled with war as a social matter. In turn, this might help explain 
why war’s economic ramifications were not a more central concern for these jurists: as 
a legal relationship between governments rather than between people, war’s negative 
socio-economic consequences were beyond the purview of international law.  
War as a disruption of progress. As far as one can say from the primary sources, the 
Advisory Committee of Jurists was not concerned about war as destructive of people 
and of goods. The objects of these international jurists’ worries were more abstract: 
they were troubled about the interruption which the First World War had posed to 
“the progress of peace and law.”63 This war, it seemed to them, had not only 
“destroyed” the historically evolved and “highly complicated system” of “human 
society,”64 but had also severely impaired “the principle of international law.”65 
Therefore, if international law was to achieve a permanent and tangible form, it had to 
bring war under its control: the League of Nations, the committee maintained, had to 
																																																						
60 Lewis, Birth of the New Justice, 81. Cf. Loder’s claim that “the President’s idea was good, but that the 
time was not yet ripe for its realisation” (Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès-Verbaux, 504). 
61 Moynier, Étude sur la Convention de Genève, 11. 
62 Rolin-Jaequemyns, La guerre actuelle, 79. 
63 Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès-Verbaux, 702.  
64 Bernard Loder, Address before the International Law Association, 28 May 1920 (File 21/6017/859, League 
of Nations Archive). 
65 Information Section, Draft of official “communiqués” of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, No. 10, 26 June 
1920 (File 21/5980/4959, 03.08.1920, Archive of the League of Nations Secretariat), 2. 
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“establish a reign of Justice in a world which has been convulsed by the most 
murderous of wars,”66 and the to be founded court was to help with this task. 
War’s political and voluntary element. In the aftermath of the Franco-German War, Rolin-
Jaequemyns and his colleagues were divided about the extent to which governments’ 
“motives” and “justifications” for war could be subject to legal evaluation, yet they 
agreed that international law was unable to completely grasp and control these aspects 
of war.67 Rolin-Jaequemyns, for instance, presumed that a government’s decision for 
war always had some “purely political side” to it: “an element which we will call 
voluntary, which escapes all juridical appreciation […] and with which the science of 
law does not need to occupy itself.”68 In this political aspect of a decision for war, “it 
is up to the statesman to judge the appropriateness with which he might employ the 
means which the law offers him.”69 Similarly, Rlin-Jaequemyns’ colleague Griolet 
maintained that a government’s privately held “motives” and publicly given 
“justifications” for a decision to go to war were not legal in character, but constituted 
“a political, historical, or philosophical matter.”70 Irrespective of their stance about 
which government had caused the Franco-German War, the jurists hence concurred 
that, as Neff puts it, “[t]he decision to resort to war […] was the prerogative of policy, 
not of law.”71  
Morality rendering war problematic. Therefore, in addition to international law, Moynier 
and his colleagues sometimes also relied on moral reasoning to problematize war. For 
one, because morality was “of a higher order”72 than law, they could turn to morality 
to circumscribe aspects of the conduct of war which were impossible to grasp by 
																																																						
66 Bourgeois, Report, 1. 
67 While Rolin-Jaequemyns was in favour of weighing these matters in legal terms, Griolet strictly 
opposed any such undertaking. Cf. Rolin-Jaequemyns, La guerre actuelle, 12ff.; Griolet, 
“Communication,” 29. 
68 Rolin-Jaequemyns, La guerre actuelle, 55. 
69 Ibid., 75.  
70 Griolet, “Communication,” 29, italics in original. 
71 Neff, War and the Law of Nations, 164. 
72 Rolin-Jaequemyns, La guerre actuelle, 80.  
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means of international law alone.73 Moynier, for example, argued that where 
international law “authorizes us to use all the means within our power to defeat the 
enemy, […] morality condemns those [means] which would be unjust,”74 including 
practices such as pillage, poisoning, the assassination of military leaders, and 
massacres of prisoners of war or of the general population.75 Furthermore, morality 
was the opposite of politics76 and provided a tie between states that even war as the 
most extreme form of politics could not sever.77 In sum, in the legal debates about the 
Franco-German War, morality was an institution on which the jurists could lay claim 
in order to resist being co-opted by politics.  
War-time violence as the problem at stake. As the previous fragment has already hinted 
at, to the jurists debating the Franco-German War, it was war’s violence and not war 
as such that was the problem at stake. They believed that the “suppression of war 
itself” could, as Moynier put it, be “no more than a stopgap solution, a thing to which 
one resigns oneself in default of a better and more humane means for making useful 
war’s law.”78 Progress in legally alleviating the conduct of war had thus far not been 
straightforward: “[i]t is,” Moynier wrote, “through many oscillations that the 
assuagement of war’s mores has been accomplished.”79 However, the Convention for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field (1864), more 
commonly known as the First Geneva Convention, meant that there now was 
international law applicable to the conduct of war. Hence, Moynier and his colleagues 
focused their problematizing efforts not on war itself, but on war-time violence. The 
members of the Advisory Committee of Jurists were somewhat more sympathetic to 
																																																						
73 Cf. Moynier, Étude sur la Convention de Genève, 7f.  
74 Ibid., 16. 
75 Ibid., 7. 
76 Rolin-Jaequemyns, “De la Manière d’apprecier,” 478f.: “If diplomats/statesmen are too engaged in 
the necessities of active politics, the peace societies are too tempted to forget these. Even today, they 
have not yet sufficiently distinguished between the law of morality […] and the demands of practical 
reason.”  
77 Moynier, Étude sur la Convention de Genève, 15f.: “If war brings to burst the already interrupted legal 
relations [between states], it does not interrupt moral relations.”  
78 Moynier, Étude sur la Convention de Genève, 31f. 
79 Ibid., 4f. 
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the idea of problematizing war-time violence, too. The French member of the 
committee, Ferdinand de Lapradelle, found it “natural that it should fall to the League 
of Nations to watch the observance of the rules by the belligerents,”80 and the more 
sceptical British member of the committee, Lord Phillimore, was nonetheless open to 
defining acts of war that were not in accordance with the laws of war as “an offence 
against the Covenant of the League of Nations.”81 
War-time violence as timeless. To Moynier and his colleagues debating the Franco-
German War, war-time violence had a timeless aspect to it. Conceiving of war as “the 
most violent […] of human relations,”82 they took war’s violence to be an expression 
of “unchained passions.”83 Insofar as this violence “occasionally drives the most 
inoffensive man to acts from which, in other times, his imagination would have backed 
away in horror,”84 war was “brutal and intoxicating”85 and produced “a common, 
blind, and bestial fury”86: “In effect the most peaceful man, if he is put in possession of 
a weapon and asked to use it every day to attack or defend, deadens his soul like his 
body.“87 Thereby, war had the capacity to reproduce itself – for “the more man comes 
into contact with brutality, the more he is carried to deal with his differences by means 
of arms.”88  
War-time violence as historically malleable. As Moynier wrote, “[i]f war has not 
disappeared, it has not remained unchanged either.”89 During their own lifetime, the 
																																																						
80 Ibid., 509 (de Lapradelle). 
81 Ibid., 508 (Phillimore). 
82 Rolin-Jaequemyns, La guerre actuelle, 8. 
83 Cf. Moynier, Étude sur la Convention de Genève; Moynier, Note sur la création d’une institution judiciaire 
internationale; Rolin-Jaequemyns, “Note sur le Projet,” 326; John Westlake, “Letter to Guillaume-Henri 
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jurists who were now commenting on the Franco-German War had witnessed how 
war’s “procedures […] have repeatedly transformed themselves” and how its 
“customs have experienced no less remarkable changes.”90 While by procedures, the 
jurists had in mind the “establishment of standing armies” which could “discipline the 
soldiers,” war’s changing “customs” concerned the codification of rules for the 
conduct of war, such as the 1863 Lieber Code and the aforementioned 1864 Geneva 
Convention.91 Thus, while wartime violence’s self-reproductive capacity was deemed 
a constant aspect of war, the way in which violence was employed in combat-
situations appeared historical. 
The need for enforcement mechanisms. As the Franco-German War had demonstrated92, 
the existence of the Geneva Convention alone was not as effective at delimiting the 
range of war’s legitimate means as had originally been hoped. To better fence in 
violence’s timeless nature by means of law, Moynier argued that what was needed 
was “a barrier against the unleashing of the frenzy and the greed of the combatants; it 
is necessary to dig a trench deep enough, to erect a retrenchment high enough for war 
not to bring about more than the minimum of ills compatible with its existence.”93 In 
short, the existing legal rules for the conduct of war needed to be outfitted with 
enforcement mechanisms. Five decades later, the members of the Advisory Committee 
of Jurists found that such mechanisms were still lacking. “The most important thing 
in connection with the rules of war,” de Lapradelle opined, “is the existence of effective 
sanctions, and not ludicrous pecuniary penalties, such as those stipulated in the 
Convention of 1907.”94 
War-time violence as criminal. The Advisory Committee of Jurists understood breaches 
of the laws of war to constitute “crimes of war.”95 Some of the jurists assumed that the 
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Permanent Court of International Justice would automatically have jurisdiction over 
crimes of war.96 Others were more sceptical, yet nonetheless open to developing a 
definition of crimes of war as “an offence against the Covenant of the League of 
Nations”97 which would be justiciable within an international “sphere of penal 
justice.”98 To the international jurists debating the Franco-German War, however, the 
notion of war-time violence as criminal was not available – they thought of such 
instances of war-time violence as “offenses” or “breaches” of the laws of war.99 
Delimiting the scope of the principle of necessity. In the second half of the nineteenth 
century, the so-called principle of necessity purported that the legitimacy of the 
conduct of war depended on what was militarily necessary for achieving war’s aims. 
To problematize war-time violence, the secondary literature contends, international 
jurists would draw on positivist legal philosophy to delimit the scope of the principle 
of necessity: wars had to have rational objectives and to further states’ interests, and 
excessive and hence non-rational acts of violence were disallowed.100 In the legal 
debates about the Franco-German War, however, one finds an example of a decidedly 
non-rationalistic argument to counter the idea of military necessity. According to 
Moynier, what had brought about recent changes in the rules regarding the conduct 
of war was the discovery and subsequent application of “a natural law that man ought 
not to be violated without punishment.”101 Hence, the destruction of the enemy could 
no longer be considered a legitimate goal of war, and it became possible for Moynier 
to argumentatively “deprive war of the good of atrocities”102: depending on “whether 
one assigns to war the goal of destroying the enemy, of dispossessing the enemy, or 
only of wresting an approval from him, the same rigours will not be necessary, nor, as 
a consequence, legitimate.”103 According to this reasoning, then, the timeless nature of 
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law stood against the similarly timeless self-reproductive nature of war-time violence. 
What was historical – and, indeed, progressive – were jurists’ insights into war and 
law, as well as the specific rules and practices they derived from these insights.  
Breaches of the rules of war as a civil wrong. With war understood as a relationship 
between states, another way for nineteenth-century international jurists to counter the 
principle of necessity was to legally problematize governments’ responsibility for their 
conduct of war. Many of the jurists debating the Franco-German War conceived of 
unlawful acts of war as, legally speaking, wrongs accruing within a private 
relationship. Achille Morin, for instance, found that since “the infractions of the 
[Geneva] convention […] were not simple faults due to negligence or ignorance” on 
the part of individual soldiers, but rather due to the respective governments and 
military leaders having failed to “give the necessary instructions,” these governments 
and military leaders bore a “civil responsibility [responsabilité civile]” for these 
infractions.104 Drawing on the Napoleonic Code of 1804 – in which responsabilité civile 
was the branch of the law that regulated how injuries incurred in private relationships 
were to be repaired – this proposal made of war a contractual relationship between 
private parties, and of infractions of the Geneva Convention a breach of contract for 
which the party at fault could be made to pay damages. In a similar vein, Rolin-
Jaequemyns thought that it was the government’s “wrong/fault [tort] to not have 
implemented or to have implemented badly the Geneva Convention.”105 By recourse 
to the common law tradition – in which torts were civil wrongs for which the 
responsible party was legally liable – this conceptualization grasped war as a private 
relationship and governments’ responsibilities in war as legal liabilities.  
Breaches of the rules of war as illegalities. A somewhat different legal problematization of 
war was proposed by Moynier. Like Morin and Rolin-Jaequemyns, he suggested that 
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it was ultimately the governments who – not intentionally, but through negligence or 
ignorance – were responsible for “all war’s ills” and who should therefore be made to 
“bear the consequences.”106 In contrast to his colleagues, however, Moynier argued 
that there ought to be “a penal sanction against those who would violate [the 1864 
Geneva Convention].”107 It was to this end that he proposed the creation of an 
“international judiciary institution” which would judge the guilt or innocence of those 
accused of having violated the convention. Moynier’s proposal was an eclectic legal 
conceptualization of “violations” or “infractions” of the Geneva Convention based on 
both civil and penal law. On the one hand, as for Morin and Rolin-Jaequemyns, these 
violations were “torts,” or breaches of a private contract108; yet on the other hand, they 
were also “illegalities,” or acts for which both individuals and governments could be 
“culpable” and penalized accordingly.109 As for enforcement mechanisms for the 
court’s sentences, these were both “damages” or “interests” a government would pay 
to repair the injury that had occurred in its contractual relationship with another 
government and “penal sanction[s]” or financial “punishments” governments had to 
pay for the unlawful acts committed by their “authorised agents.”110 At the time, 
Moynier’s proposal received only a moderate amount of critical attention111, and 
Moynier himself did not pursue it further.112 Yet precisely because of its location on 
the margins of legal discourse, the proposal demonstrates the outer limits of how war 
and war-time violence were thinkable and problematizable in the legal imagination of 
the day. 
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Rolin-Jaequemyns’ “way of appreciating, from the point of view of International Law, the facts 
of the last war.”113 In his quest to evaluate a welter of contending claims about the 
Franco-German War114, Rolin-Jaequemyns – by his own account – proceeded in three 
inferential steps: two steps for establishing the truth of a knowledge claim, and a third 
step for assessing this knowledge claim in light of the laws of war. The first step in 
establishing the truth of a claim about epistemic objects such as war and war-time 
violence was to appreciate their a priori properties. Applying one of the “elementary 
rules of historical critique,” this meant to appraise the “intrinsic possibility or 
likelihood” of the various assertions one was confronted with.115 This a priori 
assumption then made for the starting point of the investigation. Thereafter, the 
second step in establishing the truth of a knowledge claim consisted in the collection 
and analysis of empirical evidence or “external proofs” for the alleged facts. The 
significance of “external proofs” for the overall evaluation of the truthfulness of a 
knowledge claim depended on what one already knew of an object a priori: 
“The dispositions with which we approach the question of external proof largely 
depends on the degree of their intrinsic probability or likelihood. An unlikely fact 
could be true, but it will only be accepted on the basis of more positive and complete 
proofs than an a priori likely fact would require for being proven.”116 
With regard to the facts of war, Rolin-Jaequemyns distinguished between five classes 
of external and “serious proofs.” In descending order of reliability and usefulness, 
these were written documents issued by the government against whose alleged 
wrongdoing they were to serve as evidence; written documents issued by the 
government which accused its opponent of wrongdoing, and which at the time had 
not been contested by the government so accused; written documents issued by the 
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accusing side and officially contradicted by the accused; testimonies of known 
witnesses; and testimonies and documents of anonymous sources.117 Of these five 
kinds of external proofs, Rolin-Jaequemyns claimed to have made use only of the first 
two.118 His analysis arrived at verified facts by evaluating the quality or “exactitude” 
of these documents119, weighing contradictory external proofs against each other120, 
and weighing external proofs against intrinsic likelihoods. In a third step, Rolin-
Jaequemyns sought to establish the law applicable to these facts and to judge them 
accordingly. To do this, he argued, the study of the usual sources of law (“the treaties, 
the usages, and the general principles known in science and in practice”121) did not 
suffice: because of new developments (such as railroads and hot-air balloons), it was 
necessary to develop a new method for extending the “known law” through the 
“observation”122 of international relations.123 With the law applicable to a fact thus 
established, Rolin-Jaequemyns finally evaluated this fact in light of the law. Only strict 
and methodical adherence to his three “principles,” Rolin-Jaequemyns claimed, would 
enable a true appreciation of the facts of the war – and this would also be “in the 
interest of historical truth.”124 
Not wanting to know the facts of the last war. Unlike their predecessors debating the 
Franco-German War, the Advisory Committee of Jurists did not seek to produce, 
evaluate, or otherwise discuss the facts of the war in whose aftermath it was meeting 
– in spite of initial plans for doing so. The original plans for the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, which would have seen the court established and setting about 
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its work by the end of 1919, had foreseen mandating the court to investigate crimes 
committed during the First World War.125 By the time of the committee’s convention 
in the summer of 1920, however, the idea of having the Permanent Court of 
International Justice address the past war and its violence had been dropped. 
Therefore, the only time that the jurists on the committee came close to touching upon 
the facts of the past war was when, during their twenty-third session, they discussed 
Descamps’ proposal for a High Court.  
The Advisory Committee of Jurists’ way of knowing. Amongst the Advisory Committee of 
Jurists, there was only scant debate about their methodology. An incidental remark by 
Loder claimed that “a system of negative proof [...] was always liable to cause 
difficulties.”126 Also, there was Descamps’ contention that the committee had heeded 
“Descartes’ methodical caution”:  
“[W]e devoted ourselves to our work, taking care to avoid a certain a priori scepticism 
which some affect, but applying to the study of the problems which lay before us 
Descartes’ methodical caution which, when properly applied, is a very efficient means 
of throwing light upon doubtful points and the surest guarantee of attaining tangible 
results. 
We commenced by a lengthy interchange of ideas and subjected our opinions, which 
sometimes differed widely, to severe cross-examination. In this atmosphere of free and 
active criticism our hope of obtaining general agreement gradually materialised and 
took definite shape.”127 
In the first half of the statement, Descamps is referring to Descartes’ “method of 
doubt,” a methodical principle for casting universal and collective doubt upon all 
preconceived opinions, thereby setting them aside in order to arrive at foundational 
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first principles. The procedure the jurists followed according to the second part of 
Descamps’ statement, however, seems more akin to judicial procedures, in particular 
to those of the civil law/adversarial tradition128, and perhaps also to a logic of induction 
– which would also be in line with the preference for certainty expressed in Loder’s 
aversion against “systems of negative proof.” In this reading, Descamps’ invocation of 
Descartes should perhaps rather be understood rhetorically, as an appeal to authority 
– leaving the matter of the jurists’ ways of knowing ultimately uncertain. 
The impossibility of impartial knowledge about the past war. As to why they refrained from 
discussing or seeking knowledge about the First World War, the most important 
reason advanced by the members of the Advisory Committee of Jurists was their own 
incapacity for impartiality. On the one hand, this argument was politically convenient. 
According to the jurists’ epistemological stance, true knowledge required impartiality 
and neutrality.129 However, making good on this stance would have required for them 
to examine not only the central powers’ motives and conduct of the war, but also the 
violence of their own governments’ soldiers. What is more, this examination would 
have been pursuant to a German proposal for exactly this kind of inquiry.130 To the 
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members of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, it was therefore expedient to as far as 
possible avoid the subject matter of the First World War – and invoking their deficient 
capacity for impartiality served this purpose well. On the other hand, however, the 
jurists’ doubts as to their own impartiality seem to have been genuine. De Lapradelle, 
for instance, was apprehensive that he could not “examine” the past war “cold-
bloodedly”: although he claimed to have ridded himself of any “belligerent spirit,” he 
nonetheless feared that by “stirring up memories of the past,” the Advisory Committee 
of Jurists might simultaneously stir up this very spirit and bring about renewed 
conflict, violence, and war.131 Therefore, although it generally seemed “necessary” to 
de Lapradelle and colleagues to examine the past war, their inability to be sufficiently 
impartial towards this particular object of knowledge led them to forego any actual 
examination of it.132  
The possibility of impartiality towards future war. Though de Lapradelle doubted that he 
and his colleagues could impartially know about or judge the First World War, he 
found it to be altogether possible for the committee to achieve impartiality in the 
construction of the future High Court envisaged by Descamps. For one, impartiality 
could come in degrees: de Lapradelle did not call for the Advisory Committee of 
Jurists to be absolutely, but only “to be sufficiently impartial.” Moreover, just how 
difficult it was to suppress one’s emotions so to achieve sufficient impartiality 
depended on the object of one’s knowledge and judgment. Here, de Lapradelle 
claimed that the High Court would be “constructed in abstracto.”133 It was not to 
address the specific crimes committed during the First World War, but to deal with 
future crimes which were yet to be committed; moreover, these future crimes were not 
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limited to “crimes against the rules of war,” but also included other kinds of 
international crimes.134 Having thus abstracted the object which the High Court under 
discussion was to deal with, de Lapradelle argued that the members of the committee 
could be expected to engage with the idea of this court in a sufficiently impartial way. 
As the previous section has explained, the majority of the members of the Advisory 
Committee of Jurists disagreed with Descamps’ proposal for a High Court. None of 
them, however, objected to de Lapradelle’s conception of impartiality as a matter of 
freeing, to a sufficient degree, one’s ability to know from emotional bias – nor to his 
suggestion that they would be able to muster sufficient impartiality towards the 
abstracted crimes of war with which a future court would deal.  
Knowledge practices and ways of knowing in Moynier’s “international judiciary institution.” 
The proposal for an international judiciary institution which Moynier put forth in the 
aftermath of the Franco-German War contained different fragments of a legal way of 
knowing war which lend themselves to being excavated. To start with, Moynier held 
it to be “most essential that the tribunal does not exercise an inquisitional authority, 
and that, as a consequence, it never on its own initiative pursues the true or suspected 
violators of the convention.”135 Instead, the tribunal was to take action only when 
asked to do so by an injured party, which for this purpose would have to conduct a 
pre-study [examen préalable] and submit it to the tribunal.136 Moreover, Moynier 
specified that the tribunal was to submit the facts in question to an adversarial 
trial/cross-examination.137 In conjunction with the stipulation that the tribunal was not 
to act inquisitionally, this suggests that Moynier had in mind a procedure similar to 
the one used in common law systems.138 Finally, in order to “offer, theoretically at least, 
more certainty of impartiality […],” Moynier’s proposal foresaw that the institution’s 
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bench would be of “a mixed or neutral authority.”139 As de Lapradelle would have put 
it, Moynier was formulating his scheme for an international judiciary institution in the 
abstract, i.e. as an institution to deal with future wars – and he thus had few 
reservations about the possibility of impartiality. 
The purposes of knowledge in Moynier’s proposal. One of the motivations behind 
Moynier’s proposal was that in the absence of the kind of institution he envisaged, it 
had been “difficult, indeed impossible, to arrive at a legal finding of and objection to 
the facts [of the Franco-German War].”140 There were two reasons why this lack of legal 
knowledge constituted a problem. On the one hand, it made it “even more difficult to 
arrive at the penalization of the guilty and at the reparation of the harm they have 
caused.”141 On the other hand, Moynier hoped that the knowledge of war which the 
tribunal would produce would contribute, at least indirectly, to “forming and 
clarifying public opinion” and thereby to the cultivation of the moral consciences of 
soldiers and the general population.142  
Non-penal alternatives to Moynier’s proposal. Responding to Moynier’s proposal, both 
Holtzendorff and Rolin-Jaequemyns thought that it would be preferable to establish 
commissions of inquiry rather than an international judiciary institution. Holtzendorff 
suggested that each party to a war should establish a commission “composed of three 
members belonging to the belligerents and the neutral powers which, in case of a 
confirmed violation of the convention, would have to immediately determine […] the 
state of the facts.”143 This kind of commission, it seemed to Holtzendorff, would be 
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preferable to a criminal tribunal because “the most important thing of all [..] would be 
an official [authentique144] determination of acts which are contrary to the 
convention.”145 Rolin-Jaequemyns was generally favourable of Holtzendorff’s idea, yet 
in lieu of distinct commissions of inquiry on each of the sides to a war preferred a 
united “committee of instruction.” Acting upon complaints issued by the “interested 
governments,” the committee  
“would […] delegate, if needed, one or several of its members to visit places, collect 
testimonies, etc., and make a report about everything, on the basis of which the full 
commission would then state […] whether there had been, yes or no, a guilty offense 
against the Geneva Convention.”146 
Of “a character at once juridical and practical,” such a committee would be given the 
mission “not to judge and to sentence, but to determine and to demand,” i.e. “to work 
with the governments to provoke the redress of the abuse or the pursuit of the 
culpable.”147 While Holtzendorff and Rolin-Jaequemyns’ commissions of inquiry were 
conceived as alternatives to Moynier’s international judiciary institution, they too took 
a generally affirmative stance on the state as part of the solution to the problem of war-
time violence. 
The contribution of knowledge about war to law’s efforts at ameliorating the conduct of war. 
More generally, the international jurists writing about the Franco-German War 
assumed that empirical knowledge of war would be at least indirectly helpful to legal 
initiatives for addressing war’s problematic aspects. First, they thought that law as a 
science was in the business of determining and evaluating the facts of war and that it 
could help resolve political conflicts by establishing truth:  
																																																						
Holtzendorff et Westlake,” Revue de Droit International et de Législation Comparée 4 (1872), 332-334, at 
333f. 
144 According to Littre’s Dictionnaire de la langue française, one of the meanings of the term 
“authentique” was an act undertaken by a state or its agent: “Acte authentique, acte émané d'un 
officier public, accompagné de formalités et devant faire foi jusqu'à inscription de faux.“ 
145 Holtzendorff, “Letter to Gustave Moynier,” 334. 




“reliable/responsible [sérieuse] science – the science which studies, compares, considers the 
facts, history, the natural laws which guide the existence and development of people – is 
already an eminently pacifying force. ‘Science […] unites the people, passions and whims 
divide them. In politics, science can diminish disagreement and contribute to the 
rapprochement of spirits which brings about the internal happiness of a people and its 
external power. […] Science teaches the true, from which results the measure of the 
possible.’”148 
Secondly, it was through knowledge about war that international law could help to 
educate public opinion and, in particular, provide a counterweight to the conflict-
inciting tendencies of the national presses. The intense press coverage of the Franco-
German War had meant that  
“there is not one episode of battle which escapes and is not known to all the world. It is as 
if entire populations were present in the theatre of combat. Insofar as they admire the 
courage of heroes, they also hear the heartbreaking cries of the victims, and partake in the 
horrible spectacles.”149 
This, to the jurists, was an unprecedented kind of situation. Like Moynier, Rolin-
Jaequemyns worried that during war and thus in a time “when thinking tends to be as 
violent as actions,” public opinion could easily get carried away: there was a risk that 
“the victors and the vanquished […] loose their exact measure for appreciating the 
things.”150 Insofar as the task of the presumed science of international law was to 
“combat everything which could excite the nations to hate each other or to despise 
each other” and to create a “legal community between independent nations,”151 law 
and public opinion needed to work hand in hand: “The only means of avoiding a 
similar kind of catastrophe is to make a law of peoples and a public opinion which do 
not permit to repress the rules [of the law of war].”152 Finally, knowledge about war 
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could improve international law and make it a more effective means of addressing 
war. This was a generalization of Rolin-Jaequemyns’ argument that to bring up to date 
the laws which were applicable to the facts of war, one needed to observe the reality 
of international relations: “Exact knowledge of the facts, the application and the 
reasonable interpretation of the existing laws form the best base for [the laws’] 
improvement.”153 With improvements of international law, in turn, would come 
improvements in the conduct of war. Notably, in these three ways in which knowledge 
about war could help international law’s effort at ameliorating the conduct of war, this 
knowledge was not intended to itself be a pedagogical tool. Rather, its significance lay 
in its contribution to an international law which was engaged in cultivating the moral 
consciences of combatants154 and of the general public.155 
Estimating the damage due to looting. In concrete cases, however, Rolin-Jaequemyns and 
his colleagues did not always manage to resolve political conflicts by means of legal 
knolwedge. During and after the Franco-German War, the governments on both sides 
had gone to great lengths in order to calculate the damage they had incurred due to 
looting. In this context, Griolet argued that a figure of 254.172.802 francs constituted 
the sum total of the damage German looting had caused France, and maintained that 
this figure “must be fairly accurate, not only because it was determined by estimates 
of cantonal commissions, but above all because these estimates were made in the 
presence of the interested parties who could have contested them.”156 Yet Rolin-
Jaequemyns challenged this claim, pointing out that the table which Griolet had cited 
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as evidence of the sum total of damages caused by German looting had been put 
together by the French government for an altogether different purpose: 
“not in order to establish, by means of an international document including an 
element of cross-examination [document contradictoire international], the number of 
ravages committed by the Germans, but to determine, vis-à-vis the invaded 
departments, the sum of charges and damages of all kinds which have hit them 
during the war, whether the communities or the individuals.”157 
There are several interesting points to note about this discussion. First, Griolet and 
Rolin-Jaequemyns actually agreed that in order to accurately calculate the costs of a 
specifically problematic aspect of war, looting, the quantifying process should include 
an international element whereby the accused side would be invited to dispute the 
findings of the accusing side. The issue at stake between the two jurists was whether 
such a disputation had been part of the process through which the figure of 254.172.802 
francs had been arrived at, and therefore whether this figure accurately captured the 
damage which German looting had caused the French. Secondly, the individual, an 
actor who was usually not considered to be a part of the problem of war in this period, 
suddenly became relevant to this problem as someone who was “hit” during war and 
who could testify to governmental authorities about this matter.158 Finally, there was 
the politics of quantifying the problem of war: as Rolin-Jaequemyns questioned 
Griolet’s calculation for having taken into account only one of the two sides in the 
war159, Griolet accused him of being “unfortunately under the influence of his all too 
strong sympathies for the German cause and Prussian politics.”160 Pushed like this, 
Rolin-Jaequemyns backed down and argued that faced with accusations and counter-
accusations, all that could retrospectively be known about many of the presumed 
incidents of looting was that “everything did not go too well.”161 
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Counting the dead. In another example of the quantification of the problem of war, 
Rolin-Jaequemyns drew on numbers of the dead and wounded to argue that the 
bombardment of Paris had actually spared the French side significantly higher losses 
and thereby to justify the German conduct of war. Calculating that “during twenty-six 
days of bombardment, Paris has lost 31 children, 23 women, and 53 men – 107 people 
have been killed […], which makes for an average of around five per day,” and adding 
to this figure the “276 wounded of whom some have not survived their injuries,” 
Rolin-Jaequemyns granted that this was “without a doubt” a significant death toll, but 
nonetheless maintained that “in bombarding Paris, the German army could 
reasonably expect to advance by a couple of days a capitulation which was anyways 
inevitable.”162 Griolet’s refutation of this calculation of the human costs and benefits of 
the bombardment of Paris could hardly have been sharper: “Quoi de plus humain! A 
few lives, often useless, for saving thousands of people!”163 Griolet took offense with 
Rolin-Jaequemyns’ argument not only because of its dismissive stance on the 
protection of civilians, but also because of Rolin-Jaequemyns’ calculus:  
“There are individuals which human society would have an interest in excising, even 
though they are not guilty of any crimes. If one denied them a few years, a few days 
towards an anyways inevitable end, others could live and prosper in their stead. Who 
would dare to propose such acts of humanity! No one would have thought to apply 
this reasoning – the most hateful and most criminal which thinking could conceive of 
– to the conduct of war!”164  
In fact, Griolet was convinced that the reverse kind of calculation was far more 
appropriate – and that, therefore, “the lives of five little children which Prussian 
shelling has killed in their dormitory […] ought to have been more respectable, more 
sacred than those of five thousand men on both sides of the rampart.”165 In this 
instance, then, the quantification of knowledge about war – the counting of the dead 
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and wounded – in conjunction with ideas about the social utility of different groups 
(including but not limited to combatants and civilians) led to a range of conflicting 
utilitarian arguments about war. 
Applying Quetelet’s “social physics” to the Franco-German War. In his evaluation of the 
facts of the last war, Rolin-Jaequemyns drew on the “social physics” of Adolphe 
Quetelet to argue that “a certain amount of individual offenses” against the laws of 
war was in all likelihood inevitable.166 In the mid-nineteenth century, the Belgian 
astronomer and mathematician Quetelet had, within newly available governmental 
statistics, observed the constancy of crime rates from one year to another. From this 
observation, Quetelet theorized people’s “criminal propensities” to be brought about 
by causes resembling the law-like and mechanistic causes that could be found in the 
natural world.167 This conceptualization of crime as a constantly occurring 
phenomenon and as part of a cause-effect relationship posed a challenge to the at that 
time predominant idea of the free subject who had chosen to become criminal out of 
their own volition. Instead, Quetelet distinguished between accidental, variable, and 
constant causes of crime – between incidental factors such as wars and natural 
disasters, volatile factors such as individual will and personality, and constant factors 
such as age, sex, and occupation – and found that the latter type of causes could be 
statistically correlated with crime rates.168 As Richard Wetzell explains, Quetelet 
reasoned that because “crime was not a random individual act but strongly influenced 
by a variety of statistically measurable factors, including social factors, […] society 
bore significant responsibility for crime,”169 and he therefore argued that these social 
factors should be addressed by governmental policy. At the same time, Quetelet also 
made crime a phenomenon of deviance: by applying the principle of normal 
distribution around a mean to the phenomenon of crime, he cast “average man” 
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[homme moyen] as “one who regularly chose the mean course between the extremes of 
deficiencies and excess,”170 which implied that crime was a phenomenon located at the 
margins, far away from the mean. In sum, Quetelet’s work, enabled by the availability 
of a new kind of data, produced crime as a new kind of epistemic and actionable 
object.171  
As Rolin-Jaequemyns’ argument introduced this object into his and his colleagues’ 
efforts at problematizing war, it thereby reproduced many aspects of Quetelet’s notion 
of crime. Rolin-Jaequemyns not only borrowed Quetelet’s data172, but also took up 
several of his theoretical ideas. For instance, assuming that both armies would have “a 
sincere desire to conform, in their conduct, with these principles [the laws of war],” 
Rolin-Jaequemyns distinguished between “permanent” and “accidental” causes 
which could interefere with and “trouble” this desire.173 While he presumed that a 
number of “permanent” causes of crime – “age, sex, etc.” – were equally at work in 
both armies174, he proposed for several “accidental” causes of criminality – the class 
background from which soldiers were recruited, their “moral and intellectual level,” 
and the armies’ organization and discipline – to vary between the armies. This led 
Rolin-Jaequemyns to constate a difference in the likelihood with which members of 
the two armies would commit offenses.175 This a priori likelihood then served as a 
background against which the aforementioned “serious proofs” were to establish the 
truth or falsity of accusations of offenses. Thus, to render war-time violence into a 
knowable object, Rolin-Jaequemyns adopted several central aspects of Quetelet’s 
conception of crime – including the notions of crime as knowable through large 
numbers of observations, as caused (in the abstract, if not in individual cases) by social 
factors, and as addressable by governmental action – into his proposal, thereby 
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transferring these to the domain of international law. 
However, there was also one detail of Quetelet’s conception of crime which Rolin-
Jaequemyns explicitly disputed: namely, the assumption that the figure of “average 
man” existed in war- as in peace-time. Here, Rolin-Jaequemyns argued that the longer 
a war lasted – the more soldiers “harden the soul as the body,” the more “the sight of 
blood becomes familiar […] while the sweet memory of the domestic hearth fades,” 
and the more the “instinct of survival” was aroused – the higher the likelihood that 
soldiers would commit offenses against the laws of war.176 Moreover, Rolin-
Jaequemyns also contended “that any army attracts in its wake, besides crows and 
vultures, a swarm of men and women of prey, battlefield hyenas, camp and garrison 
leeches, wagered international vermin, always hungry for corruption.”177 All in all, 
therefore, “so much for the average.”178 Hence, even in contradicting Quetelet’s 
suggestion that “war itself was not a provocative cause of crime,”179 Rolin-Jaequemyns 
reproduced aspects of Quetelet’s conception of crime, such as the association of crime 
with deviance. Likewise, Rolin-Jaequemyns also joined in Quetelet’s onslaught on the 
reasonable man [sic] of Enlightenment180 – only that Rolin-Jaequemyns did not 
substitute this man with “average man,” but with war-time man driven by instincts 
and passions.  
Capable subjects of theoretical and practical legal knowledge. As the self-proclaimed 
“partisan of the law”181 Rolin-Jaequemyns put it, the jurists debating the Franco-
German War conceived of themselves as being situated between “on the one hand the 
diplomats and statesmen who conclude treaties, direct the relations between people, 
etc., and on the other hand the sages who make books.”182 Ideally, Rolin-Jaequemyns 
thought, he and his colleagues should split the difference. The “diplomats” could be 
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role-models for the practical and purposeful nature of their knowledge, which only 
had a “value” if it lend itself “to a positive and immediate application.” Meanwhile, 
from the “sages” the jurists could learn to think in general and logical terms, to seek 
“to view the facts from above, to discover their moral and juridical laws, to formulate 
the principles which the nations should obey.”183 By combining these two ways of 
knowing, Rolin-Jaequemyns mused, the jurists could achieve “[t]rue theory, healthy 
theory”: unlike the kind of theory “which beats in the clouds [...] – it is that which is 
based on the rock of experience, on the study of moral dispositions and the actual 
necessities of humanity.”184 For the jurists to base their way of knowing on “the rock 
of experience” did not mean that they would have attempted to produce immediately 
experiential knowledge of war or violence, however. Rather, it implied a mediated 
way of knowing war which combined theory with practice, law with politics, and 
observation of the external world with introspection into the individual and collective 
conscience/consciousness.185 This way of knowing, as Koskenniemi has argued, not 
only contributed to “the emergence of a [new] professional self-awareness” amongst 
the international jurists weighing in on the Franco-German War.186 It also produced 
these jurists as knowledgeable subjects of a new kind: as subjects who were steeped 
simultaneously in theory and in practice, they were capable of “[examining] facts in 
all conscience and seek to appreciate them in the light of reason.”187 
The impossibility of keeping separate law and politics – and theory and practice. Five decades 
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between theoretical and practical legal ways of knowing – between “hommes d’étude” 
and “hommes pratiques,” as de Lapradelle had it188, or between theoretical abilities 
“acquired by scientific research” and practical abilities “obtained by experience,” as it 
was put by Rafael Altamira, the Spanish member of the committee.189 Unlike their 
predecessors in the 1870s, however, these international jurists were not seeking to 
forge out for themselves an epistemic via media. They were keen to embrace the 
“entirely scientific” character ascribed to them by the League’s Secretariat and to avoid 
any semblance of taking politics into account.190 However, as both their 
contemporaries191 and the members of the committee themselves192 noted, this 
aspiration proved impossible to realize: ignoring political questions – such as the 
representation of the major powers on the to be created Permanent Court of 
International Justice – would have weakened the institution the jurists were designing, 
and hence the committee ended up engaging in political considerations rather 
frequently. 
With regards to this to be created court, too, the members of the committee initially 
held theoretical and practical abilities to be two very different animals. While Root 
emphasized that the judges on the new court’s bench should have “great judicial 
experience” so to be “in the habit of thinking judicially” and be endowed with “that 
broadmindedness which experience alone can bring,”193 de Lapradelle stressed that 
“experience was only one form, or perhaps one source, of competence.”194 Soon, 
however, the jurists came to realize that the court they were designing was going to 
rule in questions arising from and pertaining to an international realm which would 
for the first time ever constitute a “definite sphere” of practice, and hence that finding 
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candidates with prior practical experience was logically impossible.195 To solve this 
problem, the jurists opted to discard the distinction between practical epistemological 
ability based on experience and theoretical epistemological ability based on scientific 
research and instead looked for candidates with a more general “well known ability 
in international law.”196  
 
When and from where to know about and address war? 
Knowing war “as immediately as possible.” The international jurists debating the Franco-
German War not only understood this war as a contemporary event, but more 
generally believed that it would be best to try and know war and war-time violence 
not retrospectively, but immediately. Moynier’s proposal of an international judiciary 
institution, for instance, foresaw for this institution to take action not after, but during 
war, “as immediately as possible.”197 The two institutional alternatives which 
Holtzendorff and Rolin-Jaequemyns offered in response to Moynier’s proposal were 
likewise imagined to ideally take immediate epistemic action.198 Such a “prompt 
confirmation of the state of facts, for example immediately after a battle,” Holtzendorff 
believed, “would have a more important moral signification and would contribute 
more to the observation of the Geneva Convention than an international penal 
procedure.”199 Elsewhere, Rolin-Jaequemyns discussed the advantages and drawbacks 
of seeking knowledge about “contemporary events.”200 On the one hand, Rolin-
Jaequemyns believed that “contemporary facts are hardly more difficult to establish 
than the facts of the past,“201 yet on the other hand he cautioned that it would be “an 
error to think that because we are contemporary to an event, we must know it better 
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than whichever historical event.“202 He then compared “the situation of the jurist, the 
publicist, the statesman who wants to define a contemporary fact with that of the 
historian who would want to ascertain the same fact one hundred or two hundred 
years later”203: 
“The first will undoubtedly have an advantage over the second: that of collecting a 
more vivid impression, of being able, consequently, to reflect this in the manner in 
which they expose the event. But alongside this advantage comes a drawback of at least 
equivalent proportions. That is that the material at one’s disposal in the moment in 
which a historical event unfolds is necessarily incomplete. The witnesses’ statements 
are generally passioned, partial: the resentment, the vanity, the patriotism, the interest 
or the political prejudice trouble the view, mislead the imagination and make the 
otherwise genuine lie.” 204   
All things considered, however, Rolin-Jaequemyns concluded that while there was no 
ideal time for knowing war, it would still be best to seek knowledge about war as 
immediately as possible. 
Knowing war from a national point of view. Another reason why Rolin-Jaequemyns 
ruminated that the facts of a war could only be “truly known” with a century or more 
of hindsight was that war’s contemporary knowers were likely to be “thrown into a 
camp where their borders limit their horizons.”205 He not only thought that the “sages” 
in the business of knowing law and war theoretically might “risk seeing [reality] 
through the deceptive prism of […] national prejudices,”206 but also accused his French 
colleagues commenting on the Franco-German War of a pro-French bias – for they 
“belong to one of the nations engaged in the war, and consequently they themselves 
share in the cause, having remained in Paris during the siege, they were thus placed 
in the most feverish, most thunderous, most impressionable centre of the world.”207 In 
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fact, this allegation was Rolin-Jaequemyns’ rebuttal to the colleagues who had accused 
him of pro-German bias: “we,” Rolin-Jaequemyns argued, “do not actively mix 
ourselves with the facts of war.”208 What is interesting about this is not whether Rolin-
Jaequemyns and/or his French colleagues’ allegations were correct, but rather to note 
how the existence of something like a national point of view constituted an 
epistemological bone of contention between them. 
Knowing war, internationally. To counteract national bias, Moynier, as mentioned 
before, had foreseen for the judges on the bench of his international judiciary 
institution to be of a “mixed or neutral authority” so to “offer, theoretically at least, 
more certainty of impartiality, not being judge in its own cause.”209 Five decades later, 
the Advisory Committee of Jurists went further than this, reasoning that the judges of 
the Permanent Court of Justice would achieve impartiality by internationalizing 
themselves. For the Japanese member of the committee, Mineichiro Adatci, this 
internationalization entailed “that the judges were to resign their national occupations 
in order to internationalise themselves” or also to “deify themselves.”210 For de 
Lapradelle, by contrast, their internationalization meant that “[t]he judges would not 
be denationalised but super-nationalised.”211 Hence, to Adatci, their location within 
the international meant that the judges would transcend their national points of view 
to achieve something akin to a view from nowhere, whereas to de Lapradelle, 
becoming international meant to surmount and combine different national 
perspectives and so to attain a view from everywhere. These differences 
notwithstanding, both understandings assumed that internationalization helped 
impartiality. 
“Civilization” in international legal arguments of the mid-nineteenth century. In deliberating 
all kinds of matters international, Rolin-Jaequemyns and his colleagues in the 1870s 
often drew on claims to “civilization” to support their arguments. As Moynier 
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explained on the opening pages of his Étude sur la Convention de Génève, “[t]hrough its 
evolution from the state of savagery, through that of barbarity, to that of civilization, 
[humankind] has, little by little, elevated itself to a healthier notion of its intellectual 
and moral nature and gradually shaken off the yoke of its brutal instincts.”212 The term 
“civilization” – a vague notion rather than a clearly specified concept213 – carried with 
it ideas of historical evolution and progress.214 It also construed the jurists, their 
societies, and their political projects – projects such as the problematization of war – in 
distinction to temporal and spatial others, the “savages” and the “barbarians” from 
whom contemporary European societies had developed and who still inhabited the 
non-European world.215  
“Civilization” in the arguments of the Advisory Committee of Jurists. In the Advisory 
Committee of Jurists, a notion of “civilization” was introduced when a discussion 
about how the different national legal systems currently co-existing in the world 
should be represented on the bench of the Permanent Court of International Justice 
had reached an impasse.216 In this context, the assumption that these different national 
legal systems were but a “reflection”217 of the difference between civilizations – that “it 
is the various shades of civilisation which create national groups,”218 as Altamira had 
it – helped reconcile the jurists’ conflicting points of view on the matter. By allowing 
the jurists to hierarchically order different national legal systems according to how 
advanced or “backward” the civilizations from which they originated were219 or 
according to how “central” or marginal these civilizations were within the 
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international system220, the notion of “civilization” enabled them to come up with an 
allocation formula for distributing the seats “among the European, American, and 
Asiatic groups.”221 At the same time, however, it was also possible for the jurists to 
think of the different civilizations as adding up to a “civilisation of the world”222 and 
to imagine international law and the court they were constructing as reflective of this 
universal civilization. 
The Franco-German War from the point of view of “civilization.” In the secondary literature, 
it has been argued that the Franco-German War demonstrated to the international 
jurists of the time “that humanitarian laws did not become applicable merely by the 
good will of the belligerents, even when they were undoubtedly civilized European 
nations.”223 For the jurists whose writings I am studying here, this was, in fact, not an 
immediately obvious insight, but a gradual realization. In the early days of 1870, 
Moynier had looked back on military campaigns waged from 1864 to 1868 and found 
in them much evidence of the progress of civilization. These campaigns seemed to him 
to bespeak “the effectiveness of the law of nations in attenuating the calamities of war” 
and hence to suggest that the Geneva Convention of 1864 had successfully created “an 
abyss between the past and the future.”224 Therefore, “[a]ppreciating from this point of 
view the current state of the civilized peoples,” Moynier was convinced that “we can 
easily see that the nineteenth-century civilization is superior to that of previous 
centuries, for never was human life better protected.”225 Later in the same year of 1870, 
Rolin-Jaequemyns’ comments on the by then ongoing Franco-German War were 
already more defensive about the issue of “civilization.” Noting that “philosophers” 
might take “these immense and methodical bloodbaths which one calls the battles, 
these ingeniously murderous inventions, these lands strewn with debris where 
everything literally exudes death, these burnt villages, these bombarded towns, this 
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starving capital” to imply that “the difference between the barbarian and the civilized 
man of the 19th century is much smaller than ordinarily thought,” 226 Rolin-Jaequemyns 
wished to argue to the contrary. “It would already be an answer to them,” he thought, 
“to show them how much the patriotic motive, the national sentiment which animates 
the citizen-soldier today is superior to the inconscience, or: to the brutal greed of the 
erstwhile mercenary. Today, one fights for a cause. Back then, it was for a master.”227 
Soon, however, this still positive outlook on the war reversed into its opposite. When, 
roughly a year after the Franco-German War had ended, Griolet contended that the 
war had “presented an ensemble of barbarian practices”228 and Bluntschli argued that 
the German bombardment of French towns had been “more reminiscent of the 
traditional barbarities of war than provided a new example of a more humane 
conduct,”229 neither Moynier nor Rolin-Jaequemyns objected. In this way, the Franco-
German War had gradually become a problem from the point of view of “civilization.”  
War as a problem for “civilized nations” to solve. On the matter of Descamps’ proposal for 
a High Court, Root, the US-American member of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, 
claimed that he “had long felt that it would be desirable to establish an understanding 
between civilised nations as to how crimes against universally recognised principles 
of humanity, justice and morality should be dealt with.”230 Root’s assertion betrays the 
universal aspirations of the jurists’ notion of “civilization”: while war and similar 
“crimes” were universal problems, it fell to the “civilised nations” to address these. 
“Civilized” und “uncivilized” violence. For the most part, the jurists debating the Franco-
German War drew on the notion of “civilization” to reason about themselves and their 
own armies’ conduct of the war. Civilization’s others only very occasionally appeared 
within these debates, only ever as secondary to the main argument, and never as the 
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victims of violence.231 Under the heading “Employment of African troops,” for instance, 
Rolin-Jaequemyns argued that the French government’s use of “savage troops who do 
not know the laws of military honour and of humanity” ought to be considered “in 
the same category as poisoned weapons”232:  
“By employing these men who do not have any scruple to mutilate the wounded and 
finish them off on the battlefield, the French government has doubly failed in its 
international obligations, both towards the Arab tribes whose barbarity it has 
borrowed instead of communicating to them the proper ways of civilization, and 
towards the European nations which it threatened with this illegal weapon.”233 
First and foremost, Rolin-Jaequemyns’ tirade was directed against France – which by 
employing African troops had failed both to accomplish its civilizing mission towards 
these non-Europeans “savages” and to comply with the laws of war which regulated 
its intra-European international relations.234 Secondarily, by grouping them under the 
same category as poison – which the Lieber Code had recently outlawed as a weapon 
of war – Rolin-Jaequemyns also objectified the “savages troops.” His categorization 
likened these “uncivilized” others to a murder weapon which carried associations 
with malice, secrecy, insidiousness, and feminity235 and which, as Price has pointed 
out, was often “chastised as a weapon typical of savages and barbarians.”236  
Descamps and violence against “uncivilized” others. According to Lewis, “[i]t is a grand 
historical irony that Descamps was the jurist who [in 1920] called for a High Tribunal 
to judge crimes against the universal law of nations, since fifteen years before he had 
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defended Belgian King Leopold II's extreme exploitation of the Congo.”237 Perhaps, 
however, this was not so much ironical as rather only logical. To Descamps, the 
Congolese – and Africans more generally – were not “civilized.”238 Furthermore, he 
also believed that “civilization” was neither of recent origin nor arbitrary,” but “deeply 
rooted in history.”239 Finally, in support of his proposal of a High Court, Descamps 
cited the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions to argue that “the principles of the law of 
nations […] result from the usages established among civilised peoples.”240 Taken 
together, these assumptions – that Africans were per se “uncivilized,” that there was 
an essential (or at least non-arbitrary) difference between “civilized” and “uncivilized 
peoples,” and that international law and its notion of criminality sprang, inter alia, 
from how “civilized peoples” conducted relations amongst themselves – suggest that 
to Descamps, the proposal of a High Court did not contradict his earlier defense of the 
murderous Congo Free State. 
“Civilization” and racial hierarchy in legal ways of knowing war. In Rolin-Jaequemyns and 
colleagues’ mid-nineteenth century attempts at knowing war, the notion of 
“civilization” became coupled with assumptions of racial hierarchy. On the one hand, 
such assumptions informed the jurists’ ideas about the kinds of institutions that would 
be appropriate for knowing about and addressing war. In yet another alternative 
proposal to Moynier’s idea of an international judiciary institution, for instance, Lieber 
suggested a “reunion of the most eminent jurisconsults of the law of nations which our 
cis-Caucasian race possesses […] to regulate amongst themselves certain big questions 
of the law of nations” (amongst which was the question of “the employment of 
barbarous troupes as auxiliary forces”).241 On the other hand, assumptions of 
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hierarchically ordered racial difference also underlay the jurists’ concrete epistemic 
practices. Hence, in the first step of Rolin-Jaequemyns’ three-step method, the a priori 
probability of the truth of an alleged offense against the laws of war depended on the 
race as well as the “civilizational” stage of the accused. On the face of it, it was an 
argument about his and his fellow Europeans’ “civilization” that led Rolin-
Jaequemyns to profess that he believed 
“in the power of the law, the progress of the mores and that of juridical ideas, also 
during war, as a direct result of the civilization of people. And this is why I refuse 
absolutely […] to condemn, without sufficient proof, a civilized national to be guilty of 
having, collectively and at pleasure, trampled the most incontestable rules of morality 
and justice.”242  
Yet this argument, meant to absolve the French and German armies from any 
generalized guilt, implied as its flipside that Rolin-Jaequemyns  
“would have far less trouble to believe in a simple newspaper report about pillage, 
massacres and other atrocities committed by a tribe of redskins than to believe, on the 
basis of an equal kind of testimony, in a similar kind of conduct on the part of a troop 
of Europeans.”243  
In this way, Rolin-Jaequemyns’ pioneering “way of appreciating, from the point of 
view of International Law, the facts of the last war” was explicitly based on an 
assumption of racial and “civilizational” hierarchy. 
 
Conclusion 
How to conclude a chapter with so many beginnings? Researching and re-researching, 
writing and re-writing this chapter, I gradually left behind many of the apprehensions 
that had at one point or another formed my point of departure. After interrupting the 
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work on Advisory Committee of Jurists to research and write about the Balkan 
Commission, my worry about doing “proper” historical research dissipated. 
Fortunately so, since the for my purposes most important primary source relating to 
the Advisory Committee of Jurists turned out to be its published Procès-Verbaux. My 
bother with periodization vanished in the face of the minutiae of legal discussions 
which were no easier to understand for being classified as belonging to this or that 
period, and which often enough did not conform to what this periodization would 
have led me to expect. For instance, Rolin-Jaequemyns and colleages did see war, like 
Neff suggested, as a clash of governments and their political wills, but they did not do 
so “unashamedly.” Once I had realized (not least by way of Chapter 3) what it meant 
for my research to be concerned with “war” rather than with international law, it also 
seemed fine to leave unanswered Vec and Simpson’s question of how international 
law established its contemporary position vis-à-vis war and to focus instead on the 
emergence of the different ways of problematizing war which international law today 
affords. Lastly, as my appreciation of genealogy as an ongoing process and a critical 
praxis grew, my anxiety over matters of research design dissolved in equal measure.  
As in the histories that it has researched, this chapter’s manifold beginnings have led 
on to other things, and, in frequently contingent ways, have ended up producing a 
heap of fragments of “war” and its violences as epistemic and actionable objects and 
as problems of international law and politics. To offer at least some minimal points of 
orientation for navigating these fragmentary materials, I want to conclude the chapter 
by drawing on the comparison – already implicit in the chapter’s organization – 
between the two legal debates the chapter has studied. 
To start with, there are a number of points on which, if they had met, the two groups 
of jurists discussed in this chapter would probably have agreed upon. Rolin-
Jaequemyns, Descamps, and their colleagues and interlocutors all shared a preference 
for problematizing war-time violence rather than war as such as well as a belief in the 
need for outfitting the laws of war with enforcement mechanisms. For both groups of 
jurists, an older view of war as a fateful malheur loomed, largely unnoted, on the 
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margins of their debates. Both groups of jurists assumed that knowledge about war 
would be more impartial and hence better if it was produced from an international 
point of view. Lastly, both groups assumed for themselves to be epistemologically 
capable subjects in particular insofar as they distinguished themselves within a 
“civilizationally” understood hierarchy – whether this understanding was discussed 
explicitly, as between Rolin-Jaequemyns and colleagues in the 1870s, or whether it was 
assumed implicitly, as between the members of the Advisory Committee of Jurists in 
1920.244 
Yet there are also many aspects in which the problematization of war in the mid-
nineteenth century differed markedly from how war was legally problematized fifty 
years later. To start with, what kind of a problem did war constitute? Were violations 
of the laws of war civil wrongs, illegalities, offenses, or crimes? Was war a conflict 
between sovereign states only, or also a conflict between individuals? Indeed, were 
sovereign states part of the problem of war, as the members of the Advisory 
Committee of Jurists began to assume, or were they, to the contrary, part of the 
solution to this problem, as Rolin-Jaequemyns and colleagues steadfastly believed?  
There are also a number of differences between the ways of knowing of these two 
groups of international jurists. Most apparently, although both groups of jurists 
worried about the impact of war reporting and propaganda on the general public’s 
desire for war, they held diametrically opposed views about international law’s 
capacity for ameliorating this fearmongering. While the jurists debating the Franco-
German War believed that a legal evaluation of the most recent war and its violences, 
when used to educate the military and the general public, would be helpful for 
working towards a more peaceful future, their successors meeting in the aftermath of 
the First World War feared that such knowledge risked carrying the seeds of renewed 
conflict. Furthermore, Rolin-Jaequemyns and colleagues assumed for experience to 
play a certain role in the production of knowledge, yet this role would probably have 
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been rather unrecognizable to the members of the Advisory Committee of Jurists 
meeting fifty years later: for to Rolin-Jaequemyns and colleagues, experiential 
knowledge of the external world came necessarily coupled with introspection into 
individual and collective consciences and with the precondition of a priori likelihoods.  
At this point, two larger questions suggest themselves. How do this chapter’s 
fragments of legal problematizations of war in the 1870s and 1920s compare to the 
previous chapter’s findings about the problematization of war in the Balkan 
Commission’s work? Also, as materials for getting to work on our contemporary 
world, what do these fragments tell us about the problematization of war in 
international politics today? For the moment, I want to defer these larger questions. I 
will get back to them in the conclusions of this thesis, yet prior to this, I want to focus 
more closely on one particular – and, today, particularly important – way of rendering 
war a legal problem suggested by the preceding chapter’s analysis. To this end, the 
next chapter will study the criminalization of war in the aftermath of the Second World 
War. Yet still prior to this, a second reflective vignette offers a few further thoughts on 
my experimentation, throughout this chapter which has now reached its conclusion, 
with my practices of writing. 
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Reflective vignette 2 
On practices of writing 
 
Here is another part of the story, announced in the previous vignette, of my 
genealogical curiosity. Upon completing a first draft of the chapter on the Balkan 
Commission, I initially thought that I had figured out the way in which all of my 
historical chapters would be written – that I had found the elements my chapters 
would discuss, the form in which they would come together, and the practice through 
which I would realize and render their findings. I therefore started out on the next 
chapter, the one you have just read, in much the same way as I had on the preceding 
one: I identified an archive, read all the sources it contained, picked them apart into 
shorter snippets, and filed these under general headings, “understandings of war,” 
“knowing war,” “civilization,” “European modernity.”  
At that point, however, the snippets I had collected refused to be formed into an 
integrated whole – and the work process I had established through the previous 
chapter ground to a halt. I pushed on regardless, ending up with a first draft of the 
chapter that consisted of nothing but fragments and contained not a single working 
hypothesis. I told myself that I would revise it later. It was only when a conference 
paper forced me to think about the methodological side of my project that I realized 
that, perhaps, what I had done to the practice of formulating working hypotheses was 
applicable to other knowledge practices; that, in fact, the chapter on the Balkan 
Commission had suggested at least two other knowledge practices for further scrutiny; 
and that, therefore, it might actually be feasible to leave the next chapter, the one you 
have just read, in the form which it had accidentally taken. 
As with practices of thinking, practices of writing are political, too. “The orthodoxies 
of our social and political worlds,” Shapiro argues, “are recreated in the process of 
writing […]. And no form of writing is exempt: analysis itself is a textual practice that 
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is intimately related to the political practices it aims to disclose.”1 Thus, it is our 
scholarly practices of writing, “from what one chooses to reveal about oneself as a 
researcher to word choice to the construction of a logical argument,” as Yanow puts it, 
that “create the social reality one is writing about.”2 And as with practices of thinking, 
practices of writing are also political in more than just one way. For one, they are 
political insofar as they help constitute – and discipline – our scholarly selves, the most 
readily available example being controversies over the use of the pronoun “I” in our 
academic texts.3 But as the analysis of the Balkan Commission’s practice of writing a 
report has suggested, there is more to this: our practices of writing help produce us in 
relation to the objects and the subjects we are studying. It is for this reason that Swati 
Parashar asks not only “who is inside the war and who is outside,” but also “who is 
writing about the war and how.”4  
If we want our texts to be compelling, our practices of writing have to meet certain 
expectations, and these expectations place limits on how we can write, including on 
how we can write about war and its violences. Consider, for instance, the expectation 
of logical cumulation and subsumption. As Yanow describes it, this expectation 
recognizes rigor in “the crafting of a sound argument, in which observations build 
upon observations, sentences upon sentences, paragraphs and sections upon 
themselves, until the logic of the whole compels reason to say, Ah, yes, this makes sense 
as an explanation!”5 As this expectation calls for a practice of writing that ties up (i.e. 
makes fit or else cuts) all loose ends so to provide the text with an overarching 
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narrative, how does it shape whose voices and stories we integrate into our texts, and 
whose we exclude?6 Or consider the expectation that to be convincing, texts ought to 
tell us something new, yet not pose too much of a challenge to what we think we know 
already. As Crenzel shows for the final report of the Argentinian truth commission, 
the report’s “narrative strategy” – which included the reproduction of survivors’ 
testimonies – “impacted on the boundaries of the narrative itself,” as the commission 
“excluded some episodes because of their extreme cruelty, fearing that this might 
undermine the credibility of the report.”7  
How do our practices of writing distance us from that which we are writing about? 
Contemplating this question, Raoul Hilberg contrasts three different practices of 
writing about the Holocaust.8 There was the purely documentary approach taken by 
the research staff at Yad Vashem during the early 1950s, who believed “that there 
should be no analytical writing about the Holocaust.”9 Then, there was the approach 
of reportage, whose “authors […] espouse actuality, but that is not to say that they 
have replicated it.”10 Finally, there was academic and literary writing about the 
Holocaust, about which Hilberg asks: “How much more removed from the actuality 
of reportage are those works whose authors have introduced a theory or theme or just 
a visible thought to which the evidence has been subordinated?”11 For Hilberg, there 
is no way in which historians could write about the Holocaust that would not distance 
them from the reality they are writing about. Citing Adorno’s famous dictum on the 
barbarity of writing poetry after the Holocaust, Hilberg therefore wonders “that if the 
statement is true, then is it not equally barbaric to write footnotes after Auschwitz?”12  
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Yet as Hilberg also notes, our practices of writing, the rules they follow, and the 
expectations they strive to meet evolve over time. If we find fault with how our 
practices of writing produce our analytical objects as well as ourselves and others as 
knowledgeable subjects, we can try to do better. By the time I was pondering this issue, 
about a year before the final submission date, my thesis had in some respects already 
reached a point of no return. It was no longer feasible, for instance, to find a way of 
including the voices of non-elitist actors in the project: the history of the problem of 
war I was writing would be a history of how this problem had been understood and 
produced by well-off, highly educated, mostly liberally minded and predominantly 
white and Western men. And because I was writing about how others had written 
about war, there was not much of a chance to include more “purely documentary” 
elements into the text. But what I could still experiment with – and in fact had, 
unwittingly, already experimented with – was the way in which I wrote (or put 
together) chapters. In this regard, I hope that having rendered more visible this 
crafting of a chapter gives an idea of how fragmented and messy the sources, the 
writing, and my own position and capability as the chapter’s author have been – and 
that, in turn, this may help to dispel any notion that I could have stood outside the 
history I was writing to de-scribe it as it really happened. 
In fact, as Law notes, academic texts usually “hasten to describe, to refer to, a reality 
that lies outside them.”13 Law therefore wonders how we might write differently so to 
question “the referent, the out-thereness.”14 Because my efforts at changing my 
practices of writing ultimately remained so limited, I want to conclude this reflection 
with the example of a literary text that achieves a much farther-reaching change of 
practice.15 In Am Beispiel meines Bruders, Uwe Timm tries to find out and grapple with 
what his brother Karl-Heinz, who voluntarily joined the Waffen-SS and was killed in 
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action on the Second World War’s eastern front in 1943, did or did not do during the 
war.16 Timm relies on handed down family stories about his brother, on scholarly 
accounts of the war, but most crucially on his brother’s war diary and letters to their 
parents. There is one entry, Timm says, at which his previous attempts at reading the 
brother’s diary stopped. About an advance across a bridge, his brother writes: “75m 
raucht Iwan Zigaretten, ein Fressen für mein MG.”17 In this moment of having a cigarette, 
Timm wonders, what was this soldier thinking? What was his brother thinking about 
this soldier, and about the other soldiers and the civilians he encountered? What, had 
he survived the war, would his brother think about his younger self today? And what, 
though this last question is never posed explicitly, would Timm have done had he 
been old enough to join the army? Ultimately, Timm finds no answers. The sources are 
too fragmentary, they “betray neither the offender by conviction nor nascent 
resistance,” but only the terrifying normalcy of war.18 Yet nonetheless, or perhaps 
precisely therefore, writing about his brother has changed Timm: to “approach him in 
writing is the attempt […] to find oneself anew.”19 
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Looking beyond “Tokyoberg”: War as crime at the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, ca. 1946-48 
 
Today, the International Military Tribunals (IMTs) at Nuremberg and Tokyo are one 
of the prime symbols of international law’s power vis-à-vis war. Never without giving 
a requisite nod to the differences between the “victor’s justice” of the IMTs and the 
UN-sponsored justice delivered by the international criminal trials of the 1990s and 
2000s1, scholarship across different fields of inquiry takes the proceedings in 
Nuremberg and Tokyo both as key historical antecedents of contemporary tribunals 
and as testament to the timeless value of international criminal trials for achieving 
justice and peace in the aftermath of large-scale collective violence.2 In transitional 
justice research, for instance, the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals are invoked as a 
“first phase” in the history of transitional justice and, simultaneously, as a “symbol” 
of transitional justice’s promise to provide accountability, redress, and reconciliation 
to post-conflict societies.3 To scholars of international law, the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
trials, as legal precedents and as symbolic validation, serve to substantiate arguments 
promoting international criminal trials as instruments for the abolition of war and the 
eventual constitution of “a world community under law.”4 In IR, finally, the 
proceedings in Nuremberg and Tokyo appear as a case of ideational or normative 
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change, taking on a double role in disciplinary narratives of progress: as explananda, 
the trials are “the culmination of the best tendencies of the earlier [international] 
order,” whereas as explanantia, they are also credited with “[ushering] in a new and 
progressive world order.”5 It is to refer to this widespread analytical “legacy”6 of the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals – to their assumed significance as at once factual 
origin of contemporary international legal institutions and emblematic symbol of the 
value of these institutions for the progress of a common humanity – that Christopher 
Gevers has coined the term “Tokyoberg.”7 
My aim in this chapter is to look beyond “Tokyoberg.” This endeavour has two sides 
to it. On the one hand, I take the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals not as origins or as 
symbols, but as examples within the wider genealogy of the problematization of war 
in international politics which my thesis advances. As the previous chapter has 
discussed, plans for criminalizing war had been formulated before, yet the IMTs 
marked the first time that war received a fully-fledged treatment as an international 
crime for which individuals were indicted, tried, and punished by international 
tribunals.8 Therefore, one of my purposes in this chapter is to look at how this 
criminalization implied war as an epistemic object and actionable problem. On the 
other hand, after the previous chapters’ experimentation with practices of thinking 
and of writing, I use this chapter to explore practices of looking. Specifically, I try out 
a different vantage point and field of view: instead of looking at the relevant archive 
in its entirety or concentrating on its most central contents, I focus on a small number 
																																																						
5 Latha Varadarajan, “The trials of imperialism: Radhabinod Pal’s dissent at the Tokyo tribunal,” 
European Journal of International Relations 21, no. 4 (2015), 793-815, at 801. For an example of this 
interpretation of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, cf. Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human 
Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2011), at 5. 
6 Affirmatively, Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” 70. Critically, Futamura, “War Crimes 
Tribunals,” 7; Varadarajan, “The trials of imperialism,” 802. 
7 Christopher Gevers, “International criminal law and individualism: An African perspective,” in 
Christina Schwöbel (ed.), Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law: An Introduction (Abingdon, 
UK: Routledge, 2014), 221-245, at 225. 
8 “You can hold conferences on all of this, make treaties about it,” wrote Bert Röling, the Dutch judge 
on the bench in Tokyo, in his retrospective reflections on the trial, “but I think the fact that trials have 
taken place means perhaps more” (Antonio Cassese, Bernhard V. A. Röling, The Tokyo Trial and beyond: 
Reflections of a peacemonger (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1993), at 90).  
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of texts which are located at the outer edges of the body of primary sources and which 
were written by authors bringing markedly different perspectives to bear on the 
Pacific War. Taken together, the chapter’s discussion of the criminalization of war at 
the Tokyo tribunal and its experimentation with practices of looking seek to challenge 
the assumption of a unitary subject observing, knowing, and problematizing a unitary 
object.  
Before venturing any further, I want to explain my delimitation of this final 
genealogical example, my use of primary sources, and my rationale for the exploration 
of practices of looking. As for the empirical scope of my analysis, my focus is on the 
notion of aggressive war as a crime against peace. The offenses tried at the IMTs in 
Nuremberg and Tokyo were not limited to aggressive war, but also included war-time 
atrocities and genocide – and the charges designed to cover these two other kinds of 
crimes constituted new developments within international law, too. While the charge 
of war crimes, a category previously applied only to war-time violence against civilians, 
was extended in scope to also encompass undue violence against enemy combatants, 
the charge of crimes against humanity was created to establish the criminal 
responsibility of senior leaders of the Nazi regime for the Holocaust.9 Since the focus 
of my inquiry is on the problematization of war, I take up these other kinds of violent 
crimes and the charges corresponding to them only insofar as they relate to the 
criminalization of war by means of the charge of crimes against peace.  
As regards sources, the total number of relevant primary sources on the post-Second 
World War criminalization of war is difficult to estimate, yet the full extent of this 
archive is undoubtedly insurmountable for any individual research project.10 
																																																						
9 Cf. Donald Bloxham, Genocide on Trial: War Crimes Trials and the Formation of Holocaust History and 
Memory (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001), ch. 1. 
10 The Donovan Nuremberg Trials collection at Cornell University alone contains 150 bound volumes 
relating to the Nuremberg trial, amongst which 42 printed volumes plus approximately 4,000 further 
documents comprise the trial proceedings (cf. Daniel Smith, “The Legacy of Nuremberg: Sustaining 
Human Rights,” Cornell Law Forum 25, no. 3 (1999)). Meanwhile, the transcripts of the proceedings, 
judgment, and dissents in Tokyo comprise almost 50,000 pages (cf. Varadarajan, “The trials of 
imperialism,” 797). This does not yet take into account primary sources on the Allied planning for the 
trials, which span several years, countries, and archives.  
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Moreover, the relevant historiographical literature is hardly less extensive, and a 
notable strand within this secondary literature has already differentiated the 
aforementioned general critique of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials as “victor’s 
justice” into more specific and empirically founded points of criticism.11 All in all, it 
would have scarcely been possible to take either a fully comprehensive or a truly fresh 
look at the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. It was initially in response to this 
challenge that I decided to focus on a particular bundle of primary sources: the dissents 
which the judges Henri Bernard from France, Bert Röling from the Netherlands, and 
Radhabinod Pal from India issued against the majority judgment of the Tokyo 
Tribunal.12  
The three dissenting judges were jurists of varying legal backgrounds, convictions, 
and agendas. Bernard had previously been a colonial magistrate in the French West 
Africa.13 With no particular expertise in international law or East Asia and with English 
language skills insufficient for actually following the proceedings, he was appointed 
to the IMTFE, it has been suggested, in order to avert investigations into France’s 
cleansing policy in its imperial dominions in Indochina. 14 Röling was a professor of 
criminology and a judge in the court of Utrecht with similarly little specific expertise 
in international law.15 Whatever the Dutch government’s motivation for appointing 
him – he himself thought that it was sheer “chance”16 – Röling ended up issuing his 
dissent against the explicit instructions of his government. Pal, finally, had previously 
																																																						
11 Cf. Bloxham, Genocide on Trial, 4.  
12 To be precise, Bernard issued a “Dissenting Judgment,” Röling a “Separate Opinion,” and Pal a 
“Dissenting Opinion.” Two further separate opinions were issued by Justices William Webb from 
Australia and Delfin Jaranilla from the Philippines. Because they do not touch upon the 
criminalization of war as such, I did not include them in the scope of this chapter.  
13 During his tenure, Bernard reportedly “once got into trouble […] for supporting indigenous rights 
against white settlers,” and he later left his post temporarily to join the French Resistance (Mickael Ho 
Foui Sang, “Justice Bernard (France),” in Yuki Tanaka, Timothy L. H. McCormack, Gerry Simpson 
(eds.), Beyond Victor’s Justice? The Tokyo War Crimes Trial Revisited (Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2011), 93-102, at 94).  
14 Cf. Casesse, Röling, The Tokyo Trial, 30; Sang, “Justice Bernard,” 96. 
15 Cf. Robert Cryer, “Röling in Tokyo: A Dignified Dissenter,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 8, 
no. 4 (2010), 1109-1126. 
16 Casesse, Röling, The Tokyo Trial, 19. 
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been a judge at the Calcutta High Court.17 His dissent has sometimes been made sense 
of in the context of India’s political situation at the time: as Varadarajan points out, 
while India “had not borne the brunt of Japanese occupation during the war,” it was 
“in the midst of an ongoing struggle for independence” from British colonial rule.18 
Finally, the judges also had different reasons for their dissents: while Bernard and 
Röling wanted to lodge protest against specific aspects of the proceedings in Tokyo, 
Pal’s dissent found all of the accused not guilty and amounted to a tout court rejection 
of the trial’s conduct and outcome.19 
The ways in which Bernard’s, Röling’s and Pal’s dissents are marginal within the body 
of primary sources are illuminating to consider. On the one hand, these texts were 
marginal at the time of their issuance: they were not read out in court, and their authors 
did not participate in the deliberations that led to the formulation of the majority 
judgment.20 On the other hand, Bernard’s, Röling’s, and Pal’s dissents are accorded a 
comparatively marginal status in the secondary literature, including in recently 
emergent research focusing specifically on the Tokyo tribunal.21 What are the reasons 
for this paucity of inquiry? For one, there have been difficulties of access: the 
dissenting judges’ opinions were not formally part of the Tokyo tribunal’s jurisdiction 
and were only published by a Western university press several decades later.22 
																																																						
17 Varadarajan, “The trials of imperialism.” On Pal’s academic background and political stance, cf. 
Elizabeth S. Kopelman, “Ideology and International Law: The Dissent of the Indian Justice at the 
Tokyo War Crimes Trial,” New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 23, no. 3 (1991), 
373-444; Adil Hasen Khan, “International lawyers in the aftermath of disasters: Inheriting from 
Radhabinod Pal and Upendra Baxi,” Third World Quarterly 37, no. 11 (2016), 2061-2079. 
18 Varadarajan, “The trials of imperialism,” 795. 
19 Ibid., 794; cf. Bert V. A. Röling , “Opinion of Mr. Justice Röling, member for the Netherlands,” in B. 
V. A. Röling, C. F. Rüter (eds.), The Tokyo Judgment: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(I.M.T.F.E.), 29 April 1946-12 November 1948, Vol. II (Amsterdam, the Netherlands: APA University 
Press Amsterdam, 1977), 1041-1143, at 1045, 1065. 
20 Cf. Cryer, “Röling in Tokyo.” 
21 Varadarajan’s critique on this point seems fair (Varadarajan, “The trials of imperialism,” 794). A 
notable exception is Tanata, McCormack, and Simpson’s edited volume Beyond “Victor’s Justice?,” 
which not only devotes individual chapters to the three dissenting judges, but also offers a 
consideration of Pal’s judgment as part of a history of the historiography on the Tokyo tribunal 
(Simpson, “Writing the Toyko Trial”). 
22 Cf. Gevers, “ICL and individualism”; Simpson, “Writing the Tokyo Trial.” Pal first published his 
dissent in 1952 with University of Calcutta Press. In 1977, it was reissued in the two-tome edition of 
the majority judgment and dissents edited by Röling and Rüter (Radhabinod Pal, “Judgment of Mr. 
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Another reason for the secondary literature’s hesitation to engage the dissents is that 
in hindsight, these opinions – particularly Pal’s – appear to have exerted “a strong 
influence on Japanese nationalism” and are therefore seen as politically tainted.23 A 
third reason might be found in the context of how recent scholarship has more 
generally analyzed the Tokyo tribunal, namely in “an effort to rehabilitate the tribunal 
as an intrinsic part of the Nuremberg legacy.”24 Arguably, then, the three dissents 
issued in Toyko have been ignored not only because of their historiographical and 
political untowardness, but also because taking them into account could interrupt 
“Tokyoberg” as the dominant narrative about the significance of the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo trials for IR, transitional justice research, and international legal scholarship. 
Thus, this source criticism brings me back to the core analytical aim of this chapter: to 
understand the post-Second World War criminalization of war, against disciplinary 
legacies of “Tokyoberg,” as an example within the genealogy of the problematization 
of war in international politics. By looking at this example from the margins, my aim 
is not only to once more experiment with standard scholarly practices, but also to 
disturb disciplinary legacies of the IMTs as origins and symbols of the power of law 
over war in international politics. To this end, the analysis to follow is structured into 
three main sections. In the first section, I take international criminality to constitute a 
form given to a problem, and I probe this form by analyzing different approaches to 
																																																						
Justice Pal, member from India,” in B. V. A. Röling, C. F. Rüter (eds.), The Tokyo Judgment: The 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (I.M.T.F.E.), 29 April 1946-12 November 1948, Vol. II 
(Amsterdam, the Netherlands: APA University Press Amsterdam, 1977), 517-1040). It is on this 1977 
edition that I rely in this chapter. 
23 Sang, “Justice Bernard,” 94; cf. Varadaraja, “Trials of imperialism,” 795. Scholars who have 
nonetheless inquired into the three dissents have often taken either an exculpatory or an outright 
hagiographic stance towards their authors. Sang laude’s Bernard’s “qualities as a judge” and his 
“independent and engaged character,” Cryer designates Röling a “dignified dissenter,” and Khan 
puts forth Pal as a role model for international lawyers. (Sang, “Justice Bernard,” 93; Cryer, “Röling in 
Toyko,” 1109; Khan, “International lawyers”). Generally, I agree with Nakajima Takeshi that the 
instrumentalization of the dissents by right-wing nationalists should motivate the continued critical 
study of these sources rather than their analytical neglect (Nakajima Takeshi, “The Tokyo Tribunal, 
Justice Pal and the Revisionist Distortion of History,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 44, no. 3, 2011), 1-20, at 
16). Moreover, my concern in this chapter is not with character studies of individual judges, but with 
what their dissents tell us about their – and our – imaginaries of the role of international criminal 
tribunals in the problematization of war. 
24 Varadarajan, “Trials of imperialism,” 794. 
 
	 246 
criminalization and their inherent assumptions about the state of the international and 
the possibilities of progress. Thereafter, the chapter’s second section inquires into 
controversies surrounding the Tokyo tribunal’s ways of inference. I use this inquiry to 
reflect on knowledge practices, legal ways of knowing, and the figure of the judge as 
a specifically capable subject of knowledge; and I also ponder the question of 
knowledge’s politicality. Finally, the third section looks at formulations of the problem 
of war – including, but not limited to formulations implied in the Tokyo tribunal’s 
approaches to criminalization and legal ways of knowing.  
  
Approaches to criminalization and conceptions of the international 
When proceedings before the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg 
commenced in November 1945, the defendants – all of them leading Nazi officials – 
were accused of “the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to 
commit […] crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity.”25 In the 
indictment, the waging of a war of aggression, grasped through the newly coined legal 
concept of crimes against peace, was the central charge around which the three other 
charges were structured. Its position as the superordinate crime under which war 
crimes and crimes against humanity were subsumed implied that the criminal 
responsibility of the accused for war-time atrocities and for the Holocaust was to be 
judged only insofar as these had contributed to the waging of aggressive war.26 
Furthermore, when combined with the charge of conspiracy, the reach of the crime 
against peace was extended so that the defendants could be tried not only for active 
participation in the commission of this crime, but also for participation in its 
																																																						
25 Cited in Bloxham, Genocide on Trial, 17f.  
26 Cf. Simpson, Law, War, and Crime, 132f. For a critical examination of the consequences of making 
crimes against humanity an “accessory” of crimes against peace, cf. Lawrence Douglas, The Memory of 
Judgment: Making Law and History in the Trials of the Holocaust (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2001), at 55ff. 
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planning.27 The judgment of the IMT confirmed this four-count structure, as did the 
indictment28 and the majority judgment of the IMTFE in Tokyo.29  
As scholars of legal history have pointed out, the central legal concepts employed by 
the IMTs in Nuremberg and Tokyo were the outcome of the frequently coincidental 
process in which plans for the post-war situation were developed.30 In particular, the 
Allied powers had originally not envisioned that aggressive war itself could be a 
crime, and when they did decide to render it so, they initially intended for the crime 
against peace to be an ad hoc charge tried and judged only in Nuremberg.31 When the 
Tokyo trial later employed the concept of the crime against peace and the structure of 
charges associated with it, this became a cause for controversy among the judges. 
Judge Pal, for instance, argued: 
“Law, no doubt, ends by being what it is made to be by the body which applies it to 
concrete situations: Yet the body called upon to apply it should not force it to be what 
it is not, even at the risk of missing the most attractive opportunity for contributing 
towards the development of a temptingly significant concept of international law, - I 
mean ‘the legal concept of the crime against peace.’”32 
Pal, that is, contested criminalization as a solution to the problem of war in 
international politics. 
																																																						
27 On the controversy surrounding the temporal and spatial definition of these crimes, cf. Bloxham, 
Genocide on Trial, 17f.  
28 However, in Tokyo these four kinds of crimes were structured not into four counts, but into 55 
counts summarized into three groups (cf. Futamura, War Crimes Tribunals, 64). 
29 Cf. Kirsten Sellars, ‘Crimes Against Peace’ and International Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), at ix; Yuma Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake 
of World War II (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), at 81. 
30 Cf. Segesser, Recht statt Rache, ch. 5; Sellars, ‘Crimes Against Peace’; Simpson, Law, War, and Crime, 
143f. 
31 Cf. Sellars, ‘Crimes Against Peace’, 101f.; Totani, Tokyo War Crimes Trial, 21. Another interesting 
example of an unforeseen and unintended result of this convoluted process is the concept of criminal 
conspiracy: derived from US-American anti-trust law, the concept was originally introduced into the 
trial planning “to stretch available notions of criminality in order juridically to reach Nazi atrocities 
against the Jews,” yet ended up having precisely the opposite effect (Douglas, Memory of Judgment, 55; 
cf. Sellars, ‘Crimes Against Peace’, 68). 
32 Pal, “Judgment,” 577. 
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Taking these observations as my analytical point of departure, in this section I explore 
different approaches to the criminalization of war. To paraphrase Pal, I am studying 
how international law and criminalization were made, at the Tokyo tribunal, into 
means for problematizing war. After providing a brief explication of the approach to 
the criminalization of war taken by the majority judgment in Tokyo, I reconstruct the 
alternative approaches to the criminalization of war proposed by Bernard, Röling, and 
Pal. Moreover, since the purposes of criminalization depend on the social setting in 
which it is employed, I also examine these different approaches’ presuppositions 
regarding the nature of the international and the possibility of international progress 
towards peace.  
The IMTs in Nuremberg and Tokyo criminalized aggressive war through a 
combination of approaches. Legal theory at the time knew different kinds of crimes, 
including crimes against the person, crimes against property, crimes against the public 
peace, participatory or inchoate crimes (i.e. actions that contribute to the commission 
of another crime), statutory crimes (for instance, breaches of contract), and the crime 
of conspiracy.33 In Tokyo, aggressive war was criminalized as a combination of these 
kinds of crimes. It was deemed criminal insofar as it constituted a first act of attack on 
another country, insofar as it was a trigger for other crimes, insofar as it was the object 
of a criminal conspiracy, and insofar as it violated international treaties – most 
importantly, the 1928 General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, more commonly 
known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact.34  
																																																						
33 For a contemporary example, cf. William L. Burdick, The Law of Crime (Albany, NY: M. Bender&Co., 
1946). For a discussion of the history of these kinds of crimes, cf. Nicola Lacey, “In Search of the 
Responsible Subject.” 
34 Cf. Sellars, ‘Crimes Against Peace’, 103f.; Totani, Tokyo War Crimes Trial, 86. A further approach to 
criminalization undertaken in Tokyo was that of “negative criminality” – criminalizing the omission 
to prevent a criminal action when one would have been in a position to do so, for instance as a 
member of government. This notion of negative criminality was not applied to the crime against 
peace, but only – in Count 55 of the Indictment in Tokyo – to war crimes (cf. ibid.,103). 
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Exemplifying these various understandings of criminality, the definition of aggression 
offered by Joseph Keenan, the US Chief Prosecutor in Tokyo, held aggression to consist 
in a 
“first or unprovoked attack, or act of hostility; the first act of injury or first act leading 
to a war or controversy; an assault; also, the practice of attack or encroachment.  
A nation that refuses to arbitrate or accept an arbitration award, or any other peaceful 
method, in the settlement of a dispute but threatens to use force or resort to war.”35  
On this definitional basis, the prosecution in Tokyo charged the accused with a whole 
list of individual incidents of aggression going back to the 1931 Mukhden Incident.36 
The defense challenged these charges of aggression by arguing that Japan had waged 
a war in self-defense.37 Yet the majority of the judges in Tokyo rejected the defense’s 
argument, maintaining that “the right of self-defense does not confer upon the State 
resorting to war the authority to make a final determination upon the justification for 
its action.”38 
The IMTs’ criminalization of war (re-) produced, yet also challenged existing 
conceptions of state sovereignty and of the international. In some of its aspects, the 
criminalization of war by the post-Second World War IMTs consciously eschewed 
interfering with sovereignty as a key principle of international law. For instance, what 
Douglas has called the “piggyback[ing]” of crimes against humanity onto crimes 
against peace was, inter alia, conceived to enable the trial of the domestic crime of the 
Holocaust before an international court whilst leaving intact the more general 
principle of states’ unchecked sovereignty over their internal affairs. 39 In other aspects, 
the way in which war was criminalized in the IMTs actively bolstered the principle of 
sovereignty. For example, making aggressive war into a statutory crime insofar as it 
																																																						
35 Quoted in Kopelman, “Ideology and International Law,” 393. 
36 Cf. Totani, Tokyo War Crimes Trial, 90ff. 
37 Cf. ibid., 97. 
38 Quoted in Kopelman, “Ideology and International Law,” 393f.; cf. Totani, Tokyo War Crimes Trial, 90. 
For a discussion of the majority’s findings with regard to the various individual charges of aggression, 
cf. ibid., ch. 4. 
39 Douglas, Memory of Judgment, 52. 
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was a breach of an inter-state contract reaffirmed sovereign states’ exclusive rights 
within the international.40 However, the criminalization of aggressive war in 
Nuremberg and Tokyo also contained challenges to traditional notions of state 
sovereignty. Such notions were put into question by the IMTs’ attribution of criminal 
responsibility for aggressive war to individuals instead of to states – a “radical 
premise” and a “significant departure from previous practice,” as Sellars points out41 
– as well as by the majority’s argument that the authority for determining the 
legitimacy of a claim to self-defense lay not with the state making that claim.42 In sum, 
however, the challenges to sovereignty implied in the post-Second World War 
criminalization of aggressive war are comparatively minor ones: The Allied powers’, 
and in particular the United States’ overall purpose in criminalizing war was not to 
overhaul basic principles of the international order, but to maintain this order and to 
assert their place within it.43  
To varying extents and for varying reasons, Bernard, Röling, and Pal disagreed with 
the majority’s approach to the criminalization of aggressive war and with its implied 
understandings of criminality and the international. For Bernard, aggressive war was 
not criminalizable through human action, “as a result either of custom, social 
convention, treaties or agreements,”44 but was timelessly criminal: “such a war is and 
always has been a crime in the eyes of reason and universal conscience.”45 Taking a 
natural law perspective, Bernard argued that neither the Kellogg-Briand Pact nor the 
charter of the Tokyo tribunal made aggressive war a crime; rather, these documents 
																																																						
40 Cf. Sellars, ‘Crimes Against Peace,’ 108 
41 Sellars, ‘Crimes Against Peace,’ 85; cf. Bloxham, Genocide on Trial, 20f. 
42 Cf. Kopelman, “Ideology and International Law,” 393f. 
43 Cf. ibid.; Sellars, ‘Crimes Against Peace.’ In the words of Robert Jackson, the Chief Prosecutor at 
Nuremberg, the way in which aggressive war was criminalized in Nuremberg and Tokyo implied that 
“whatever grievances a nation may have, however objectionable it finds the status quo [of the 
international order], aggressive warfare is an illegal means for settling those grievances or for altering 
those conditions” (Jackson quoted in Sellars, ‘Crimes Against Peace,’ 118f.).  
44 Henri Bernard, “Dissenting Judgment of the member from France,” in B. V. A. Röling, C. F. Rüter 
(eds.), The Tokyo Judgment: The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (I.M.T.F.E.), 29 April 1946-
12 November 1948, Vol. I (Amsterdam, the Netherlands: APA University Press Amsterdam, 1977), 481-
496, at 493; cf. Sang, “Justice Bernard,” 96f.) 
45 Bernard, “Dissenting Judgment,” 490.  
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were “evidence” of a natural law existing independently of human volition or 
agency.46 The assumption that aggressive war was criminal under natural law led 
Bernard to reject the defense’s argument that the Tokyo trial was violating “the 
principle of the non-retroactivity of laws” – if aggressive war had always been a crime, 
then the defense’s appeal to the rule of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege was 
meaningless.47 Yet it also made him take an indifferent stance as to the majority’s 
various moves to criminalize aggressive war.48  
As for the international, Bernard understood it not as a separate social sphere 
constituted of relations between nation-states, but as a universal realm “shared by all 
individuals and all nations.”49 This universal realm was regulated by a natural law 
“[existing] outside and above nations,” which meant that aggressive war was not an 
international, but a “natural” and “universal” crime. On the basis of this assumption, 
Bernard then argued that individual and collective criminal responsibility for the 
crime of aggressive war did not cancel each other out, but added to each other, and he 
therefore resolved to concur with the majority judgment’s conviction of the 
individuals accused of the crime of aggressive war.50  
Röling agreed with Bernard that the Kellogg-Briand Pact had not made aggressive war 
“criminal in the ordinary sense.”51 Yet finding that war was “only a crime in statu 
nascendi,”52 Röling was not convinced by Bernard’s argument that aggressive war was 
timelessly and universally criminal. Instead, he sought to further criminalize war by 
conceptual exegesis. Noting that “the word ‘crime’ in international law, as in domestic 
																																																						
46 Ibid., 489; cf. Sang, “Justice Bernard,” 98. Douglas suggests that the prosecution in Nuremberg and 
Tokyo sometimes steered into the direction of a natural law approach, too (Douglas, Memory of 
Judgment, 83f.). 
47 Bernard, “Dissenting Judgment,” 490.  
48 Already during the preparation for the IMT in Nuremberg, the French had taken a very different 
view of how to criminalize war – one which criminalized the war itself in consequence of the 
criminality of the Holocaust as well as war crimes (cf. Sellars, ‘Crimes Against Peace,’ 91ff., 131).  
49 Bernard, “Dissenting Judgment,” 494.  
50 Ibid., 490; cf. Sang, “Justice Bernard,” 98. 
51 Röling, “Opinion,” 1055.  
52 Cassese, Röling, The Tokyo Trial, 65. 
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law, may indicate concepts of quite different nature,”53 Röling found the available 
conceptualizations of the crime against peace wanting and argued that for the Tokyo 
trial to be able to try and judge the crime of aggressive war, it needed to conceptualize 
this crime differently. To this end, his suggestion was to render war criminal in a way  
“comparable to political crimes in domestic law, where the decisive element is the 
danger rather than the guilt, where the criminal is considered an enemy rather than a 
villain and where the punishment emphasizes the political measure rather than the 
judicial retribution.”54  
Drawing on this idea of domestic political crimes as well as on older conceptions of 
criminal responsibility as founded in an individual’s nature55, Röling reasoned that 
aggressive war could be made an international crime insofar as its authors were of a 
“dangerous character” and therefore constituted a threat to the security of the 
international community.56 In the post-war situation with which Röling and his 
colleagues were dealing, the victors of the preceding war were in charge of protecting 
international society against this threat: as “powers victorious in a ‘bellum justum,’” 
they were “responsible for peace and order thereafter.”57 In this situation, 
criminalization could be a legitimate and viable instrument for the problematization 
of war not in spite of its inevitable political aspect, but precisely because of it. Here, 
Röling was perhaps intentionally imprecise: reasoning that “the judicial way” of 
achieving international security both extended and exceeded “[m]ere political action,” 
his dissent left the relationship between law and politics ambiguous58, and this 
vagueness in turn allowed him to mostly agree with the judgment which resulted from 
the majority’s combinatory approach to criminalization. 
																																																						
53 Röling, “Opinion,” 1048; cf. Casesse, Röling, The Tokyo Trial, 66f. 
54 Röling, “Opinion,” 1060; cf. Richard H. Minear, Victor’s Justice: The Toyko War Crimes Trial (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), at 53f.  
55 Cf. Lacey, “In Search of the Responsible Subject,” 357. 
56 Röling, “Opinion,” 1060. 
57 Ibid., 1059; cf. Cassese, Röling, The Tokyo Trial, 65. 
58 Röling, “Opinion,” 1060. It was only in his later interviews with Antonio Cassese that Röling 
showed concern about the political element of the trial (Cassese, Röling, The Tokyo Trial, 65; cf. 70, 81).  
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In Röling’s approach to the criminalization of aggressive war, the international 
featured as a problematically “underdeveloped” realm.59 Its most important defect 
was the principle of “unlimited sovereignty,” which came at the “price” of “an 
occasional war.”60 To ultimately overcome the problem of war, Röling maintained, “a 
community of nations must have developed which no longer tolerates violence 
between its members and in which war in a sense acquires the character of civil war.”61 
The Tokyo majority’s various approaches to the criminalization of war would only 
make sense once such a community of nations was achieved. Moreover, the 
international was also underdeveloped with regard to its conception of the 
individual.62 While Röling did not object to trying individuals for international crimes 
and before an international tribunal, he thought that there was no international 
equivalent to “the principle of [individual] liberty” as it existed in domestic contexts 
“to protect citizens against the power of governments.”63 Individuals, unlike states, 
were no fully-fledged agents of or rights-bearers within the international, which was 
therefore not home to an actual, but only to a potential “world community.”64 
This view of the international as an “underdeveloped” realm implied that its 
problematic aspects were improvable. On the one hand, although the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact had not actually restrained sovereignty, it seemed to Röling to have indicated “the 
willingness of the nations concerned to avoid war through peaceful resolution of 
conflicts” and their “preparedness to solve disputes even if that solution might entail 
the loss of historical rights.”65 Hence, the problem of war could be addressed by state 
actors willfully deciding to forego some of their long-established privileges. On the 
other hand, Röling also contended that the “dreadfulness” of war had the capacity to 
“compel the nations to take the legal steps to achieve the maintenance of peace.”66 
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64 Ibid., 69. 
65 Röling, “Opinion,” 1053. 
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War’s appalling nature, that is, contributed to its eventual overcoming. While I will 
explore this last point in more depth in this chapter’s final section, what I want to note 
here is Röling’s confidence in the principal improvability of the international. 
Disagreeing with the majority judgment and with Bernard’s and Röling’s dissents, Pal 
argued that “no category of war became a crime in international life up to the date of 
commencement of the world war under our consideration.”67 Pal attacked the majority 
judgment’s countervailing verdict relentlessly. First off, he disagreed that aggressive 
war was a crime under the Kellogg-Briand Pact: the pact did not specify a criterion for 
the determination of whether a particular war had been started in self-defense, in effect 
leaving the aggressiveness of war “unjusticiable.”68 More generally, while Pal agreed 
that a war undertaken “in violation of treaties, agreements or assurances” constituted 
“a breach of contract,” he argued that such breaches of contract did not necessarily 
constitute international crimes.69  
Pal also disagreed with the proposals for the criminalization of aggressive war brought 
forth by Bernard and Röling. To invalidate the natural law-argument that aggressive 
war had always already been a crime70, Pal distinguished between the theory and the 
practice of international law and denied the applicability of natural law arguments to 
the latter realm.71 Against Röling’s proposal for criminalizing aggressive war by means 
of re-conceptualization, Pal argued that this amounted to “an appeal to the political 
power of the victor nations with a pretense of legal justice,”72 a course of 
argumentation which was unbecoming for a judicial tribunal: “we cannot behave in 
any manner which may justify the feeling that the setting up of the tribunal was only 
																																																						
67 Pal, “Judgment,” 579; cf. Kopelman, “Ideology and International Law,” 410; Minear, Victor’s Justice, 
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for the attainment of an objective which was essentially political, though cloaked by a 
juridical appearance.”73 Thus, where Röling had left the relationship between politics 
and law conveniently ambiguous, Pal pointed out the in his view thinly veiled political 
nature of the Tokyo trial’s criminalization of war.74  
Unlike Bernard and Röling, Pal also did not follow the majority’s stance when it came 
to holding individuals legally accountable for the crime of aggressive war. For many 
of his contemporaries’ approaches to the criminalization of aggressive war, Pal argued, 
individual criminal responsibility was merely added as an afterthought.75 Yet he also 
objected to approaches to the criminalization of aggressive war in which individual 
criminal responsibility was put up front. Against a proposal which sought to 
criminalize aggressive war in analogy to international crimes for which individual 
criminal responsibility already existed, such as piracy, Pal demured that these two 
kinds of acts were not actually alike enough to allow for such an analogical 
conclusion.76 While “[t]he instances of [existing] criminal international law affecting 
individuals are all cases where the act in question is the act of the individual on his 
own behalf,” the act of aggressive war was of a different nature – it constituted “a 
particular kind of infringement upon the sphere of international relations” as a 
whole.77 On the more general question of the individual as a rights-bearer and an agent 
in the international, Pal agreed with Röling that “it is high time that international law 
should recognize the individual as its ultimate subject and maintenance of his rights 
as its ultimate end,” yet contended against Röling that “[t]his certainly is to be done 
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75 If aggressive war was to be criminalized through customary law, for instance, then this “custom to 
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76 Pal, “Judgment,” 601. 
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by a method very different from that of trial of war criminals from amongst the 
vanquished nations.”78 
A final reason for his rejection of the criminalization of war was Pal’s belief that the 
international “was not based on a footing which would justify the introduction of the 
conception of criminality.”79 Citing the work of Georg Schwarzenberger80, Pal argued 
that the international was not a community of nations founded upon the principle of 
solidarity and “united in spite of their individual existence,” but “at best” a society of 
nations founded upon the principle of self-help and “isolated in spite of their 
association.”81 The difference in organizing principles meant that law’s function in and 
for a community was fundamentally different from the role it played in a society. The 
law regulating relationships within a community, Pal held, “generally formalizes 
customary behaviour” and “finds its main justification in its application to abnormal 
situations,”82 in which it works to restrain and prevent “individualistic excess” 
through criminalization and punishment.83 By contrast, “the law regulating the 
relations between the members of a society […] is to prevent the Bellum omnium 
contra omnes, or to make limited co-operation possible between individuals.”84 
Societies were not “[bodies] of which the order or security could be said to have been 
provided by law,”85 and they were “inapt for the introduction of criminal 
punishment.”86 Therefore, so long as the international was a society and not a 
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community, it would be “premature”87 to introduce criminality into international 
law.88  
Unsurprisignly, Pal’s take on the meaning and potential of international progress was 
radically different from the notions of progress held by his colleagues. In the majority’s 
as well as in Röling’s understanding, the abolition of aggressive war by means of 
criminalization was assumed to contribute to progress towards a peaceful 
international.89 Yet Pal dismissed both the object of peace and the instrument  of 
criminalization which these notions of international progress presumed. In general, 
Pal was uncertain about the ultimate attainability of peace within international society 
and wondered “if it is possible to create ‘peace’ once and for all, and if there can be a 
status quo which is eternal.”90 Beyond such abstract questions, Pal also found that “in 
the present state of international relations […] a static idea of peace is absolutely 
untenable.”91 The international as it was presently constituted was an hierarchical, 
unequal, and violent association of states. There were “still dominated and enslaved 
nations,”92 and worse still, the “domination of one nation by another continued to be 
regarded by the so-called international community only as a domestic question for the 
master nation.”93 So long as this “servitude of nations still prevailed unreviled,”94 Pal 
argued, the criminalization of war would not constitute peaceful progress, but would 
further the maintenance of the violent status quo. Indeed, in an international which 
achieved peace through the criminalization of aggressive war, “[p]eace […] is only a 
negative concept – it is simply a negation of war, or an assurance of the status quo.”95 
By contrast, true international progress, in Pal’s vision, would require a far more 
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radical change of the status quo and the replacement of the international society with 
an international community. 
To summarize, exploring criminalization as a way of problematizing war, this section 
has found various contested notions of criminality and approaches to criminalization. 
The majority judgment criminalized aggressive war on the argument that it was an 
attack on another country, violated international treaties, acted as a catalyst for other 
crimes, and constituted the object of a criminal conspiracy. Bernard and Röling 
disagreed with this combinatory approach to criminalization, yet found other ways to 
arrive at the conclusion that aggressive war was a crime: whereas Bernard stipulated 
aggressive war to be timelessly and universally criminal, Röling thought that 
aggressive war should be rendered into an international crime akin to domestic 
political crimes. Pal, finally, rejected the majority’s as well as Bernard’s and Röling’s 
proposals and argued vigorously against both the criminality and the criminalization 
of aggressive war. 
Crucially, these different approaches to the criminalization of aggressive war also 
encompassed divergent views of the international as the socio-political realm in which 
criminalization was to be effected. The dissenting judges disagreed with the majority 
judgement as well as among themselves about the international standing of 
individuals and about the nature of relations between states in the present moment. In 
addition, the primary sources also contain differing valuations of the present state of 
the international and, concurrently, of the necessity and meaning of international 
progress. In this context, the majority judgment can be read as an attempt to bolster 
the status quo of the international and as a vision of an “evolutionary” progress 
towards peace within the existing international order.96 This made the criminalization 
of aggressive war into a tool of progress. By contrast, Röling’s cautiously optimistic 
vision of how the problem of war could be overcome assumed that this would require 
altering some of the international’s basic principles, including the principle of state 
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sovereignty. On this view, the criminalization of aggressive war was not a means for 
effecting this change, but rather would become most effective as a tool against war 
once this change had been achieved. Pal, finally, advocated the most radical vision of 
international progress. Pointing to historically and presently existing international 
relations of domination and violence, his dissent exposed the status quo of the 
international as anything but peaceful and argued that the criminalization of war 
amounted to a tool not for, but against true international progress.  
Taken together, the analysis in this section suggests that as a tool for problematizing 
war, criminalization can be taken neither at face value nor for granted. For one, 
criminalization was not a purely legal tool. Underlying the different strategies for and 
against the criminalization of aggressive war were political motivations: while the 
majority judgment was eager to further the Allied powers’ place in the international 
order and apprehensive to specify and apply the charges in a way that would not put 
these powers at risk of having their own conduct of the war put on trial, Pal’s resolve 
to unmask how violence and inequality had been constitutive of the contemporary 
international order led him to reject treating as criminal any aspect of the Japanese 
conduct. Moreover, criminalization was not a readily and easily available tool for 
problematizing war. To the contrary, to render aggressive war into the crime against 
peace, the jurists gathered in Tokyo had to argue for and construct criminalization as 
a legal instrument. As a means for problematizing war, criminalization was not a 
given, but had to be produced, and this production was driven, on all sides of the 
debate, by political motifs.  
 
From evidence to ultimate facts: contested practices of inference and the 
political nature of knowledge 
Besides necessitating sustained argumentation, the criminalization of aggressive war 
also relied on and called for the production of empirical knowledge about war. 
Formally, the prosecution, defence, and judges in Tokyo were remarkably unfettered 
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in their knowledge-production procedures. Article 13 of the Tokyo Charter 
determined that “[t]he tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. It 
shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and non-technical 
procedure.”97 Yet in the actual conduct of the trial, the majority of its participants chose 
to rely on exactly the kind of technical rules to which they were not strictly bound. As 
Röling observed: “According to our Charter, technical rules of evidence would not 
apply. […] But the tendency was to apply ever more technical rules.”98 In this context, 
the three dissenting judges disputed not only some – or, in the case of Pal, all – of the 
“facts” about the war that the majority judgment produced, but also the practices and 
procedures through which the war was made first into an assortment of individual 
evidentiary facts and thereupon into a legally actionable factum probandum, the crime 
against peace. Bernard’s dissent straightforwardly called the tribunal’s procedures 
“defective,”99 to which Röling concurred: “I had not much difficulty, in theory, with 
our Statute […]. But in practice, I had many difficulties and misgivings.”100  
In this section, I attend to these contentions surrounding the epistemological aspects 
of the Tokyo tribunal. The first half of the section examines Bernard’s, Röling’s, and 
Pal’s objections to the kinds of evidence upon which the court based its work and the 
procedures by means of which the dissenting judges got from evidence to evidentiary 
and then to ultimate facts. In the section’s second half, I ponder what to make of these 
controversies surrounding the Tokyo tribunal’s inferential procedures. To this end, I 
gather what can be gleaned from the dissents in relation to a number of concepts 
developed in previous chapters. I conclude with reflections on the question of 
knowledge’s political nature. 
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From evidence to evidentiary to ultimate facts: controversies about inferential procedures  
For analytical purposes, the proceedings of the Tokyo tribunal, from the taking of 
evidence to the formulation of the judgment, can be thought of as a sequence of 
inferential steps.101 The judges had to draw inferences about the truth of individual 
pieces of evidence, about individual supporting or evidentiary facts, about the 
ultimate fact or factum probandum of Japan’s having conspired to and waged a war of 
aggression, and about the criminality of this war and the conspiracy thereto. Since the 
last section has already discussed the challenges involved in resolving aggressive war 
to be criminal, I here concentrate on the preceding three inferential steps and focus, in 
particular, on those aspects of the majority’s implemention of these steps that Bernard, 
Röling, and Pal disagreed with. 
With regard to the evidence to be used, the aforementioned Art. 13 of the Tokyo 
charter stipulated that the tribunal “shall admit any evidence which it deems to have 
probative value.”102 In line with this rule, the IMTFE in Tokyo used different kinds of 
evidence – according to Röling, “779 affidavits, and altogether 4,836 documents, were 
produced in evidence, but we also heard 419 witnesses.”103 Overall, the judges had a 
preference for written materials. This was the case not only for the majority, but also 
for the dissenting judges: Röling’s dissent, for instance, was based on both official and 
classified documents issued by the Japanese government104 as well as on published 
memoirs105, private letters106, and diary entries of key actors.107 There was a problem 
with this preference, however: under the leadership of US Chief Prosecutor Joseph 
Keenan, the International Prosecution Section – the agency which had been tasked 
with gathering evidence for the trial – had focused not on collecting written 
																																																						
101 This sequential ordering of inferential steps is meant as ideal-typical or analytical rather than actual 
– not least because there were allegations that the majority of the judges had agreed on the guilty 
verdict from the outset of the trial (cf. Sang, “Justice Bernard,” 99). 
102 Quoted in Minear, Victor’s Justice, 118.  
103 Cassese, Röling, The Tokyo trial, 52; cf. Minear, Victor’s Justice, 119.  
104 E.g. Röling, “Opinion,” 1067, 1069, 1071f., 1075f., 1080ff., 1089f. 
105 E.g. ibid., 1066, 1068, 1074. 
106 E.g. ibid., 1068, 1073, 1077, 1080, 1089. 
107 E.g. ibid., 1065, 1067, 1074, 1088. 
 
	 262 
documents, but on interrogating war crimes suspects.108 Moreover, towards the end of 
the war, the Japanese government had destroyed many confidential documents.109 In 
light of these problems, the Tokyo tribunal’s preference for written documents was not 
implemented as systematically as that of its Nuremberg predeccessor.110 
Whether a written document or an oral testimony, every piece of evidence required 
the judges to ascertain its verisimilitude, and the practices by which the majority of the 
judges drew these inferences about the truth content of pieces of evidence were a first 
object of epistemological contention. The three dissenting judges criticized the 
majority’s at best haphazard, at worst selective reliance on rules of evidence as well as 
its procedures of cross-examination. With regard to his colleagues’ application of rules 
of evidence, Röling was dumbfounded at their practice of inferring the truth content 
of a piece of evidence on the basis of principled assumptions. He thought that the 
verisimilitude of every individual piece of evidence should be examined and judged 
“in relation to all the other evidence.”111 Like Röling, Pal also chastised his colleagues’ 
method of determining the verisimilitude of pieces of evidence on principled grounds 
rather than on a case-by-case basis. He objected, for instance, to the judges’ refusal to 
admit press releases issued by the Japanese government as evidence on the grounds 
that these constituted “pure propaganda and nothing else,” “nothing but argument 
from the Japanese viewpoint.”112 Rejecting the “sweeping” assumption “that 
propaganda is prima facie a lie,”113 Pal found the majority’s argumentation to be 
inherently biased:  
“Even if these press releases be taken as ‘painting with a Japanese brush a picture of 
events for consumption at home and abroad’ this would present us with one version 
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of the event, the prosecution having given us another version. It will be for us to decide 
which version we should accept. The prosecution version is also a version of a party. 
Some infirmity is likely to be present in both.” 114 
Pal’s counter-argument to the majority judgment’s position thus amounted to a 
refutation of the assumption that Japanese propaganda, in particular and in contrast 
to the propaganda of other powers, was “prima facie a lie.” Rather, “infirmity” was a 
mark of all propaganda.  
In other instances, Pal disagreed with how his colleagues established the truth content 
of pieces of evidence through the application of rules of evidence, such as the best 
evidence rule: 
“We sometimes rejected statements […] if the statement happened to refer to the contents 
of any document and that document was not produced. We did not accept such statements 
even if it were certified by the requisite authority that it could not find the document now. 
We insisted upon a certificate that the document had been destroyed.”115 
Pal found that the “meticulous strictness” with which the tribunal implemented the 
best evidence rule was both unwarranted in light of its charter’s stipulations and 
inconsistent with its execution of another rule of evidence, the hearsay rule. “I, for 
myself,” wrote Pal, “did not see much sense in the rule of exclusion at a trial where 
any amount of hearsay evidence had to be taken in.”116 As a general rule of procedure, 
Pal explained, the hearsay rule held that “[t]he opinions or beliefs of third persons are 
[…] no evidence at all, and therefore inadmissible. Witnesses are to state facts only, i.e. 
what they themselves saw or heard.”117 As a consequence of its charter’s lenient 
stipulations regarding rules of evidence, Pal argued, the tribunal had “admitted much 
material which normally would have been discarded as hearsay evidence”118 and had 
frequently relied on evidence whose truth content was dubitable at best.  
																																																						
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid., 639. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid., 637. 
118 Ibid., 630. 
 
	 264 
The other kind of criticism which the three dissenting judges’ directed at their 
colleagues’ means for inferring the truth content of pieces of evidence concerned the 
conduct of direct and cross-examinations. For Röling, the issue was one of undue 
constraint in how he, as a judge, interacted with the defendants to determine the truth 
of their testimonies. As he recounted in his retrospective interviews with Antonio 
Cassese:  
“Our President was a dictator. He didn’t like to have us put questions. It was never 
forbidden, but he said, well, pass your question to me and I will put it to the witness. 
Perhaps I have forgotten, but I don’t remember the judges ever putting questions to 
specific accused.”119  
For Pal, by contrast, the issue was one of a flawed evidentiary procedure which 
implied that “the ability and the willingness of [the witnesses] to declare the truth 
remain untested.”120 Pal criticized that “in lieu of presenting the witness for direct 
examination in court,” the judges frequently allowed the prosecution to use “the 
affidavit of the witness or his statement taken out of court, offering the witness only 
for cross-examination.”121 The problem with this was that not conducting direct 
examinations meant to forego a first opportunity for testing the “infirmities” of a 
witness’s statement of fact. In addition, it also diminished later opportunities for such 
testing – for without a direct examination, there were no points of comparison through 
which to enhance one’s understanding of the witness’s appearance in the ensuing 
cross-examination. However, as Pal further criticized, in many instances the court also 
did not conduct cross-examinations – though it was only by cross-examination that the 
“infirmities with respect to the observation, memory, narration and veracity” of a 
witness “might be so far exposed […] as to enable the judge fairly to evaluate the 
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utterance.”122 In sum, Pal admonished that the evidence derived through such 
procedures ought to be treated with “[m]uch caution.”123 
Determining the truth content of individual pieces of evidence was only the first step 
in a longer inferential process. Further steps were needed to get from pieces of 
evidence to evidentiary facts, and from evidentiary facts to the ultimate fact of a war 
of aggression and a conspiracy thereto. It is to Bernard’s, Röling’s, and Pal’s criticisms 
of different elements of the procedures through which the judges formed their 
conclusions about these different kinds of facts that I attend in the following 
paragraphs. 
A first kind of processual criticism centered on when and by whom evidence was 
handled and interpreted to draw inferences. In this regard, the three dissenting judges 
pointed out a number of irregularities in how evidence was introduced into the court. 
Röling, for instance, complained that many pieces of evidence “were produced, first 
by the prosecution, later by the defence, in a more or less haphazard way, as it fitted 
their argument.”124 The dissenting judges also lamented that procedural rules 
regarding the introduction of evidence into the court were executed inconsistently. 
Whereas Pal protested an instance in which procedural rules were sidelined so that a 
document could be “offered in evidence only after the defense closed their case,”125 
thereby making it impossible for the defense to react to it, Röling chalked down an 
instance in which rules of procedure were invoked to keep the corrected version of a 
document from being introduced into the proceedings.126  
The dissenting judges also disagreed with the tribunal’s distribution of the burden of 
proof regarding the evidentiary facts and the factum probandum. Bernard, for one, 
found fault with the majority’s idea that rather than the prosecution having to prove 
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the guilt of the defendants, it was the defendants who had to prove their innocence.127 
Moreover, he criticized that in light of this logic of proof, it was highly problematic 
that the trial had neither included a “preliminary inquest conducted equally in favour 
of the Prosecution as of the defence by a magistrate independent of them both” nor 
any other equitable measure by means of which to ensure that the defence could 
“obtain and assemble elements” necessary for developing arguments about the 
evidentiary facts and the factum probandum.128 In a similar vein, Röling was aghast that 
the court denied “the request of the defence to have access to the files of the 
prosecution to see whether they could find favourable evidence for their case.”129 More 
generally, Röling was frustrated that in the overall logic of the trial, the judges had 
only limited knowledge of the full range of evidence: they knew only what the 
prosecution and defence introduced before them.130 In this constellation, Röling 
criticized that “the prosecution withheld evidence from the Court that could favour 
the defence” and that “the judges were not informed of the difficulties in obtaining 
desired documents from the prosecution.”131  
A final set of contentions relating to the handling of evidence for inferential purposes 
stemmed from the Tokyo Charter’s provision that “[t]he Tribunal may require to be 
informed of the nature of any evidence before it is offered so that it may rule upon the 
relevance thereof.”132 In their dissents, Röling and Pal pointed out that the majority 
used this stipulation to refuse evidence of the Allied powers’ plans for war.133 For 
instance, as Röling recounted later, “the President stopped [the accused and the 
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defence] when they were about to speak of matters that were ruled out by the Court 
as being irrelevant, such as communist activity in China, the misdeeds of Allied 
governments or troops, and so on.”134 By invoking a lack of probative value, Röling 
and Pal argued, what the court did was to prevent the introduction of evidence that 
could have helped the defence to develop an alternative account of the Japanese 
conduct. As Röling put it: 
“Arguably, by these restrictions the accused were seriously hampered in their defence. 
But the important point was that the Tribunal, at least its majority, regarded those 
things as irrelevant. The facts were not unknown to them; but they just did not matter, 
if one believed that Allied misbehaviour should have no influence whatsoever on the 
evaluation of Japanese misbehaviour.”135  
Ultimately, Röling and Pal contended, the majority of the judges used the charter’s 
stipulation to prevent the defence from establishing facts that were politically 
inconvenient to the Allied powers and did not care that this impeded the defence’s 
capacity to function effectively. 
A second kind of criticism which the three dissenting judges expressed about the 
majority’s procedures for drawing factual inferences concerned the majority’s 
interpretation of the evidence that actually was before them. On this matter, Bernard 
formulated a wholesale rebuttal of “[t]he manner in which deliberations were 
conducted.”136 In terms of the procedures through which a trial ought to infer 
evidentiary and ultimate facts, “the guarantees which the law of nations grants [the 
defendants],” Bernard argued, foresaw “oral deliberations, outside of all influence, 
bearing upon all produced evidence, among all the judges who sat at the trials.”137 Yet 
the court’s actual procedures for arriving at findings of fact fell short of this standard: 
“the eleven judges which compose the Tribunal were never called to meet to discuss 
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orally a part of or in its entirety [the findings of fact].”138 Instead, oral deliberations 
about the findings of fact were held between the members of the majority only. Once 
the majority had reached its conclusions, the rest of the judges were invited to 
comment upon these in writing.139 Appalled by this in his view fundamentally flawed 
procedure, Bernard felt compelled to clarify that “[t]he placing of my signature at the 
bottom of the judgment” did not constitute an approval of the judgment itself, but 
“must be interpreted [only] as acknowledgment of the respect of customary forms of 
the deliberations of Tribunals.”140  
Röling and Pal raised further criticisms of the majority’s procedures for interpreting 
evidence. For instance, Röling believed that the majority had failed to contextually 
situate key documents relating to Japan’s foreign policy, and that it had therefore 
erroneously concluded that these documents constituted evidence of the ultimate fact 
of a conspiracy to war.141 Similarly, Pal had “a great deal of difficulty in accepting 
[documents] as evidence of what the prosecution sought to establish thereby,” namely 
the ultimate fact of Japan’s having waged an aggressive war.142 Notably, whereas 
Röling’s criticism allowed for the majority’s alleged misinterpretations to be the result 
of a kind of epistemic carelessness or negligence, Pal intimated that these were willful 
misreadings.143 
What Röling and Pal were unwilling to infer in these exemplary instances were 
ultimate facts which were not directly observable: the conspiracy to war, which in turn 
contributed to the war’s aggressive quality. In this regard, Bernard maintained that 
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“[n]o direct proof was furnished concerning the formation among individuals known, 
on a known date, at a specific point, of a plot the object of which was to assure to Japan 
the domination unaccepted by its inhabitants of some part of the world,”144 and Pal 
argued that “[t]he factum of this alleged conspiracy, design or plan has not been 
attested to directly by any witness, thing, or document.”145 Noting the prosecution’s 
assumption that “’the quality of treachery rests in the minds of those making the 
attack,’”146 Pal also found it impossible “to infer,” on the basis of the available evidence, 
“[the defendants’] criminal mentality.”147 Insofar as the concepts of conspiracy and 
aggression amounted to a “method of proof” for getting at the ultimate facts148, that is, 
the three dissenting judges heavily criticized the majority’s usage of these concepts to 
establish the factuality of the acts to which they referred.149  
Regarding the facta probanda of a war of aggression and a conspiracy thereto150, the 
three dissenting judges were united in their disagreement with the majority’s finding, 
yet reached very different conclusions of their own. Bernard argued that to arrive at 
its findings of fact, the majority had put words into the defendants’ mouths.151 Yet 
while he did not want to deny that “[t]he most abominable crimes were committed on 
the largest scale by the members of the Japanese police and army,” he eschewed having 
to pronounce findings of fact by claiming that he “could not venture further in the 
formulation of verdicts, the exactitude of which would be subject to caution.”152 Röling 
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noted a number of “issues, where a different interpretation should be given to the facts 
laid before the Tribunal,” but limited his reinterpretation of the majority’s inferences 
about the ultimate facts to instances in which such reinterpretation “might have direct 
bearing on the question of criminal liability.”153 Pal, finally, completely disagreed with 
all the majority’s findings regarding the facta probanda.   
With Bernard having opted out of the business of infering ultimate facts, by which 
inferential procedures did Röling and Pal arrive at their respective conclusions? Röling 
steered a middle course: he resolved that the war had been aggressive and had resulted 
from a conspiracy thereto, yet that the extent of both of these ultimate facts – and 
therefore, the extent of the defendants’ criminal liability for them – was smaller than 
the majority professed to have shown.154 To this end, Röling argued that the majority’s 
findings of fact were afflicted by conceptual imprecision and by a lack of insight into 
the actual occurrences of the evidentiary facts cited. On the one hand, against the 
prosecution’s intention in employing the concepts of aggression and conspiracy to cast 
the net widely155, Röling contended that “[i]t is wellnigh impossible to define the 
concept of initiating or waging a war of aggression both accurately and 
comprehensively.”156 For Röling, the fact of a defendant’s membership in a 
government which had conspired to wage aggressive war was “not sufficient” to 
conjecture this defendant’s actual participation in these matters; rather, such a 
conjecture necessitated evidence of the defendant’s aggressive and conspiratorial 
“intentions” in joining the government.157 On the other hand, Röling found that 
weaknesses inherent in the evidentiary material hampered the drawing of inferences 
regarding both evidentiary and ultimate facts. For instance, because the defence had 
not been allowed to produce evidence of the “aggressive intentions on the part of other 
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countries,” Röling argued that it was impossible to infer, as the majority had done, that 
Japan had had no objective reason to feel threatened and on the basis of this 
evidentiary fact to conclude that the war had been aggressive.158 In addition, intra-
governmental matters, such as the clashes between “aggressive” and “conservative” 
factions over whether or not Japan should go to war, were “difficult to grasp,” making 
it impossible to establish the intentions of all of the members of the Japanese 
government at all of the relevant points in time with the necessary certainty.159 In sum, 
after reviewing the evidence before him, Röling generally agreed with the majority’s 
finding of a Japanese conspiracy to wage aggressive war. However, he not only 
disagreed with some of the details of these findings160, but also found that the 
conceptual and evidentiary weaknesses of the majority’s process of inference “left 
sufficient room for doubt” about the defendants’ intentions.161 Using this room for 
doubt, Röling concluded that several of them had joined the Japanese government to 
not to participate in, but to prevent the deeds of which they were now accused.162 
In stark contrast to Röling’s bounded criticism, Pal’s dissent contained a wholesale 
rejection of all of the majority’s factual inferences. Pal disagreed that the war had been 
an act of aggression on the part of Japan, opined that “the whole story of the over-all 
conspiracy is a preposterous one,”163 and found that the defendants “were perhaps 
wrong, and perhaps they misled themselves,” but that they were neither aggressors 
nor conspirators.164 With regard to the ultimate fact of conspiracy, Pal argued that the 
majority’s standards for inferring this factum probandum were lacking in rigour.165 
Whereas the court had used a criterion of sufficient proximity to get from evidentiary 
to ultimate facts166, a more suitable standard, Pal argued, would hold that “[t]he 
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evidentiary facts [..] must have such a bearing upon the principal fact as would make 
them inconsistent with any result other than the truth of the factum probandum”167 – 
yet “the presented facts, by inference from which we are invited to conclude the 
enormous conspiracy, mostly admit of a plurality of causes.”168 Underlying this 
argument was a different philosophy of history. In his discussion of the pitfalls of the 
majority’s procedures for inferring the ultimate fact of a conspiracy, Pal wrote:  
“The total fabric of the historical development facing us at the present moment is 
indeed the result of the interweaving of very various strands; it will be a puerile 
oversimplification of the problem to start with only one single thread ignoring the 
complex and intimate involvement in the whole historical process of the various forces 
which contributed to the hopeless complexity of the present international life.”169 
Ultimately, then, Pal contended that the inferential procedures through which his 
colleagues tried to match the concept of conspiracy with observable facts so to arrive 
at the factum probandum relied on the assumption of a kind of causality that could not 
be found in “international life” as it actually existed. 
With regard to aggression, Pal firstly noted both the absence of a generally agreed-
upon definition and the majority’s suggestion that such a definition was unnecessary 
for them to draw inferences about the factum probandum of aggression. He rejected this 
view: since “[n]o term is more elastic or more susceptible of interested interpretation, 
whether by individuals, or by groups, than aggression,” a complete lack of definition 
was bound to seriously undermine any court’s fact-finding work.170 Secondly, Pal also 
took note of the welter of definitions of aggression that had been proposed by legal 
scholars as well as by the League of Nations. Proving the ultimate fact of aggression 
according to these definitions, Pal argued, would necessitate analyses that were 
exceedingly difficult to undertake, whether because “[h]undreds of thousands of 
events may have to be examined” or because relevant events were “likely to [have 
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been] witnessed only by excited or prejudiced observers.”171 Finally, Pal sought to 
refute the majority’s finding of fact with regards to aggression by pointing to a possible 
alternative explanation: the Japanese government’s decisions to begin different 
military campaigns, he argued, were actually undertaken in reaction to threatening 
events.172 
 
Knowledge practices, legal ways of knowing, and the judge as a subject of truth: how is 
knowledge political? 
What to make of the three dissenting judges’ criticisms of their colleagues’ inferential 
procedures for determining the truth content of pieces of evidence and for getting from 
this evidence to evidentiary to ultimate facts? In this second half of the section, probing 
the empirical grip of a number of key concepts developed in earlier chapters – 
knowledge practices, ways of knowing, and subjects of knowledge – in the example of 
the Tokyo tribunal ultimately leads me to wonder what it means to speak about the 
political nature of knowledge. 
To start with, what can be gleaned from the foregoing discussion about the court’s 
knowledge practices? While a first bundle of knowledge practices to look into would be 
those through which evidence is initially gathered or produced, the dissents by 
Bernard, Röling, and Pal do not provide much insight into these kinds of practices. In 
the main, the three judges’ dissents allow for conclusions about the second step of the 
process in which evidence is gathered, namely the introduction of evidence into the 
court proceedings. In this regard, what can be established from the three dissents is 
that the judges in Tokyo practically selected evidence according to various, not always 
intrinsically coherent or cumulatively consistent logics.  
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As for how evidence was then interpreted by the judges, the dissents criticized two 
kinds of practices in particular. On the one hand, Bernard and Pal objected that the 
court had arrived at its factual inferences not through oral deliberations conducted in 
chambers and between all of the judges, and that those of the judges on the bench who 
were not members of the majority had only been able to react in writing to the findings 
of fact already concluded by the majority. It was for this reason that Bernard, 
disapproving of the tribunal’s actual findings, signed the judgment only to indicate 
his continuous respect for judiciary practices.  
On the other hand, Röling and Pal criticized how the concepts of conspiracy and 
aggression had been used as “methods of proof” for arriving at findings about the 
ultimate facts; in consequence of this criticism, they themselves produced somewhat 
or altogether different findings of fact. To render the acts of aggression and conspiracy 
inferable, Röling developed operationalizations of the corresponding concepts that 
differed from those proposed by the majority. After sorting and weighing the evidence 
provided by the prosecution and the defence on the basis of these operationalizations, 
Röling concurred with the majority’s general findings of a war of aggression and a 
conspiracy thereto, yet disagreed with many of the details of the majority’s account. 
By contrast, Pal not only admonished the contested and unclear character of the 
concepts of aggression and conspiracy, but also demanded, in addition to the weighing 
of evidence, a further practice for drawing inferences about ultimate facts: the ruling 
out of alternative explanations for these facta probanda. Especially in light of Pal’s 
underlying philosophy of history, this latter requirement was impossible to fulfill – 
leading Pal to disagree with all of the majority’s and with Röling’s findings of fact. 
Overall, however, the analytical purchase of the concept of epistemic practices on the 
material provided by three dissents seems quite limited – all the more so in comparison 
to that of the concept of ways of knowing. This latter concept can be used to analyze the 
controversies surrounding the tribunal’s inferential procedures in terms of the 
differences between two distinct legal traditions, the common and the civil law 
 
	 275 
tradition of criminal jurisdiction.173 Referred to by Röling as “the Anglo-Saxon and the 
continental system,”174 these two traditions constituted distinct ways of knowing. As 
Röling explained:  
“The [Anglo-Saxon system] rests on two parties, the prosecutor and the accused, who 
offer evidence to prove their contentions, and the judge bases his judgment on what 
has been brought to his knowledge. […] Moreover, the decision is often taken by a jury 
of laymen, who may easily be deceived by statements or documents. For that reason 
many rules have been adopted to protect the jury from misleading, untrustworthy 
evidence. […] 
Continental proceedings differ, in that they […] entrust judicial magistrates, the ‘juges 
d’instruction’, with an inquiry for that purpose. The whole procedure, before and 
during the trial, has more of an inquisitorial character in contrast to the accusatory 
character of the Anglo-Saxon system. On the continent the jury plays a less dominant 
role. […] The judge may take into account anything he considers as having a probative 
value, anything which helps him arrive at the truth.”175 
The Tokyo tribunal, in fact, was a mix of these two systems. In line with the civil law 
tradition, the tribunal’s judges – there was no jury – were not bound by any technical 
rules of evidence; yet in line with the common law tradition, the tribunal’s procedural 
logic was an accusatorial one and the judges, in order to decide about the admission 
of evidence, frequently resorted to the kind of technical rules they were in fact not 
bound by. Consequently, Pal, coming from the Anglo-Saxon system, attacked the 
tribunal’s inferential procedures for being too closely modelled on the continental 
system, whereas Bernard and Röling, coming from the continental system, criticized 
the tribunal for too closely following the Anglo-Saxon system.176  
Grasping the continental and the Anglo-Saxon tradition as distinct legal ways of 
knowing also sheds light on the dissenting judges’ diverging epistemological ideals. 
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Röling’s and Bernard’s epistemological ideal was centered on the person of the judge, 
for whom epistemological principles were at the same time ethical ones. “Personally, 
being accustomed to the continental system,” Röling wrote, “I am a bit critical of many 
technical rules of evidence.”177 Instead, Röling stressed the importance of a judge’s 
impartiality, a quality which he claimed to embody himself: relating the story of a 
conflict between himself and his government over his dissent, Röling explained that 
“I was accustomed to working as an independent judge, guided only by the law, 
without any interference from outside” and that “I felt it was impossible to participate 
in a judgment that ran counter to my own well-considered opinion.”178 
By contrast, Pal, who was steeped in the common law tradition, emphasized that 
factual truth had to rest on direct observation and on the minimization of “infirmities” 
in one’s inferential practices.179 While it was “[t]he mark of the witness” to have 
“knowledge resting on his own observations” and to “speak de visu suo et audio,”180 
the role of the judges on the bench was “to form their own conclusions or opinion on 
the facts stated” before them.181 As regards “infirmities” in a tribunal’s inferences, Pal 
acknowledged that it was impossible to fully eliminate these182, but demanded that a 
trial ought to achieve for its findings of fact a “degree of such probability […] as to 
justify one in regarding it as certainty.”183 However, insofar as “probability belongs 
wholly to the mind,”184 two problematic tendencies of the mind could obstruct the 
minimization of infirmities: there was the “suspicion” with which judges might 
already enter the trial185, and there was “the pleasure which [the mind] is apt to take 
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in readily adapting circumstances to one another and even in straining them a little, if 
need be, to force them to form parts of one connected whole.”186 In light of these, the 
rationale for detailed technical rules of evidence was that they would keep in check 
these tendencies and the “erroneous persuasion” likely to be caused by them. 
Summing up the differences between the two legal traditions’ epistemological ideals, 
Röling remarked that “[t]he purpose and the result of [an Anglo-Saxon/common law] 
trial is not the real truth, but the trial-truth. Continental proceedings differ, in that they 
aim to discover the real truth.”187 Of course, this was an oversimplification and a 
polemic. What Röling meant was that a criminal trial in the common law tradition 
began and ended with versions of the truth – the prosecution’s and the defence’s 
versions, and the judges’ or jury’s decision for either version so that a judgment about 
an act and its criminality could be rendered. By contrast, a criminal trial in the civil 
law tradition revolved around the judges’ effort to reconstruct a full account of events 
upon which to base their judgement. To capture these differences between the two 
legal traditions, the concept of ways of knowing seems a good alternative to the rather 
tendentious notions of “trial-truth” and “real truth.” 
To conclude my discussion of the Tokyo tribunal’s epistemological aspects, I would 
like to pose one further question: How was the tribunal’s knowledge political? The 
secondary literature has overwhelmingly located the political aspect of the tribunal’s 
knowledge in the different political purposes it was made to serve. While this is an 
important point, I want to suggest that knowledge’s political nature also lies in how it 
is arrived at or produced – and that the concept of subjects of knowledge can help to 
analytically illuminate the thus located political aspect of knowledge. 
In the secondary literature on the Tokyo trial, the political nature of knowledge has 
been considered in three ways in particular. First, with regard to the tribunal as an 
instance of victor’s justice, the literature has discussed the knowledge which the 
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tribunal produced as a victor’s version of the Pacific War, i.e. an account of the war 
which plastered over the atrocities committed by the Allied powers and avoided 
looking into these powers’ role in the onset of the war.188 Secondly, the secondary 
literature has highlighted the political motivations driving Pal’s account of the war. In 
this regard, Kopelman maintains that Pal was “blinded […] to the militaristic and 
imperialistic nature of Japanese expansionism,”189 and Cryer contends that Pal 
uncritically relied on the “stated Japanese intentions to liberating Asia.”190 Pal’s resolve 
to denounce the violence of Western imperialism, these authors argue, caused him to 
willfully ignore the violence of Japan’s imperialism. Thirdly, the secondary literature 
has discussed the political nature of the knowledge produced by the Tokyo tribunal in 
terms of its didactic effects on Japanese society. In this context, both the majority’s and 
Pal’s respective partialities have been cited as obstructing this knowledge from 
achieving the (re-)educational results it was intended to achieve. On the one hand, it 
has been argued that in the early postwar period, the Japanese public perceived the 
partiality of the majority judgment and therefore did not feel obliged to incorporate 
this judgment in its developing narratives of the war, leading to a “collective 
amnesia.”191 On the other hand, from the early postwar years until the present day, 
revisionist and militarist Japanese historians and politicians have regularly drawn on 
Pal’s dissent.192  
While these are certainly relevant points, they are indicative of a narrow 
understanding of knowledge’s political nature which, by taking knowledge as 
information, assumes for knowledge to be political insofar as it is made to serve 
political purposes. Much in this vein, the existing secondary literature has highlighted 
how the Tokyo tribunal’s varying findings of fact have furthered likewise varying 
political agendas. However, this preoccupation with the informational content of the 
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knowledge produced by the Tokyo trial has led the literature to almost entirely 
disregard the political character of the process of knowledge production. To remedy 
this limitation and to widen the question of how knowledge about war is political, I 
propose to undertake two further steps. First, I suggest to relocate the question to look 
at how the different inferential procedures, knowledge practices, and legal ways of 
knowing at play in Tokyo tribunal lend themselves to the advancement of different 
political agendas. Secondly, I reconfigure the question to ask how these legal ways of 
knowing and the theories of truth that came with them presumed and produced the 
judge as a certain kind of knowledgeable subject.  
As to the first of these two ways of knowledge’s being political in Tokyo, on the one 
hand, Röling and Bernard, the two dissenting judges coming from the civil law 
tradition, denounced how the common law aspects of the trial’s proceedings were 
used to advance the Allied powers’ political aims. Bernard complained that while “the 
Charter permitted granting to the Accused guarantees sufficient for their defense, I 
think that actually these were not granted to them.”193 Similarly, Röling highlighted 
that according to the logic of a common law trial, the prosecution was “a party in a 
conflict” acting not “in the interest of [a] community,” but in self-interest. (The other 
party to this conflict, of course, was the defence.) In this constellation, a trial could 
“only work effectively if there is a certain ‘equality of arms’ between the parties,” yet  
“[t]hat was not the case in the post-war trials. The prosecution was in possession of the 
documents. It had the manpower and the means to prepare its case. The defendants 
were in a clearly inferior position and in such a case the Anglo-Saxon system provides 
only a veneer of fairness, not true fairness.”194 
In sum, Röling and Bernard criticized how the tribunal instrumentalized certain 
elements of the common law approach to criminal jurisdiction in order to further, as 
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Röling put it, the Allied powers’ “political motives.”195 
On the other hand, Pal’s dissent frequently pointed to how the main civil law 
component of the tribunal – the stipulation that the judges did not have to take into 
account technical rules of evidence – was made to serve the Allied powers’ purposes.196 
As Pal explained: “A trial conducted on this basis may be sufficiently unrevealing so 
as to shut out the essential facts responsible for the world trouble and may, at the same 
time, afford ample opportunity for a collective expression of retributive and aggressive 
sentiment.”197 The tribunal, Pal argued, instrumentalized its civil law-inspired rules of 
evidence to bolster the Allied powers’ international position and to prevent inquiry 
into their conduct of the war as well as into, by extension, the larger historical context 
in which imperial wars were embedded. Notwithstanding his disagreement with the 
more radical aspects of Pal’s argument, and in spite of his general “preference for the 
continental system,” Röling also highlighted that this system allowed for political 
instrumentalization just like the Anglo-Saxon system: “it only works as long as judges 
are impartial and so long as a country has a decent, honest government.”198 Arguably, 
neither thing could be said of the Tokyo tribunal and the international context in which 
it operated. Taken together, Bernard, Röling, and Pal’s dissents can thus serve to push 
the question of how knowledge is political beyond the confines in which the secondary 
literature on the Tokyo tribunal has so far considered it. They show that not only the 
tribunal’s findings of fact were used to further political purposes, but that the means 
by which the tribunal arrived at these findings of fact were similarly instrumentalized.  
And yet, this push still leaves intact the terms in which the question is posed – and 
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which, for a Foucault-inspired genealogy, are inadequate for grasping knowledge’s 
political nature. Implicitly, the secondary literature on the Tokyo tribunal seems to 
assume not only that knowledge is political insofar as it is instrumental to the 
realization of political purposes, but also that true knowledge is that which is not 
instrumentalized.199 For Foucault, however, knowledge was always and inevitably 
political. Hence, the “political question” of truth was not its instrumentalization by 
political actors or its emancipation therefrom, but how régimes of knowledge were 
“linked in a circular relation with systems of power.”200 Therefore, to engage the Tokyo 
tribunal as an example of the problematization of war in international politics, it seems 
necessary to alter the terms in which the question of the political nature of the 
tribunal’s knowledge has been posed. While a single example obviously cannot 
provide a full view of the entanglement of régimes of knowledge and power, what it 
can do is to provide some empirical material for making a stab at this entanglement. 
Therefore, I want to conclude this section by returning to another concept developed 
in previous chapters to look at how the tribunal’s work presupposed and (re-
)produced subjects of knowledge.  
In the primary sources under study here, several different subjects of knowledge – 
among them the witness, the expert, and the accused/criminal – make an apperance, 
but there is one particularly prominent subject of knowledge: the judge. A first way in 
which the judge as a subject of knowledge features in the three dissents is via the 
different legal ways of knowing from which the dissenting judges hailed. In the 
common law tradition, as Pal wrote, the judges’ and the jury’s task was “to form their 
own conclusions […] on the facts stated” on the basis of their “range of common 
																																																						
199 A case in point is Cryer’s appraisal of Röling’s epistemological approach: “Röling, transcending the 
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200 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977. Edited by Colin 
Gordon, Translated by Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, Kate Soper (New York, NY: 
Pantheon Books, 1980), at 133. “It’s not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power 
[…] but of detaching the power of truth from the forms of hegemony […] within which it operates.” 
 
	 282 
experience or common knowledge.”201 That the ruling was usually taken by a jury of 
laypeople was another reason why there were such strict rules of evidence. For these 
reasons, as Röling explained, “in the Anglo-Saxon system, the judge is passive. He just 
weighs what the parties bring before him. He leaves it to the parties to bring facts 
before the Court and only interferes when it is necessary for the maintenance of the 
rules of procedure.”202 In the civil law tradition, by contrast, the jury “plays a less 
dominant role” as the “continental procedure […] gives the judge an active role 
whereby he takes initiatives to discover the truth.”203 Because “the judge is a legal 
expert with great experience, there is scarcely any need for technical rules of 
evidence,” implying that “[t]he judge may take into account anything he considers as 
having a probative value, anything which helps him arrive at the truth.”204 As ways of 
knowing, both legal traditions hence assumed for the judge to have a specific kind of 
expertise and therefore to be a particularly capable subject of knowledge. Yet while in 
the Anglo-Saxon tradition, the judge’s unique epistemological capability was the 
enforcement of the inferential process, in the continental tradition, the judge’s distinct 
capability was the determination of truth itself. 
A second way in which Pal and Röling’s dissents assumed the judge as a particular 
subject of knowledge was in terms of their respective theories of truth. Pal seems to 
have ascribed to a correspondence theory of truth. Not only was he convinced that 
“[b]elief, no doubt, is purely mental,” but he also urged that “we must remember that 
our belief [about the occurrence of a fact] would approximate a correct representation 
of the actual fact only if the data for that fact have fully entered into the mental 
formation of that belief.”205 I.e., Pal assumed for beliefs to be fully mental and facts or 
truth to be fully of this world. Because of his presupposition that the mind tended to 
misrepresent the facts, the problem he worried about was how to make sure that the 
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mind’s beliefs corresponded the actual facts – hence his insistence on technical rules 
of evidence. Ultimately, for Pal, judges were no different from human beings more 
generally: albeit capacitated by their expertise, they were deficient subjects of 
knowledge. 
By contrast, Röling adhered to a coherence theory of truth according to which a judge 
“should consider [a piece of evidence] in relation to all the other evidence.”206 
According to coherence theories of truth, truth is not a property of the world, but is – 
partly or fully – subjective, or a property of the mind. What is more, insofar as it is 
subjective, truth can be understood as the product of the subject’s historical and 
political context and position.207 If truth was a property not of individual pieces of 
evidence but of the system into which these pieces were arranged, it was ultimately 
the judge who produced truth, and judges’ prior experiences made them both 
specifically capable and specifically positioned subjects of knowledge. 
I do not mean to conclude, on the basis of only a handful of citations, that Pal really 
adhered to a correspondence theory of truth and that Röling really followed a 
coherence theory of truth. Rather, the point to take away from this analysis of the 
theories of truth which the judges possibly held is that when we wonder what different 
theories of truth assume about the subjects of knowledge they imply, methodology – 
in the sense of a process of reflecting on our ways of knowing (see Chapter 2) – 
becomes political in a new way. The question is no longer one of knowledge’s 
instrumentalization. Rather, it is about the positioning that capacitates us as subjects 
of knowledge: Are we epistemologically capable insofar as we are split from the 
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objects of our knowledge, insofar as we stand in relation to them, or insofar as we find 
ourselves to be part of the problems we seek to know about?  
With this question, the section has come full circle. In the section’s first part, I inquired 
into contestations surrounding the Tokyo tribunal’s procedures of inference for getting 
from evidence to evidentiary facts and from evidentiary facts to the facta probanda of 
aggressive war and conspiracy. On the basis of this inquiry, in the second part of the 
section I probed the analytical usefulness of a number of concepts developed in earlier 
chapters for making sense of these contestations. While the concept of knowledge 
practices had relatively little analytical purchase, the concept of ways of knowing 
illuminated how Bernard, Röling, and Pal’s disagreements with the majority’s 
procedures of inference stemmed from the respective legal traditions from which the 
dissenting judges originally hailed. Finally, the concept of the subject of knowledge was 
perhaps the most useful in terms of the genealogical aims of my thesis, for it allowed 
me to reformulate the question of knowledge’s political nature. While the secondary 
literature on the Tokyo tribunal has by and large posed this question in terms of the 
instrumentalization of knowledge-as-information for political purposes, thinking 
about the judge as a knowledgeable subject let me rework the question into one about 
how subjects of knowledge are capacitated because of or in spite of their positioning 
in relation to the objects of their knowledge. 
What, then, of this object of the Tokyo tribunal’s knowledge – how did the tribunal 
formulate war as a problem and thereby produce it as an object of political action? This 
is what I attend to in the third and final section.  
 
The problems of war and war-time violence at the IMTFE 
After the previous two sections’ explorations of criminalization as a means for 
problematizing war and of the criminal trial as a site at which knowledge about this 
problem is produced, my aim in this section is to analyze the three dissenting judges’ 
various and contested formulations of the problem of war itself. To clarify, I am not 
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concerned here with the question of how exactly to judge the Pacific War 
historiographically or legally.208 Rather, my purpose is to explore some of the Tokyo 
tribunal’s assumptions about war as a phenomenon in and an object of international 
politics – and as a problematic one at that. To do so, I again put to use some of the 
analytical concepts and categories developed in previous chapters. Specifically, I look 
for formulations of war as a legal, an economic, and a social problem as well as for 
assumptions about warfare as a rational and “civilized” undertaking.  
 
War as a legal, social, and economic problem  
Apropros war as a legal problem, Bernard, Röling, and Pal’s dissents yield insights 
into contestations about three aspects in particular. First, they touch upon the question 
of responsibility for the problem of war. The majority judgment made war into a 
problem for which individuals, not states, bore (criminal) responsibility. Referred to 
by the secondary literature as the Tokyo majority’s most “radical” move209, it was also 
one of its most controversial ones. Indeed, while generally agreeing with the idea that 
the problem of war was one for which individuals bore responsibility, both Röling and 
Bernard disagreed with certain aspects of the majority’s conception of responsibility. 
Röling, for one, deprecated how the majority intertwined the notion of individual 
responsibility for war with the concept of conspiracy. Basically, the concept of 
conspiracy implied that “if you were involved, you were responsible for everything”210 
																																																						
208 For a helpful overview of the prosecution’s, the defense’s and the judges’ narratives of the war, cf. 
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majority judgment, Bernard, and Röling by and large confirmed the prosecution’s narrative; Pal, by 
contrast, sided with the defense’s framing of the war (cf. Pal, “Judgment,” 953). 
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– an idea that Röling strictly rejected. Calling the conspiracy charge “one of the ugly 
aspects of the Anglo-Saxon criminal system,” Röling was of the view that “your 
responsibility is restricted to what you have intentionally achieved.”211 For an 
individual to be considered co-responsible for the war, membership in the Japanese 
government alone did not suffice: “To have influence over government decisions one 
needs to occupy a position of power. If one does accept such a position with good 
intentions, one should not be blamed, but praised. Even if in the event one’s 
endeavours fail.”212 
Bernard, by contrast, had no specific contentions about the conspiracy charge’s 
conception of responsibility, generally agreed with the majority that individuals could 
be held responsible for aggressive war, and, as mentioned before, also assumed that 
finding individuals responsible for war did not subtract from the responsibility of 
states. However, he disagreed with the majority’s conception of responsibility for war-
time atrocities. To enlarge the scope of criminal responsibility for war crimes, the 
Tokyo majority used the concept of “negative criminality” to render criminal high-
ranking military and political officials’ failure to prevent the commission of atrocities 
by normal rank and file soldiers. Against this, Bernard argued that in comparison to 
actual atrocities, any omission by higher-ranking officials to undertake possibly 
preventative measures did not constitute “a crime of equal seriousness”: he found that 
“the responsibility involved [in a crime of omission] is of an entirely different nature 
from that of the immediate author” and that the majority judgment had not specified 
this very different kind of responsibility.213 
A second contentious aspect of war as a legal problem which comes to the fore in the 
Tokyo tribunal’s dissents concerns the criminalization of aggressive war as a “return” 
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of just war thinking.214 As Kopelman has pointed out, already since the end of the First 
World War, there had been a revival of “the tradition of folding the jus in bello into the 
jus ad bellum,”215 or of making the incidence of war crimes in an army’s war-time 
conduct depend not on the occurrence of atrocities, but on whether the army had 
fought a just or an unjust war. In this context, the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals saw 
a more explicit reemergence of the legal distinction between aggressive wars and wars 
of self-defense.216 As alluded to in the previous sections, in their various moves for 
rendering aggressive war criminal, the majority of the judges in Tokyo left the term 
“aggression” itself undefined.217 The legal and political difficulties implied in the 
definition of aggression had already led to considerable controversies amongst the 
Allied representatives gathered at the London Conference.218 The majority of the 
judges in Tokyo, rather than coming up with a definition of their own, followed 
Keenan’s aforecited definition of agression without much ado about its validity and 
scope. 
While Bernard and Röling seem to have had little problem with the resulting lack of 
definitorial clarity219, Pal issued a far-reaching critique of this definitional deficiency. 
First off, Pal contended that the definition of aggression was no simple matter: unlike 
what some of his collagues had argued, “in international life as at present organized it 
is not possible ‘by the simple aid of popular knowledge’ to find out which category of 
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war is to be condemned as aggressive.”220 Instead, it needed “a clear agreement of the 
different nations as to the measures which they would deem to be aggressive.”221 
Thereupon, Pal emphasized the inexistence of such an internationally agreed-upon 
definition of aggression to underscore that the contemporary international order 
which his colleagues on the bench sought to preserve and further had been established 
through colonial conquests and subordination, i.e. through aggressive wars. After 
pointing out that “any interest which the Western powers may now have in the 
territories in the Eastern Hemisphere was acquired mostly through armed violence,”222 
Pal stressed that “none of these wars perhaps would stand the test of being a ‘just 
war.’”223 In light of this, Pal found the other judges’ application of just war principles 
to the Japanese case not only grossly erroneous, but also self-righteous. A suitable 
definition of aggression, Pal declared, was one which gave aggressive war “its true 
place in the scheme of knowledge showing its origin and connection with other 
cognate facts,”224 and which thereby disenabled the selective ignorance with which the 
Western powers looked at their own histories of aggression. 
A third aspect of war as a legal problem into which the primary sources under study 
provide insight are differing assumptions about the nature of war’s wrongness (as 
distinct from assumptions about the nature of war). Famously, the judgment of the 
Nuremberg trial had declared aggressive war to be “essentially an evil thing”: “To 
initiate a war of aggression […] is the supreme international crime differing only from 
other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.”225 
In a similar vein, Keenan had opened the Tokyo trial by claiming that it sought to 
address “the scourge of aggressive war.”226 However, a closer look at the Tokyo 
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tribunal’s different approaches and objections to the criminalization of war actually 
finds divergent ideas about the nature of war’s wrongness.  
First off, the Tokyo majority judgment’s combinatory approach for criminalizing 
aggressive war carried with it different assumptions about the nature of war’s 
wrongness. In legal theory, different kinds of crimes implied different kinds of 
wrongs: whereas personal, property, and inchoate crimes were mala in se, i.e. 
inherently wrong or evil, the category of statutory crimes comprised acts that were 
mala prohibita, or wrong insofar as society had decided for these acts to be unwanted 
and had legally codified this decision.227 Hence, in the majority’s combinatory 
approach to criminalization, aggressive war was both a malum in se and a malum 
prohibitum. On the one hand, as the object of a criminal conspiracy and as a trigger for 
other crimes, aggressive war was an inchoate crime, its wrongness inherent in its 
nature. On the other hand, the majority judgment also criminalized aggressive war 
insofar as it constituted a breach of international treaties and amounted to a statutory 
crime whose wrongness was a human-ascribed trait. 
None of the three dissenting judges fully agreed with this dual characterization of 
war’s wrongness. Bernard’s natural law perspective entailed a conception of 
aggressive war as naturally and necessarily evil but could not accommodate any 
stance in which war’s wrongness was based on human decision. Röling, by contrast, 
strongly disagreed with Keenan when the latter “spoke of the crime against peace as 
‘the vilest,’”228 and more generally objected to any view of aggressive war as evil by 
nature. Comparing the crime against peace with war crimes and crimes against 
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humanity, Röling noted a “difference in character” distinguishing the crime against 
peace from the other two kinds of crimes tried in Tokyo: it was not a “vile act, violating 
the law in such a way that punishment has to be inflicted so as to maintain legal 
order.”229 Instead, Röling propagated that aggressive war was a wrong exclusively 
insofar as humans decided to make it so and that the purpose of punishment for this 
wrong was solely to prevent the individual perpetrator from future crimes. In fact, it 
was this reasoned rejection of an understandings of war as malum in se which made it 
necessary for Röling to find an alternative to the majority’s approach to the 
criminalization of aggressive war – which, as I have discussed in the first section, led 
to his construction of war as a “political” crime.  
Like Röling, Pal rejected the view of war as evil by nature, mocking it as a “simple 
belief in a valiant god,”230 yet he did so for entirely different reasons. According to Pal, 
war’s wrongness was neither a natural or otherwise innate evil nor a result of collective 
human decision-making. Rather, while in the abstract war was a neutral instrument of 
statecraft, “an act of national sovereignty for the purpose of changing existing rights 
independently of the objective merits of the attempted change,”231 in its historical actuality, 
war was clearly a wrong. On the one hand, war’s principally neutral character meant 
that in the contemporary international in which “there is no provision anywhere in the 
system for any peaceful adjustment without struggle,”232 war could also be “a 
legitimate instrument of self-help against an international wrong.”233 On the other 
hand, since the “politico-historical evolution of mankind” – Pal carefully avoided the 
term progress – “has been accomplished chiefly through war,”234 war’s historical 
actuality translated into a potentiality: as war had historically been the most effective 
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means for changing the international, “the method of self-help by force” now 
constituted the most effective means of “self-defense or self-preservation”235 for the 
“dominated nations of the present day.”236 Taken together, precisely because 
aggressive war had long been the preferred instrument of Western powers for 
subjugating peoples and forming the international according to their interests, it could 
and should now fall to the “dominated nations” to seize this instrument for their 
purposes.  
While Pal thus argued vehemently against his colleagues’ formulations of war as a 
legal problem, he did conceive of war as problematic in other ways. Notably, Pal 
theorized war as a social problem. Citing William Hesseltine, a US-American pacifist, 
historian, and member of the socialist party237, Pal contended that “an inevitable 
concomitant of armed warfare” was a profound sense of hatred between individuals 
on the war’s different sides – i.e., that war produced an “enmity [which] finds its 
natural expression not only on the battlefield in the heat of conflict but also in the lives 
of the soldiers and the sentiment of the community from which they come.”238 In a long 
passage of Hesseltine’s writing on the US-American Civil War which Pal quoted 
verbatim, war was stipulated to produce such enmity through two kinds of processes. 
On the one hand, hatred and enmity were “the natural result of the upheaval of the 
social order which the war produced.”239 On the other hand, however, they also 
resulted from the extreme nature of combat situations:  
“The attachment to an ideal, a cause, or a country, when such attachment calls for the 
sacrifice of security and life, blinds the person feeling that attachment to whatever of 
virtue there may be in the opposing ideal, cause, or country. Seemingly, it becomes 
necessary for the supporters of one cause […] to hate the supporters of the enemy cause 
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with a venom which counter-balances their devotion to their own. […] The enemy 
becomes a thing to be hated; he does not share the common virtues, and his 
peculiarities of speech, race, or culture become significant as points of difference or, 
better, sins of the greater magnitude.”240 
In this argumentation, it was not enmity that led to war, but war which produced 
enmity. The disturbance of the social order which war induced and the existential 
threat which war-time violence constituted for its participants rendered previously 
neutral, not morally connoted markers of difference (“peculiarities”) into violations of 
morality (“sins”) and, in effect, led to the de-humanization of enemy combatants, 
making them “thing[s] to be hated.” Pal did not explicitly link the passage by 
Hesseltine to his overall argument about the role of war in the establishment and 
maintenance of a colonial international order, but the connection can be inferred: as 
Western powers used military force to construct colonial empires, the people they 
subjugated became immoral and non-human objects to them. 
Röling also took war to be socially problematic, yet did so in a rather different 
inflection. Initially, Röling seems to have assumed that war, since it inevitably 
produced enmity, was socially problematic by nature. Röling’s expectations about the 
situation he would encounter in Japan were not derived from scholarly works such as 
Hesseltine’s, however. Rather, they were shaped by his personal experiences of the 
German occupation of the Netherlands. In his retrospective interviews, Röling 
recounted that “we resented the Germans very much, and […] refused to have any 
contact with them,”241 and that “[w]hen I came to Japan, I felt, well, we are now the 
occupying power and we will be treated in the same way.”242 However, he soon 
noticed that “[t]here was a very different attitude towards war and victory there [in 
Japan] from the one I was used to.”243 When he told two new Japanese acquaintances 
“of my attitude in Holland to the occupying power and asked them whether they had 
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the same kind of feeling […] they were quite amazed and they explained that for them 
the war was over. […] Nothing of the past should prevent us from […] becoming 
friends.”244 Hence, whereas Röling had originally assumed that his own experience 
was universalizable and that war necessarily produced an insurmountable 
resentment, he later, and again due to personal experience, changed his mind about 
this social facet of war.  
In addition, Röling also regarded war as economically problematic. In his interviews 
with Cassese, Röling applied the general question of whether war was economically 
beneficial or disdvantageous to the cases on trial in Nuremberg and Tokyo. In this 
context, Röling pointed out that while many German industrialists had hoped to 
benefit from the Nazis’ military and genocidal campaign and had therefore 
contributed to this campagin in a significant way, the economic elite of Japan, because 
“[t]hey were convinced that the war would disturb that [industrial] development” of 
Japan, had been opposed to the war.245 For this reason, Röling thought it correct that 
in the prosecution in Tokyo had not indicted industrial leaders. 
Pal agreed with Röling insofar as the non-indictment of Japan’s leading industrialists 
was concerned, but challenged the way in which the question was posed. For once, 
Pal’s apologetic inclination led him to a conclusion which aligned with those of his 
dissenting his colleague: like Röling, Pal also believed that “the war potentialities of 
[Japan’s] industries” had not been a cause of the war.246 Yet at a more general level, Pal 
found arguments about war’s immediate economic costs and benefits to be besides the 
point. “To look at the problem thus,”247 he contended, blinded one to how the economic 
development of the West had historically been based on “transmuting military 
violence into commercial profit,”248 as over the course of centuries, the economic 
development of the West had been enabled by imperial conquests. Reframed in this 
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way, the economically problematic character of war was yet another reason why Pal 
was deeply sceptical of the tribunal’s proclaimed intention to achieve a just and 
peaceful international order. Since “‘the man of violence cannot both genuinely repent 
of his violence and permanently profit by it’”249 – a quote he took from Arnold 
Toynbee’s work on the development of civilizations – Pal argued that so long as many 
of the colonial era’s mechanisms of economic exploitation continued to exist, the 
Tokyo trial’s selective criminalization of aggressive war was a sham. 
 
Rational, controllable, ethical: assumptions about “civilized” war-time violence 
In the second part of this section, and taking my cue from the findings of the preceding 
chapters as well as from Kopelman, I want to take a closer look at how “the assumption 
that the ravages of warfare should be mitigated as far as possible by prohibiting 
needless cruelties” was intertwined with “[t]he idea of ‘civilized warfare.’”250 At the 
Tokyo tribunal, in how far did assumptions about the controllability of war-time 
violence overlap with ideas regarding this violence’s (ir-)rationality? And how were 
they entangled with beliefs about “civilization” as a prerequisite of effective ethical 
action? 
A first indication of the three dissenting judges’ views regarding the controllability of 
war-time violence can be gleaned from their objections to the majority’s concept of 
negative criminality. When the majority of the judges in Tokyo employed the concept 
of negative criminality to find the Japanese political and military leaders guilty of 
having failed to prevent war crimes, this presupposed that it was possible to control 
war-time violence by official order. As mentioned above, Bernard thoroughly 
disagreed with the concept of negative criminality. He did not believe war-time 
violence to be fully controllable, and rejected, for instance, the argument that “Army 
or Navy commanders can, by order, secure proper treatment and prevent ill-treatment 
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of prisoners”: “‘Can’ is not right; ‘might’ only would be true.”251 Therefore, 
criminalizing instances in which the military command structures failed to prevent 
atrocities made no sense to Bernard. Joining in with Bernard’s refutation of the concept 
of negative criminality, Röling argued that since “[n]o government or commander will 
be able to prevent all war crimes,” some “war crimes are likely to be committed.”252 
Likewise, Pal concurred that “the alleged atrocious incidents” commited by Japanese 
rank and file soldiers were “not at all unusual” insofar as “[t]here is no army or navy 
in the world which has not committed crimes of this nature.”253 All in all, the three 
dissenting judges were in broad agreement that effectively managing war-time 
violence from afar was far more difficult than the majority judgment assumed. 
A number of passages of Röling and Pal’s writings allow for a closer examination of 
the entanglements between assumptions about control, rationality, and “civilization” 
to which Kopelman only alludes in passing. To start with, in a breakdown of how its 
“behaviour” in the Russo-Japanese War had enabled Japan to join “the group of 
‘civilized states,’” Röling pointed out different ways in which warfare could be 
“civilized”:  
“At that time the Japanese were praised for their gallantry in fighting and for 
honouring the laws of war. Perhaps that praise was a bit exaggerated by the British, 
because it was England that introduced Japan to the circle of ‘civilized nations’. […] 
Fighting like a gentleman was, according to the British, an indication of ‘civilization’. 
Other commentators explained the admission of Japan to the group of ‘civilized states’ 
as a consequence of Japan’s military power. It had beaten China, and then Russia. […] 
Once it had proved it was able to fight a war with modern, scientific weapons, Japan 
was recognized as a civilized nation.”254 
I quote Röling’s account at length because it is indicative of several distinct ideas about 
what made the conduct of war “civilized.” Firstly, war-time violence was “civilized” 
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if it showed courage, but also restraint and respect for the laws of war. A second 
marker of “civilized” war-time violence was its modernity, or its being fought 
rationally and with “scientific” technology. And finally, its success meant that Japan’s 
conduct of the war had to have been “civilized” – for it was unthinkable that an 
“uncivilized” country could be militarily superior to a “civilized” one. These three 
markers of “civilized” conduct in war usually appeared in combination: “civilized” 
warfare was warfare which won wars whilst avoiding the use of atrocious and 
irrational kinds of violence – “needless cruelties,” as Kopelman puts it.  
Moreover, Röling’s account also bespeaks a certain notion of “civilization” as a 
singular phenomenon of which Japan was not naturally a part. In this understanding, 
there was only one “civilization” and only one way of being “civilized.” Through 
mastery of this way, originally “uncivilized” nations could become “civilized” and 
gain admittance to “the group of ‘civilized states.’” Thus, in Röling’s account, the way 
in which the Japanese army had employed violence in the Russo-Japanese war was an 
indication of its proficiency in “civilized” conduct. 
In light of these various aspects of “civilization,” how to make sense of the Japanese 
conduct of the Pacific War? Röling and Pal both interpreted the conduct of the 
Japanese in contrast to that of their German allies. Röling maintained that the Japanese 
conduct of the war was wholly unlike that of “the German scoundrels, the SS, who 
killed uselessly,”255 and Pal found that as far as the responsibility of military and 
political leaders for war crimes was concerned, “the case before us stands on a footing 
entirely different from what was found […] at the trial of the European-Axis-Major-
War-Criminals.”256 Yet in making these very similar differentiations, Röling and Pal 
developed entirely different arguments about war-time violence and “civilization.” 
Although he himself did not put it like this, Röling’s main concern in this regard 
amounted to comprehending how the Germans could have committed irrational or 
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“useless” war crimes and crimes against humanity in spite of their “civilization.” To 
respond to this explanatory challenge, Röling theorized that in the German conduct of 
the war, a first round of atrocities could be explained as an instance in which the 
German soldiers had been misled – and realizing what they had done, they thereupon 
perpetrated subsequent atrocities in order to “kill [their] conscience.”257 Hence, after 
their capacity for rational and ethical insight and action had failed the Germans once, 
this same capacity then drove them to perpetrate further irrational and unethical acts 
of violence. While this argument helped Röling to square the status of Germany as a 
“civilized” country with the irrationality he saw in the German conduct of the war, he 
maintained that “[i]t doesn’t help at all to understand the Japanese.”258 Yet this does 
not seem to have troubled him very much: for in comparison with the German conduct 
of the war, the Japanese conduct actually posed few interpretive problems for Röling. 
The Japanese army had used violence rationally and with little restraint, and Röling 
simply noted that it had thus not fought in as ‘civilized’ a manner as it had during the 
Russo-Japanese War.259 
By contrast, Pal’s main objective in making sense of war-time atrocities was to point 
out the hypocrisy of trying the Japanese leaders for war crimes whilst leaving the 
nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki legally unaccounted for.260 The 
comparison, Pal argued, ought to be drawn not between the German and the Japanese, 
but between the German and the Allied powers’ conduct of the war: “[i]n the Pacific 
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war under our consideration, if there was anything approaching [the German crimes], 
it is the decision coming from the allied powers to use the atom bomb.”261 Some of his 
contemporaries had urged that “the atom bomb comes to force a more fundamental 
searching of the nature of warfare and of the legitimate means for the pursuit of 
military objectives,”262 yet to Pal, this call for a new reckoning about the nature of 
warfare only demonstrated the ignorance of those who issued it. “We need not stop to 
consider” the nature of warfare anew, wrote Pal, for “if any indiscriminate destruction 
of civilian life and property is still illegitimate in warfare, then, in the Pacific war, this 
decision to use the atom bomb is the only near approach to the directives of […] the 
Nazi leaders during the second world war.”263  
Moreover, Pal’s dissent also contained a twofold critique of assumptions about 
rationality and restraint as the combined markers of “civilized” warfare. On the one 
hand, Pal discerned a “persistent tendency on the part of the belligerents to shape their 
conduct according to what they consider to be their own needs.”264 This propensity, 
Pal argued, overrode any considerations of restraint and was characteristic not only of 
the Japanese army’s conduct265, but of that of the Allied forces, too.266 Not least in view 
of the Allied employment of nuclear bombs, the assumption that, in nominally 
‘civilized’ warfare, the principles of means-ends rationality and restraint went hand in 
hand was clearly deceptive. On the other hand, Pal’s dissent also challenged 
assumptions about the rational logic of warfare. Musing that “[h]istory will say 
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whether any outburst of popular sentiment against the usage [the atomic bomb] is 
irrational and only sentimental”267, Pal highlighted the speciousness of the seemingly 
straightforward argument that the Allied bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had 
simply been a rational step to win the war. Hence, Pal’s dissent questioned not only 
the assumption of an infallible link between rationality and restraint in the conduct of 
presumably ‘civilized’ warfare, but also what rationality as such actually meant. 
A final insight that can be gleaned from Pal and Röling’s writings is the crucial role 
that  racism and de-humanization played in enabling the bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. In another instance in which Pal took issue with what he perceived to be his 
contemporaries’ ignorance, he argued against the idea that “these blasts [the atomic 
bombs] have brought home to mankind ‘that every human being has a stake in the 
conduct not only of national affairs but also of world affairs’”268: “Perhaps these 
explosives have awakened within us the sense of unity of mankind […]. But certainly 
these feelings were non-existent at the time when the bombs were dropped.”269 
Similarly, Röling contended that the US army saw “the Japanese as a sub-human race. 
The bombing of the Japanese cities, followed by the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, was made possible by precisely that feeling that it was not human beings 
they were cremating by the hundreds of thousands.”270 Röling conjectured that “the 
notion of white supremacy” and the “racial discrimination” experienced by the 
Japanese “may have been one of the roots of the Pacific War” only with considerable 
hindsight.271 Pal’s dissent, by contrast, was incensed and indignant over the matter. 
Highlighting that “the word humanity” had routinely been used “so as to exclude 
reference to the unlucky dominated nations of the world,”272 Pal concluded that he did 
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not “perceive any such feeling of broad humanity in the justifying words of those who 
were responsible for [the atomic bombs’] use.”273 
To summarize, in this section I have inquired into formulations of war as legally, 
socially, and economically problematic, as well as into understandings of warfare as a 
rationally controllable problem and a problem of “civilization.” At the Tokyo tribunal, 
whether and how war and warfare constituted actionable problems in and for 
international politics were contentious questions: next to a sharp divide between Pal 
and virtually all of his colleagues, there were also many smaller fissures separating 
Bernard and Röling’s stances on the matter both from each other and from the 
majority. The analysis of these controversies has produced a number of insights into 
the premises enabling and structuring different formulations of the problem of war in 
Tokyo. While these premises defy any straightforward systematization, I want to 
suggest that in one way or another, they all differ in their assumptions about the 
temporal and spatial scope of the problem of war as well as in their awareness of this 
scope. 
To start with, looking for and wondering about conceptions of war as a legal problem 
led me onto competing views of the nature of war’s wrongness. These views not only 
situate the problem of war within differing temporal and spatial horizons, but also 
show differing degrees of awareness of this situatedness. To understand war’s 
wrongness as naturally evil or a malum in se assumes the existence of a temporally and 
spatially ubiquitous legal order, a legal order simultaneously present and ever-present 
which the criminalization of war could help to keep in this timelessly present state. By 
contrast, the view of war’s wrongness as a wrongness by decree or a malum prohibitum 
presupposes a legal order which is historical – and political – in the sense of being 
made and re-made by humans. Against both of these understandings stands Pal’s view 
of war as an in principle neutral tool, yet a wrong in its historical actuality. When 
combined with the critique of just war thinking’s blindness towards the unjustness of 
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the wars waged by European colonial powers, this view considers war’s wrongness in 
transtemporal and transspatial terms: because of war’s historical wrongness and 
because of the ongoing effects of this wrongness in the contemporary international, 
war, at present, ought to be seen not (only) as a wrong, but (also) as a right of those 
who have been so negatively effected by it in the past.  
Different premises about the temporal and spatial nature of the problem of war were 
also inherent to the dissenting judges’ formulations of war as a social and an economic 
problem. While Pal’s assumptions about the de-humanizing effects of war-time 
violence claimed applicability across time and space, Röling’s view of the social 
problem of war, based on his personal experiences, emphasized the non-universality 
of war’s social consequences. With regard to war as an economic problem, the 
disparity between the majority judgment and Röling’s stance on the one hand and 
Pal’s dissent on the other brings into focus the delimitations inherent in how questions 
about war’s economic aspects are formulated. Specifically, by fixating on war’s more 
immediate and more immediately observable costs and benefits, the familar question 
of whether war is economically advantageous or disadvantegous often overlooks the 
crucial role of longer-term economic developments: for instance, the role that colonial 
exploitation and violence have played in the economic development of the West. It 
disregards, that is, what Pal referred to as the transmutation of “military violence into 
commerical profit.” 
Finally, as I tried to disentangle the various aspects of the idea of “civilized” warfare, 
I happened upon not only different formulations of warfare as problematic, but also 
different motives for making sense of the occurrence of presumably problematic war-
time violence. Here, I would like to suggest that these different interpretive intentions 
assigned distinct temporal and spatial scopes to the problem at stake. To develop this 
contention, I revisit Shilliam’s conceptualization of European-modernity originally 
introduced in Chapter 3 of this thesis. This conceptualization highlights that whereas 
the temporal aspect of non-European-modern subjectivity can potentially be 
overcome, its spatial aspect is practically impossible to surmount. For while “pre-/yet-
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to-be-modern subjects” can employ “techniques through which they might cultivate a 
sufficient ethical adeptness,” they will never be able to claim the “European ancestry” 
which is the spatial marker of European-modernity.274  
For the example under study here, Shilliam’s conceptualization of European-
modernity highlights the ambiguities inherent in a “civilizational” understanding of 
the problem of war which attempted to locate this problem firmly outside European-
modernity. Firstly, warfare is problematic insofar as it is “uncivilized,” yet 
determining the “civilizational” quality of particular instances of war-time violence 
might pose a conundrum: insofar as warfare served as a technique for becoming 
“civilized,” the conduct of a particular war (for example, the Russo-Japanese War, as 
discussed by Röling) could be both “un-civilized”/problematic and “civilized”/un-
problematic – depending on the point in time from which it was regarded. Secondly, 
and as indicated by the explanatory challenge that the German conduct of the Second 
World War posed for Röling, the temporal and the spatial axis of the “civilizational” 
understanding of the problem of war as located outside European-modernity 
functioned according to different logics: wheras the atrocities committed by the 
German army were a temporary lapsus of “civilization,” an aberration of otherwise – 
as per their European-modern ancestry – “civilized” people, the atrocities committed 
by the Japanese were the deeds of people who could not claim such ancestry or 
permanently “civilized” status.  
In spite of such ambiguities, however, this “civilizational” understanding of the 
problem of war was difficult to challenge – as Pal’s dissent attests to. Pal made 
countless direct and indirect references to the violence and warfare through which 
European powers subjugated people in other parts of the world. There are also 
multiple passages in which Pal lumps together the Allied dropping of nuclear bombs 
with the atrocities committed by the German army. In effect, Pal’s argumentation puts 
into question the meaning of ideas such as rationality, restraint, and “civilization” in 
																																																						
274 Shilliam, “Decolonising the Grounds,” 250f. 
 
	 303 
the conduct of war. Pal himself did not put these pieces together, yet the bigger picture 
beginning to emerge from his arguments is one in which the problem of war is no 
longer located outside European-modernity: it is a picture of European-moderns who 
realized their professed proficiency in ethical matters – their alleged “civilization” and 
their exclusive capacity for moral reasoning and action – through the violence they 
inflicted on assumedly “uncivilized” people. Nonetheless, what the secondary 
literature has mostly discussed with regard to Pal’s dissent is not his radically different 
vision of the spatio-temporal location of the problem of war, but his stance towards 
imperial Japan – which, though worthy of critique, is perhaps not all that different in 




With the aim of looking beyond disciplinary legacies of “Tokyoberg” as an origin and 
symbol of the power of law over war in international politics, in this chapter I have 
directed my gaze at three main areas of inquiry. First, I attended to different 
approaches – and objections – to the criminalization of war and to their inherent 
assumptions about the state of the international and the possibilities of progress. The 
majority judgment in Tokyo criminalized war through a variety of approaches, and in 
effect made it into a variegated crime. To varying extents, the three dissenting judges 
disagreed with this combinatory approach. Bernard found aggressive war to be 
timelessly and universally criminal and was therefore largely indifferent towards his 
colleagues’ efforts at criminalization. Röling sought to render aggressive war criminal 
by likening it to a domestic political crime. Finally, Pal argued against any 
criminalization of war. Moreover, these different approaches to criminalization were 
based on different understandings of the international as the socio-political realm in 
which criminalization was to be effected. In particular, the judges on the bench in 
Tokyo held markedly different views of the present state of the international and the 
necessity and meaning of international progress. The majority advocated a bounded 
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progress towards peace that would leave intact the international status quo. The 
dissenting judges disagreed: Röling envisioned that international peace would require 
alterations of the principle of state sovereignty, and Pal argued for a radical kind of 
international progress that would transcend the presently existing and historically 
constituted relations of domination and violence. These visions took the 
criminalization of war to be, respectively, an instrument for achieving international 
progress, an instrument for securing progress that had been achieved by other means, 
and an instrument that hindered progress. In sum, the first section of the chapter thus 
showed how criminalization, far from being a ready-made tool for rendering war into 
an actionable problem, required construction – and that underlying the arguments 
through which it was constructed were wholly different understandings and visions 
of international politics.  
Secondly, I looked at epistemological aspects of the Tokyo tribunal’s work. To probe 
how the tribunal made war into not only an actionable, but also an epistemic object, I 
focused on the three dissenting judges’ contentions about the majority’s practices for 
determining the truth content of pieces of evidence and for drawing inferences from 
evidence to evidentiary facts and from evidentiary facts to the facta probanda of 
aggressive war and conspiracy thereto. On this basis, I then reflected on the analytical 
usefulness of a number of concepts developed in previous chapters in trawling this 
empirical material. While the concept of epistemic practices did not offer much 
analytical grip, the concept of ways of knowing enabled me to illuminate the 
epistemological aspects of two distinct legal traditions, the common law or Anglo-
Saxon and the civil law or continental system of criminal law. Finally, conceptualizing 
the judge as a subject of knowledge allowed me to pose anew the question of the political 
nature of knowledge: not (only) as a question about the instrumentalization of 
knowledge-as-information for political purposes, but (also) as a question about the 




Thirdly, I scrutinized the three dissenting judges’ writings for how they conceived of 
war as a problem of international politics. In the first part of the section, I looked at 
formulations of war as a legal, social, and economic problem. Apropos war as a legal 
problem, I traced controversies surrounding the majority’s attribution of responsibility 
for aggressive war to individuals as well as its (re-)turn to just war thinking. Moreover, 
I discussed the divergent assumptions about the nature of war’s wrongness 
underlying the Tokyo Tribunal’s different approaches to the criminalization of war. 
All three of the dissenting judges opposed the majority’s assumption of war as a wrong 
both due to its inherent nature (war as evil or malum in se) and insofar as humans 
decided to make it so (war as a statutory crime or malum prohibitum): while Bernard 
and Röling held war to be, respectively, either only a malum in se or only a malum 
prohibitum, Pal stipulated war as a principally neutral tool, yet a wrong in its historical 
actuality. With regard to war as a social problem, I discussed Pal’s understanding of 
the processes whereby war and war-time violence are not so much the result as the 
cause of enmity and de-humanization, as well as Röling’s experience-based intuition 
that the social problem of war was not of a universal nature. Finally, with respect to 
war as an economic problem, Röling’s reflections about the immediate economic costs 
and benefits of the Pacific War contrasted with Pal’s argument about the role 
aggressive war had played, over the longue durée, in the development of the 
international order.  
Thereafter, the third section also looked into the notion of “civilized” warfare and its 
underlying assumptions about war-time violence as rational, controllable, and ethical. 
Here, all of the three dissenting judges disagreed with the majority’s concept of 
“negative criminality” and its assumptions about the extent to which war-time 
violence is controllable. Furthermore, I pondered how the notion of “civilized” 
warfare operates to make some instances of war-time violence more puzzling than 
others. Finally, Pal’s dissent in particular questioned not only the notion that 
“civilized” warfare is characterized by a balance between the purposiveness of 
violence and the ethical imperative of restraint, but also the meaning of the idea of 
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means-ends rationality in the nuclear age. The section ended with a reflection on what 
these formulations of war as a legal, social, and economic problem and of war-time 
violence as “(un-)civilized” implied about the temporal and spatial scope of the 
problem of war.  
How do these manifold points compare to the findings of the previous chapters, and 
how do they relate to the problematization of war in contemporary international 
politics? To prepare the ground these larger questions, I again want to conclude the 
chapter by summarizing some of the insights it affords into the co-productive 
relationship between different analytical elements as well as into the constitutive 
exclusions of how war as an object of knowledge and action was configured in the 
example under study. As to the co-productive relationship between war’s becoming 
an actionable problem and its formation as an epistemic object, the materials discussed 
in this chapter illustrated, first, how the instrument of criminalization and the 
knowledge-production requirements that came with it produced war as a particular 
kind of problem. Consider, for instance, how the preconditions for empirical 
knowledge about war contributed to the court’s decision to employ the concept of 
conspiracy. As Kopelmann points out, “[b]y considering the defendants as individuals 
in order to avoid any Act of State defense and then drawing them together in a 
conspiracy, the Judgment attempted to escape technical, evidentiary limitations on its 
decision-making.”275 Employed to circumvent evidentiary standards, the concept of 
conspiracy not only made of war, as Kopleman notes, a problem for which individuals 
were responsible. It also implied war as a problem which was inherently wrong rather 
than a wrong by human decision.  
Secondly, the chapter also indicated how different theories of truth can contribute to 
the production of knowledgeable subjects. In the example of the Tokyo Tribunal, some 
judges’ self-understandings seem to have been informed by a correspondence theory 
of truth. Supposing that truth was a property of the object to be known, this theoretical 
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stance led them to assume a position to the outside of the objects they were seeking to 
know. Other judges, by contrast, seemingly acted on the assumption of a coherence 
theory of truth according to which truth depended on a judge’s insight into the overall 
constellation of pieces of evidence. This made of truth a property of subjective (and 
intersubjective) reasoning. Moreover, it assumed a subject whose epistemic capacities 
stemmed not from their positioning towards the object of their knowledge, but from 
their experience and, potentially, their situatedness within historical and political 
contexts.   
As stated before, I do not meant to suggest that Pal, Röling and their colleagues were 
aware of, let alone explicitly debated or actively sought to further these different 
understandings of themselves as knowledgeable subjects. Rather, and as explained in 
Chapter 2, I hope that my analysis of the historical (co-)production of different objects, 
subjects, and their preconditions can ultimately serve as material for getting to work 
on the constitutive exclusions of our contemporary ways of knowing and addressing 
the problem of war. In this context, by illustrating how different theories of truth imply 
differently constituted subjects of knowledge, the above discussion suggests as 
political an aspect of our ways of knowing which is usually not seen as such – namely, 
our methodological and epistemological, presumably “underlying” assumptions. 
What else does this chapter’s analysis suggest in terms of the constitutive exclusions 
of the problematization of war? Three further points seem particularly noteworthy. 
For one, the chapter has pointed to the constitutive exclusions of what it meant, to the 
judges on the bench in Toyko, for war and warfare to be “(un-)civilized.” In this 
context, Pal’s dissent questioned his colleagues’ understanding of the notion of 
“civilized” warfare as warfare that was rational both in the sense of being purposive 
and the result of means-ends calculations and in the sense of being restrained and 
controlled. The point this raises is that the notion of “civilized” and rational warfare 
worked to exclude the possibility that in any war, all of the parties to the war might 
engage in both rational and irrational violence, and that there was thus no stable and 
straightforward connection between the presumed “rationality” of warfare and its 
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morality. Irrespective of the differing conclusions the judges in Tokyo reached about 
the criminality and morality of the violence committed by the Axis and Allied powers 
in the Pacific War (or perhaps, irrespective of which party one or another judge sought 
to be an apologist for), the materials presented in this chapter thus highlight how the 
idea of “civilized” and rational warfare structured which violence and which wars 
were and were not seen as problematic. 
This particular blindness of international law, Pal’s dissent suggested, might be 
explained by its complicity in bringing about the current international order. “When 
international law will allow a victor nation thus to define a crime at its will,” Pal wrote, 
“it will […] be surprised to find itself back on the same spot whence it started on its 
apparently onward journey several centuries ago.”276 International law would find 
itself in a situation, that is, which was not all that different from “those days when [the 
victor in a war] was allowed to devastate the occupied country with fire and sword, 
appropriate all public and private property therein, and kill the inhabitants or take 
them away into captivity.”277 It was this sort of aggressive war which, Pal argued, had 
brought about the contemporary international order, and this sort of aggressive war 
which he had in mind when he emphasized that “there was hardly a big power which 
was free from that taint,” yet that “all the powerful nations” were not equally held to 
account for by international law.278 International law’s capacity for problematizing 
war, Pal might be taken as suggesting, depended not least on its ability to ignore its 
historical complicity in the crimes it was now judging. This made law ill-positioned to 
grasp – let alone address – the aggressiveness of the wars by means of which the Allied 
powers had built their empires and the violence and inequality which still defined the 
present-day international. 
A final point I would like to note is that for all of the challenging questions it raised 
about the constitutive exclusions of criminalization as a means for problematizing war, 
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Pal’s dissent did not offer a way out of the conundrum it pointed to. Pal did imagine 
that at an unspecified future point in time, the international as a kind of human 
association might no longer be a society of states “isolated in spite of their association” 
but a community of nations founded on the harmonious co-existence of its constituent 
members.279 However, rather than specifying means or mechanisms for the 
transformation of the international into a community no longer in need of the 
instrument of war, Pal focused on developing the argument that in the contemporary 
international, states should not be deprived of this instrument. The larger question this 
raises is this: what potential do different ways of problematizing war carry for 
imagining progress, and specifically for conceiving of less exclusionary ways for 
realizing a future without war?  
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international community under the reign of law, or correctly, the formation of a world community 
under the reign of law, in which nationality or race should find no place” (ibid., 578). 
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Reflective vignette 3 
On practices of looking 
 
Besides raising questions large and small about criminalization as a means for 
problematizing war, there has also been another purpose to the preceding chapter. 
Inspired by one of the insights of my analysis of the Balkan Commission’s work – 
namely, that the commissioners at some point swapped their practice of collecting 
materials for the practice of direct observation – the exercise of “looking beyond 
‘Tokyoberg,’” as per the preceding chapter’s title, was one of experimenting with my 
own practices of looking.  
Originally, much like my experimentation with practices of writing in Chapter 4, this 
experimentation with practices of looking was a response to pragmatic imperatives 
that had arisen in the course of my historical research. This time round, the challenge 
was that the archive on the international military tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo 
was far too vast and well-researched to allow for the kind of comprehensive and 
simultaneously fresh look which I had previously taken at other archives. It was clear 
that I would have to take decisions about my focus and my selection of materials. Yet 
it was also clear that I would have to do so without being able to rely on the kind of 
preliminary comprehension of the whole of the archive and the secondary literature 
that, or so I had found comfort in imagining, had formed the basis of my decision-
making process when researching the Balkan Commission, for instance.   
In reflexive research, Yanow writes, the “purposive selection of texts, respondents, 
and/or observational posts” can serve to “intentionally and self-consciously address 
the oblique, partial sight that characterizes all human observation.”1 Heeding this 
advice, I decided to make the challenge of this particular archive work to my 
advantage: I would experiment with my delimitation of the analysis’ field of view and 
																																																						
1 Yanow, “Neither Rigorous Nor Objective,” 77. 
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with my definition of the vantage point from which the analysis was conceived. I was 
taking a gamble. Would looking at only a small number of marginal documents afford 
me enough insights to base a chapter on them? And would this chapter not fall short 
analytically when compared to the previous two, in which individual perspectives by 
design retreated behind emerging orders of things?  
Developing genealogical practices of looking is a difficult task: as Verena Erlenbusch 
puts it, the challenge consists in cultivating practices capable of “recognizing the 
limitations of our system of thought.”2 To start with, genealogical research needs to be 
familiar with the archive’s order of things, yet it also needs to question the archive’s 
categories and the limits that these impose on what we can spot in the sources we 
gather. This is what I have attempted to do in looking at the criminalization of war in 
the practice of the IMTFE: I have tried to understand what this criminalization meant 
to those who were debating it in Tokyo and what it has meant to those who have 
researched it since, and at the same time, I have sought to take these debates as 
instances of the problematization of war and to weigh how their categories impinge 
upon my interest in this problematization. Moreover, genealogy must also be mindful 
of those of its limitations which, inevitably, stem from its own emerging ways and 
practices. My evolving notion of the problematization of war, for instance, had been 
enabled not least by the concepts, practices, and empirical orders of things that I had 
established through my work on previous chapters. Therefore, as part of looking 
beyond “Tokyoberg,” I have tried to query some of these concepts, practices, and 
orders. Finally, genealogy must not take its own point of view for granted. My 
perspective on the things I was researching, I had come to realize, could not be based 
on an Archimedean point, but was part of, affected by, and sometimes interrupted and 
destabilized by my research. To make good on this insight, the intentionally partial 
gaze that I have honed in Chapter 5 has sought to part ways with the ideal of the all-
																																																						
2 Verena Erlenbusch cited in Colin Koopman, “Ways of Doing Genealogy: Inquiry after Foucault. A 
Group Interview with Verena Erlenbusch, Simon Ganahl, Robert W. Gehl, Thomas Nail and Perry 
Zurn,” Le foucauldien 3, no. 1 (2017). 
 
	 312 
seeing observer. All in all, then, genealogy needs practices of looking that will 
recognize when they reach their limits. “When does a particular set of data fit into 
existing categories and when do we need new categories?,“3 Erlenbusch asks. And we 
might add: when do we need new practices?  
Like other epistemic practices, practices of looking are political, too. As John Berger 
has argued, “we never look at just one thing; we are always looking at the relation 
between things and ourselves.”4 Hence, our ways and practices of looking are political 
in how they forge relations, producing us as subjects for how we are interconnected 
with, yet distinct from that which – and those whom – we are observing. With regards 
to war, this implies that our practices of looking are not only political insofar as they 
are instrumentalized for certain purposes, i.e. insofar as “what is ‘seen’ and 
‘witnessed’” in war, as Joanna Tidy writes, becomes “a material of political currency” 
through which we “make sense of, make, and remake war as a thing socially known 
and in existence.”5 Our practices of looking are also political for how the “frames” 
through which we make sense of war and of the lives it takes, as Judith Butler 
contends, help to enable this continued existence of war: for how these frames “work 
to differentiate the lives we can apprehend from those we cannot,” and for how they 
thus “not only organize visual experience but also generate specific ontologies of the 
subject.”6 For short, our practices of looking help produce – and are in turn at least 
partially reproduced by – the problem of war and us in relation to it.  
When Foucault suggested that one key “trait” of genealogy was “its affirmation of 
knowledge as perspective,” he was taking issue with what he perceived to be a 
standard practice on which his colleagues’ conduct of research was predicated: 
“Historians take unusual pains to erase the elements in their work which reveal their 
																																																						
3 Ibid. 
4 John Berger, Ways of Seeing (London, UK: Penguin, 2008 [1972]), at 9. 
5 Joanna Tidy, “Visual regimes and the politics of war experience: Rewriting war ‘from above’ in 
WikiLeaks’ ‘Collateral Murder,’” Review of International Studies 43, no. 1 (2016), 95-111, at 95.  
6 Butler, Frames of War, 3. For the argument that the epistemology of war, or war’s “frames,” enables 
war’s ontology, cf. ibid., 29. 
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grounding in a particular time and place, their preferences in a controversy – the 
unavoidable obstacles of their passion.“7 How could historical research be otherwise? 
Foucault’s answer was a call for historical research which would neither dissolve itself 
“before the objects it observes” nor dissolve these objects under its observing gaze.8 
Instead, historical research was to “[give] equal weight to its own sight and to its 
objects” so that in its study of the histories of these objects, it would also study the 
history of itself and its ways of knowing.9 In this way, genealogy could become become 
a “curative science.”10 
Foucault’s argument is relevant here not so much for its applicability to historical 
research then or now, but for the question it raises about a genealogical curiosity. How 
does such a curiosity strike the balance between its own sight and the perceptions, 
perspectives, and knowledges it studies? For one, it could notice the resemblances 
between itself and these knowledges. It could look, for instance, into the “passion” 
that, as Foucault contends, is inevitably a part of any will to knowledge. Indeed, I have 
often recognized myself in the sources I studied, for example in the Balkan 
commissioners’ exhilaration upon seeing something that had presumably not been 
seen before (at least not by “Western” eyes) and also in their terror of seeing the traces 
of the wars’ violence on people’s bodies, on houses, on landscapes.  
At the same time, Foucault also makes it clear that a genealogical gaze and the curiosity 
it expresses and furthers cannot but be afforded from our being situated in a certain 
time and place. Here, the question of striking a balance becomes an ethical one. With 
Zurn, we might  
“wonder how much flights of curiosity are the purview of privilege. Living in the grip of 
marginalization, one's curiosity is often hard, cold, and quick. How can I survive this 
moment? […] When I endorse curiosity as a political practice, I am forced to confront what 
																																																						
7 Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 90. 





that assumes about the practitioners of curiosity.”11 
In this sense, however much my taking a genealogical look at the problem of war is 
intended to re-implicate me in this problem, I can only afford this look because I am 
not, as Zurn would say, immediately in the “grip” of war. What does this imply for 
the ethics of a genealogical curiosity? How can such a curiosity best use the privilege 
that enables it?  
Foucault once wrote that “[w]e must not imagine that the world turns toward us a 
legible face which we have only to decipher.”12 Yet rather than as a cause for despair, 
we should see this as a chance: a chance to question how our practices of looking make 
some worlds and not others, and to see in our crafting of practices and ways of looking 




11 Zurn cited in Koopman, “Ways of Doing Genealogy.” 
12 Michel Foucault, “The Order of Discourse,” in Robert J. C. Young (ed.), Untying the Text: A Post-





This thesis started with the observation that for all of our efforts at debunking IR’s 
foundational “myth of 1919,” we still seem to take for granted one of this myth’s key 
features: namely, war as an analytical object which we can know about and take action 
towards. From this observation onwards, the thesis developed a genealogy of war as 
a problem of international politics which pursued two lines of inquiry. On the one 
hand, I inquired into war’s becoming an object of empirical knowledge and practical 
action – and, on the flipside of this becoming, into the histories of our ways and 
practices of making war thus. On the other hand, I also inquired into, reflected upon, 
and experimented with genealogy as a way of doing historical and critical research on 
our contemporary problems. My aim in this twofold inquiry was to clarify, complicate, 
and enable further critical work on our ways of knowing about and addressing the 
problem of war, and to begin to undertake this work and thus to demonstrate what is 
at stake in it. 
Or at least, this is how I announced it in the introduction. In fact, however, it was only 
in the course of working out the genealogy proposed in this thesis that I realized what 
I was working on – the problem of war and our (IR and other) ways of addressing it – 
and that I grasped what I was doing with and to genealogy. Looking back now, my 
point of departure and the paths and purposes I pursued from this point onward seem 
much more acute than they did at the outset. And so they should. For as I have argued 
throughout the thesis, genealogy is, amongst other things, a way of rendering existing 
problems further problematic.  
This argument about genealogy as problematization is one of the answers the thesis 
gives to the question I posed in the introduction: What does a genealogy of the 
problem of war in international politics do to our understanding of war and to our 
conception and practice of genealogy? Such a genealogy, this thesis argues, questions 
how we understand war, our ways of knowing about it, and our attempts at 
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problematizing it. It also questions how we conceive of and practice genealogy, how 
we look upon our own knowledge practices, and how we pursue our ways of critique. 
In the end, such a genealogy might even change how we understand ourselves, be it 
as scholars of war and peace, as transitional justice researchers, as genealogists, critical 
methodologists, or simply as students of IR.  
A genealogy of the problem of war effects these changes not through one grand 
gesture, but rather in many small ways, altering, often ever so slightly, the questions 
asked, the materials considered, the facets pointed out, the practices undertaken. 
Through this way of proceeding, the genealogy proposed in this thesis has produced 
manifold insights which, or so I hope, can be taken up to get to work on our 
contemporary problematization of war. Yet this same way of proceeding, having 
unravelled and made impossible any assumption of the problematization of war as a 
coherent object of analysis or of genealogy as a unified means of studying this object, 
now also makes the thesis challenging to conclude 
Taking up the challenge, my aim in this conclusion is to bring together the thesis’ main 
findings regarding the problem of war and regarding genealogy. First, I compile the 
insights shed by my inquiry into the histories of our ways of knowing about and 
addressing war, and I ponder what these insights, understood as working materials, 
can tell us about our contemporary ways of rendering war problematic. Secondly, I 
summarize my conceptual exploration of and practical experimentation with 
genealogy. Both parts of the conclusion also explicate the contributions this thesis 
makes to different kinds of IR (and non-IR) literatures. In the end, however, genealogy 
is a way of doing history and critique that renders problems newly intelligible without, 
however, submitting them to any “principle of closure”1 – and I therefore conclude by 
suggesting genealogy as a way of becoming curious, thus posing the question of what 
is yet to come. 
 
																																																						
1 Foucault, “What is Critique?,” 64. 
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The problematization of war in international politics: histories of the 
present as working materials  
Taking genealogies to constitute histories of how our present problems have come to 
be, the genealogy of the problem of war proposed by this thesis aims not only to 
denaturalize this problem, but also to equip us with materials with which we can get 
to work on remaking it. As Koopman has argued, Foucauldian genealogies “provide 
some of the materials people will need to remake themselves,” materials which “are 
nothing other than the historical accumulation of the diverse pratices […] that form 
the problematizations in which they continue to operate.”2 In this sense, the insights 
which this genealogy affords into the contingent historical becomings of our 
contemporary problem of war not only underline that our present could have been – 
and hence, that our future could be – otherwise. They also hope to enable a 
reassembling of our ways and practices of addressing this problem and of our selves 
as related to and, insofar as we are IR scholars, oftentimes also defined by it.  
With this understanding of genealogy in mind, this section presents the main insights 
produced by this thesis’ genealogy of the problem of war as materials to be taken up 
in getting to work on our complexly constituted present. While genealogy, as Foucault 
once put it, involves the “development of a given into a question,”3 and while it 
provides us with materials with which we can begin to work out what to do with this 
question, it does not give us an answer to the questions that it raises – it does not tell 
us what to do. Therefore, it is ultimately up to you, the reader, to decide what you will 
do with the materials offered by this thesis, and whether and how you will make use 
of them. Nonetheless, and perhaps to start you off, I do want to do three things. First, 
I provide a summary of the thesis’ main historical findings, drawing comparisons and 
indicating overarching points. Then, I use these findings to raise a number of questions 
about the problem of war and our contemporary ways of coming at it. Thirdly, I 
																																																						
2 Koopman, Genealogy as Critique, 143. 
3 Michel Foucault, “Polemics, Politics and Problematizations,” in Paul Rabinow (ed.), The Essential 
Works of Michel Foucault, Vol. 1: Ethics, Translated by Robert Hurley and Others (New York, NY: The 
New Press, 1997), 111-120, at 118. 
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suggest for consideration one point that seems to me to be particularly worthy of 
renewed critical efforts. The section ends with a brief synopsis of the contributions this 
genealogy of the problem of war makes to different literatures within and beyond IR. 
Chapter 1 commenced the genealogical work by establishing starting points for the 
analysis to come as well as by accounting for how I initially arrived at these starting 
points. To this end, the chapter’s first part turned to the example of the contemporary 
international politics of transitional justice, a politics crucially concerned with 
addressing different kinds of large-scale violences, among them war and violent 
conflict. Reviewing transitional justice’s history from the 1980s to the present day, I 
traced changes in its understanding of “truth” as well as in the instruments that it 
employs in its search for this truth. I then outlined how war is configured as a problem 
of knowledge and action at the intersection of several broader developments within 
transitional justice. I argued that transitional justice today exemplifies a particular 
knowledge-action-nexus: a conjunction in which war constitutes a problem whose 
future recurrence can be prevented by means of knowledge about its past occurrence.  
Taking up this starting point, I then analyzed four historical examples of initiatives 
that undertook to counteract war by producing knowledge about it. Studying primary 
sources collected from physical archives in Europe and the United States as well as 
from online repositories, I focused on how these initiatives formulated war into a 
practically actionable problem and how they sought – or, in one case, avoided seeking 
– empirical knowledge of it.  
Chapter 3 considered the example of a commission of inquiry into the Balkan Wars of 
1912 and 1913. Sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the so-
called Balkan Commission travelled to the different countries of the region 
immediately after the end of the Second Balkan War and, a little less than a year later, 
published its findings in a report intended to give an account of the Balkan Wars 
powerful enough, in the words of one of the commissioners, “to make another war 
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impossible.”4 Yet the report’s publication preceded the outbreak of the First World 
War by mere weeks, and the commission’s lofty goals soon fell into oblivion. In my 
analysis of the commission’s work, I focused, first, on the formulations through which 
the commissioners perceived war to be problematic. I examined how they weighed the 
prospects of success of legally problematizing war as such against those of a legal 
problematization of war-time violence, and I explored how, inspired by ideas 
stemming from recently emergent empirical disciplines such as economics and 
psychology, the commissioners proceeded to render war-time violence into an 
economic and a moral problem. Secondly, the chapter considered the commissioners’ 
purportedly “scientific” way of knowing war. Here, I showed how both the form of 
the commission of inquiry and the knowledge practices through which the 
commissioners carried out their research – their practices of looking and of writing – 
were the result of contingent and often enough accidental historical processes. I also 
considered some of the preconditions of the commission’s form, practices, and ways 
of knowing. Finally, I inquired into European modernity as the place in space and time 
from which the commissioners undertook their research into and their actions upon 
the problem of war, and I showed how this place was predicated upon a 
“civilizational” hierarchy. 
Moreover, the chapter examined the co-productive interrelationships between these 
various elements of the Balkan Commission’s problematization of war. For instance, I 
showed how the form of the commission of inquiry facilitated the structuring of the 
problem of war as one of corrigible deviance from a behavioural norm. I also discussed 
how the commissioners’ formulation of war as a legal, economic, and moral problem 
was expedited by – and, in turn, helped produce as all the more urgent – their 
“scientific” knowledge practices and way of knowing. Overall, I argued that the 
Balkan Commission’s work constituted an example of how, in the early twentieth 
																																																						
4 CEIP Archive, Vol. 121, Letter Dutton to Butler, 23 July 1913. 
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century, war was seemingly all at once becoming a this-worldly problem and an 
empirically knowable and practically actionable object.  
Finally, the chapter highlighted the constitutive exclusions on which the Balkan 
Commission’s problematization of war depended. First, I showed how the 
commissioners defended their preferred, rational formulations of war-time violence 
as a problem of corrigible deviance against alternative, dialectical formulations of war 
as an expression of class struggle or also as a driver of historical progress. Secondly, in 
their aspiration to empirical ways of knowing war, the commissioners dismissed 
metaphysical systems of thought such as philosophy or religion. Lastly, to make 
themselves into subjects capable of knowing and addressing war, the commissioners 
skillfully navigated the countervailing demands placed on them by the “civilizational” 
hierarchy between European modernity and its non-European and non-modern (or 
not yet modern) others: to be persuasive to their international audience, they cast the 
Balkan wars as both European modern and “uncivilized,” and they both worked 
closely with and kept their distance from the “peasants” whom they met on their 
journey. In this way, the Balkan Commission’s claim to epistemic and moral authority 
in questions of war and to membership in an emerging international civil society 
concerned with these questions excluded the Balkan countries’ governments and 
citizens from this authority and this society – and simultaneously excluded the 
commissioners from the various problems of war they formulated. 
Chapters 4 and 5 followed up on some of the leads that Chapter 3 provided. In Chapter 
4, I studied two groups of international jurists who, in the aftermaths of the Franco-
German War and the First World War, debated the prospects of an international 
tribunal to persecute and try offenses against the laws of war. My reading of these 
debates began by looking at war and war-time violence’s becoming problematic. 
Thereupon, I focused on the practices through which the jurists debating the Franco-
German War imagined, as one of them put it, that it would be possible to “[appreciate], 
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from the point of view of International Law, the facts of the last war,”5 as well as on 
why their colleagues convening fifty years later considered such an appreciation to be 
a dangerous undertaking. Finally, I again scrutinized “civilization” as a point of view 
from which to know about and take action against war. 
The views of these two groups of jurists on war and what could be done against it 
make for an interesting comparison with those of the Balkan Commission. Like the 
commission, both groups of jurists thought that war-time violence stood better chances 
at being problematized than war as such. In their resulting efforts at problematization, 
moreover, both groups’ assumptions about the kind of problem that war was as well 
as about their own and others’ capacity for action against war relied on somewhat 
ambiguous understandings of a presumed “civilizational” hierarchy. Finally, the 
jurists debating in the aftermath of the Franco-German War also drew on ideas 
developed by an emerging social-scientific discipline – in this case, criminology – to 
conceptualize undue war-time violence as caused by social factors and as knowable 
through statistical data. 
In other aspects, however, the legal debates which Chapter 4 studied clearly differed 
from the Balkan Commission’s problematization of war. For instance, like the Balkan 
Commission, the jurists debating the Franco-German War were familiar with the 
assumption that the intoxication of combat led to war’s reproduction – yet unlike the 
commissioners, they did not understand this intoxication as embedded within a wider 
dialectic in which war would potentially transcend itself.6 Moreover, while the Balkan 
Commission’s work might be seen as indicative of war’s becoming a this-worldly 
problem and an actionable object, the two legal debates analyzed in Chapter 4 show 
																																																						
5 Rolin-Jaequemyns, “De la Manière d’apprecier.” 
6 Cf. Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer, 83. The only trace of a dialectical formulation of the problem of war 
in the primary sources I draw on here was Rolin-Jaequemyns’ suggestion that in war, “next to the 
scourge one finds the remedy […]. The remedy consists in the reliable appeal which war makes to all 
the dormant faculties of a nation” (Rolin-Jaequemyns, “De la Manière,” 525). Yet even Rolin-
Jaequemyns did not consistently believe that war could produce something positive: “la guerre, une 
chose mauvaise en soi ne pouvant produire que des résultats plus ou moins mauvais“ (Rolin-
Jaequemyns, La guerre actuelle, 30). 
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that the commissioners’ “desacralization”7 of war was not yet taken for granted: for 
hovering on the margins of both debates, one could still find a notion of war as a fateful 
malheur. Lastly, there were notable differences between these initiatives’ respective 
ways of knowing. While the Balkan Commission sought to produce sense-based 
knowledge of war that was “empirical” in roughly today’s understanding of the term, 
to the jurists debating the Franco-German War, experiential insight into the external 
world needed to be coupled with introspection into their individual and collective 
consciences in order to become (potentially true) knowledge. Moreover, while the 
Balkan commissioners were very enthusiastic about the epistemological advantages of 
their contemporaneity to the wars they were studying, the jurists debating the Franco-
German War saw in this kind of contemporaneity a major epistemological obstacle. 
Furthermore, the jurists’ discussions also brought into view additional aspects of the 
legal problem of war which the sources pertaining to the Balkan Commission did not 
discuss in as central a manner. First, this concerned the role of the state. While the 
jurists considering this matter in the aftermath of the Franco-German War imagined 
that sovereign states would take on a beneficial and in fact quite central role within 
the “international legal institution” that they envisaged for trying breaches of the laws 
of war, their colleagues congregating fifty years later saw sovereign states as a key part 
of the problem and hence strove to construct a more fully international tribunal. 
Secondly, the primary sources under study in Chapter 4 allowed for a far more 
detailed reconstruction of how war and certain of its violences were assumed to 
constitute legal problems and, more particularly, of what it took for them to be 
criminalized. On this question, the chapter showed that the idea that breaches of the 
laws of war constituted crimes required a notion of international relations as more 
than just private relations between states. Finally, the chapter traced how the jurists 
debating the Franco-German War, influenced by criminological research, understood 
war-time crimes to be addressable by governmental action – and how this 
																																																						
7 Kévonian, “L’enquête,” 30. 
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conceptulization was positioned against the older idea of crime as a reasoned personal 
choice. 
Pursuing these matters further, Chapter 5 inquired into the post-Second World War 
criminalization of war at the IMTFE in Tokyo. Through a close reading of three 
dissents issued against the majority judgment at the IMTFE, I traced different 
approaches to the criminalization of war, thus showing that criminalization, far from 
being a readily available tool for rendering war problematic, required construction and 
argumentation and was enabled by historical preconditions. Next, I looked at 
epistemological aspects of the Tokyo tribunal, focusing in particular on the three 
dissenting judges’ criticisms of the majority’s practices for drawing inferences. Lastly, 
I scrutinized the three dissenting judges’ understandings of war and war-time violence 
as problematic, including their divergent assumptions about the nature of war’s 
wrongness, their puzzlement about the extent to which war-time violence was 
rationally controllable and hence “civilized,” and the differing temporal horizons in 
which they conceived of war and war-time violence as problematic. 
The chapter not only examined the production of criminalization as an instrument for 
problematizing war, but also discussed several of this problematization’s co-
productive aspects. It showed, for instance, how different approaches to 
criminalization saw it as, respectively, an instrument for achieving international 
progress, an instrument for securing progress that had been achieved by other means, 
and an instrument that hindered progress. The chapter also demonstrated how the 
instrument of criminalization and the knowledge-production requirements that came 
with it produced war as a particular kind of problem for which individuals rather than 
states bore responsibility, and which was inherently wrong rather than a wrong by 
human decision. Moreover, the chapter explicated the ways in which different legal 
traditions and their respective theories of truth produced the judge as an 
epistemologically capable subject. Much like a correspondence theory of truth would 
have it, some of the judges in Tokyo considered themselves to be capacitated subjects 
of truth for being detached from the object of their knowledge. Others, however, 
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regarded themselves as enabled to knowledge for being experienced in finding truth 
in the overall constellation of pieces of evidence – much like a coherence theory of 
truth would assume. Adding to the insights that Chapter 3 afforded into the co-
production of the Balkan Commission’s practices and ways of knowing and its 
preferred formulations of the problem of war, Chapter 5 thus highlighted the co-
productive interrelationships between various assumptions underlying such 
practices, ways, and formulations. 
Finally, Chapter 5 added upon the previous chapters’ findings regarding the 
constitutive exclusions of the problematization of war. For one, it showed that in 
addition to sidelining metaphysical systems of thought, emerging empirical ways of 
knowing war also worked to the exclusion of epistemologies that assumed for the 
attainability of truth to depend on the knowing subject’s situatedness within historical 
and political contexts. Next, linking what in previous chapters might still have seemed 
like separate matters, Chapter 5 highlighted how the notion of a distinction between 
rational and irrational warfare, when coupled with ideas about modern and 
“civilized” violence, made some wars and some violences problematic while 
rendering others unproblematic – and how it thereby precluded the notion that all 
wars constitute a problem. Finally, the chapter raised the question of the complicity of 
the tribunal’s ways of problematizing war with the problem of war itself. In this 
regard, while some of the Tokyo Tribunal’s blindnesses were self-imposed and 
politically convenient ones8, the dissent of the Indian judge, Radhabinod Pal, also 
bespoke a blindness of a different kind. In effect, Pal argued that international law had 
contributed to bringing about the current international order by turning a blind eye to 
the violence of the colonial wars – and that the Tokyo Tribunal’s capacity for 
problematizing war depended not least on its ability to ignore international law’s 
																																																						
8 I here have in mind the way in which the charges in Tokyo were specified and applied so to ensure 
that the Allied powers would not be at risk of having their own conduct of the Second World War put 
on trial (cf. Varadaraja, “The trials of imperialism,” 806). The same argument has also been made for 
the Nuremberg Tribunal (cf. Douglas, Genocide on Trial, 55). And it could also be made about the spirit 
in which Pal considered Japanese war crimes. 
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historical complicity in the kinds of crimes it was now judging. Yet as I also showed in 
the chapter, Pal was able to deliver this scathing critique only because he did not seek 
to devise a way out of the problematic conundrum it pointed to. 
What, then, does it mean for these insights to constitute working materials for us in 
the present? To be clear, the historical materials offered by this thesis do not tell us 
about our contemporary present in a straightforward way. For instance, they do not 
imply that because rational formulations of the problem of war supplanted dialectical 
ones, resurrecting such dialectical formulations would be the solution to our woes, or 
that because empirical ways of knowing war superseded metaphysical systems of 
thought, a return to metaphysics would hold the answers to our questions. Rather, the 
materials offered by this thesis seek to invite a questioning of our contemporary ways 
of problematizing war, an inquiry into the limits of these ways, and a push against 
and, perhaps, a reconfiguration these limits. While this is an open invitation – you 
make of these materials what you will – I still want to offer a few questions which, 
depending on how we come to the problem of war, I believe these materials might 
raise for us. 
If we come to the problem of war from an interest in transitional justice or also in 
international criminal law, then we might query, for instance, what the renewed 
criminalization of war currently underway (see Chapter 1) presupposes about war. 
What kind of wrong does this criminalization assume for war to be, and whom, if 
anyone, does it grant authority in determining that war is this kind of wrong? What 
assumptions about the international as an association – of states, of communities, of 
individuals, or of other entities – does it rely upon? What sort of international progress 
does this criminalization envision, and how does it hope to contribute to it? How does 
it see itself, and international law more generally, in relation to the problem that is 
war? Depending on the answers that we give to these questions, we might then 
wonder about the possibilities and limits which the present move towards 
criminalizing war entails for how we can imagine and work towards a future 
international – or, at some point, a present one – free from war.  
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In fact, the same question could be asked about the discipline of IR, too: how do our 
current frames for rendering war problematic enable, and how do they limit our 
imagination with regards to what a future free from war could look like and what we 
could do to work towards such a future? More generally, if we come to the problem of 
war from the discipline of IR, then the materials offered by this thesis’ analysis suggest 
myriad questions. To start with, we might ponder what happens when we think of 
war-time violence as an act that can be either rational or irrational, and when we 
conceive of such violence and of war itself as a rationally structured problem of 
deviance from a behavioural norm. What other understandings of the problem of war 
do these rational formulations exclude and, hence, preclude from being taken 
seriously, or even more fundamentally from being thought, within the discipline?  
To push the questioning of rational formulations of the problem of war even further, 
in how far are these formulations and those of our analyses of war that rely on them 
still shot through with assumptions about dichotomies of modern and non-modern, 
“civilized” and “uncivilized” violence? This is not only, but also a question of which 
wars we study at length, and which wars we devote far less attention to today. In this 
context, Bartelson has argued that once war had become “narrowly defined in 
interstate terms, whatever kind of violence that was inflicted on nonsovereign 
communities or uncivilized nations was not war properly understood.”9 To this 
observation, we can now add that the exemplary historical efforts at rendering war 
problematic which this thesis studied did little to challenge this particular constitutive 
exclusion of what did and what did not count as “war proper.” In fact, as judge Pal 
pointed out, efforts at problematizing war frequently reproduced this distinction. 
How, then, do our current attempts at problematizing war fare in this regard? 
If we wanted to embroil ourselves in further details, we could also wonder about the 
productive role that our explanations of war and its violences play for how we can 
(and, by implication, cannot) know about these items and grasp them as problematic. 
																																																						
9 Bartelson, War in International Thought, 175. 
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Is there a sense, for instance, in which our empirical inquiries into the economic, social, 
psychological, and other causes and consequences of war continue to make war and 
its violences themselves unknowable and unwriteable? What was gained when war, 
gradually and haphazardly, became an object of analysis for the emergent empirical 
social sciences – and what, in turn, is lost when war is a fully-fledged research object 
of these sciences today?  
The historical materials offered by this genealogy also raise questions about our ways 
and practices of knowing war. Most overtly, when we collect data, whether by “going 
there” or by looking at war from afar, when we think about these data, perhaps 
conjecturing by means of hypotheses, when we write about war, whether reports, 
policy briefs, journal articles, or PhD theses – what, in fact, are we doing? How do the 
practices through which we seek to know war bolster our ways of problematizing war? 
How do we produce ourselves as epistemologically capable subjects vis-à-vis war – 
and on what exclusions do these claims to epistemic authority in questions of war rest?  
In this vein, we might also use the materials provided by this thesis to wonder about 
how our ways of problematizing war help constitute ourselves. Insofar as the 
assumption that the problem of war is foundational for the discipline of IR helps secure 
our scholarly and disciplinary sense of self, asking how exactly how war has been 
made an epistemic and actionable object has the potential to rupture this self-
understanding of ours. Thereby, it might create an opening in which the work that this 
thesis proposes for us to undertake on our contemporary problematizations of war 
comes to seem all the more more urgent. 
Besides raising a small plethora of questions about our contemporary 
problematizations of war, I also want to point to a constitutive exclusion of these 
contemporary problematizations which seems to me to be a particularly vexing one. 
In all of the examples which this thesis has studied, problematizations of war that were 
upheld and furthered by subjects implicated in these problematizations were 
supplanted by problematizations that assumed for the problematizing subjects to be 
positioned to the outside of the problem. When rationally structured formulations of 
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the problem of war replaced dialectically structured ones, when empirical ways of 
knowing war supplanted metaphysical and introspective ways, when commissioners 
and judges deemed themselves capable of dealing with war by virtue of being modern 
and “civilized” rather than seeing war as a problem of their modernity and 
“civilization” – in all of these instances, war became a problem to be known about and 
acted upon from the outside. 
Today, in the discipline of IR as in the international politics of problematizing war, a 
similar structuring of the problem of war often seems to be at work. To be sure, the 
analogy is an indirect one: for the most part, we no longer base our structuring of the 
problem of war on ambiguous notions of a “civilizational” hierarchy10, and 
metaphysical systems of thought today do not compete with empirical ways of 
knowing in the same way in which they did roughly a century ago. However, as we 
theorize and measure, observe and describe, judge and run truth-seeking initiatives 
about war, we oftentimes tend to do so from a position located to the outside of the 
problem that we are seeking to deal with. Like the Balkan Commission, the jurists 
debating the Franco-German War, and the judges at the IMTFE, we render war and its 
violences problems of deviance which are diagnosable and corrigible from the outside. 
Indeed, our capacity for taking meaningful epistemological, ethical, and political 
action on the problem of war often relies on and reproduces our being external to this 
problem. 
This particular limit of our contemporary problematizations of war is problematic for 
at least two reasons. On the one hand, the assumption that meaningful action towards 
war requires the acting subject to not be part of the problem of war denies a great 
number of people any real agency towards this problem. On the other hand, it also 
inhibits those of us who regard ourselves as capable of addressing war from inquiring 
into how we might be implicated in the problem that war constitutes. This poses a 
																																																						
10 Not least because as a purpose of progressive international politics, “civilization” has arguably by 
now been replaced by “human rights” (cf. Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History 
(Harvard, MA: Hardvard University Press, 2010), at 176ff.).  
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conundrum that is not easily resolved: if we take seriously this thesis’ contention that 
many of our contemporary ways of problematizing war rely on our being external to 
the problem of war, then we lack the analytical means – the theories, the concepts, the 
practices – to grasp just how we might be part of the problem. 
Take, for instance, just war theory. Zehfuss has argued that just war theory conceives 
of war as arriving “from what is imagined as the outside” and in consequence cannot 
begin to to make sense of our responsibility for war.11 Yet as the genealogy developed 
in this thesis suggests, this is not just about how we theorize war, but also about how 
we theorize ourselves. As the history of how we came to imagine war as arriving from 
the outside turns out to (also) be a history of how we came to imagine ourselves as 
being external to and therefore capable of addressing the problem of war, just war 
theory’s inability to inquire into our responsibility for war might be even more difficult 
to alleviate than Zehfuss assumes.  
However, I would wager that in this, just war theory is probably only but one 
particular example of a tendency characteristic of many of our IR frames of war. While 
a broader survey of IR’s ways of problematizing war is beyond the scope of this thesis 
(though perhaps such a survey might be one of the next steps that should follow from 
it), I hope that the thesis has nonetheless brought forward an argument urging us to 
get to work on the concepts and practices through which we seek to know war, and 
that it has offered plentiful historical materials which we could use to commence this 
work. As but two particular points of departure for this future work, this thesis would 
suggest that we ought to seek out ways of knowing war that base themselves on and 
champion the knowing subject’s situatedness within historical and political contexts 
(and hence, that try to come to terms with their historical complicity in the problem of 
war), as well as ways of knowing war that place themselves within the same temporal 
and spatial horizons as their object of study (and hence, that might make of war a 
trans-temporal or trans-spatial problem). 
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To conclude this section, I want to offer a brief recapitulation of the contributions that 
this thesis’ genealogy of the problem of makes to a number of literatures. First, to IR 
research which is already historically and/or critically interested in war as an object of 
thought and action, the thesis contributes not only by focusing on a period of time that 
has so far received relatively little analytical attention, but also by scrutinizing what 
this research often takes as its unspoken point of departure: namely, the assumption 
that war is problematic. While this thesis in fact shares this assumption, it argues that 
precisely to take seriously that war constitutes a problem, we ought to pay heed to the 
ways in which we render it thus. Subjecting these ways to an historical and critical 
examination can expose them as contingent and malleable and can thereby render 
them changeable. Thus, this thesis’ genealogy of the problem of war in international 
politics contributes to the declared aim of this strand of literature to “[bring] war 
back,” as Bartelson puts it, “within the scope of human volition and responsibility.”12  
However, whereas Ceadel, Bartelson, and Zehfuss have fixated their gazes on specific 
theoretical views of war, I have tackled this same task by taking a more open look at 
different understandings of war as well as at our forms, practices, and ways of 
knowing war – and I have hence arrived at a somewhat different conclusion. Whereas, 
for instance, Bartelson’s history of the ontogenetic view of war ends with a call for us 
“as social scientists” to “come up with new ways of understanding the emergence of 
political order” that recognize, yet do not rely on this particular view of war13, this 
thesis concludes by urging us to reconsider our ways of making war actionable – an 
undertaking which may certainly include remaking our ways of understanding order-
making, but which is equally certainly not limited to this point. Ultimately, my thesis 
thus carves out a different way of conducting historical and critical analyses of “war” 
in and for IR.  
Moreover, the thesis also took inspiration from historical and social-theoretical 
research on the problematization of war and war-time violence. To these lines of 
																																																						
12 Bartelson, War in International Thought, 3. 
13 Ibid., 201. 
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research, the thesis does not claim to have added new insights – rather, it has translated 
their advice into action and, or so I hope, provided the ground for engaging them in 
new kinds of conversations. On the one hand, social-theoretical works had suggested 
European modernity as the particular context in which the thesis would have to make 
sense of the problem of war. Drawing on Shilliam’s conceptualization of the 
temporally and spatially delineated “European-modern condition,”14 I have pointed 
out the specific ways in which, in the examples under study, European modernity 
served as a position in time and space from which it became possible to know about 
and take action towards war, and how, in turn, this position was made possible by the 
exclusion of non-European and non-modern subjects from this capacity for 
meaningful and competent action. 
On the other hand, with regards to engaging various literatures from within and 
beyond IR in renewed conversation about the problem of war, this thesis proposes that 
a focus on war’s becoming problematic can provide a ground on which to hold an 
exchange between different disciplinary perspectives. Rather than a plea for 
interdisciplinary research on “war,” this is a call for research to inquire into how 
different academic disciplines constitute themselves as being in charge of ameliorating 
the problem of war, and to question how these disciplinary purposes structure and 
limit our possibilities of thought and action. In this context, a focus on the 
problematization of war can, I want to suggest, provide an opening for conversations 
which are not structured around and hence confined by disciplinary boundaries and 
concerns. 
Overall, this thesis’ genealogy of the problem of war has argued that the ways in which 
war has been problematized curb our analytical and political imaginations. They 
delimit who can take action against the problem of war and how, and they 
circumscribe what ways towards a future free from war we can envision. At the same 
time, however, the genealogy developed in this thesis also provides us with materials 
																																																						
14 Shilliam, “Decolonising the Grounds.” 
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that we can use to try and change this state of affairs. My hope is that insight into the 
multiple, contingent, and often accidental histories of our ways of problematizing war 
as well as into the co-productive relationships between these ways’ different elements 
and into their constitutive exclusions will provoke us to no longer take for granted our 
contemporary problematizations of war, but to reflect on our present ways and to 
work towards making these ways otherwise.  
 
Against methods: conceptualizing and practicing genealogy as critique 
Taking to heart Foucault’s quip that genealogy ought to work out itself in its acts of 
cognition15, in this thesis’ second main line of inquiry, I pondered, undid, and redid 
genealogy as a way of doing research. To start off this work, the second main part of 
Chapter 1 examined the current state of genealogy in IR. It found that many recently 
published genealogical studies of international politics conceive of and practice 
genealogy as a method: in a two-step procedure, they first specify genealogy to then 
use it as a research instrument. Yet as this procedure makes of genealogy a tool to be 
wielded onto the world which is not itself a part of the world that it studies, it risks 
exempting genealogy’s epistemic practices from the purview of the historical and 
critical insights they produce. In this, recent genealogical research in IR stands in 
contrast to a first generation of IR genealogies which, as exemplified by the works of 
James Der Derian and Jens Bartelson, had found conceptual and practical ways of 
reflexively bringing their own conduct within the scope of their histories and critiques. 
This contrast between early and more recent genealogical works in IR suggested the 
conception and practice of genealogy as method to constitute a second problem for the 
thesis to work on. 
Chapter 2 began to set about the thus-defined task. In the chapter, I reported on and 
reflected upon what I suggested to think of as the different actions my thinking had 
taken en route to being.16 To conceive of and practice genealogy as part of the world 
																																																						
15 Cf. Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 90. 
16 Hawkesworth, “Contending Conceptions of Science and Politics.” 
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that it studies, the chapter proposed genealogy as history/critique, problematization, 
and critical praxis. To this end, I first considered Foucauldian genealogy in contrast to 
Foucault’s archaeologies and to Nietzsche’s genealogies. Through this reading, I 
cultivated an appreciation of genealogy as a kind of history that, working with an at 
least dual research focus, studies historical processes of emergence, and moreover as 
a kind of critique that, working with a considerable amount of primary sources, 
inquires into the becoming of our contemporary ways of being, knowing, and doing 
in order to render these ways changeable. I highlighted that genealogy as 
history/critique is as principally contingent and practically in flux as the objects that it 
studies. Finally, I argued that genealogy as history/critique can show not only that 
what we take for granted has a history, but also how it is historical – and that these 
insights into the historical processes of becoming of our present ways constitute 
working materials that can crucially enable a critique of our present conditions.  
Secondly, I discussed the concepts through which I developed the genealogy proposed 
in this thesis as a thus understood history/critique. Most centrally, I drew on 
Koopman’s reading of Foucault to suggest the notion of “problematization” to refer to 
the processual, multiple, and dispersed becoming of a problem – and thereby both to 
genealogy’s research objects and to genealogy itself.17 As problematization, genealogy 
seeks to render existing problems further problematic, and it thus attempts to make 
itself part of the processes that it studies. In this way, the concept of problematization 
can serve to reflexively insert genealogy into the histories and critiques it pursues. In 
addition, I also discussed a number of further key concepts – including those of 
“practice,” “co-production,” and “critical praxis” – which simultaneously arose from 
the interplay between primary sources, secondary literatures, and problems to be 
worked on and informed my research of this interplay.  
Thirdly, I explained how the genealogy developed in this thesis would attempt to 
realize a critical praxis. I discussed the key decisions that I took in the course of 
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developing my historical analysis, including decisions about the historical period and 
the empirical examples to focus on, the kinds of primary sources to use, and my 
approach to and practices for collecting and analyzing these sources. I also previewed 
how, in the chapters to follow, I was going to use the historical analyses to experiment 
with my own knowledge practices so to conduct genealogy as, in Foucault’s words, “a 
historico-practical test of the limits we may go beyond, and thus a work carried out by 
ourselves upon ourselves.”18 
In the following three chapters, I got to work not only on the primary sources I had 
gathered from various archives, but also on some of my own knowledge practices. The 
particular practice of thinking on which I focused in Chapter 3 – the formulation of 
working hypotheses – was one which had played a central role in my prior studies. By 
contrast, the epistemic practices with which I experimented in Chapters 4 and 5 – 
practices of writing and practices of looking – were suggested by the historical analysis 
presented in Chapter 3. To further contemplate and explicate these experimentations, 
each of the three historical chapters was followed by a brief reflective vignette.  
There are a number of points which all of these practical experimentations shared in 
common. First, they all highlighted that knowledge practices are political insofar as 
they help produce particular realities. For instance, I argued that many of our most 
common practices of thinking, writing, and looking produce us as knowledgeable 
subjects who are distinct and distanced from the objects of our knowledge. Secondly, 
I suggested that insofar as knowledge practices are historical, they are in fact also 
changeable. Therefore, the outcome of our genealogical work does not need not be, 
pace Hamilton, that we passively “accept […] that this moment will change.”19 Rather, 
if we find fault with our practices and the realities they help produce, then we can use 
the materials provided by genealogy to try and change these practices and these 
realities. Thirdly, my experimentation with knowledge practices attempted such a 
genealogically informed change of practice. Against hypotheses that put into practice 
																																																						
18 Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?,” 47. 
19 Hamilton, “Genealogy of Metatheory,” 161. 
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the Cartesian split between the subject and the object of knowledge, against analytical 
storylines that suggest an omniscient scientific narrator describing “a reality that lies 
outside them,”20 and against an observant gaze that depends on the possibility of a 
stable and secure perspective, I attempted to hone practices of thinking, of writing, 
and of looking that would not likewise reproduce me as a knowledgeable subject 
located in a stable position to the outside of the problems I study. Overall, by bringing 
thought to bear on itself in practice, the experimentations and the reflective vignettes 
were meant to extend an invitation: to question the practices through which we seek 
knowledge of the world, and to try and change these practices so that they become 
conscious of their being a part of this world. This, then, is what the genealogy of the 
problem of war proposed by this thesis did to our conception and practice of 
genealogy: it undid genealogy as method, and it remade genealogy into 
history/critique, problematization, and critical praxis.  
This conception and praxis of genealogy, I argue, brings genealogy’s epistemic 
practices within the scope of its historical and critical insights. While I do not mean to 
imply for the conduct of genealogy that I have pursued in this thesis to constitute the 
only way in which this could be achieved, I want to maintain that this genealogical 
conduct has constituted an ongoing and open process which conceived of itself as part 
of the processes that it studied, and which to this end laid open its procedures and 
examined their contingencies, limits, and blind spots. Against the tendency of 
genealogy as method to situate its own epistemic practices beyond the purview of 
critique, the genealogy I developed in this thesis thus actively sought to insert itself 
into the histories, the politics, and the world that it analyzes. 
Notably, this thesis did all this to our conception and practice of genealogy through 
an inquiry into war’s becoming an object of knowledge and action. It was for this 
reason that I proposed the concept of “problematization”: for it allowed me to avoid, 
as Chapter 2 pointed out, basing my analysis on an ontology of war and violence, 
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forces and struggles. Moreover, following up on the argument that a genealogy of the 
historical emergence of our contemporary problems can offer us empirical materials 
for getting to work on these problems, I went to work on one the limits of the 
contemporary problematization of war. As my historical analyses showed the 
manifold ways in which commissioners and judges were epistemically and ethically 
capable subjects by virtue of being situated outside of the problem of war, in my 
genealogical practice I sought out ways of knowing which would, even if provisionally 
and perhaps never entirely successfully, draw the knowing subject back within the 
problems they were studying. In sum, then, in my work on genealogy, I not only tried 
to undo it as method and redo it as history/critique, problematization, and critical 
praxis, but I also attempted to practically respond to one of the problems raised by the 
genealogical analysis that was the project’s other main line of inquiry. 
Through this work on genealogy, the thesis seeks to partake in emergent IR 
discussions about the political life and critical potential of methods. Instead of treating 
methods as given, innocent, or ready-made tools to be wielded onto the world in the 
pursuit of knowledge, authors writing from perspectives such as pragmatism, critical 
security studies, and assemblage thinking have proposed different ways of rendering 
visible and workable methods as part of the world that we seek knowledge of. Yet 
while these proposals all mention “historical contingency” as one of the ways in which 
methods form part of the world, few of them have pursued this matter further. 
Moreover, though the general argument about reflexivity as a kind of critique is a 
familiar one21, existing proposals for a critical take on methods in IR seem to so far 
have given only a partial consideration to the critical leverage that a reflexive “turning 
back” of knowledge onto itself might provide. While pragmatism has formulated 
reflexivity as a marker of distinction elevating (social) scientific knowledge claims 
above those made by other ways of knowing, assemblage thinking and critical security 
studies have not yet put forth an anti-hierarchical alternative to this stance on 
reflexivity. In light of this state of discussion, my thesis contributes to IR’s 
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understanding of methods and critique in two ways: by putting forth history and 
reflexivity as additional aspects of the politicality and criticality of methods, and by 
developing a genealogical analysis that exemplifies what a historical and reflexive take 
on methods and critique could come to in practice.  
In Chapter 2, I promised to sketch, in the thesis’ conclusion, a few lines of conversation 
which might be pursued between the genealogical approach to critical methods 
developed in this thesis and the perspectives offered by pragmatism, critical security 
studies, and assemblage thinking. Between pragmatism and genealogy, one 
particularly necessary exchange would center on the viability of assuming (social) 
science as a privileged way of knowing. Pointing out the historicity of all ways of 
knowing, genealogy argues against attributing a principal epistemological advantage 
to any such way in particular. Therefore, unlike pragmatism’s double or triple 
hermeneutics, genealogy turns knowledge back on itself not in order to lift itself above 
other ways of knowing, but rather uses its historical insights to practically work on 
itself and its own limitations. Meanwhile, a conversation between critical security 
studies, assemblage thinking, and genealogy could attend to the differing meta-
theoretical emphases that these approaches espouse. Whereas critical security studies 
and assemblage thinking involve assumptions about the emergent, generative, and 
entangled ontology of the social and material world, genealogy as practiced in this 
thesis tries to avoid basing itself on ontological suppositions.22 What implications do 
their respective emphases on ontology and epistemology have for the critique of 
methods that these different approaches aspire to, for instance for their ethos and 
critical praxis? 
While a comprehensive answer to this question is beyond the scope of this thesis, the 
question points to another, more general topic of conversation between pragmatism, 
critical security studies, assemblage thinking, and genealogy: insofar as these 
approaches offer different ways of rendering supposedly “ready-made” methods part 
																																																						
22 In this, it actually finds itself in broad agreement with pragmatism (cf. Friedrichs, Kratochwil, “On 
Acting and Knowing,” 705).  
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of the world, where exactly do their respective moves for doing so assume for the 
political quality and critical potential of methods to lie? Pragmatism’s politics of 
methods is a pluralist one23: appraising “science as a social activity,”24 pragmatism 
supports an ideal of “research as the consensus-oriented practice of discursive 
communities”25 whose “purpose” lies in the production of knowledge “to enable 
orientation in the social world.”26 In turn, the critical potential of pragmatist methods 
such as abduction consists in their enabling of prudent judgment. Instead of 
succumbing to “radical doubt” (an endeavour that is, for pragmatism, of an 
“unproductive nature”27), a pragmatist “scientific practice” retains a scholar’s capacity 
for critical judgment and strives to amount to a “quasi-judicial procedure.”28  
For critical security studies as well as for assemblage thinking, matters stand rather 
differently. Aradau and Huysmans, for instance, “emphasize the effects methods 
have”29: they understand methods as entangled in conflictual relations of power, as 
involved in the making and breaking of worlds, and as rendering some worlds more 
visible and others less so. On this view of the politics of methods, “the question of 
methods necessarily is a question of conflicting, competing, diverse ‘conceptions’ of 
worlds.”30 Therefore, methods’ critical potentiality comes to depend on our ability to 
recognize, judge, and practically interrupt their world-making effects. An example of 
this is provided by assemblage thinking, which takes issue with and seeks to interrupt 
how standard IR methods help to stabilize an anthropocentrist order of things. Instead, 
by enacting methods as assemblages, it makes them part of a “set of life-worlds in 
which agency circulates between humans and non-humans”31 and thereby 
																																																						
23 Hawkesworth, “Contending Conceptions of Science and Politics,” 43ff. 
24 Friedrichs, Kratochwil, “On Acting and Knowing,” 712. 
25 Ibid., 711.  
26 Ibid., 706. 
27 Ibid., 711. 
28 Ibid., 712. 
29 Aradau, Huysmans, “Critical methods in IR,” 605.  
30 Ibid., 607. 
31 Lisle, “Energizing,” 68. 
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“[politicizes] how things and people are entangled.”32 
For genealogy, the politicality of methods and their critical potential lie yet elsewhere. 
Casting methods in a historical light, genealogy emphasizes how their contingent 
historical emergence enables and constrains our contemporary ways and practices of 
knowing. This genealogical view of the politics of methods is clearly at variance with 
the pragmatist notion of method as a collective decision based on a principle of 
consensus. It is somewhat more aligned with the conflictual understanding of politics 
espoused by critical security studies’ take on methods – yet it avoids making this a 
claim about the nature of politics. Moreover, genealogy focuses not (only) on methods’ 
world-making effects, but also considers ways and practices of knowing as part of co-
productive relationships. From this follows an understanding of critique that is both 
interruptive and (re-)constructive: analyzing the historical emergence of our 
contemporary ways and practices of knowing, genealogy disturbs the assumption that 
these ways and practices were given tools, and it provides us with empirical materials 
to get to work on our ways, our practices, and our selves. Unlike pragmatism, a 
genealogical take on methods and critique thus calls into question our capacity for 
judgment and embraces rather than shuns doubt. Unlike critical security studies and 
assemblage thinking, genealogy experiments not with the ways in which methods are 
assembled with other elements of our analyses, but with the practices of which 
methods are comprised. In this way, it not only interrupts our own practices and ways 
of knowing (and thereby the subjects, objects, and worlds that these help produce), but 
also begins the work of critically remaking these practices and ways. 
 
A sense of curiosity 
Genealogy, for Foucault, was “a process of making [something] intelligible but with 
the clear understanding that this does not function according to any principle of 
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closure.”33 By necessity as by design, then, there is a sense in which a genealogical 
project can have no conclusion, neither logically nor narratively. Genealogy poses 
more questions than it answers. It opens up new vistas, lines of thought, and ways of 
action. It renders thinkable what was previously unthinkable, questionable what was 
previously unquestionable, and it makes existing problems more problematic.  
Perhaps more than anything else, therefore, what I hope the reader might take away 
from this thesis is a renewed sense of curiosity. The thesis has tried to do several things 
at once. Most overtly, it has conducted an historical and critical inquiry into the 
problem of war as well as carried out an examination of and experimentation with 
genealogy. Perhaps somewhat less conspicuously, however, the thesis has also been 
an attempt at wondering about and subverting a will to knowledge. It has been a 
process of becoming of curious and of sustaining an evolving and ever-questioning 
curiosity. Here and there throughout the thesis, I have tried to render this process 
visible, to convey a sense of its joys and elations and of its difficulties and frustrations. 
Whatever the will to knowledge with which you arrived to the thesis – a preoccupation 
with the problem of war, perhaps, or a concern with genealogy or with critical 
methods more generally, or maybe an interest in international politics or in the 
discipline of IR – I hope that the thesis has affected this will in some way, and that it 
may have begun to instill in it a new kind of curiosity. 
“[W]hat is philosophy today,” Foucault once asked, “if it is not the critical work that 
thought brings to bear on itself? In what does it consist, if not in the endeavour to know 
how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently, instead of legitimating 
what is already known?”34 I do not think of this thesis as a piece of philosophy, but 
otherwise, Foucault’s rhetorical question captures the thesis’ spirit very well. Indeed, 
the thesis’ genealogy of the problem of war in international politics has been an 
endeavour to become curious about our possibilities for thinking and doing 
differently. In this sense, what I first and foremost hope for the thesis to have achieved 
																																																						
33 Foucault, “What is Critique?,” 64. 
34 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, 8f. 
 
	 341 
is to have conveyed a sense of the difficult, urgent, and productive work on our 
practices, our ways, and our selves that is required if we want to critically question 







Growing up in West Germany in the 1980s and 1990s, war was a distant problem. It 
was what, an incredibly long time ago, had caused the scar on my grandfather’s thigh. 
It was why once, when I was still in kindergarten, all the carnival processions were 
cancelled. Later, when I was in primary school, it was what brought refugees to our 
town. It was on television sometimes, just before the show that my friends and I all 
watched on Saturday evenings. Later still, and rather suddenly, it was also something 
that the German army participated in again. But it was nonetheless far away. 
A year and a half before the very hot summer day on which I tried to prove my ability 
to study political science, my friends and I protested against the imminent invasion of 
Iraq. Our protests did not stop the US-led “Coalition of the Willing.” And yet, joining 
the anti-war march in our small hometown made us, for the first time, participants in 
the international politics of problematizing war. 
When I was sitting the exam to show that I was studierfähig, I did not know that there 
was, in Germany at least, a sub-discipline of political science called International 
Relations, nor that this (sub-) discipline preoccupied itself with the study of war. But I 
passed the exam, went on to study politics, and specialized in IR. I graduated with a 
master’s in peace and conflict studies and worked in applied peace research for a 
while. My colleagues and I conducted fieldwork in post-independence South Sudan: 
interviewed people, collected other data, drew conclusions, and wrote a report.1 Then, 
I decided to pursue a PhD. 
Now, quite a few years later, the war in Iraq is still (or again) ongoing; to it, other wars 
have been added. Meanwhile, the debate in Germany is about weapons exports to 
Saudi-Arabia and about whether German troops should be sent to Syria. Curiously 
																																																						
1 Elke Grawert, Christine Andrä, Oil Investment and Conflict in Upper Nile State, South Sudan (Bonn, 
Germany: BICC, 2013). 
 
	 343 
enough, I am finding myself back in Tübingen these days. It is all very familiar, yet at 
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